

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

A FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING SOCIAL
COHESION WITH SYRIANS IN TURKEY

Prof. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN

SB
2019



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July -2020




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M. MURAT ERDOĞAN
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A FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING SOCIAL COHESION WITH
SYRIANS IN TURKEY

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To Rya...

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Abbreviations

AFAD	: Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, Turkish Ministry of Interior
DGMM	: Directorate General of Migration Management, Turkish Ministry of Interior
DTM	: Displacement Tracking Matrix
ECHO	: European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ECHR	: European Court of Human Rights
ESSN	: Emergency Social Safety Net
EU	: European Union
FGD	: Focus Group Discussions
FRIT	: Facility for Refugees in Turkey
HUGO	: Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center
IOM	: International Organization for Migration
IS	: Islamic State
LFIP	: Law on Foreigners and International Protection
MEB	: Turkish Ministry of National Education (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı)
MoNE	: Turkish Ministry of National Education
MPM	: Migrants' Presence Monitoring Programme
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
SB	: Syrians Barometer
SUY	: Social Cohesion Assistance (Sosyal Uyum Yardımı)
ŞEY	: Conditional Education Support (Şartlı Eğitim Yardımı)
TAGU	: Turkish German University Migration and Integration Research Center
TEC	: Temporary Education Center
TL	: Turkish Lira (currency)
TNSA	: Turkey Population and Health Research, Hacettepe University Population Studies Institute
TÜİK	: Turkish Statistical Institute
UN	: United Nations
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

SB-2019-TABLE 1: A Chronological Review of Recent Developments Concerning the Syrians in Turkey and International Protection

2011

March 2011; Beginning of anti-administration demonstrations in Syria
2011; Number of individuals under international protection and/or those applied for international protection in Turkey; 58.018
15 March 2011; Beginning of pro-democracy, anti-administration demonstrations in Deraa, Syria
29 April 2011; Arrival of the first Syrian group of 252 individuals in Turkey
April 2011; 252 (Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years)
26 April 2011; Syrian Army enters Deraa, where the first demonstrations started
October 2011; "Temporary Protection Status" started to be given to Syrians

2012

January 2012; 14.237 (Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years)
30 May 2012; Turkey expels all Syrian diplomats in Ankara
30 June 2012; UN-backed Geneva Talks take place for the first time under the initiative of Syrian Action Group

2013

January 2013; 224.655 (Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years)
11 April 2013; Law on Foreigners and International Protection enters into effect
14 November 2013; The Regulation on the Establishment, Missions and Working of the Provincial Organization of Directorate General of Migration Management is adopted
16 December 2013; A Readmission Agreement is signed between Turkey and the European Union concerning the irregular migrants

2014

January 2014; 1.519.286 (Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years)
22 January 2014; Second Round of Geneva Talks commences
11 April 2014; Directorate General of Migration Management becomes active
22 April 2014; The Regulation on the Establishment, Management, Administration and Auditing of the Reception and Accommodation Centers and Repatriation Centers is adopted
11 June 2014; IS takes control of Turkey's Consulate General in Mosul, Iraq
28 June 2014; IS declares the establishment of an Islamic State and Caliphate
10 August 2014; R. T. Erdoğan is elected President of the Republic of Turkey
September 2014; Establishment of the Provincial Organization of Directorate General of Migration Management starts
22 October 2014; The Regulation on Temporary Protection is adopted
November 2014; IS attack on Kobane starts

2015

January 2015; 2.503.549 (Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years)
18 April 2015; The works and proceedings previously conducted by the Directorate General of Security's Section for Foreigners are transferred to Provincial Migration Management Units
September 2015; Aylan Kurdi dies trying to escape through the Mediterranean

2016

January 2016; 2.834.441 (Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years)
January 2016; The Free Visa Agreement between Turkey and Syria is terminated
25 January 2016; Third Round of Geneva Talks commences
March 2016; EU-Turkey Statement on Refugees is signed
17 March 2016; Regulation on Fight Against Human Trafficking and Protection of Victims is adopted
17 March 2016; Regulation concerning the Implementation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection is adopted
18 March 2016; EU-Turkey Summit and Statement
26 May 2016; Regulation on the Work Permits of Foreigners Under Temporary Protection is adopted
01 April 2016; EU-Turkey Summit and Statement
August 2016; Operation Euphrates Shield commences
January 2016; The process of updating and completing the missing bits of the information that was collected from Syrians during their registration by the Police or Provincial Migration Management Directorates commences

2017

January 2017; 3.426.786 (Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years)
09 January 2017; The Project of Data Verification of Syrians under Temporary Protection officially begin
23-24 January 2017; The First Round of Astana Talks takes place under the initiative of Turkey and Russia

2018

January 2018; 3.623.192 (Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years)
January 2018; Operation Olive Branch commences
March 2018; The administration of the Camps is transferred from AFAD to DGMM
June 2018; The Construction of the Wall on Turkey-Syria border is completed
June 2018; Turkey moves to an Executive Presidential System

2019

January 2019; 3.628.120 (Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years)
22 July 2019; Istanbul Governorate decides to expel from the city Syrians who are not registered or who are registered within different provinces
13 December 2019; 3.698.133 (Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years)
31 December 2019; 3.576.370 (Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years)

Foreword

The number, complexity and protracted nature of today's conflicts have resulted in forced displacement at an unprecedented level. Almost 80 million people are now uprooted around the world as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence or human rights violations. The number of people fleeing war, persecution and conflict either within the borders of their country of origin or across international borders reached close to 80 million in 2019. This means, that forced displacement is now affecting more than one per cent of humanity – 1 in every 97 people. While most of those forcibly displaced are internally displaced persons, some 30 million are refugees, who crossed international borders in search of safety and protection.

Syrians make up the world's largest refugee population. Half of the pre-war population of Syria has been affected by displacement, and more than 5.5 million Syrians had to seek safety in neighbouring countries. Located in a geography where large migration and refugee movements throughout history have taken place, Turkey is home to the largest refugee population in the world, with close to 4 million refugees and asylum-seekers, some 3.6 million of whom are Syrians under temporary protection.

Turkey has a comprehensive legal framework for international and temporary protection: The Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the Temporary Protection Regulation, which provide the basis for the legal stay, the registration and international protection procedures, and access to rights and services by persons in need of international protection. The public system and national institutions have expanded their services to enable access of persons seeking international protection in Turkey to health care, education and social services and to provide for opportunities for self-reliance.

In this context, the Syrian Barometer 2019 aims at analyzing social perceptions of Turkish citizens and Syrians through the lenses of their interactions, relationships and experiences which have been shaped and evolved over the years of living together. The study provides a comprehensive assessment on a broad range of topics, looks into the aspirations as expressed by individuals and brings forward recommendations, based on the analysis of opinions and evidence expressed by persons who participated in the study by means of the focus group discussions and surveys.

UNHCR Turkey hopes that the Syrian Barometer 2019 provides a valuable reference for many who are interested to work in this field and would like to express sincere thanks to Professor M. Murat Erdogan and his team for their commitment and work with the study. Our thanks also go to the Academic Board for their contribution to the Syrian Barometer 2019.

Katharina Lumpp
UNHCR Representative

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When the first group of 252 Syrian asylum-seekers arrived in Turkey on 29 April 2011, nobody had expected the crisis to have continued this long and the number of refugees to have increased this much. No one had probably predicted that this date would become such a significant symbolic turning point for Turkey's history. In the face of changing dynamics of the process, which had been even more significant than the increasing numbers on strengthening the tendencies of Syrians to remain permanently in Turkey, I have started conducting studies on various aspects of this issue since 2013, firstly as part of Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center (HUGO) and then of Turkish German University Migration and Integration Research Center (TAGU), of which I am the founding director. My studies usually have been based on fieldwork. When the first product of this research was published by HUGO in 2014 under the title of "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration", the number of Syrians in Turkey was 1.6 million. In a relatively early phase, this study argued that a large part of the Syrians would remain in Turkey permanently and that serious groundwork was needed for integration, having emphasized the significance of "social acceptance" in this context. This was followed by studies focusing on the impact of Syrians on the business world in 2015, Syrian children living in camps in 2016; and in 2017, Syrians and media, and Syrians and municipalities in process management. In this framework, "Syrians Barometer: a framework for achieving social cohesion" was published in 2017 as the most comprehensive academic research in the field. Syrians Barometer developed a model through which social realities and perceptions are encountered to build a peaceful future for the Turkish society as well as the Syrians. This model envisioned to work in a "barometer" mentality whereby regularly repeated studies with a carefully crafted questionnaire could follow the changing attitudes and tendencies in response to major developments.

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This study is a humble attempt to contribute to building a peaceful future for the **Turkish society**, who has been the real hero during this challenging process, and an honorable life for everyone in the country. Therefore, my last and most important thanks go to the Turkish society, who -despite their doubts and concerns - welcomed over 4 million refugees with a remarkable degree of goodwill.

M. Murat Erdoğan



Photo: M. Murat Erdoğan

Introduction

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

1

As the anti-administration demonstrations that started in March 2011 spiraled out of control and turned into a civil war encompassing all of Syria, the tragedy surrounding the plight of Syrians who had to escape from their countries to save their lives and sought asylum in neighboring countries has been continuing over 9 years. The number of Syrians who escaped out of the country, which had a national population of 22.5 million in 2011, has surpassed 6.6 million. Additionally, there is more than 6.1 million displaced people within Syria.¹ More than 80% of Syrian refugees live in neighboring countries particularly including Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Around 15% of Syrian refugees live in European countries, particularly including Germany and Sweden. As of April 2020, it is still very difficult to be able to predict how the situation in Syria will unfold with any degree of certainty. However, significant changes can be observed in Syrians' possibility of motivation and tendency to return, both due to the current conditions in Syria and the fact that they have been establishing new lives for themselves in their countries of residence. This, in turn, demonstrates the necessity of undertaking serious planning and adopting large-scale policies in social, economic, political and security-related fields for the countries hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees, particularly including Turkey.

The High Representative of UNHCR Filippo Grandi describes what is happening in Syria as "the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time".² Sharing 911 km of land borders with Syria, one of the most significantly affected actors from this immense crisis is Turkey. The first mass movement of Syrians into Turkey took place with the arrival of a group of 252 individuals through the Cilvegözü border gate in Hatay, following which the mass movement of Syrian refugees into the country has continued until 2017 thanks to the "open door policy" implemented by Turkey.³ According to the official figures provided by the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) of the Ministry of Interior, the number of Syrians "under temporary protection" is 3.576.370 as of 31 December 2019.⁴ This figure, which corresponds to 4,36% of Turkey's national population of 82.003.882⁵, displays a tendency to increase - albeit on a smaller scale compared to previous years. This increasing tendency is due mostly to the natural population growth (by births) of the Syrian community and despite those Syrians who acquired Turkish citizenship or voluntarily returned to Syria over the years. There has been a significant increase, particularly since 2014, in the number of individuals seeking international protection in Turkey besides the Syrians under temporary protection. Given that the total number of individuals 'under international protection' and those with an application for international protection in Turkey was 58.018 in 2011, the scope of the immense transformation that Turkey has undergone becoming the country hosting the largest number of 'refugees' in the world should be noted.⁶

1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR: <https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html> (Access: 01.12.2019); also see UNHCR figures at : <https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html> and IOM-World Migration Report 2020, p.43 (https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf) (Access: 01.12.2019)

2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR: <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html> (Access: 01.12.2019)


3 Even though Turkey is party to both 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 New York Protocol Relating to Legal Status of Refugees, it retains the geographical limitation in the Convention. The national legislation has also been produced in this context and therefore Turkey only grants refugee status to individuals coming from Europe (interpreted as Council of Europe member countries) and carrying the conditions of a "refugee" described in the 1951 Convention. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which entered into force in 2013, also adopted this approach while regulating the statuses of "refugee", "conditional refugee", and "subsidiary protection". The asylum-seekers arriving from Syria, on the other hand, were granted another protective status, namely "Temporary Protection". In the current legal framework, asylum-seekers arriving from outside of Europe are granted the "conditional refugee" status, upon assessment of their application and if they fulfill the criteria set by the 1951 Convention. This study, being fully aware of this legal context and its official definition of a refugee, prefers to use the concepts of "Syrians" or "asylum-seekers" to refer to the displaced Syrians arriving in Turkey since 2011. It also occasionally uses the concept of "refugee" to refer to Syrians due to the sociological context and the common use of the concept.

4 In the SB-2019 study, 3.576.370 was used as the basis for the current number of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. This number was released by the Directorate General of Migration Management as of 31 December 2019. It needs to be noted that there are 3 updates on this figure in the month of December alone. In the first update on 13.12.2019 the number was declared to be 3.695.944, in the second one on 25.12.2019 it was announced to be 3.571.030, and in the third, "end of the year" update on 31.12.2019 it was announced to be 3.576.370. There is an observed decrease of 119.547 individuals from the 13.12.2019 figure. This sudden drop is explained to be related to a precautionary de-activation of the registrations of individuals who don't show any action for a long time on their registrations. <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access: 10.11.2019)

5 The Directorate General of Migration Management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs calculates this rate by dividing the number of Syrians under temporary protection by the number of Turkish citizens (82.003.882). If the calculation was to include the total number of Turkish citizens and Syrians under temporary protection in the country, then the rate would be 4,17%.

6 World Migration Report 2020, p.40

SB-2019-FIGURE 1: Syrian Refugees by Country of Residence (6.6 Million / 31 December 2019)



The above figure, which shows the countries of residence of the Syrians who had to leave their countries in the last 8,5 years since April 2011, clearly demonstrates the scale of the responsibility shouldered by Turkey. At the time of writing, the number of Syrians who had to escape their country is calculated to be 6 million 650 thousand.⁷ As of 31 December 2019, the number of Syrians in Turkey is 3,576,370, which corresponds to 54,1% of all Syrian asylum-seekers. Turkey is followed by Lebanon (15,8% - 919,578), Jordan (10,4% - 654,266), (Northern) Iraq (3,8% - 246,592) and Egypt (1,9% - 126,027). Approximately 15% of Syrian refugees reside in the EU, other European countries, the USA and Canada. Within Europe, the number of Syrian refugees per country is Germany (532,100), Sweden (109,300), Austria (49,200), the Netherlands (32,100), Greece (23,900), Denmark (19,700), Bulgaria (17,200), Switzerland (16,600), France (15,800), Armenia (14,700), Norway (13,900) and Spain (13,800).⁸

⁷ UNHCR is releasing and updating the numbers of Syrians in regional countries in the context of its 3RP framework. (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>). However, accessing accurate numbers concerning European and North American countries is more problematic. Therefore, even though the figures presented here are predicted to be very close to reality, they cannot be presented as authoritative.

⁸ UNHCR-Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018 <https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf> (Access: 01.12.2019)

1. Refugee Law and the Legal Framework Concerning International Protection in Turkey⁹

The most important foundation of the Refugee Law is the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (UDHR) which was adopted on 10 December 1948. Its Article 14, which states that “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”, provides a framework for all national and international regulations. Specifically related to asylum-seekers and refugees, the legal background is set in international law by the 1951 “Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” and its complementary 1967 “Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”. As of 2014, there are 144 state signatories of the 1951 Convention and 145 state signatories of the 1967 Protocol. According to this Convention, a refugee is a person who:

*“owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.*¹⁰

According to United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) data, there are currently 70,8 million displaced people around the globe in various statuses.¹¹ Among these, 25.9 million have the “refugee” status and approximately 4 million are “stateless”, with the rest having other statuses. Unfortunately, the number of displaced people in the world is increasing every day. 30 new individuals are displaced every minute around the world. Of course, these figures are the ones which could be detected by the relevant UN bodies and the UNHCR itself suggests that they would be greater than what is calculated. Another significant fact is the injustice that exists in how the responsibilities and burden stemming from asylum-seekers and refugees are shared. The issue of fair burden-sharing and the efforts under UN leadership since 2016 to increase solidarity with refugee-hosting countries have culminated into the “Global Compact on Refugees”. However, while such initiatives would certainly play a significant role in raising awareness concerning various inequalities, their effectiveness in implementation is expected to remain limited.

Turkey has moved in cooperation with the international community since the beginning of the process. Turkey, while having signed the Geneva Convention on 24 August 1951, retains the original geographical limitation of the Convention in order to reduce the risks stemming from its location in an unstable region¹². In fact, originally there were two limitations in the Convention for all parties. The first limitation concerned the “time period” included in the Convention. Accordingly, the refugee status was meant for only the people who were displaced by “the events that occurred pre-1951”. This limitation was lifted with the 1967 Protocol. The second limitation, which Turkey still retains, is the “geographical” one. Accordingly, the Convention originally applied the refugee status only to people who were displaced in Europe. Therefore, as it still retains the geographical limitation, Turkey only accepts refugees from Europe, technically from Council of Europe member countries. Today, there are only 4 countries (Turkey, Congo, Madagascar, and Monaco) still retain the geographical limitation from the original Geneva Convention of 1951. However, the fact that this limitation was not able to shield Turkey from mass inflows of asylum-seekers has become plainly obvious.

The first significant internal legal action concerning the asylum applicants in Turkey was adopted in 1994 through a Regulation. It was named “The Regulation Concerning Foreign Individuals who Applied to Turkey for Refugee Status or who Applied for a Residence Permit in Turkey to Apply Another Country for Refugee Status AND The Mass Movements of Asylum-Seekers That Arrive at Our Borders and Potential Population Movements”. This Regulation, which has been controversial in terms of international law and which was the reason for many of the problems that were brought to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), was revised in 2006. The expectation from developing a comprehensive legislation that is in accordance with the international law has become more urgent and important, particularly in the context of membership negotiations with the EU. In the 2001 Accession Partnership Document, the demand for “lifting the geographical limitation to 1951 Geneva

9 Information and explanations in this section have been partly derived from M.M.Erdoğan, *Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration* (2015), Bilgi University Press, p.43 et al.

10 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1 (2) <https://www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.pdf> (Access: 10.09.2019)

11 UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html> (Access: 02.09.2019)

12 1951 Convention 1(B)

Convention and developing social support units for refugees” was included among “medium term” priorities under the title of “Expanded Political Dialogue and Political Criteria”. This same demand was repeated, in a more detailed way, in the 2003 and 2006 Accession Partnership Documents. The last Accession Partnership Document, released by the EU in 2008, included these issues in its 24th Chapter and particularly emphasized the importance of “integrated border management”, “de-militarization”, and “lifting the geographical limitation”. The “EU Council Directive”, which was adopted by the EU in 2001 and which introduced the temporary protection status, was also embraced by the Turkish legislation. This Directive was adopted as an outcome of the developments that occurred in the Balkans in 1990s. This important EU document suggests that the main objective of temporary protection is to provide quick passage for asylum-seekers to safety and to secure their basic human rights. According to the EU Council Directive concerning the temporary protection status during mass inflows, temporary protection is overseen as an exceptional tool to be employed during mass inflows which put the asylum systems under strain, but without undermining or extorting the regular asylum procedures. In Turkey, one of the most important documents in this field is the “National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Migration and Asylum” which was adopted in 2005.¹³ This plan has also served as a significant background for the new and comprehensive law on migration in Turkey.

a. Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2013)

It is well-known that there is a close relationship between the developments in the sphere of migration management in Turkey and Turkey’s relations with the EU. After Turkey was declared a “membership candidate” by the EU in December 1999, the Turkish “National Plan” and EU’s “Accession Partnership Document”¹⁴ prepared in 2001 gave special emphasis on preparations for the full implementation of the Schengen Agreement, fight against irregular migration, and integrated border management issues. This document and the ones that followed frequently mentioned the issues of civilianization of migration management in Turkey and following a border management policy that is in tune with the EU’s. In this context, the efforts to make a law on migration management and to create an institution in Turkey had begun much earlier than the Syrian crisis. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) numbered 6458 has entered into force on 11 April 2013 when published in the Official Gazette. Thereby, LFIP became the first comprehensive legislation on the topic and the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) was established under the Ministry of Interior. DGMM became active on 11 April 2014.

LFIP has brought some concepts related to international protection into Turkish legislation which had not existed before. In this context, it defined various types of international protection as “refugee”, “conditional refugee”, and “subsidiary protection”. The mass inflows from Syria, which had started during the period of law’s preparation, has also caused the “temporary protection” to be included in the law. LFIP defines these statuses in the following way:

“Refugee: A person who as a result of events occurring in European countries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his citizenship and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process.” (LFIP-Article 61)

13 The National Action Plan states in its introduction:

In parallel with the developments towards accession to the European Union and for the fulfillment of the legislative obligation on the European Union and the Member States, Turkish Government undersigned the Accession Partnership Document of 2001 and subsequently revised the said document on 19 May 2003. For this endeavor, Turkish Government follows a National Program for the adoption of the EU legislation... In order to comply with the EU Acquis (legislation) on Justice and Home Affairs in the field of migration and asylum, Turkey has formed a special task force where various state agencies responsible for border control, migration and asylum are represented. Turkey has established three different working groups in respective fields (borders, migration and asylum) for developing an overall strategy. As a result of activities carried out by the Special Task Force following papers have been produced; “Strategy Paper on the Protection of External Borders in Turkey” in April 2003, “Strategy Paper on Activities Foreseen in the Field of Asylum within the Process of Turkey’s Accession to the European Union (Asylum Strategy Paper)” in October 2003, “Strategy Paper to Contribute Migration Management Action Plan in Turkey (Migration Strategy Paper)” in October 2003.

14 https://www.ab.gov.tr/katilim-ortakligi-belgeleri_46226.html (Access: 29.08.2019)

Embracing the geographical limitation included in the 1951 Geneva Convention, LFIP defines “conditional refugees” in the following way:

“Conditional Refugee: A person who as a result of events occurring outside European countries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted conditional refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process. Conditional refugees shall be allowed to reside in Turkey temporarily until they are resettled to a third country.” (LFIP- Article 62)

The number of those who arrived in Turkey escaping events that occurred in Europe and whose legal status in Turkey is “refugee” is 28 as of 2019. The more significant group in Turkey is obviously that of individuals who were displaced by events occurring outside of Europe. Reaching hundreds of thousands in number, these international protection applicants could get the status of “conditional refugee” in Turkey, if their applications are accepted. Those applicants who cannot be given the conditional refugee status but who nonetheless requires international protection are given the status of “subsidiary protection” as defined by LFIP’s Article 63:

“Subsidiary Protection: A foreigner or a stateless person, who neither could be qualified as a refugee nor as a conditional refugee, shall nevertheless be granted subsidiary protection upon the status determination because if returned to the country of origin or country of [former] habitual residence would: a) be sentenced to death or face the execution of the death penalty; b) face torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; c) face serious threat to himself or herself by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or nationwide armed conflict; and therefore is unable or for the reason of such threat is unwilling, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his country of origin or country of [former] habitual residence.” (LFIP- Article 63)

This is a regulation that was included to protect those who don’t fit within the definitions of refugee and conditional refugee statuses in line with the “non-refoulement” principle and international human rights law.

Regarding **mass migration movements, the approach of LFIP appears to be based on “temporary protection”. The status of “temporary protection”,** which currently covers the Syrians in the country, is immensely important considering the ongoing mass migration movements in the region. Concerning temporary protection, the law includes the following:


Temporary Protection:

(1) Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection.

(2) The actions to be carried out for the reception of such foreigners into Turkey; their stay in Turkey and rights and obligations; their exit from Turkey; measures to be taken to prevent mass influxes; cooperation and coordination among national and international institutions and organizations; determination of the duties and mandate of the central and provincial institutions and organizations shall be stipulated in a Directive to be issued by the Council of Ministers. (LFIP- Article 91)

SB-2019-FIGURE 2: International Protection in Turkish Legislation

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN TURKISH LEGISLATION
 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (6458 / 4.4.2013) and Temporary
 Protection Regulation (6883/22.10.2014)



It can be observed that more protective policies are being adopted against refugees throughout the world. This situation, in turn, causes the countries neighboring or with geographical proximity to crises to be further negatively affected by mass inflows. As also stated by the UN, in a world where 9 out of 10 refugees live in a developing country, the protective and even restrictive attitudes of the developed countries concerning refugees is noteworthy. This context inevitably affects Turkey's refugee policies in various ways as well. While Turkey has significantly improved its asylum system and become the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world since 2014, it continues to implement the geographical limitation concerning refugees in Geneva Convention to which it has been a party. The long-standing discussions concerning this, however, appear to be sidelined by the Syrian crisis and Turkey's policies.

b. Temporary Protection Regulation¹⁶

Article 91 of LFIP defines "Temporary Protection" and states that the details of what this entails would be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers through a Regulation. This Regulation was adopted in 2014 and it entered into force on 22 October having been published in the Official Gazette.¹⁷

The Regulation included the requirement of "biometric" inputs of foreigners including taking finger prints and addresses to be saved in a separate system to prevent any current and future issues concerning registration. The right of foreigners to access to basic services and other social assistance programs is defined to be conditional upon them remaining in the cities where they are registered. According to the Regulation, the rules and procedures concerning employment and working of those under temporary protection would be determined by the Presidency, upon the proposals prepared by the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services having received the views of the Ministry of Interior. These foreigners are allowed to work only in the sectors, vocations and geographical regions determined by the Presidency. They need to apply to the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services to obtain a work permit.

16 <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/10/20141022-15-1.pdf>

17 A detailed discussion of the Temporary Protection Regulation was included in the study "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration". The information included under this title is taken from the mentioned source.

The regulation clearly mentions the “non-refoulement” principle with a pro-refugee interpretation (Art.6). According to the Regulation, no one within the scope of this of this Regulation shall be returned to a place where he or she may be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment or, where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The Article 11 of the regulation is on how to terminate temporary protection. Accordingly, “(1) The Ministry may make a motion to the Cabinet for the termination of temporary protection. Temporary protection may be terminated by the decision of the Cabinet. (2) The Cabinet may decide in the following ways after the decision on termination: a) Complete termination of temporary protection and repatriation of those who were under temporary protection, b) Giving those under temporary protection the status of which they fulfill the criteria en masse or making individual assessments of their applications for international protection, c) Allowing those who were under temporary protection to remain in Turkey under the conditions which would be determined by Law.”

c. The Status of Syrians in Turkey

The legislative and administrative regulations in Turkey obviously do not allow the Syrians to be defined as “refugees”. The public institutions and politicians in Turkey have refrained from using the concept of “refugee”, which would bring or may be perceived to bring legal obligations upon the country, and generally preferred to use the concepts “asylum-seeker” or, more frequently, “guest”. However, the definition of Syrians in Turkey in the context of international law was spelled out through a Circular dated 30 March 2012 upon the recommendation of the UNHCR and Syrians in Turkey were henceforth recognized as “foreigners under temporary protection”.


Finally, the Temporary Protection Regulation, which entered into force on 22 October 2014, has clearly defined the legal status of Syrians in Turkey. According to the Provisional Article 1 of the Regulation,

“The citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic, stateless persons and refugees who have arrived at or crossed our borders coming from Syrian Arab Republic as part of a mass influx or individually for temporary protection purposes due to the events that have taken place in Syrian Arab Republic since 28 April 2011 shall be covered under temporary protection, even if they have filed an application for international protection. Individual applications for international protection shall not be processed during the implementation of temporary protection.”

d. International Protection Applicants in Turkey

There has always been human mobility, on an individual or mass scale, towards Turkey due to its geographical location and the instability in the region. In addition, the intense and durable crises experienced in neighboring countries have significantly increased the number of displaced people moving towards Turkey. The statistics released by the DGMM in 2017 concerning the number of applications for international protection in Turkey between 2005-2016 amply demonstrate the remarkable increase (see Figure below). According to these figures, it is noteworthy that the cumulative number of applications by the year 2011, when the Syrians started to arrive in mass numbers, is only 58.018. The fact that this number has reached to millions in a matter of few years and exceeded 4 million by 2019 should be seen as a major reference in understanding the scale of the situation experienced in terms of management as well as its social implications.

SB-2019-FIGURE 3: The Number of Individuals Applied for International Protection in Turkey, 2005-2016



Source: DGMM: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/uluslararası-koruma_0_378_4712_icerik (Access: 25.09.2017)


According to UNHCR Turkey data, there were 368.400 foreigners in Turkey as of September 2018 including 170 thousand Afghans, 142 thousand Iraqis, 39 thousand Iranians, 5.700 Somalis, and 11.700 individuals from other countries.¹⁸ While the DGMM gives the annual numbers of applications for international protection, it does not provide the existing numbers of international protection. Here, factors such as developments during decision making, voluntary return of the applicants to their countries of origin or their movement to a third country, all affect the overall figures.¹⁹ However, according to UNHCR-Turkey there are in total 330 thousand asylum-seekers and refugees registered in Turkey as of March 2020.²⁰

18 UNHCR Turkey: <http://www.unhcr.org/tr/unhcr-turkiye-istatistikleri> (Access: 20.10.2017)

19 DGMM: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/goc-idaresi-genel-mudurlugu-istisare-toplantisi_350_359_10676_icerik (Access: 05.09.2017). The Minister of Internal Affairs Soyly gave the number of individuals under international protection in Turkey as “around 337 thousand” in his speech on NTV on 24 July 2019. In the same speech, Soyly mentioned the number of those under temporary protection to be 3 million 634 thousand and the number of those staying in Turkey with a residence permit to be 1 million 23 thousand. Together, he declared, the number was around 4.9-5 million. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RSzHgMMlkxw> (Access: 24.11.2019) (from 7 minutes 18 seconds onwards).


20 This figure was given to be 330 thousand in UNHCR March 2020 report. UNHCR-Turkey, March Operational Update: <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2020/05/UNHCR-Turkey-Operational-Update-March-2020.pdf> (Access: 18.04.2020)

SB-2019-FIGURE 4: UNHCR Turkey: Number of International Protection Applicants in Turkey by Country of Origin



Source: UNHCR: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68853> (Access: 25.12.2019)

SB-2019-FIGURE 5: International Protection Applications in Turkey




Source: DGMM, <https://www.goc.gov.tr/uluslararasi-koruma-istatistikler> (Access: 15.12.2019)

The official records suggest that the total number of individuals under various international protection statuses in Turkey (including Syrians and non-Syrians) by the end of 2019 is over 3,9 million.


There is a remarkable increase in the number of irregular migration and international protection application figures especially after 2016. Turkey has witnessed unprecedented levels of irregular migration and international protection applications after 2014, a large part of which including individuals from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. According to DGMM figures, more than 1.2 million irregular migrants were apprehended between 2015 and 2019.

SB-2019-FIGURE 6: Number of Apprehended Irregular Migrants in Turkey, 2005-2019



Source: DGMM, <https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-goc-istatistikler> (Access: 05.01.2020)

SB-2019-FIGURE 7: Number of Apprehended Irregular Migrants in Turkey by Country of Origin, 2005-2019



	IRAQ	AFGHANISTAN	PAKISTAN	SYRIA	MOLDOVA	PALESTINE	MYANMAR	GEORGIA	IRAN	OTHER
2014	1.728	12.248	2.350	24.984	101	508	6.425	1.519	626	8.158
2015	7.247	35.921	3.792	73.422	261	615	5.464	2.857	1.978	14.928
2016	30.947	31.360	19.317	69.755	256	365	1.169	2.679	1.817	16.801
2017	18.488	45.259	30.337	50.217	308	832	374	2.954	2.707	24.276
2018	17.629	100.629	50.438	34.053	269	10.545	378	3.153	4.066	46.631
31.12.2019	12.097	201.437	71.645	55.236	204	12.210	296	2.171	8.753	90.613

Source: DGMM, <https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-goc-istatistikler> (Erişim: 05.01.2020)

2. Social Acceptance and Integration

Syrians Barometer study aims to make an analysis of the current situation concerning the Syrians in Turkey and contribute in the processes of social integration through providing “a framework for peaceful and honorable coexistence”. Mass human mobility brings with itself the issue of how to live together concerning the “native/home society” and the “newcomers”- in whatever way or for whatever reason they may have arrived in the country. In this context, it is important to provide a brief evaluation of the conceptual discussions on “harmonization” (or similarly used concepts in the literature such as “integration”, “cohesion” or “adaptation”, etc.) and specifically “social cohesion”²¹. Such an evaluation is necessary to explain how the essential concept “social acceptance” is defined in this study, which is argued to serve as the basis of harmonization and social cohesion.

As human mobility and mass movements have been intensifying, a number of concepts have been developed and discussed concerning how to ensure the cohabitation of social groups from massively different religious, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds “with the least amount of problems”; and how, if possible, this social diversity can be molded so as to produce “social benefits”. Among these, the most popularly used concepts include integration²², harmonization, social cohesion, inclusion, adaptation, assimilation, acculturation, multiculturalism, interculturalism, and tolerance/toleration, among others. New concepts are emerging every day in this lively field as human mobility intensifies. For instance, while the number of international migrants was around 150 million in 2000, it has increased to 272 in 2020. In the same years, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons increased from 35 million to 71 million. The issues concerning harmonization of Syrians in Turkey, the scale and pace of whose mass movement have been extraordinary, provide fertile ground for new conceptual discussions in this literature.

The main motivation of the concept of “harmonization”, which was used as the framework of this study, is similarly to prevent potential social, economic, and political problems; and if this is impossible, then, to minimize such problems and conflicts amongst the various social groups that are living together, while trying to increase the social benefits that could be accrued from the emerging social diversity. In the context of this study, the concept of “social cohesion” is used in an attempt to reveal the conditions of and the road map for the peaceful coexistence of foreigners (migrants, refugees, etc.), in other words the “others” who are in numerical minority in the society, and the rest of the society where they are not perceived as a “threat to social peace” and all segments of society live without conflict and tensions.

As an inalienable part of migration discussions, the concepts of “integration”, “harmonization”, and “social cohesion” which has been more frequently used in recent years, are all produced in different contexts and with various priorities. However, the most popularly used and discussed concept of “integration” has been widely criticized for taking a static existing culture granted and assuming an organic national identity. In this context, the criticisms towards this concept include -at least- 4 main charges. The first criticism against the concept of “integration” relates to the problems created by the fact that the concept belongs to engineering/mechanical fields, instead of the social field, and was only later applied to this field to which it did not belong. Integration refers to the action or process of mechanically combining one thing with another to make a whole. Application of this concept to the social world would obviously be problematic. Another major criticism against integration derives from the “hierarchical essence” of the concept. This is also closely related to the third charge against the concept: “Integration into what, by whom, and how?”. These questions relate to the inherent vagueness of the concept and their answers are inevitably political/ideological. The political power that manages the

21 For a recent and comprehensive review on “social cohesion”, see IOM-World Migration Report 2020, p.185 et al. (https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf) ve R. Bauböck –M.Tripkovic (Eds.) (2017) *The Integration of Migrants and Refugees*, An EUI Forum on Migration, Citizenship and Demography, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/45187/Ebook_IntegrationMigrantsRefugees2017.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y) (Access: 01.12.2019)

22 The IOM Migration Dictionary defines integration as follows: “The two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live, whereby migrants are incorporated into the social, economic, cultural and political life of the receiving community. It entails a set of joint responsibilities for migrants and communities, and incorporates other related notions such as social inclusion and social cohesion. Note: Integration does not necessarily imply permanent residence. It does, however, imply consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and societies of the countries of transit or destination, of access to different kinds of services and the labor market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and receiving communities in a common purpose” <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#Integration> (Access: 31.12.2019)

process, which is usually the state of the local society, defines “integration” in such a way that takes the “existing”- referring to the local society - as primary and imposes that on the newcomers. What is more, this political process is usually shaped by security concerns and political anxieties. This perspective also leads the way for an understanding of “the locals have the right to determine the rules”. Such an approach to integration as the newcomers adapting themselves to what is existing as the rule/necessary background to living together is thereby legitimized. And this is exactly where another significant problem related to the concept emerges: since integration is defined as a justified acceptance that the newcomers adapt themselves to what is existing, in time this could justify the expectation of “assimilation”²³ This is why, for many social scientists, integration is just a concealed stepping stone to assimilation.²⁴

Perhaps the main agreement among the migration researchers is that there is no universally agreed upon definition of “harmonization”, “social cohesion” or similarly developed concepts that would be valid for everyone, everywhere and at all times. In the absence of such standard agreed upon definitions, there emerge many subjective and context-specific evaluations and conclusions concerning these concepts. “The Guidebook for Local Bodies and Operators on Integration of Immigrants in Europe”²⁵, which was published by the EU, states “that integration is a dynamic and two-way process involving mutual participation of immigrants and citizens; that education and employment are crucial for helping migrants to become active participants in society; and that as an essential requirement for integration, immigrants need to learn the language and history of the host society”. While there is an emphasis on the rights and opportunities to be provided for the “newcomers”, it can still be observed that the host society is prioritized.

Demireva, in her study entitled “Immigration, Diversity and Social Cohesion”, similarly suggests that there is no universal definition for “social cohesion” and that this concept is usually associated with concepts such as “solidarity”, “togetherness”, “tolerance” and “harmonious coexistence”. Demireva here refers to the social order of a specific society and argues that “what proves the existence of social cohesion are a common vision and sense of belonging shared by all social groups in society; acceptance and appreciation of diverse backgrounds of different people; ability to provide similar opportunities to individuals coming from very different backgrounds; and the existence of strong and trust-based relations amongst people of diverse backgrounds at workplaces, schools, and neighborhoods”.²⁶ This definition appears to enjoy widespread acceptance and it generally conforms to the “durable solutions” that the UNHCR offers regarding cases where prolonged refugee experiences: i.e. 1. “working for voluntary repatriation”, 2. “attempting to resettle in a third country”, and 3. “implementing local integration policies”.²⁷

The relationship between migration and harmonization not only relates to geographical and historical experiences, but also to the quality of migration including the reasons and motivations of movement. Therefore, the relationship between harmonization, on the one hand, and “voluntary migration” or “forced migration”, on the other, differs from one another. While the literature usually deals with the former, this study mainly focuses on the latter. Berry and Roberts suggest that harmonization efforts following forced migrations reflect both a social model and a political vision, and that is what differentiates forced migrations from voluntary movements.²⁸ In other words, the way in which the newcomers arrive necessarily affects both themselves and

23 The book “Europe without an identity” written by Bassam Tibi, a German citizen of Syrian origin, contains very interesting hints regarding the discussions on the “hierarchical structure” of the concept of immigrant integration and the questions of “integration into what, integration into whom?” with its discussion on integration of Muslim immigrants in Germany and Europe and the proposed concept of “Leitkultur” (“lead culture”). See Tibi (1998) *Europa ohne Identität: Leitkultur oder Wertebeligkeit*, Siedler V..

24 For the approach of Prof. Dr. Nermin Abadan-Unat, one of the pioneering names of migration studies in Turkey, who often mentions that the concept of integration by its nature leads to assimilation and objects to this concept see N.Abadan-Unat, (2017) *Bitmeyen Göç / Konuk İşçilikten Ulus-Ötesi Yurttaşlığa* (Unending Journey: From Guest-workers to Transnational Citizens). Istanbul: Bilgi University Publishing, 3rd Edition

25 The Guidebook for Local Bodies and Operators on Integration of Immigrants in Europe http://www.ll2ii.eu/pdf/Guidebook_for_Local_Bodies_and_Operators_on_Integration_of_Migrants_in_Europe_TR.pdf (Access: 12.01.2020).

26 N. Demireva (2017) *Immigration, Diversity and Social Cohesion*. Briefing, The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, also UNHCR: Solutions for Refugees (<https://www.unhcr.org/solutions.html>) and IOM World Report 2020-p.343.

27 UNHCR: Solutions for refugees (<https://www.unhcr.org/50a4c17f9.pdf>) (Access: 10.12.2019)

28 J.P. De Berry,- A. Roberts. (2018). *Social Cohesion and Forced Displacement: A Desk Review to Inform Programming and Project Design*. World Bank Group. (<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/125521531981681035/pdf/128640-WP-P163402-PUBLIC-SocialCohesionandForcedDisplacement.pdf>) (Access: 31.12.2019)

the society to which they are to become a part. It can be suggested that what the forced migrants primarily need is “protection” and that their situation is significantly affected by uncertainty and various “traumatic experiences”. In this context, even though it is considered to be a contentious issue area in Western Europe, voluntary migration appears to be more easily manageable when compared to forced migration. It also needs to be added that the way the two are perceived by the receiving societies and states appear to be significantly different. This distinction also finds a manifestation in the UN’s perspective as in the context of preparing a Global Compact since 2016, there are different modalities concerning migrants and refugees.²⁹

Undoubtedly, the discussions on how to prevent conflict, dissipate tensions, and live together in peace have a long history among human beings going back to the times they started living in groups. However, beginning with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, gradual emergence of nation states and coming to prominence of national identities, partly through processes explained by Anderson in his “imagined communities”³⁰, brought a new dimension to these debates. As also suggested by Castles and Miller, prominent migration scholars and the authors of the seminal book “Age of Migration”, human mobility and migration have existed in every period of human history, producing significant influences for human beings.³¹ The authors suggest that the current age, defined by intense trans-border migrations, brings along two important questions for the states; one concerning the issue of “state sovereignty” and the other concerning “social transformation and integration processes”. They also argue that “trans-border migration does not only damage physical borders, but also emotional and cultural borders”, highlighting the significant implications of migration. Even though migration brings some difficult and painful processes, it is now almost impossible to imagine a social structure that is completely cleansed from migration and its implications. As Faist argues, today many politicians around the world see migration as the “new normal”³². Faist also emphasizes that the issue of social cohesion does not only concern people coming from outside of the borders. Accordingly, similar discussions concerning “social exclusion” and “social cohesion” take place within a country amongst citizens from different ethnic, religious, or cultural backgrounds.³³

There has been a wealth of studies as well as theories concerning the impacts of trans-border migration on the local societies. These studies elaborate on or emphasize different aspects of social cohesion. The Chicago School of Sociology is the first scientific theory on integration in an urban context.³⁴ Established in early 20th century in the US which is a traditional country of immigration, the Chicago School has focused on inter-group relations in Chicago, where more than one third of the population was constituted by people who were born outside of America, with the ultimate aim of “building a unifying national identity”. The Chicago School argues that social cohesion requires different groups living together to merge with one another. The famous concept of “Melting Pot” defends the process of different ethno-cultural and religious identities of immigrants to be melted in the same American pot to produce a single culture having somewhat distanced themselves from their such previous identities. In other words, it defends “assimilation” albeit in a different - and positive - conceptualization. This is because this school of thought as well as others influenced by it perceive the probability of immigrants keeping their pre-migration identities and cultures as a threat and danger for the social context in which they arrived. Developed by Bogardus in 1925, and used in the present study of Syrians Barometer, the “social distance scale” aims to understand the social life and social differentiations as well as to improve social relations.³⁵ One of the pioneering American urban sociologists, R. E. Park, argues in

29 Global Compact on Refugees / The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

30 B.Anderson (2015) *Hayali Cemaatler (Imagined Communities)*, Metis Yayınevi, İstanbul.

31 First published in 1993 by Castles and Miller, later editions of the book included contributions from Haas as well. For the most recent edition, see S. Castles, H. De Haas, and M. Miller (2018) *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Sixth Edition, The Guilford Press.

32 T.Faist (2018) *A Primer on Social Integration: Participation and Social Cohesion in the Global Compacts*. (COMCAD Working Papers, 161). Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, Fak. für Soziologie, Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD). <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssaar-58138-7>

33 OECD conducts the study “social cohesion index” to assess cohesion among the citizens of the same country and reveals interesting results: <https://www.oecd.org/dev/inclusivesocietiesanddevelopment/social-cohesion.htm>

34 Kaya, Ayhan (2014) “Türkiye’de Göç ve Uyum Tartışmaları: Geçmişe Dönük Bir Bakış” (Migration and Integration Discussions in Turkey: A Look to the Past), *İdealkent Kent Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol. 14, 2014, p.12

35 Emory S. Bogardus (1925) “Social Distance and Its Origins.” *Journal of Applied Sociology* 9 (1925): 216-226, and Emory S. Bogardus (1947) *Measurement of Personal-Group Relations*, *Sociometry*, 10: 4: 306-311.

his theory of “Race Relations Cycle”³⁶ that integration processes among different groups go through four different phases: “contact and establishing relations”, “competition over scarce resources”, “state’s efforts to include the newcomers in the public space”, and “accommodation or assimilation”. However, the “melting pot” approach which produces assimilation and promises to be a “project of serenity” has not become as successful as expected. Instead of forgetting them to some extent, many immigrants displayed a tendency to hold firmly on to their identities to cope with the structural and psychological challenges produced by migration.³⁷ In other words, expectation of assimilation brought further segregation, increasing the potential for conflict.

As assimilationist theories had failed and “social diversity” increasingly turned into a defining characteristic of societies in every field, starting from 1960s, the assimilationist policies started to be rejected. They were replaced by “multiculturalism” in philosophy and “integration” in practice.³⁸ Based on the premise that different groups can live together in harmony³⁹, the concept of “multiculturalism” was first used by an education expert from New Mexico named A. Medina in 1957. Medina has presented multiculturalism as the “key for a successful life together” suggesting that a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic society requires multicultural perspectives and policies to live in peace and harmony. Multiculturalism can be defined as the “process or policy of maintaining and supporting the group identities of different cultural groups in a multicultural society”. The “Canadian Multiculturalism Act” of 1971 had a significant effect on the popularization of the concept. With the Act, Canada defined the different cultures and cultural groups in the country as indispensable parts of its national heritage and a major richness of the country, announcing that each of them is morally equal in the eyes of the state. This approach gives official recognition to each cultural group, allows them to live their cultures in the sense of being able to freely carry out cultural practices, and hence, supports each group to build and manage their own places of worship or schools, and so on.⁴⁰

Studies on immigrant integration have usually focused on the processes of integration, thereby investigating the necessary conditions for integration or the minimum standards of cultural, legal or political integration. The main objective appears to understand the conditions in which the “newcomers” (immigrants) are brought to an equal position in education, working life, and enjoying the services provided by the state, without being excluded from public institutions.⁴¹ Kaya highlights the significance and effectiveness of the state suggesting that “the issue of integration has always been important for societies in which groups from different ethno-cultural and religious backgrounds live. The discussions concerning integration are to a large extent based on the approaches of the receiving societies and states.”⁴² Providing one of the most familiar definitions of integration, Hynie suggests that “integration, in its broadest sense, refers to inclusion and participation, both socially and economically” and that it is a “process whereby both the receiving communities and the newcomers change, and change each other”.⁴³

In their important paper entitled “Understanding Integration”, Ager and Strang define integration in terms of “assumptions and practice regarding citizenship and rights; processes of social connection within and between groups within the community; and lack of structural barriers to such connection related to language, culture and the local environment” specifically emphasizing the importance of achievement and access across the sectors of employment, housing, education and health.⁴⁴ Jenson investigates the structural aspects of social cohesion in five dimensions: belonging/isolation (a cohesive society is one in which citizens “share values”), inclusion/exclusion (social cohesion is related to economic institutions, particularly the markets, and it requires

36 See, Stanford M. Lyman (1968) The Race Relations Cycle of Robert E. Park, The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring, 1968), pp. 16-22.

37 Ayhan Kaya, *ibid.* p. 13.

38 For a liberal perspective, see W. Kymlicka, (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

39 B.Kartal ve E.Başçı, (2014) *Türkiye’ye Yönelik Mülteci ve Sığınmacı Hareketleri (Refugee and Asylum Movements Towards Turkey)*, CBU Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 12 (2) pp.222.

40 For a liberal perspective, see W. Kymlicka, (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

41 See: A.Yükleyen & G. Yurdakul (2011) *Islamic Activism and Immigrant Integration: Turkish Organizations in Germany, Immigrants & Minorities*, 29:01, 64-85 .

42 Kaya, Ayhan (2014) “Türkiye’de Göç ve Uyum Tartışmaları: Geçmişe Dönük Bir Bakış” (*Migration and Integration Discussions in Turkey: A Look to the Past*), *İdealkent Kent Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol. 14, 2014, p.12

43 M. Hynie (2018). *Refugee integration: Research and policy*. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 24(3), 265-276.

44 See: Ager, A., & Strang, A. (2008). *Understanding integration: A conceptual framework*. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 21, 166-191.

capacity to include), participation/non-involvement (social inclusion requires involvement and participation in a wide array fields including politics), recognition/rejection (respect for plurality, tolerance, and recognition-individuals' feeling that others accept them and recognize their contributions are essential for social cohesion), and legitimacy/illegitimacy (social cohesion depends on maintaining the legitimacy of public and private institutions that act as mediators).⁴⁵ Bernard has added a new dimension, i.e. equality/inequality, to the five that were offered by Jenson.⁴⁶ Schmitt defines social cohesion in terms of goals to be attained. These goals include elimination of inequalities and social exclusion and strengthening of social relations, social interactions, and social ties.⁴⁷ Having emphasized trust, participation, and the willingness to help as important aspects of social cohesion, Chan's perspective on the concept is based on a dual framework. While "horizontal dimension" is related to cohesion amongst social groups, "vertical dimension" is related to state-citizen cohesion.⁴⁸ As Unutulmaz argues, however, all integration policies are ultimately the products of a "political vision" that is developed by the receiving country depending on its conditions, agenda, and capacity.⁴⁹

One of the very important concepts in the context of social cohesion and integration debates is "multiculturalism" and it has been subject to heavy criticism in Western Europe particularly in relation to Muslim immigrants. Here, it is important to differentiate the two meanings of multiculturalism: while in the sense of presence of multiple cultures in a society it refers to a social fact; the concept gains a normative substance in its second meaning asking for the recognition of equal moral value and standing of each culture.⁵⁰ However, multiculturalism in this latter normative sense and multiculturalist policies developed based on it have frequently been criticized for encouraging different communities to become inward-looking, closed groups and thereby leading to segregation instead of integration. In the British context, one particular criticism was that multiculturalism had produced "parallel societies", living side-by-side but not sharing anything with one another.⁵¹

Attempts were made to resolve the problems encountered in the "assimilationist" and "multiculturalist" models through the employment of the concept of "integration". In this context, integration was offered as an ideal in-between approach where newcomers would join host society quickly and with equal rights through embracing the values of this society, whilst preserving their existing cultures. It needs to be noted that underlying all these discussions is the view that sees the society as an organic whole. However, in an age of globalization and communications, it should not be forgotten that individuals could foster more than one cultural belonging. The Commission on Integration and Cohesion, which was established in the UK in 2007, was a manifestation of this view which presented the concepts of integration and social cohesion as desired alternatives to the perils of multiculturalism and assimilation. In migration and integration debates, there is a reductionist tendency to see all migrants as a single block with more or less homogenous experiences. However, immigrant communities are neither homogenous nor static entities, which mean that in addition to having significant degrees of inner diversity, they change over time. Therefore, there are heterogenous and increasingly complex identity structures within migrant communities. Foroutan describes these with the notion of "hybrid identities".⁵² This new reality further complicates the integration processes, whereby new identities need to be defined again.

45 Jenson, Jane, "Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research", Canadian Policy Research Networks, Ottawa, 1998, p. 15

46 Paul Bernard (2000) "Social Cohesion: A Dialectical Critique of a Quasi-Concept", Strategic Research and Analysis Directorate, Department of Canadian Heritage, Ottawa, s. 19.

47 Regina, Berger Schmitt, Social Cohesion as an aspect of the quality of Societies: Concept and Measurement. EuReporting Working Paper No 14, Centre For Survey Research and Methodology, Mannheim, 2000, p. 28

48 Joseph Chan, Ho -pong to ve Elaine Chan, "Reconsidering social cohesion: Developing a Definition and Analytical Framework for Empirical Research", Social Indicators Research, 2006, 75(2), p. 294

49 On this subject, see: O.Unutulmaz (2016) Gündemdeki Kavram: Göçmen Entegrasyonu-Avrupadaki Gelişimi ve Britanya Örneği (The Hot Topic: Integration of Immigrants- Its Development in Europe and the Case of Britain), Gülfer Ihlamur-Öner, A.Ş. öner (eds.) Küreselleşme Çağında Göç Kavramları ve Tartışmalar, İletişim Yayınları İstanbul, 2016, p. 157

50 See: N.Yurdusev: İflas eden çok kültürcülük mü yoksa Almanya mı? (Is it Multiculturalism that is failing, or is it Germany?) (<https://www.dunyabulteni.net/iflas-eden-cok-kulturculuk-mu-yoksa-almanya-mi-makale,14912.html>) (Access: 29.12.2019) Also, see: W.Kymlicka (1995).

51 The riots that erupted in England and UK government's commissioning of a report by Ted Cante have become a significant turning point. The research conducted in the events and the ensuing publication of the "Cante Report" in 2001 argued that state multiculturalism has caused segregation in society and created parallel societies, which lived side by side but never meaningfully interacted. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/25_05_06_oldham_report.pdf (Access: 29.12.2019)

52 See: N. Foroutan, I.Schäfer (2009) Hybride Identitäten – muslimische Migrantinnen und Migranten in Deutschland und Europa. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (5/2009), pp. 11-18.

One of the most frequently discussed concepts within integration debates is “belonging”. While this concept can be defined in such a way to imply assimilationist expectations, it can also be seen as an opportunity for the newcomers and the local society to bind themselves together under a common culture and sense of belonging. Defining belonging with a dominant group would inevitably legitimize assimilationist policies and reanimate the hierarchical understanding for integration. The lack of any belonging and “simply living on a land together”, however, could lead to breakups, parallel lives, and even conflicts. The 3Bs, i.e. “Being / Belonging / Becoming” should be very carefully balanced so that a society that includes an emotional attachment and sense of ownership could be established in the face of diversity, without asking for assimilation. This should be done not with the state in the center of the process and through ideology and coercion, but with the society in the center and voluntarily. This could only be realized through a strong social acceptance.

Having paid significant efforts to establish its own migration management system since early 2000s, Turkey appears to address the issue of integration for the first time with the adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in 2013, of which harmonization was a significant part. Recognizing the issue of integration as an inalienable part of the process, the Law embraces a philosophical stance on the issue and declares that it draws a clear line between integration and assimilation. The preference to use the concept of “harmonization” in the Law can even be partly attributed to this clear rejection of assimilation given the above discussed criticism of the concept of integration being a sugar-coated version of assimilation. In its Article 96, LFIP assigns certain missions to the Directorate General of Migration Management in terms of integration of immigrants: “The Directorate General may, to the extent that Turkey’s economic and financial capacity deems possible, plan for harmonization activities in order to facilitate mutual harmonization between foreigners, applicants and international protection beneficiaries and the society as well as to equip them with the knowledge and skills to be independently active in all areas of social life without the assistance of third persons in Turkey or in the country to which they are resettled or in their own country.” The Law also establishes a Department of Harmonization and Communication within the Directorate General to carry out and coordinate activities related to harmonization of immigrants. The philosophical background of the adopted perspective is presented in the following way: “harmonization is neither assimilation, nor integration. It is the harmonization that emerges when the immigrants and the society understand each other on a voluntary basis.”⁵³

Many of these debates concerning the philosophical content of the concept, what exactly is meant by it, and how its practice in the real life is envisaged will most likely continue in the future. Developing new concepts related to these debates appears ambitious and naturally risky. This is both because of the fact that integration is not something that is only related to migration and because there are thousands of different integration processes simultaneously underway all around the world. It is not possible, or realistic, to explain the integration processes as experienced by the Syrians in Turkey, Turks in Germany, Somalians in Canada, Chinese in Japan, and Algerians in France with a single concept. In the face of these limitations and the risk of being seen as “too general”, “vague” or “abstract”, it has been inevitable for the Syrians Barometer study to offer a humble definition of the concept of integration to explain how it is used and understood in this study as well as to provide it as a background concerning integration policies and future projections. This definition endeavor tries to distance the concept from ideology and a hierarchical structure, and contains a foundational principle as expressed by Kant. In light of Kant’s words “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law”, **this study defines integration as “the way of life in which different communities, whether came together voluntarily or involuntarily, could live in peace and harmony on a common ground of belonging where pluralism is embraced in a framework of mutual acceptance and respect.”**

Syrians Barometer study aims at investigating a social situation created by mass forced migration, making empirical observations to produce solid findings, and providing a framework on “integration”. Its definition of integration is as defined above. The study preferred to engage with the empirical findings of the field study and to underline the essential significance of perceptions and social acceptance for integration, instead of elaborating theoretical discussions on the issue. The topic of integration was firstly discussed in the framework of the study entitled “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration”, which was initially published as a report and then as a book in 2014. One of the preeminent themes the book focused on was the concept of

53 Directorate General of Migration Management “Uyum Hakkında”: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/uyum-hakkinda> (Access: 02.01.2020)

“social acceptance” which was offered as the most important basis for the integration process.

Integration processes in the aftermath of mass forced migration involve many different conditions, actors, obstructions, opportunities, and principles. This study argues that one of the most sensitive and important issues concerning these processes is “social acceptance”. It is important to note that the level of “acceptance” in a society differs significantly depending on the quality of migration. In other words, integration processes of voluntary immigrants and asylum-seekers/refugees who were the victims of forced migration as well as the relations each could establish with the local society differ on many occasions, and therefore their presence in the society produces different outcomes. When we look at the main regions in which the 272 million international migrants and approximately 70 million refugees around the world live as of 2020,⁵⁴ we can clearly see the immense differences in the policies the developed countries adopt concerning these two different groups. As it is well-known, while only around 10-15% of the refugees live in developed countries, when it comes to voluntary migrants, or “economic migrants” as they are more frequently called in the literature, the figures change radically. This is clearly no coincidence. While regular and especially qualified immigrants are perceived as “added values” to their countries of residence, refugees and asylum-seekers are perceived as problems and risk factors. The respective state policies, in turn, are determined based on these perceptions. In this context, there is a clear need to increase and improve the integration policies and their implementation concerning the high number of refugees.

What Turkey has lived since 2011 is an extremely intense forced migration experience on a mass scale. Turkey has found itself in a situation where it needs to develop integration policies for millions of asylum-seekers.

We can identify five different domains related to mass international migrations:

1. The policies and precautions adopted in the public sphere; border and process management,
2. The social solidarity and acceptance displayed by the host society,
3. The attitudes of the “newcomers”,
4. The conditions in the origin country,
5. The approach of and the actions taken by the international community.

These domains, which are certainly inter-related and intersecting, play an especially vital role in overcoming the difficult times, undermining the potential problems related to living together, and even attempting to transform potential problems into potential benefits.

“The motivations of the newcomers”, in other words whether they are voluntary immigrants or refugees, appear as one of the most significant elements of the integration process, as they shape the perceptions and reactions of the host society towards these groups. This is because while voluntary migration is perceived as manageable and orderly; asylum is perceived to bring along uncertainty, temporariness, unpredictability, trauma, and lack of documentation. That is why more than 70% voluntary migrants and almost more than 90% of “highly skilled” migrants live in developed countries, while only around 10% of refugees live in these same countries.⁵⁵ This is amply evident in the lists of countries hosting the greatest number of immigrants and greatest number of refugees. Even when they originate from the same country, voluntary migrants are seen as “instruments for development” and refugees as “burdens and risks”. This situation has also found its expression in the attempts to create a global compact and the process that started in 2016 with the UN’s New York Declaration has produced two distinct documents, one for immigrants and the other for refugees. The respective titles of the documents also manifest the rupture: “Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” and “Global Compact on Refugees”. This can be interpreted as an important proof that the issue of integration is much more complicated when it concerns the refugees.

Actors: It is possible to identify six main actors as the determinants of the process of integration: the host (local) society; host state institutions; “newcomers” (immigrants / asylum-seekers / refugees); international organizations, especially including ones that play a larger role concerning the refugees such as relevant UN institutions; NGOs; and lastly, the “origin country” institutions. Each of these actors has the potential, albeit at

54 UNHCR Global Trends-2018: <https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf>, (Access: 18.09.2019)

55 UNHCR: <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/> (Access: 02.01.2020)

varying degrees, to facilitate or obstruct the integration process and their coordination, or the lack thereof, is a very important determinant in the process.

In addition to the quality/status of the newcomers (i.e. whether they are immigrants, asylum-seekers or refugees), the **numerical size** of the group is also an important determinant in terms of the integration process. While a reasonable number in comparison to the population size, economic situation, and administrative capacity of the country might make the process more easily manageable; when the number increases, with the growing anxieties of the host society, the process becomes inevitably more complicated. Failure of integration and inability to manage the process, in turn, would lead the asylum-seekers to turn within themselves and become ghettoized, which in its turn would further exacerbate the anxieties of the host society. This vicious cycle could bring a number of serious problems including deterioration of public services, increasing trends in crime rates, job losses, and anxieties over identity.

Which one is more Effective: Cultural/Religious/Ethnic Closeness or Numerical Size? The cultural closeness or familiarity of the newcomers with the host society initially appears as an important factor. In other words, the higher levels of cultural closeness could facilitate the integration process. It is clear that the religious and ethnic closeness, which found its manifestation in the then popularly used concepts of “Ensar and Muhacir”⁵⁶, was influential especially in the initial periods in ensuring a high level of social acceptance and solidarity displayed towards Syrians. However, this positive influence is increasingly overshadowed by rising numbers, perception of increasing tendencies to remain in Turkey permanently, and certain negative experiences regarding public services and employment. The local society seems to deliberately emphasize how “different” they are from the newcomers in an attempt to put a distance between the refugees and themselves.

One of the most effective factors that will determine how the process will unfold is the numerical size. As previously mentioned, while smaller numbers - judged by the context and capacity of the country - will make the process more easily manageable; increasing numbers will steadily complicate the matters through effects both on the refugees, e.g. possibility form their own ghettos, and on the host society through growing tensions and concerns. The increase in the number of refugees to beyond manageable levels reinforce the social anxieties in the local society in two ways. Firstly, the local society increasingly tends to see the newcomers as a single homogenous community that is constantly growing and posing a risk to their identities. Secondly, the newcomers increasingly experience the comfort and security of their growing numbers, expanding their living space while becoming more self-reliant as a community. Even though this process, sometimes referred to as “ghettoization” or “forming parallel societies” in the literature, appears to increase the security of the newcomers, it also leads to isolation and social segregation. This segregation might mean in some cases that the minority group might construct their cultural identities in opposition to the host society identities, seeing the latter as their “other”.⁵⁷ Therefore, it can be suggested that the numerical size is a more effective factor than cultural closeness in the context of integration processes in the medium and long terms.

Placement Policies and Local Governments: Many developed countries implement a planned policy of placement of asylum-seekers in the country. In Germany, for instance, there is a placement system called “Königsteiner Schlüssel” which is established on the basis of the federal state system to oversee a balanced geographical distribution of refugees in the country. In this way, the distribution of burden is largely balanced among states, cities, and districts. This, in turn, is an important advantage in migration management for the country. However, in cases of mass inflows and particularly for the neighboring countries, it becomes very difficult to centrally plan and implement a placement strategy concerning the refugees. When they first started to arrive since 29 April 2011, a majority of the Syrians were first admitted to the camps (temporary residence centers) in the cities neighboring Syrian border. At their peak, there were 26 camps with a capacity to host 270 thousand refugees. However, as the number of Syrians kept growing, the Turkish state “tacitly permitted” the Syrians to move and settle wherever they wished. The fact that Syrians are scattered all across Turkey in a very unbalanced way became apparent with regular registrations. There emerged very

56 Both Arabic words, Ensar refers to the Muslims who helped Prophet Mohammed during his migration from Mecca to Medina; while Muhacir literally means migrant.

57 A.N.Yurdusev (1997). *Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği*, A.Eralp (Ed.), Türkiye ve Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma, Demokrasi. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 17-85.

significant discrepancies in the number of Syrian residents, not only among regions, but also among cities, districts, and even neighborhoods. Syrians have chosen where to reside on the bases of whether or not they have family members or friends living there, the working opportunities, and the living conditions. While the Syrians constitute 4,5% of the national population in Turkey, their respective proportions to the populations of different cities in which they live are extremely unbalanced. For instance, the Syrian residents living in the city of Kilis corresponds to over 80% of this city's population, this figure is 3,6% in Istanbul and 0,11% in Ordu. There are noteworthy differences in the number of Syrian residents living in different districts of the big cities. In Sanliurfa, for instance, while one of the 13 districts has 2 thousand Syrian residents, in another one the number of Syrian residents exceeds 80 thousand. Similarly, in Istanbul, while one of the 39 municipalities is home to less than 100 Syrian residents, there are over 70 thousand Syrians living in another one. It is crystal clear that this extreme imbalance makes it more difficult to manage the process. However, it can be suggested that the experience of "spontaneous placement" of Syrians in Turkey is highly noteworthy and it proved to be an effective factor that has led Syrians to feel secure and establish a new life in Turkey. As suggested, the meaning and implications of rising number of asylum-seekers is different for the host society and for the asylum-seekers themselves. One of the important issues that need to be emphasized here concerns the risks that this model of unregulated settlement of refugees poses for local governments. In fact, in the absence of additional resources to be used for the refugees, the local governments that receive large numbers of refugees end up using the scarce, and at times already insufficient, resources to respond to the local challenges created by this inflow. Such cases will inevitably mean increasing tensions in the local contexts. In addition, in the absence of additional resources to be transmitted, there is an additional risk for the successful municipalities which can manage to process well and provide good services to turn into centers of attraction for even more refugees and additional burden.

Local Integration and Prioritization of Development:

* It is necessary for the state to develop new capacities and improve existing ones in a way to meet the additional demands created by refugees as well as to keep the social acceptance high.

* It is very highly likely that in the absence of a sufficient level of social acceptance, the integration policies of the state will eventually be obstructed. Therefore, a special effort needs to be paid in order to keep the level of social acceptance high.

* Registration and Protection, Education, Health, Accommodation, Livelihood Sources (Work), Legal Status, Security, and Developing Institutional Capacity are of special importance.

* Prioritization of Local Integration would directly contribute in keeping services at a high quality and social cohesion.

Social Acceptance and Integration in the Case of Syrians in Turkey

It is possible to suggest that the almost nine-year period with more than 3,6 million Syrians in Turkey was passed with "minimum conflict" and even that it was "quite successful". The public institutions in Turkey have paid extraordinary efforts to deal with this humanitarian crisis, the scope of which has gone beyond all the expectations in the beginning, in cooperation with many international organizations, especially including the UN institutions. It can be suggested that these institutions have done a very admirable and successful job given the unprecedented scale of the crisis and the many institutional disadvantages including the fact that main authority managing the process, the Directorate General of Migration Management, was established in 2014. The main point of criticism has been the lack of a more long-term strategic perspective and instead implementation of usually more short-term projects mostly in a "problem-solving" mentality, which is partly understandable given the dynamic nature of the whole process. The expectation in Turkey has been that the crisis in Syria would come to an end and the Syrians would return to their homes. This expectation has been the reason why the management of the process was built on a "short term" approach of "problem-solving". Despite this expectation of eventual "return", it can also be observed that an unnamed integration policy has been implemented in the field with various institutional actors responding to the realities in the field.

Even though the concerns, anxieties, and complaints are becoming increasingly visible over the last few years, the levels of social solidarity and social acceptance have been extraordinarily high in Turkey. The total number of foreigners who applied for international protection and who are under such protection in Turkey was 58 thousand in 2011. With the arrival of Syrians, this figure has risen to over 4 million, accounting for more than

5% of the national population. This has inevitably led the issue of integration to rise in the political agenda. Even though there was a “social shock” with almost all of the Syrians living and working side by side with the Turkish society, there hasn’t been a serious tension or conflict in the country as of 2019. Undoubtedly, it can be suggested that the Turkish society needs to be given credit for this solidarity and success, which was initially based on religious/cultural closeness and the expectation of “temporariness”. Even though there has been a considerable erosion in the level of social acceptance and an increase in society’s concerns and the social distance between the Turkish society and the Syrians, there is still a high level of social acceptance. The facts that the issue of refugees still hasn’t been politicized to an extent to dominate the Turkish politics and that the society still doesn’t take their frustration on the subject out on the refugees themselves can be offered as evidences for this argument. While the details will be presented and discussed in the following sections, two issues need to be emphasized that are essential for creating the conditions for conflict-free life for Syrians and the rest of the society in Turkey. Two of the most significant fears in the face of such mass migrations are “loss of jobs and livelihoods due to the arrival of cheap labor” and “increase in criminality and insecurity”. Generally speaking, neither has been experienced in Turkey. Syrians have both been able to stand on their feet and not created any major disturbances in the daily life- possibly with some expectations in border city contexts where the Syrians are mostly concentrated. To what extent and how long will these be sustainable remains to be seen. In any case, however, with all the potential and actual challenges, the past 9 years can be seen as a success, with the principle credit belonging to the solidarity and social acceptance displayed by the Turkish society.

Without a doubt, in the initial periods of the crisis and even until 2013, it wasn’t expected either that the numbers would rise to their current levels or that the crisis in Syria would last this long. However, expectations were proven wrong. This has created unexpected conditions for Syria, Turkey, and the Syrians in Turkey. Turkey has adopted an “emergency”, and even a “disaster management”, approach and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD)⁵⁸ assumed a central role in the process, including the establishment of the camps and provision of emergency services. Syrians who arrived between 2011 and 2013 were settled into these camps that were quickly formed or built. When the capacities of these camps became insufficient, Syrians started to settle by their own means outside of the camps, including cities that are not in the border region. This was the beginning of a county-wide spread of Syrians in a rather short while. Still, however, it can be suggested that until 2014 the factors that dominated Turkey’s management of the process were “the direct link between the future of the administration in Syria and Syrians’ return to their country”, “emergency management”, and “temporariness”.

It is known that integration policies are complicated, dynamic, and multi-faceted. In addition, there is a perceived risk that integration policies might encourage permanent settlement, which in the Turkish case made them undesirable. In this context, it has been very difficult to make a definitive decision and develop a clear integration agenda. In contrast, very contradictory policies and discourses could dominate the agenda sometimes simultaneously (e.g. “encouraging voluntary return and taking necessary steps for return within Syria” and “developing integration policies”).

It can be said that cultural closeness played a positive role in increasing social acceptance in the initial phases. It is, however, impossible to explain the high and sustained levels of social acceptance in Turkey with cultural closeness alone. Three important dynamics to account for this fact could be identified. The first one is the fact that Turkey has had a long and intense history of internal migration, which has led to a very mobile social dynamic. This extremely dynamic social structure is one of the factors that reduce the reactions and anxieties concerning the newcomers. The second important factor relates to a structural economic problem in Turkey: the existence of a large informal economy. Accounting for more than 36% of the national economy, the informal economy in Turkey has led Syrians create employment opportunities for themselves and earn a livelihood without causing loss of employment for the host society. While this can be seen as a positive development considering the scale of mass immigration, it needs to be stated that this is not sustainable in the long run. The SB research findings reveal that 37,9% of Syrians in Turkey are actively working. Even though this figure cannot be officially verified and therefore needs to be considered with caution, it does give

58 Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) was established by the Law numbered 5902 in 2009 under the Prime Ministry. With the institutional regulations in the framework of moving to a Presidential system, AFAD was placed under the Ministry of Interior by Presidential Decree numbered 4.

us an important idea concerning the economic activity of Syrians. These findings show that Syrians have found themselves a space among more than 10 million Turkish citizens who are working in the informal economy.

As another important factor in the overall process, it is necessary to mention the performance of Syrians: they certainly need to be given credit for the relative lack of social problems in Turkey as they live without causing conflict. "Quickly increasing crime rates", a common fear among societies that receive mass immigration in a short time span, has not generally realized in Turkey. Syrians have both achieved to stand on their own feet and refrained from actions that could disturb the social peace.

How the future will unfold concerning Syrians in Turkey will probably be determined more by the Turkish society than by the state policies. Therefore, it is necessary to highlight some social vulnerabilities prevalent in Turkey. There appears to be two major problem areas for Turkey which has received over 4 million refugees in a short period of time. The first of these is the fact that the issue at hand concerns refugees, not voluntary immigrants, and that both the Turkish society and the state were caught unprepared. The other one is the existing fragility and the recent state of "rage" within the Turkish society which runs the risk of getting worse with the newcomers. In 2018, a study in Turkey has developed a social cohesion index based on the social cohesion model of Eurofound and Bertelsmen Stiftung. Entitled "Social Cohesion in Turkey", the main components of social cohesion were argued to be connectedness, social relations and an understanding of common benefits. According to the findings of this study, while the sense of connectedness and social relations are strong in Turkey, the same cannot be said concerning trust and perception of justice. Finding a very positive approach to acceptance of differences, the research has suggested that the level of an understanding of common benefits, in contrast, was medium-to-low. A quote by F. Keyman in this study reveals that the issue concerns the Turkish society as a whole, and not merely related to newcomers or non-citizens: "Turkey appears to be a weak 'country of values' in creation of common values, participation in civil society, and trusting strangers. In this context, we can say that we are not living in a 'Turkey of values' but in a 'Turkey of identities'".⁵⁹ From this perspective, one can speculate about the risk of developing new vulnerabilities in Turkey's social structure regarding the refugees in general and Syrians in particular.⁶⁰

A similar approach is evident in the article written by G. Sak in 2016 in which he discusses the fact that Turkey was placed 120th in a list of 155 countries compiled by OECD ranking social cohesion. Sak argues that this ranking reflected that there is a high potential for internal conflict in the society as well as that the social capital is very weak, meaning that significant problems could be experienced in the future.⁶¹ Therefore, it is necessary to underline the risks posed by living with a new group of people who will likely be demographically significant in Turkey's future. It can be suggested that such risks are growing and a new social vulnerability is emerging to take its place among Turkey's existing ones. Furthermore, this new vulnerability has an additional quality that it is open to external manipulation. While it may not be possible to get rid of this completely, there are many steps that could be taken to reduce the potential negative impacts. There are significant responsibilities and duties for the state, the society, and the Syrians to create a harmonious common life in dignity.

Migration and integration policies refer to a political vision. The objective may be, direct or indirect, assimilation of the newcomers or, sometimes, the existing society may be designed using the newcomers. However, it needs to be reiterated that this study does not use the concept of integration in an ideological or hierarchical way. Instead, it employs an understanding of a pluralist society which can foster a common sense of belonging. Integration inevitably has a subjective aspect. Therefore, while the newcomers usually believe that they have successfully adapted or integrated to the life in the new context, the host society usually holds a contradictory belief that the refugees have failed to integrate. The complex, multi-actor, and dynamic nature of the subject makes it even more difficult to develop a framework. Obviously, it is not possible to talk about a flawless integration model or a flawless integration policy. The essential issue is to get closer to a harmonious and peaceful life for societies having ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity. Therefore, it can be suggested that what this study attempts to develop is not a model, but a framework.

59 Ataseven, A., Bakış, Ç., (2018) "Türkiye'de Sosyal Uyum, İstanbul Politikalar Merkezi, İstanbul.

60 Ayşen, Ataseven ve Çağla, Bakış, ibid. pp.5.

61 G.Sak (2016) "Türkiye sosyal uyum endeksinde 155 ülke arasında 120'nci", TEPAV web page: <https://www.tepav.org.tr/tr/blog/s/5513> (Access: 29.12.2019)

Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

2


I. SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN TURKEY

1. Numerical Data Concerning Syrians in Turkey

a. General View

As stated, the first migrations from Syria to Turkey took place on 29 April 2011 when the first group of 252 Syrians arrived in Turkey. Syrians continued to arrive ever since albeit in gradually smaller numbers over the last few years. The number of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey was 1.519.286 in 2014, 2.503.549 in 2015, 2.834.441 in 2016, 3.426.786 in 2017, and 3.623.192 in 2018. As of 31 December 2019, the number of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey was 3.576.370.⁶²

SB-2019-FIGURE 8: Number of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey, 2011-2019



	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
TOTAL NUMBER OF SYRIANS	14.237	224.655	1.519.286	2.503.549	2.824.441	3.426.786	3.623.192	3.576.370
NET NUMBER OF SYRIANS BY EACH YEAR	14.237	210.418	1.294.631	984.263	330.892	592.345	196.406	-46.822
POPULATION OF TURKEY	73.7	74.7	75.6	76.6	77.7	78.7	80.8	82.0
SYRIANS AS % OF TURKEY'S POPULATION	0,01	0,3	2,00	3,26	3,63	4,35	4,48	4,36


Source: DGMM: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access: 05.01.2020)

The registrations of Syrians in Turkey were updated by the DGMM in cooperation with the UNHCR as of February 2019, yielding a clearer picture. There are 99.643 Syrians in Turkey who remain in Turkey with a residence permit. In addition, some Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey were given Turkish citizenship, particularly in the last two years. As of December 2019, the number of Syrians who obtained Turkish citizenship was 110 thousand.⁶³

⁶² DGMM: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access: 10.11.2019)

⁶³ The Minister of Interior Suleyman Soyly, declared the number to be 110 thousand on 30 December 2019 on a TV program on CNN-TURK. Soyly suggested that the number of Syrians who obtained citizenship in Turkey was 102 thousand, with half of this number being children. He also announced that the number of those yet to be registered was 50-60 thousand. <https://www.haberturk.com/son-dakika-bakan-soyly-dan-onemli-aciklamalar-2514831> (Access: 22.08.2019). In addition, for the announcement made by the Director of Communications of Turkish Presidency, F. Altun, see: <https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/haberler/haberler/detay/turkiye-suriyelilere-yardim-etme-konusunda-kararli-adimlar-atti> (Access: 22.08.2019)

SB-2019-FIGURE 9: Syrians in Turkey by Status



Source: DGMM: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> , <https://www.goc.gov.tr/ikamet-izinleri> , (Access: 05.12.2020)

An important characteristic of Syrians in Turkey is the fact that they became “urban refugees”, particularly since 2013. As of 31 December 2019, only 1.7% (63,443) of Syrians in Turkey live in 7 camps located in Hatay, Kilis, Adana, Kahramanmaras, and Osmaniye. The number of Syrians living in the camps continues to decrease. The remaining Syrians live in cities all around Turkey as urban refugees.

b. The Process of Registration, Updating and Reliability of Numbers

As already mentioned, there has been a constant trend of increase in the number of Syrians in Turkey since 29 April 2011. The first and only exception has been the year of 2019, which has displayed the first decrease of around 120 thousand in the number of Syrians under temporary protection in an update released on 27 December 2019. The update work conducted in the last week of 2019 took place in relation to those Syrian individuals that have the status of temporary protection whose registration was not updated in the previous 1 year and therefore whose registration was turned into “passive”. When these individuals update their personal data by going to the Provincial Migration Management Directorates, their registrations of temporary protection are re-activated and presented in the official statistics. In this way, the probability of those individuals whose registration was turned into passive to leave Turkey was controlled and reliability of data is ensured.

In the process of registration, DGMM worked in close cooperation with the UNHCR. In the registrations conducted between 2011 and 2015, in which DGMM was not involved, there were certain hesitations stemming both from organizational issues and the massive scale of the inflows. DGMM attempted to overcome such hesitations, clarify the records, and increase the accuracy and reliability of the data by a software they developed called “GÖÇNET”. With this new system in place, not only did new individuals start to be registered in a healthier manner, an updating effort started on 1 January 2017 concerning the up to 2 million 834 thousand registrations conducted between 2011 and 2016 by different institutions and in various ways. This biggest project of updating the registrations, which was conducted under the cooperation of DGMM-UNHCR and took 2 years to complete, played a decisive role in clarifying the data related to Syrians in Turkey. Through this: (i) registration was centralized, (ii) finger prints were taken as part of registrations, (iii) an identification number is generated for each registration, (iv) those registered were issued “secure ID cards”, and (v) a wide range of demographic and socio-economic data was collected from Syrians through a form that contained around 90 information sections, with a number of “mandatory fields”. All this information was structured in such a way to allow for efficient tracking and regular updates. This dynamic and self-updating system enables the authorities to track changes related to giving birth, marriage, divorce, education lives of children, access to health services, and receiving SUY/ESSN funds of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. It also produced more reliable data concerning the number of Syrians in Turkey, eliminated duplications, and allowed for keeping the data up-to-date through this very dynamic process.

This process involved updating the previously collected data from 2 million 834 thousand registered Syrians as well as the first-time registrations of newly arrived Syrians and babies born to Syrian parents in Turkey. During various encounters with them, authorities from DGMM suggested that the new registration numbers were 517 thousand (415 thousand new registrations and 102 thousand newborn babies) in 2017, 397 thousand (284 thousand new registrations and 113 thousand newborn babies) in 2018, 300 thousand (193 thousand new registrations and 107 thousand newborn babies) in 2019. In total, there were over 1 million 214 thousand newly registered and newborn (892 thousand new registrations and 322 thousand newborn babies) Syrians were taken under registration as people under temporary protection in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019.

Another comprehensive field study concerning Syrians under temporary protection, international protection applicants, and irregular migrants in Turkey was conducted under the cooperation of DGMM and IOM in 2018 and 2019, entitled "Migrant Presence Monitoring" (MPM).⁶⁴ The study was conducted in 25 cities, including Istanbul. Even though this research excluded some important cities hosting around 1.1 million Syrians such as Hatay, Kilis, Adana, Mardin, Osmaniye, Kayseri, and Ankara; while the findings showed that Syrians in Turkey are very mobile, they also largely confirmed the DGMM figures concerning where Syrians live. While according to DGMM data there were 2 million 230 thousand registered Syrians in the cities covered by MPM research, the study found that the total number of Syrians living in these cities were 2 million 245 thousand. However, the figures suggested by DGMM were not matched to those found by MPM in some cities, especially including Istanbul, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Izmir, and Bursa. While there are 496 thousand Syrians registered in Istanbul according to DGMM figures, the MPM study has found that 961 thousand Syrians were living in this city. This study also confirmed that a significant number of Syrians, while being registered in border region cities like Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Hatay, and Kilis, live in big metropolitan cities especially including Istanbul. In this context, the study revealed, for instance, that 236 thousand Syrians lived in Şanlıurfa where 477 thousand are registered and 323 thousand Syrians lived in Gaziantep as opposed to the 406 thousand registered in the city.


Therefore, the GÖÇNET registration system of DGMM which is constantly updated, the registration updating project conducted by DGMM and UNHCR, and the findings of the MPM field study conducted by DGMM and IOM show that, while there is a high degree of mobility of Syrians among cities, the figures provided by DGMM concerning the number of Syrians in Turkey are largely accurate.

c. Distribution of Syrians in Turkey by Cities

The distribution of Syrians in Turkey by cities is known through their registration data. However, the number of registered Syrians in a city and the number of Syrians who actually live in that city might differ. As a result, while more Syrians live in the big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, and Adana than the number of registered refugees in these cities; it is the other way around in border cities such as Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, and Kilis where a fewer number of Syrians live compared to the number of registered Syrians. According to the registration-based data as of 31 December 2019, the largest number of (479,420) Syrians live in Istanbul. The registered Syrian residents of Istanbul account for 3.18% of city's population. In terms of absolute numbers, Istanbul is followed by Gaziantep where 454 thousand Syrians live (22,4% of its population), Hatay with 439 thousand Syrian residents (27,33% of its population), and Şanlıurfa with 427 thousand registered Syrians (21,01% of its population). In terms of the percentage of population, Kilis is the city with the largest Syrian community. With a local population of 142 thousand, Kilis is home to 116 thousand Syrians. In other words, the number of Syrians in Kilis corresponds to 81,56% of this city's population. The number of Turkish cities with more than 100 thousand registered Syrians is 10. Considering the fact that many of these cities already had various structural problems, arrival of large numbers of Syrians have led to an increase in poverty as well as some problems regarding access to public services.

64 IOM-Turkey: <https://turkey.iom.int/migrant-presence-monitoring> (Access: 21.02.2020)

SB-2019-FIGURE 10: Top 10 Cities in Turkey with Syrian Residents (31.10.2019)



Source: DGMM: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access: 05.01.2020)


The distribution of Syrians in Turkey by cities of residence display significant discrepancies among different cities. Compared to their populations, there are 12 cities that have a higher percentage of Syrian residents than the Turkey's overall average, which is 4.47%. These 12 cities, ranked by percentage of Syrian residents to city's population, are Kilis (%81,73), Hatay (%27,39), Gaziantep (%22,29), Şanlıurfa (%21,11), Mersin (%11,29), Adana (%10,82), Mardin (%10,61), Osmaniye (%9,53), Kahramanmaraş (%8,12), Bursa (%5,91), Kayseri (%5,80), and Konya (%4,98).

SB-2019-FIGURE 11: Distribution of Syrian Refugees in the Scope of Temporary Protection by Province (31.12.2019) (Alphabetical)

Province No	Province	Registered	Population	Comparasion Percentage with Province Population	Province No	Province	Registered	Population	Comparasion Percentage with Province Population
	TOTAL (TURKEY)	3.576.370	82.003.882	4,36 %		TOTAL (TURKEY)	3.576.370	82.003.882	4,36 %
1	ADANA	243.613	2.220.125	10,96%	42	KAHRAMANMARAŞ	93.604	1.144.851	8,18%
2	ADYAMAN	21.016	624.513	3,37%	43	KARABÜK	995	248.014	0,40%
3	AFYON	9.145	725.568	1,26%	44	KARAMAN	817	251.913	0,32%
4	AĞRI	1.119	539.657	0,21%	45	KARS	169	288.878	0,06%
5	AKSARAY	3.241	412.172	0,79%	46	KASTAMONU	3.242	383.373	0,85%
6	AMASYA	806	337.508	0,24%	47	KAYSERİ	73.714	1.389.680	5,30%
7	ANKARA	96.011	5.503.985	1,74%	48	KIRIKKALE	1.732	286.602	0,60%
8	ANTALYA	1.976	2.426.356	0,08%	49	KIRKLARELİ	1.042	360.860	0,29%
9	ARDAHAN	118	98.907	0,12%	50	KİRŞEHİR	1.438	241.868	0,59%
10	ARTVİN	37	174.010	0,02%	51	KİLİS	116.252	142.541	81,56%
11	AYDIN	7.809	1.097.746	0,71%	52	KOCAELİ	55.585	1.906.391	2,92%
12	BALIKESİR	4.703	1.226.575	0,38%	53	KONYA	111.399	2.205.609	5,05%
13	BARTIN	247	198.999	0,12%	54	KÜTAHYA	1.443	577.941	0,25%
14	BATMAN	15.719	599.103	2,42%	55	MALATYA	28.544	797.036	3,58%
15	BAYBURT	22	82.274	0,03%	56	MANİSA	13.061	1.429.643	0,91%
16	BİLECİK	603	223.448	0,27%	57	MARDİN	38.027	829.195	10,62%
17	BİNGÖL	1.069	281.205	0,37%	58	MERSİN	207.834	1.814.468	11,45%
18	BİTLİS	1.190	349.396	0,34%	59	MUĞLA	11.213	967.487	1,16%
19	BOLU	2.977	311.010	0,95%	60	MUŞ	1.521	407.992	0,37%
20	BURDUR	7.653	269.926	2,84%	61	NEVŞEHİR	9.744	298.339	3,27%
21	BURSA	176.773	2.994.521	5,90%	62	NİĞDE	5.044	364.707	1,38%
22	ÇANAKKALE	5.699	540.662	1,05%	63	ORDU	877	771.932	0,11%
23	ÇANKIRI	597	216.362	0,28%	64	OSMANİYE	49.736	514.415	9,31%
24	ÇORUM	2.824	536.483	0,53%	65	RİZE	1.046	348.608	0,30%
25	DENİZLİ	11.652	1.027.782	1,13%	66	SAKARYA	14.980	1.010.700	1,48%
26	DIYARBAKIR	23.619	1.732.396	1,36%	67	SAMSUN	6.510	1.335.716	0,49%
27	DÜZCE	1.828	387.844	0,47%	68	SİİRT	4.220	331.670	1,27%
28	EDİRNE	1.074	411.528	0,26%	69	SİNOP	170	219.733	0,08%
29	ELAZIĞ	13.164	595.638	2,21%	70	SİVAS	3.594	646.608	0,56%
30	ERZİNCAN	103	236.034	0,04%	71	ŞANLIURFA	427.696	2.035.809	21,01%
31	ERZURUM	1.126	767.848	0,15%	72	ŞIRNAK	14.997	524.190	2,86%
32	ESKİŞEHİR	5.215	871.187	0,60%	73	TEKİRDAĞ	12.859	1.029.927	1,25%
33	GAZİANTEP	454.361	2.028.563	22,40%	74	TOKAT	1.046	612.646	0,17%
34	GİRESUN	189	453.912	0,04%	75	TRABZON	3.365	807.903	0,42%
35	GÜMÜŞHANE	189	162.748	0,05%	76	TUNCELİ	45	88.198	0,05%
36	HAKKARİ	5.215	286.470	1,82%	77	UŞAK	2.497	367.514	0,68%
37	HATAY	439.983	1.609.856	27,33%	78	VAN	2.178	1.123.784	0,19%
38	İĞDIR	85	197.456	0,04%	79	YALOVA	3.881	262.234	1,48%
39	ISPARTA	5.345	441.412	1,21%	80	YOZGAT	4.784	424.981	1,13%
40	İSTANBUL	479.420	15.067.724	3,18%	81	ZONGULDAK	623	599.698	0,10%
41	İZMİR	147.627	4.320.519	3,42%					

Source: DGMM: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik (Access: 05.01.2020)

SB-2019-FIGURE 12: Syrian Residents as Percentage of City Population–December 2019
(Cities that have either 100 thousand Syrians or more than Turkey's average)



In terms of percentage of city population, the cities in the border region clearly host much larger Syrian communities. In terms of absolute numbers, these cities in the border region have more than 2.1 million Syrian residents: Gaziantep (454 thousand), Hatay (439 thousand), Şanlıurfa (427 thousand), Adana (243 thousand), Mersin (207 thousand), Kilis, (116 thousand), Kahramanmaraş (93 thousand), Mardin (88 thousand), and Osmaniye (49 thousand). More than 57% of all Syrians in Turkey live in these border region cities, while the remaining 43% live in other regions. The three largest metropolitan cities; i.e. Istanbul (479 thousand), Ankara (96 thousand), and Izmir (147 thousand), have in total 722 thousand Syrians registered in them. In other words, more than 20% of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey live in these three largest cities. 13,39% of all registered Syrians live in Istanbul. However, as it was already mentioned, the actual number is known to be higher due to those Syrians who are registered in other cities but who live in Istanbul. According to the above-introduced MPM study conducted by DGMM and IOM, the total number of Syrians living in Istanbul was 961 thousand, which would mean that the proportion of Syrians to the population of Istanbul could be as high as 6,37%.⁶⁵

d. Urban Refugees

One of the most significant characteristics of Syrians in Turkey is that they have turned into “urban refugees”, especially since 2013. As of 27 November 2019, only 1,77% (63.443) of the total number of 3.576.370 Syrians in Turkey live in the 7 camps located in the following 5 cities: Hatay (3), Kilis, Adana, Kahramanmaraş, and Osmaniye.

⁶⁵ The “Migrants’ Presence Monitoring” (MPM) activity conducted by DGMM in cooperation with IOM in 25 cities and found that there were significant differences between the number of registered Syrians in these cities and the actual number of Syrians living in them. Therefore, the study has shown that the actual rates of Syrians living in cities might be different from the ones calculated using the registration figures. According to this MPM activity, some of the ratios of Syrians to the populations of the cities that they live are as follows: İstanbul: 961 thousand, 6,37%; İzmir 51 thousand, 1,18%; Gaziantep 323 thousand, 15,92%; Şanlıurfa 234 thousand, 11,49%; Mersin 163 thousand, 8,98%; Kahramanmaraş 85 thousand, 10,39%. In the 2018-2019 MPM activity, some of the cities hosting large numbers of Syrians, namely Kilis, Hatay, Adana, Mardin, and Osmaniye were not included. IOM-Turkey: <https://turkey.iom.int/migrant-presence-monitoring> (Access: 20.02.2020)

SB-2019-FIGURE 13: Sheltered and Unsheltered Syrian Refugees by Temporary Protection (December 2019)



Distribution of Syrian Refugees in the Scope of Temporary Protection According to Shelter Centers (7 Shelter Centers in 5 Cities)

City	Name of the Temporary Shelter Center	Number of Syrian Refugees under Temporary Protection in Shelter	Grand Total in Cities
ADANA (1)	Sarıçam	20.700	20.700
KİLİS (1)	Elbeyli	8.517	8.517
KAHRAMANMARAŞ (1)	Merkez	10.859	10.859
HATAY (3)	Altınözü	2.667	10.757
	Yayladağı	4.061	
	Apaydın	4.029	
OSMANIYE (1)	Cevdetiye	12.610	12.610
TOTAL		63.443	

Source: GİGM: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik (Access: 05.01.2020)

e. Age and Sex Distribution of Syrians in Turkey

It is observed that the average age of Syrians in Turkey is smaller than that of Turkish population. While **the average age of Turkish population was 31,7 according to the 2018 data, the average age of Syrians in Turkey is 22,54**. When the share of young populations (those aged 15-24) within the overall populations are concerned, a similar finding emerges. While the young population constitutes 15,8% of Turkey's population, within the Syrians the share of young population is **22,55%**.

The number of Syrian babies born in Turkey increases day by day since 2011.⁶⁶ This increasing number of births can be seen as an indicator of normalization in the lives of Syrians. According to the Ministry of Health data, as of January 2020, the total number of Syrian babies born in Turkey was 535 thousand. More specifically, there were 116 thousand Syrian births in Turkey between 2011 and 2015; 82.850 in 2016; 111.325 in 2017, 113

66 According to the information provided by the Ministry of Health, the number of Syrian babies born in Turkey was 198.948 as of 31 December 2016. BY 30 September 2017, this number has increased to 276.158. Source: Presentation by Migration Health Department of Directorate General of Public Health, Ministry of Health (Hacettepe University- 16 October 2017).

thousand in 2018; and 107 thousand in 2019.⁶⁷ As of 31 December 2019, the number of Syrians aged 0-4 was 591 thousand, that of aged 5-9 was 494 thousand, which means that the total number of Syrian babies who were born in Turkey can be calculated to be over 550 thousand.

* As stated, the number of Syrians in the 0-4 age group most of whom were born in Turkey was 591.255 as of 31 December 2019. According to the Turkey Population and Health Research (TNSA) conducted by Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University in 2018, the fertility rate in Turkey is 2,3. The highest regional fertility rate in Turkey is in Eastern Anatolia, which is 3,2. The total fertility rate among Syrians in Turkey is 5,3. It is also observed that 93% of Syrian births in Turkey take place at a health facility.

* The number of Syrian children aged 5-17, in other words those who are in the “mandatory schooling age”, is around 1 million 60 thousand.

* The Syrian population in the active working ages (15-64) is around 2.2 million.

SB-2019-FIGURE 14: Distribution by Age and Sex of Registered Syrian Refugees Recorded by Taking Biometric Data (31.12.2019)


AGE	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
	1.931.289	1.645.081	3.576.370
0-4	305.587	285.668	591.255
5-9	254.441	239.693	494.134
10-14	191.036	176.755	367.791
15-18	146.839	119.728	266.567
19-24	307.928	222.710	530.638
25-29	194.629	140.049	334.678
30-34	159.703	118.365	278.068
35-39	112.869	90.181	203.050
40-44	74.479	66.882	141.361
45-49	55.394	53.370	108.764
50-54	44.733	43.194	87.927
55-59	31.105	31.576	62.681
60-64	21.732	22.378	44.110
65-69	14.146	14.895	29.041
70-74	7.931	8.590	16.521
75-79	4.356	5.477	9.833
80-84	2.397	2.984	5.381
85-89	1.302	1.725	3.027
90+	682	861	1.543

Source: GİGM: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik (Access: 05.01.2020)

* The sex distribution of Syrian population in Turkey, similar to those observed in Lebanon and Jordan, is quite interesting. 1.931.289 or 54% of the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey are male while 1.645.081 or 46% are female. The age group in which the sex distribution is the most unbalanced is 19-29. In this age


group, males constitute 58% while females make up of 42%. In every age group between 0 and 54 Syrian males are more populous than females.

SB-2019-FIGURE 15: Population Pyramid of Syrians in Turkey



Source: TNSA, http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/tnsa2018/rapor/sonuclar_sunum.pdf

SB-2019-FIGURE 16: Sex Distribution of Different Age Groups of Syrians in Turkey



Source: Dr. Mehmet Ali Eryurt (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies)

2. Syrians in Turkey and Education⁶⁸


There are four main issue areas related to the education of Syrians in Turkey. The first one of these relates to the general educational attainment level of Syrians. The second issue is the access to education of Syrian children and youth, while the third and the fourth concern higher education, and language and vocational education, respectively.

a. General Educational Attainment Level of Syrians in Turkey

The general level of educational attainment is very important concerning Syrians' integration processes as well as the future education policies that regard their access to education in Turkey. The existing data on this subject, limited as it is, suggests that the average level of educational attainment is significantly below the Turkish national average. To emphasize, this is extremely relevant for the integration and education policies. One of the most important implications of the level of education in the community is apparent in the support that the families display to their children's education. Similarly, level of education could play an important role in terms of learning Turkish, entrepreneurship, participation in social life, and ability to acquire local values and norms.

The illiteracy rate in Turkey is 3,6%, which is 1,1% among men and 6,1% among women.⁶⁹ Information regarding the general education level of Syrians in Turkey, who correspond to 4,5% of the national population, is quite scarce. Perhaps the only relevant official data released to this day was within "First Stage Needs Assessment Covering 2016-2018 Period for Syrians with Temporary Protection Status in Turkey", which was published by the Ministry of Development in the framework of "Turkey-EU Compact on Refugees" negotiations.⁷⁰

SB-2019-FIGURE 17: SYRIANS ACCORDING TO THEIR EDUCATIONAL STATUSES (%) (2016)



Source: First Stage Needs Assessment Covering 2016-2018 Period for Syrians with Temporary Protection Status in Turkey, Ministry of Development, March 2016, p.7

68 For the information used in this section see: M.Murat Erdoğan and Metin Çorabatır (2019) "Suriyeli Mülteci Nüfusunun Demografik Gelişimi, Türkiye'deki Eğitim, İstihdam Ve Belediye Hizmetlerine Yakın Gelecekte Olası Etkileri" (Demography of Syrian Refugees and Potential Impacts on Education, Employment and Municipal Services in Turkey), GIZ, Quadra Program.

69 The city with the highest rate of illiterates in Turkey is Sanliurfa with 10%. TÜİK: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist> (Access: 08.09.2019) and Anadolu Agency: <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/okuryazar-olmayanlarin-yuzde-85-2si-kadin/1504120> (Access: 08.09.2019). In addition, according to TÜİK data, the rate of illiterates who were 25 years old or older was 5,4% in Turkey, which was 1,8% among men and 9% among women. (<http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?sessionId=QHmtYPfcpVGmQqb4TNQH21dZQOQbP867kRyLQpw5CXGDRmnnfC9!1760913843?id=24643>) (Access: 04.12.2019)

70 Ministry of Development: First Stage Needs Assessment Covering 2016-2018 Period for Syrians with Temporary Protection Status in Turkey, March 2016, p.6.

According to this March 2016 study that was based on the data provided by DGMM, 33% of Syrians in Turkey were illiterate while 13% were literate but not graduated from any formal school. Another 26,6% in this study were marked as “no response”. This shows, unfortunately, a significant lack of education. However, it has been frequently suggested that this information obtained in 2016 might not be very reliable and there might be significant errors in the figures due to some technical difficulties and intensity experienced during the collection of data. Syrians Barometer-2017 has found that 18,5% are illiterate and another 11,8% are literate but not graduated from any school. Similarly, “2016 Research on Health Context of Syrians in Turkey” conducted by AFAD and WHO has found that 14,9% of Syrians have no official education and 14,3% have a lower than primary school level of education.⁷¹ According to a Hacettepe University IPS research in 2018, those with no primary school diploma constitute 35% among men and 40% among women in the Syrian community in Turkey.⁷² In the Syrians Barometer-2019 research, on the educational attainment level of the Syrian households, the findings are as follows: 8,2% are illiterate, 16,7% have not finished primary school, 31,7% are primary school graduates, 22% are middle school graduates, 11,4% are graduates of high-schools or equivalent, 2,7% are graduates of junior college or vocational schools, 7% are with an undergraduate degree, and 0,3% are with graduate degrees. In other words, a total of 24,9% of Syrians appears to be illiterate or without a primary school degree in this study.

To better understand the general picture, information from pre-war Syria released by the Turkish Ministry of National Education (MoNE) would be helpful. Accordingly, the schooling rate in Syria before 2011 was 92% at the primary school level, 69% at the middle-school level, and 26% at the high-school level. In the same period in Turkey the schooling rate at the primary school level was 99%, at the middle-school level 93%, and at the high-school level 70%. In other words, while the average schooling rate in Syria was 62,3%, it was 87,3% in Turkey in the same period.⁷³ Furthermore, the schooling rate was even lower in North Syria, from where a majority of the Syrians in Turkey came. Therefore, all these indirect data bits confirm one another to show that the general picture concerning the level of education of Syrians in Turkey is not very bright.

SB-2019-TABLE 2: Educational Attainment of individuals in the household

	#	%
Illiterate	436	8,2
Literate but no formal education	891	16,7
Primary school	1690	31,7
Primary education/elementary school	1170	22,0
High school or equivalent	608	11,4
Undergraduate	141	2,7
Bachelor's	373	7,0
Master's/PhD	15	0,3

Note: Results for persons over the age of 6.

71 Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Ali Eryurt -Hacettepe University, Institute of Population Studies: 2016 Research on Health Context of Syrians in Turkey, AFAD-SB-WHO.

72 This study has found that those with no primary school diploma constituted 14% among men and 25% among women. 2018-TNSA, http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/tnsa2018/rapor/2018_TNSA_SR.pdf (Access: 04.12.2019)


73 Syrian Barometer-2017, pp.44.

According to 2017 data, the rate of illiteracy in Turkey was 3,3%. Therefore, whether the data released by the Turkish Ministry of Development (33%), or by Hacettepe University IPS study (35-40%), or by SB-2017 (18,5%) or SB-2019 studies (8,2%) is taken into consideration, it is clear that there is a significant imbalance in terms of the general level of education, which may create significant implications.

b. School Age (5-17 Years of Age) Syrian Children in Turkey

Education of Syrian children in Turkey is of vital importance both for preventing lost generations from emerging and for any vision of a future peaceful cohabitation to be realized. According to data from DGMM and MoNE, the number of school age Syrian children, i.e. 5- to 17-year-olds, is 1 million 60 thousand in Turkey as of 31 December 2019. This number constitutes 29,64% of all Syrians under temporary protection in the country. Turkey has been displaying a huge effort in the face of this unprecedented and massive number, which had put significant strain on the capacity of national education. The numbers of schooled Syrian children for the past few academic years are as follows: 230 thousand in 2014-2015, 311 thousand in 2015-2016, 492 thousand in 2016-2017, 610 thousand in 2017-2018, and 643.058 in 2018-2019. The number reached in the 2019-2020 academic year is 684.728. While 87% of these students are enrolled in public schools, 13% of them (25.287 students) receive education at the Temporary Education Centers (TECs), where the language of education is Arabic with intense Turkish language courses. According to the most recent available data, 63,23% of the Syrian children in this age group have been schooled. In terms of different levels of education, schooling rates differ significantly: it is 27.19% at kindergarten, 89,27% at primary school, 70,5% at middle-school, and 32,88% at high-school levels.⁷⁴ According to MoNE data, as of 2019, the number of students at 12th grade who have the potential for placement in a university was only 10.077, which constituted 14,7% of the age population. One very clear problem related to education of Syrian children in Turkey is dropping out of school, which becomes increasingly evident and frequent in more advanced levels of education.

SB-2019-FIGURE 18: Number of Syrian Students with Access to Education in Turkey by Years



Source: MoNE the Directorate General of Lifelong Learning https://hboqm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2019_06/26115239_14_HAziran___2019_YNTERNET_SUNUUU_.pdf (Access: 07.07.2019)

The Syrian school age children who receive education in Turkey appear quite balanced in terms of their gender distribution. Of the total 684.728 Syrian students, 49,18% are girls and 50,82% are boys.

74 Directorate General of Lifelong Learning: https://hboqm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2019_11/06141131_11Ekim2019internetBulteni.pdf (Access: 05.12.2019)

SB-2019-FIGURE 19: Schooling Numbers and Rates of Syrians by School Grade (01 April 2019)

CLASS	E-SCHOOL (Turkish Public School) Registered Students	YÖBİS (Temporary Education Centers in Arabic) Registered Students	TOTAL	Education levels	School age population	School age population by Education Levels	Percentage
Pre-School (5-year-olds)	30.997	1.201	32.198	32.198	95.094	95.094	33,9%
1.class (6-year-olds)	99.914	626	100.540	365.535	101.529	382.748	95,5%
2.class (7-year-olds)	92.398	920	93.858		99.667		
3.class (8-year-olds)	70.211	2.554	72.765		94.684		
4.class (9-year-olds)	55.494	42.878	98.372		86.868		
5.class (10-year-olds)	67.503	908	68.411	173.252	85.820	300.458	57,66%
6.class (11-year-olds)	42.817	2.513	45.330		77.881		
7.class (12-year-olds)	22.444	9.129	31.573		69.818		
8.class (13-year-olds)	13.862	14.076	27.938		66.939		
9.class (14-year-olds)	20.254	214	20.468	72.073	66.550	269.236	26,77%
10.class (15-year-olds)	10.290	691	10.981		64.782		
11.class (16-year-olds)	5.344	3.870	9.214		69.398		
12.class (17-year-olds)	2.849	7.228	10.077		68.515		
HEP A-B & High-school preparation	5	3.704	3.709				
Open schools	17.624	0	17.624				
TOTAL STUDENT	552.546	90.512	643.058	643.058	1.047.536	1.047.536	61,39%

HEP A: Turkish A1-A2 level language course for foreign students of 10-18 years of age (2.535 students) / HEP B: Complementary education for 3rd and 4th grades (153 students) / High School Preparation, Support, and Catch-Up Classes (1.021 students) / Source: General Directorate of Lifelong Learning (May 2019)

Revisiting some statistics related to education in pre-war Syria would help accentuate the scale of Turkey's efforts concerning the access to education of Syrian children. 2011 data concerning schooling in Syria suggest that schooling rate was 12% at kindergarten, 92% at primary school, 69% at middle-school, and 26% at high-school. These figures confirm that Turkey has displayed an admirable performance in a matter of 5 years, which need to be seen as a success. In addition, education in Syria was very negatively affected by the outbreak of war. In northern Syria, the average rates of access to education is 6% in Aleppo, 38% in Idlib, 60% in Raqqa, and 80% in Al-Hasakah.⁷⁵

c. Regulations of Ministry of National Education Concerning Education of Syrians in Turkey

MoNE has made several regulations concerning the education of Syrians from the beginning. The first major step was the adoption of "MoNE Regulation on Secondary Education Institutions" on 7 September 2013. This Regulation, in its 29th Article, under the title of "Students of Foreign Nationality", has made the first comprehensive regulations related to this field.⁷⁶ With the process moving very quickly, the Ministry issued a new Circular in September 2014 entitled "Education Services For Foreign Nationals", which has lifted the requirement of a residence permit for Syrian children's registration to a school. The Regulation on Temporary Protection, published in the Official Gazette on 22 October 2014, regulates education-related issues in its 28th Article. Here, education is defined as a right for those under temporary protection and the MoNE is authorized to coordinate and audit policies. The 35th Article of this Regulation on the "limitations on the enjoyment of rights" is quite noteworthy. This article states that "Those who partially fail to fulfill their obligations or who couldn't fulfill their obligations in the determined time frame would be warned by relative authorities; legal and administrative action would ensue for those who fail to comply". Having said this, however, the Article goes on to single out "emergency health services" and "education": "Those who fail to fulfill their obligations could face complete or partial restrictions in enjoying their rights, except for education and emergency health services."⁷⁷ In addition, MoNE has implemented a "High School Proficiency and Equivalency Exam for Foreign Students" in June 2015. As a result, the successful ones of 8.500 attendees were issued a certificate of equivalency or

75 Presentation on "Education Services towards Students under Temporary Protection" by the Department of Migration and Emergency Education, Directorate General of Lifelong Learning, Ministry of National Education

76 MoNE Regulation on Secondary Education Institutions: <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/09/20130907-4.htm> (Access: 03.07.2019)

77 Regulation on Temporary Protection: http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/03052014_6883.pdf (Access: 03.07.2019)

graduation diplomas by MoNE. Those who already graduated from high schools were given the chance to enroll to various universities in Turkey.

There were other significant steps taken for Syrian students in Turkey by MoNE in 2016. The first of these was an agreement concluded with the EU Turkey Delegation which devoted 300 million € from the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) to be spent for education expenses. An even more important step was taken in August 2016 when MoNE had finalized a “road map” for the education of Syrian children in Turkey. Here, a remarkable change of approaches is apparent compared to 2011-2015 period. This road map that was adopted by the Ministry also established a new institutional framework with the formation of a “Department of Migration and Emergency Education” under the Directorate General of Lifelong Learning.⁷⁸ The new planning has established integration of Syrian children into Turkish education system as the main objective and regulated the rights of refugees in the national education framework as well as the various services to be offered to them. As a natural result of this, gradual elimination of TECs, where education is offered in Arabic and using a Syrian curriculum, within three years to be completed in 2020.

There is an urgent need to build additional capacity including additional teachers, classrooms, and school buildings to be able to provide a high-quality education for the Syrian children without causing the local society to suffer. Such a capacity building and improvement of existing capacities is essential to minimize the risk of lost generations as well as to prevent social tensions that might arise as a result of deteriorating education services. However, it is obvious that this would take a lot of time and resources to accomplish. MoNE data concerning current education practices in Turkey suggests that an average classroom would serve 30 students and an average primary school has a capacity of 720 students, with one teacher to be employed per 20 students. These figures clearly demonstrate that integrating the 1 million 47 thousand Syrian children into formal education in Turkey would require, among other things, a lot of new classrooms and teachers. Obviously, education also brings a significant cost to the state’s budget. According to Turkish Statistical Institute calculations, the average cost of a primary school/middle-school/high-school student in Turkey was 8.111 TL in the year 2017.⁷⁹ On the basis of this figure, it could be suggested that the total cost of schooling for the 684 thousand Syrian children in Turkey has been 5,5 billion TL, which was around 873 million € according to December 2019 exchange rates (6,3 TL=1 €). This would show the scale of the financial cost on Turkey’s budget, only looking at one public service sector, i.e. education.

Another component of the additional costs would relate to the aforementioned need to increase the number of teachers, classrooms, and schools. The July 2017 needs analysis exercise conducted by MoNE includes both the accumulated general needs and the city-based needs.⁸⁰ The most striking bit of information in this analysis was that there was a need for 1.189 new schools to cater to the needs of 856 thousand school age Syrians at the time, while the number of planned new schools to be built in the framework of EU-funded projects was 183, accounting only for 15,3% of the need.⁸¹ According to this exercise, the number of school age Syrian children in Şanlıurfa was 142.042 at the time with 197 new schools needed. However, in October 2018 the number of school age children has grown to 152.742 and the needed number of new schools increased to 212. The number of new schools to be built in the framework of EU projects, in the meantime, remained unchanged at 14. Of course, there are new schools that are planned or built by the MoNE, private sector or other charitable donors. However, it is plainly obvious that it will take quite a long time for the whole need to be satisfied.

78 <http://www.meb.gov.tr/suriyeli-cocuklarin-egitimi-icin-yol-haritasi-belirlendi/haber/11750/tr> (Access: 03.07.2019)

79 <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=27600> (Access: 11.07.2019)

80 Presentation on “Education Services towards Students under Temporary Protection” by the Department of Migration and Emergency Education, Directorate General of Lifelong Learning, Ministry of National Education.

81 For the purpose of supporting the education infrastructure for Syrians under temporary protection, it is planned to transfer EU funds in the context of FRIT (150 million Euros constructing 75 reinforced concrete school buildings), in the context of MADAD2 (68 million Euro constructing 30 school buildings- reinforced concrete and prefabricated), and in the context of additional FRIT funds (45 million Euro constructing 46 prefabricated schools). Presentation on “Education Services towards Students under Temporary Protection” by the Department of Migration and Emergency Education, Directorate General of Lifelong Learning, Ministry of National Education.

The “Department of Migration and Emergencies Education” was established within the Directorate General of Lifelong Learning with the MoNE “road map” dated August 2016.⁸² A very comprehensive project concerning education of Syrians, Project on “Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System” (PICTES), implemented by MoNE and supported by the EU was also conceived within the framework of March 2016 Statement and started on 3 October 2016. The expected outcomes of the project included “increasing Syrian children’s access to education”, “improving the quality of education provided for Syrian students”, and “enhancing the operational capacity of educational institutions and staff members”.⁸³ There is a significant risk that without such capacity enhancement, merely schooling Syrian children in Turkey would produce negative influences on the education system. Therefore, prevention lost generations without making the local children suffer from a decrease in quality of education requires taking such issues concerning capacity into consideration.

Another important initiative in 2017 by the MoNE in cooperation with international actors has been the introduction of the “Conditional Cash Transfer for Education” (CCTE), which proved to be an important financial assistance for the poor Syrian families. The program started in May 2017 financed in the amount of 66,5 million USD. The number of Syrian children benefiting from this support in the past two years was 494.620.

Conditional Cash Transfer for Education

This program is implemented to encourage access to education of school age Syrians in Turkey. In fact, the program has been implemented by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies since 2003, which in principle was open to non-citizens as well but in practice almost exclusively benefited by Turkish citizens. The process of incorporating Syrians and other refugees in the country has been accelerated in 2017 by the Ministry in close cooperation with United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), MoNE, Turkish Red Crescent, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), and the Norwegian government. CCTE payments are made per individual student once every two months on the condition that they regularly attend school from kindergarten to the end of high-school. Girls receive a larger support than boys.⁸⁴ Eligible families can apply to benefit both from CCTE and SUY/ESSN programs.

d. Syrians in Turkish Higher Education System

The number of Syrian students, some of whom being university drop-outs from Syria and others graduated from Turkish schools to proceed to higher education, enrolled in Turkish universities has been steadily increasing.⁸⁵ The number of Syrian students who were enrolled to around 100 public and 50 private universities in Turkey was 14.747 in the 2016-2017 academic year, 20.701 in 2018-2019, 27.606 in 2018-2019, and 33.553 in 2019-2020. Syrian students are at the top of the list of foreign university students in Turkey, whose total number is around 140 thousand. Syrian students at the public universities do not pay any tuition fees. In the 2017-2018 academic year, there were 410 doctoral and 1.650 graduate students among Syrians. There are many national and international institutions, especially including the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), who provide scholarships to Syrian students. Among these EU support, DAFI, HOPES, and SPARK scholarships have a special place. According to existing studies, however, only around 15% of Syrian university students receive a scholarship.

The Turkish state and its relevant institutions, MoNE and Higher Education Council (YOK), have been making significant efforts to increase the number of Syrian students in Turkish higher education. There appear to be four main reasons for this strategy:

1. To provide a peaceful and honorable future for the Syrian youth who had escaped war and destruction in Syria; prevent lost generations from emerging; developing human capital
2. To help Syrian university students to create bridges between the more than 3.6 million Syrians and the Turkish society, thus making them important actors of a peaceful future together
3. To make them contribute in Turkey
4. To help them assume a pivotal role in the reconstruction of Syria should they return to their country of origin


82 <http://www.meb.gov.tr/suriyeli-cocuklarin-egitimi-icin-yol-haritasi-belirlendi/haber/11750/tr>

83 <https://pictes.meb.gov.tr/izleme/> (Access: 13.07.2019)

84 The supports are in the amount of 35 TL for male and 40 TL for female students at the primary school level and at the high school level they are 50 TL for both male and female students. See: UNICEF-Turkey [http://unicef.org.tr/files/editorfiles/ccte_brosur_TR_250817_printer\(1\).pdf](http://unicef.org.tr/files/editorfiles/ccte_brosur_TR_250817_printer(1).pdf) (Access: 20.10.2017)

85 M. Murat Erdoğan, Armağan Erdoğan, Başak Yavçan, Tulin Haji Mohamad (2019) Elite-Dialogue-II: “Elite Dialogue-II: Dialogue with Syrian Asylum-Seekers in Turkey through Syrian Academics and Graduate Students”, TAGU-TMK.

SB-2019-FIGURE 20: Syrians in Higher Education



Source: YOK: <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/> (Table created by M. Murat Erdoğan using yearly numbers released by YOK)

It is important to note that international institutions play an important role in this process, particularly through financial assistance. It is, however, essential that this role needs to be strengthened and made sustainable. Preventing lost generations from emerging and developing human capital are common interests for everyone concerned.

e. Turkish Language Courses and Vocational Training

Turkish language teaching is a very important topic for the Syrians in Turkey. For the first time, Turkey has found itself in need of developing large scale language education modules intended for foreigners. MoNE has recruited 5.959 temporary education personnel, 5.468 of whom Turkish language teachers and 491 Guidance and Psychological Counseling personnel, to be employed for “Teaching Turkish to Foreigners” in 2017. These new personnel were given a special training for two weeks before commencing their missions. 925.000 prints of specially developed “Turkish Education” sets, which were prepared by Yunus Emre Institute, were distributed to Syrian students.

The Public Education Centers also developed age-specific “Turkish Language for Foreigners” modules. The language courses at these Centers were applied for 6-12, 13-17 age groups and adults at A1, A2, and B1 language proficiency levels using modules developed by the Ministry. Between 2014 and 2019, 302.906 Syrians have attended Turkish language courses. 126.019 (41,60%) of these Syrians were men while 176.887 (58,4%) were women.

The Directorate General of Lifelong Learning at the Ministry of National Education makes a considerable effort to increase the participation of Syrians to Turkish language education and vocational training courses. In the same period between 2014 and 2019, total number of Syrians at all age groups who attended Turkish language and other courses offered by the Ministry through these Centers was 505.922.

3. Livelihoods of Syrians in Turkey⁸⁶

One of the most sensitive issue areas in mass migration contexts concerns working. The local society is worried

86 For the information used in this section see: M.Murat Erdoğan and Metin Çorabatır (2019) “Suriyeli Mülteci Nüfusunun Demografik Gelişimi, Türkiye’deki Eğitim, İstihdam Ve Belediye Hizmetlerine Yakın Gelecekte Olası Etkileri” (Demography of Syrian Refugees and Potential Impacts on Education, Employment and Municipal Services in Turkey), GIZ, Quadra Program.

that the newcomer immigrants/refugees, who would often assume the role of “cheap labor”, would take their jobs and incomes. This is not a completely unsubstantiated expectation. Especially in contexts where there is high unemployment, this concern against the newcomers could be even higher. Turkey has not experienced any significant concern against “incoming foreigners” until 2011. Arrival of Syrians starting from 2011 has brought this “phenomenon” to the agenda of Turkish society. As a natural outcome of receiving in a short while a remarkable number of asylum seekers, whose number corresponds to more than 5% of the national population, the issue of employment has come to the fore. A TISK report⁸⁷ in 2015 revealed that laborers who were scared due to the fear of losing their jobs in the face of a huge supply of cheap labor were not the only ones who were concerned in Turkish economy. Employers were found to be worried as well concerning the potential negative effects this mass inflow of asylum-seekers could have through the informal economy. The corporate businesses mentioned the difficulties of competing against cheap labor and production in the informal economy, and suggested that it would be better for the economy if the Syrians would be permitted to work. Here, a stark difference emerges between such corporate businesses which cannot employ foreign workers without a work permit and the non-corporate, smaller businesses which can, partly or wholly, engage in activities in the informal economy. The second stark contrast can be observed among workers and can be said to be class-based. Those who work as non-skilled, manual laborers are much more strongly against giving Syrians the right to work than highly-skilled individuals.

This issue became increasingly important particularly since 2013. Until 2013, a much smaller number of Syrians were in Turkey and they generally stayed in camps. Therefore, approaching to the issue with an emergency management mentality, the Turkish state provided for all basic needs of Syrians in the country. However, as the number of Syrians in Turkey kept increasing and Syrians who lived outside of the camps started to dramatically outnumber those in the camps, a new era has begun since the end of 2013. This transformation whereby Syrians started to live in urban centers also de facto brought them into economic activity.

In the absence of central planning concerning where Syrians would live in the country, they primarily preferred to move to such urban centers where they can work and where their relatives or acquaintances lived. In addition, all previous studies suggest that more than 30% of Syrians living in camps, whose needs are provided for by the state, still leave the camps in the morning on permission to engage in paid work outside. It was not even a question for those Syrians who lived outside of the camps.

a. Regulations Concerning Right to Work

The “Regulation Concerning Work Permits of Foreigners Under Temporary Protection”, which was prepared based on the 29th Article of “Regulation on Temporary Protection”, entered into force on 15 January 2016. According to this legislation, regulations concerning working of Syrians under temporary protection are as follows:

1. Duration Condition: To have remained in Turkey with the temporary protection status for at least 6 months
2. Location Condition: Working is only possible in the city where the individual is registered, apart from exceptional cases
3. Quota: The number of workers under temporary protection cannot be more than 10% of the total number of workers at a business (if the citizens do not apply to a vacancy notice in 4 weeks, the quota can be surpassed)
4. Employer Condition: Application for the work permit must be made by the employer with whom the foreigner under temporary protection will work
5. Wage Condition: A wage under the official minimum wage cannot be paid
6. İŞKUR: Foreigners under temporary protection can participate in the courses and programs organized by İŞKUR
7. Exception: An exception to the requirement of a work permit can be issued by provincial governorates for those who will work in seasonal agricultural and husbandry workers.
8. Limitation: Syrians cannot apply to jobs and occupations which are exclusively limited for Turkish citizens by law.

87 M.Murat Erdoğan and Can Ünver [2015] Perspectives, Expectations and Suggestions of the Turkish Business Sector on Syrians in Turkey, TISK.

This Regulation has been a very important step allowing Syrians under temporary protection to legally work in Turkey. However, it has had a limited impact on formalizing the Syrian labor that is employed in the informal economy. The number of work permits issued to citizens of Syrian Arab Republic was reported to be 34.573 (31.526 men, 3.047 women) in the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services report entitled “Foreigners’ Work Permits”. However, there is no indication as to how many of these are Syrians under temporary protection and how many are individuals with residence permit in Turkey.⁸⁸ Two separate UNHCR publications both report higher figures. A document released in August 2019 suggests Turkey had issued 80 thousand work permits⁸⁹, while another document dated 2020 reports that a total of 132.497 work permits were issued.⁹⁰ In this context, it is noteworthy that 85.840 out of 1 million 82 thousand foreigners, who live in Turkey with residence permits, have applied for work permits.⁹¹

A large part of Syrians in Turkey work in construction, production, and service sectors. In a noteworthy manner, it is observed that Syrians play a rather less active role in the agriculture and husbandry fields. In line with EU policies, some well-thought incentive policies that is supported by the EU could significantly contribute in employment and social cohesion in Turkey.⁹²

b. Social Cohesion Assistance Program (SUY/ESSN)

Some financial support programs for Syrians have started with the resources that were devoted by the EU through the March 2016 Turkey-EU Statement that committed the EU to transfer 3+3 billion Euros over the following 4 years to Turkey to be used for Syrian refugees. One such significant program is the Social Cohesion Assistance Program (SUY) which was organized as part of EU’s “Emergency Social Safety Net for Refugees in Turkey” (ESSN). Turned into the world’s largest cash transfer program, SUY has become a significant source of relatively stable financial income for a large number of Syrian and other refugees in Turkey since 2016.⁹³ SUY program provides a monthly cash payment of 120 TL (18 €⁹⁴) per person to foreigners under international protection in Turkey who live outside of camps. The support is provided through KIZILAYKART after an “evaluation of neediness”⁹⁵ is conducted. SUY program, widely known as “Kızılay Kart”, is financed by EU’s ECHO office. The program is implemented by Turkey’s Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services, Turkish Red Crescent, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC); while DGMM and Directorate General of Population and Citizenship Affairs of the Ministry of Interior assume supportive roles.⁹⁶

88 Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services: Work Permits of Foreigners <https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/media/31746/yabanciizin2018.pdf> (Access: 10.02.2020). The Ministry provided the information related to the number of work permits issued to citizens of Syrian Arab Republic as 32.111 on 15 November 2018 and 31.185 on 31 March 2019. The UNHCR, however, published the 3RP-Regional Strategic Overview-2020-2021 which suggested the number to be 132.497 (pp.12). In this study, the figure, i.e. 34.573, provided by the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services has been taken as the basis.

89 Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees (July-August 2019) <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70892>

90 UNHCR- 3RP Regional Strategic Overview (2020) <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/73116> (Access: 02.05.2020)

91 DGMM, <https://www.goc.gov.tr/ikamet-izinleri> (Access: 15.12.2019)

92 For an important study on this subject, see: Kemal Kirişçi (forthcoming February 2020) How the EU can use agricultural trade to promote self-reliance for Syrian refugees in Turkey, Brookings Institute-TENT Foundation.

93 EU-Turkey Delegation: <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/tr/turkiyedeki-muteci-krizine-avrupa-birliginin-mudahalesi-710> (Access: 12.12.2019)

94 Rate of Euro was 6.66 TL as of 31 December 2019.

95 In this assessment, the following were considered to be in need: families with 4 or more children, families with a high number of “dependent” individuals (i.e. those families with 1.5 or more dependent individuals per healthy member), single parents of at least one minor child, families with disabled members, individuals with more than 40% disability, single women, senior individuals of 60 years of age or older who lives alone. There are also who were included by the initiatives of Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations. This last group contained 28.312 individuals accounting for 1,7% of SUY beneficiaries as of December 2019.

96 In the first period of implementation (2016-2019) of SUY, implementing partners included UN World Food Program (WFP) and supporting institutions included firstly the Prime Ministry and then AFAD, as a unit of Ministry of Internal Affairs.

SB-2019-FIGURE 21: ESN INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE (2020)




Between December 2016 and December 2019, SUY program has provided 1 billion Euro of financial assistance to a total of 1.750.008 individuals under international protection at 300.759 households. 89,4% of these, i.e. 1.536.977 individuals at approximately 274 thousand households, are Syrian. As of December 2019, the numbers of SUY beneficiaries with other nationalities are as follows: 117.905 Iraqis (6,7%), 55.541 Afghans (3,2%), and 3.460 Iranians (0,2%). This support, even though it is not sufficient in itself, is an extremely important resource for the refugees who live in urban settings to pay for costs like rent, electricity, water, and transportation.

As stated above, SUY program provides a significant regular financial support for over 1.5. million or 43% of Syrians under temporary protection and for 175 thousand or 50% of foreigners with other nationalities under international protection in Turkey. However, it should not be forgotten that the remaining 2.3 million individuals under temporary or international protection do not receive this support. In addition, the payment of 120 TL per person per month is far from being sufficient in urban contexts.⁹⁷ In this context, it becomes mandatory for Syrians and other refugees to work for a living, whether or not they benefit from the SUY program. Furthermore, SUY program started in December 2016 and the number of its recipients only gradually increased, which shows that a very large number of Syrians had to provide for themselves by working from the start, as Syrians started to arrive in the country since April 2011.

Another significant contribution of the SUY program has been its indirect effect for the cities hosting large concentrations of refugees through the cash inflow that it caused. This has played a significant role in the strengthening of local economies through external support. For instance, for the city of Gaziantep, where 252 thousand refugees benefit from the SUY program, this means a monthly inflow of 30 million TL and an annual inflow of 363 million TL. Sanliurfa receives an annual inflow of 258 million TL through 179 thousand beneficiaries, while Hatay receives an annual inflow of 241 million TL through 167 thousand recipients. This proves that SUY supports are not only essential for its direct recipients, but they are also a very significant resource for local economies.

97 The average size of households for Syrians under temporary protection was calculated to be 5.8.

SB-2019-FIGURE 22: Number of SUY Recipients by Months and Years, December 2016-December 2019



Kaynak: Kızılay, <http://kizilaykart-suy.org/TR/hakkinda.html> (11 Kasım 2019)

c. Syrians and the Informal Economy

As already mentioned, it is almost impossible for the Syrians who live outside of camps to sustain their lives without working. So much so that it is known that a large part of Syrians who receive the SUY support have to work regardless. It is not possible to access official data concerning this issue by its very nature. It can be deduced that informal economy creates a significant opportunity and space for Syrians to be able provide for themselves. While the existence of a large informal economy is neither acceptable nor sustainable in the long run, in a country with a high unemployment rate like Turkey, it is next to impossible to create sufficient formal employment opportunities for Syrians in the short and medium run. It can be suggested that this situation is one of the factors that help maintain the level of “fragile” social acceptance still relatively high.⁹⁸ According to TUIK data as of March 2019,⁹⁹ 33,9% of actively working Turkish citizens are not covered by any social security institution. In other words, over 10 million Turkish citizens out of the 32.3 million “labor force” are working “informally”. It is exactly this large informal economy that has allowed Syrians to find space for working. Large-scale field studies such as Syrians Barometer find that 30-40% of Syrians appear to be actively working. Therefore, it can be assumed that 1 million to 1.4 million of the 3.6 million Syrians in Turkey are working. These studies find that more than 30% of Syrian respondents report that they are working even within the camps. Given the fact that there are 630 thousand Syrian households in Turkey, even when it is assumed that only 1 person per household is working, it means that at least 630 thousand Syrians are actively working. With the low level of wages, it is obvious that only one working member would not be enough for the family. Therefore, even if a vast majority of them are working in the informal economy, it can be predicted that at least 1.2 million Syrians are working in Turkey.

It can be suggested that the informal economy, which already was a structural problem of Turkish economy, has grown a little with the arrival of Syrians. Working informally obviously leads to a serious exploitation of

98 M.Murat Erdoğan (2018), Syrians Barometer: A Framework For Achieving Social Cohesion With Syrians. İstanbul Bilgi University Publishing, İstanbul

99 TUIK: <http://tuik.gov.tr/HbGetirHTML.do?id=30683> (Access: 07.07.2019)

labor as well as being unacceptable in terms of labor rights and unsustainable for the national economy. However, it has been because of the existence of this informal economy that Syrians have been able to sustain their livelihoods without causing any significant levels of economic displacement of Turkish citizens. Even though unemployment rate in Turkey has increased to 14,1% as of March 2019 with 4.5 million Turkish citizens looking for employment, it wouldn't be realistic suggest that this dramatic increase has been caused by the arrival of Syrians. This is because of the fact that Syrians have been able to find themselves space in the large informal economy which already included over 10 million Turkish citizens.

According to March 2019 TUIK data, labor force participation rate among Turkish citizens is 52,9% (71,7% among men and 34,4% among women). It is reasonable to expect that this rate would be lower among Syrians due to the language barrier and cultural differences. In any case, all the projections conclude that there are 1 to 1.2 million Syrians in Turkey who are actively working and making a significant contribution to the Turkish economy.

d. Entrepreneurship

Syrian entrepreneurs undoubtedly play a special role in the economic integration of Syrians as well as in the economic contribution that Syrians make in Turkey. Syrians can establish their own businesses in accordance with Turkish Commercial Law.¹⁰⁰ In officially registered businesses in Turkey, the business owner can apply for a work permit. Even though some of them are micro level businesses that can only finance themselves, there is a clear trend of increase in the number of Syrian businesses in Turkey. The greatest number of foreign businesses that were established in Turkey in 2017 and 2018 belonged to Syrians. According to a statement made by the Ministry of Commerce, as of 26 February 2019, the number of companies with at least one Syrian partner is 15.159.¹⁰¹ Adding those businesses that were established informally, it can be predicted that the number would be much higher. Among most common businesses are wholesale commerce, real estate, and construction. According to data provided by UNHCR, the total capital of Syrian entrepreneurs in Turkey at the end of 2018 reached 400 million USD.¹⁰²

100 According to a TEPAV research, there are over 15 thousand companies established by Syrians, which employ at least 44 thousand Syrians. See: https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1533018887-4.TEPAV_Suriye_Sermayeli_Sirketler_Bulteni___Haziran_2018.pdf (Access: 16.09.2019). Also: Hürriyet Newspaper (06.09.2019): "Patron da çalışan da Suriyeli... Suriyelilerin kurduğu veya ortak olduğu 15 bin şirkette 44 bin Suriyeli çalışıyor." (Both the boss and the worker are Syrians: 44 thousand Syrians are working at companies established or partnered by Syrians) <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/patron-da-calisan-da-suriyeli-41322721> (Access: 16.09.2019)

101 CNN-TURK: <https://www.cnnturk.com/ekonomi/bakan-pekcan-15-bin-159-suriyeli-sirket-var> (Access: 16.11.2019)

102 UNHCR- Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70892> (Access: 02.05.2020)

Justification and Research Information

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

3

I. SYRIANS BAROMETER-2019 JUSTIFICATION AND RESEARCH INFORMATION

SYRIANS BAROMETER (SB) research is conceived of as a regularly held study to be simultaneously conducted on Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey, whose number has exceeded 3,5 million as of December 2019, and the Turkish society.¹⁰³ The most comprehensive study in its field, SB is based on survey research conducted on large representative samples, which is further complemented with focus group discussions. The present study is structured as a continuation of two previous studies, "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration" published in 2014 and "Syrians Barometer: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey" published in 2017. SB aims at drawing attention to the social realities in the field, deliberately trying to stay away from the contentious politicized debates, while striving to analyze the mutual social perceptions and, crucially, the changes and developments in these perceptions. In this context, the study also endeavors to reveal and discuss the existing experiences and relationships in the field, future projections and concerns, and prospects for social cohesion. It is not possible, of course, to suggest that the findings of this study's survey and focus groups can be directly generalized to the entire populations. In other words, what is presented here as the views of the "Turkish society" or "Syrians in Turkey" are obviously the views of the participants of this research and can only be related to the wider populations in a limited manner.

It is planned to repeat this study, the main objective of which is to provide a "a framework for achieving social cohesion with Syrians in Turkey", once every year. It is expected and hoped that this study would provide reliable data on a regular basis for the relevant public institutions, the interested researchers, academics, civil society organizations, and international institutions as well as producing a useful resource for data-based policies.

Mass migration movements create concerns among receiving societies. This is particularly the case when refugees are the subject. This is reflected in the fact that while developed and high-income countries host more than 80% of international immigrants, these same countries are much more reluctant in receiving refugees.¹⁰⁴ Partly as a result of this, only 15% of refugees are able to arrive in such developed, high-income countries.¹⁰⁵ This observable difference concerning migrants and refugees is also visible in the context of integration policies, which prove to be more complicated and challenging in the case of refugees than migrants. It can be suggested that integration discussions as well as initiatives are increasingly becoming commonplace in Turkey and that what is at issue in the Turkish context is almost exclusively refugees. Particularly considering the large numbers of refugees and quick pace with which they had arrived in Turkey, "integration of refugees" (instead of "integration of regular immigrants") proves to be an additionally challenging process by its very nature.

The present SB study, just like SB-2017, is based on comprehensive public opinion surveys that were implemented across Turkey on representative samples of both the local (Turkish) society and Syrians in the country.

The field study of SB research includes surveys and focus group discussions. The research questions were formed by the TAGU team and project advisors, while the analysis of the findings and the preparation of the report was conducted by TAGU. The field implementation of the surveys was conducted by Ankara Centre for Social Research (ANAR), one of the most experienced institutions in this sector. Working on comprehensive and representative samples, face-to-face surveys were conducted in 26 cities with 2.271 Turkish citizens and in 15 cities with 1.418 Syrian households. The survey conducted with a 95% confidence level and a confidence interval of $\pm 2,6$. In total, 20 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted: 12 with Turkish citizens and 8 with Syrians in 4 different cities (Ankara, Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Hatay). The part on Syrians included only the

103 In this study, the concept of "Turkish society" was mostly preferred to refer to local people and citizens of Turkey because of its perceived inclusivity and sociological explanatory power.

104 The top 10 countries hosting most immigrants are: USA (50.7 million), Germany, Saudi Arabia, Russia, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, and Italy- World Migration Report 2020, p.10.

The top 10 countries hosting most refugees are: Turkey, Pakistan, Uganda, Sudan, Germany, Iran, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Jordan - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR: <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/> (Access: 01.12.2019)

105 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR: <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html> (Access: 01.12.2019)

individuals under temporary protection who live outside of camps in Turkey. In other words, Syrians that live in camps (temporary accommodation centers) who constitute less than 2% of the Syrian population in Turkey and Syrians who remain in Turkey with other statuses (e.g. residence permit holders, naturalized citizens, etc.) are outside of the scope of this study.¹⁰⁶ In addition, FGDs were introduced for the first time in SB-2019 to collect more in-depth data on the perceptions, experiences, and expectations.

Dates of Research Application

Survey:

Syrians: 1-20 May 2019 (CAPI- Computer assisted personal interviewing)

Turkish Citizens: 18 April – 1 May 2019 (CAPI- Computer assisted personal interviewing)

Sample, Confidence Level and Interval

The survey on the opinions of the Turkish society on Syrians took the average size of Turkish households to be 3,4 in accordance with TUIK 2018 data. Therefore, the number of households was calculated by dividing the population by this average: $82.003.882 / 3,4 = 24.118.789$. The sample size, in turn, was calculated on the basis of these figures on a 95% confidence level and $\pm 2,06$ confidence interval to be 2.271.

The survey questionnaires for Turkish citizens were administered in the city centers of 26 cities in NUTS-2 level, with individuals of 18 years of age or older who have the capacity to understand and answer the questions. In the selection of individual respondents simple random sampling was used and the number of surveys to be conducted in each city was determined according to their respective populations. The selection of households to conduct surveys was done applying the random walk rule by the city field managers. Maximum effort has been paid to ensure proportional representation of different sex, age, educational attainment, and occupational groups since the study aimed to include these as potentially relevant categories for analysis.

The survey on Syrians, on the other hand, was conducted as a household research. In this framework, a survey questionnaire was applied face to face to Syrians living outside of camps. The surveys were conducted with one competent individual from each household. The average size of Syrian households is taken to be 6 in determining the research universe. Total number of Syrian households in Turkey is calculated by dividing the Syrian population by this number: $3.475.327 / 6 = 579.221$ (DGMM:09.05.2019). The sample size, in turn, was calculated on the basis of these figures on a 95% confidence level and $\pm 2,06$ confidence interval to be 1.418.

Therefore, the survey on Syrians was applied on 1.418 households in 15 cities. Through this survey, information of 6.527 Syrians who live in these households was collected.

While the total number of surveys (Turkish citizens + Syrians) conducted in SB-2017 was 3.324; this number has increased to 3.689. (2.271 + 1.418) in SB-2019

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

10 July 2019 – 10 August 2019

- 20 FGDs were conducted in 4 different cities including 12 FGDs with Turkish citizens and 8 with Syrians under temporary protection. Each FGD included 6 to 10 participants and all were recorded upon obtaining participants' informed consent. There were a total of 125 participants in the FGDs including 78 Turkish citizens and 47 Syrians. One specific FGD was conducted with the participation of naturalized citizens of Syrian origin, who used to be in the temporary protection status. Details of FGDs are presented in Table 3.
- Data collected from FGDs was analyzed using the qualitative analysis software MAXQDA.

¹⁰⁶ As of 1 November 2019, the total number of Syrians who stay at one of the 7 Temporary Residence Centers in 5 cities in Turkey has dropped to 62.492. This figure corresponds to 1,68% of the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. See, DGMM, <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access: 10.11.2019). One of the FGDs conducted with Syrian participants included Naturalized Turkish Citizens, who used to be under temporary protection before they obtained citizenship.

SB-2019-TABLE 3: SB-2019 Focus Group Discussions (20 FGD, 78+47=125 FGD Participants)

City	TURKISH CITIZEN			SYRIAN	
İSTANBUL	WOMEN 5	ARTISANS-WORKERS 6	NGO WORKERS 6	WOMEN 5	STUDENTS 6
ANKARA	WOMEN 6	STUDENTS 9	ACADEMICS 6	WOMEN 5	ARTISANS-WORKERS 5
GAZİANTEP	WOMEN 5	STUDENTS 8	NGO WORKERS 6	WOMEN 9	NGO WORKERS 5
HATAY	WOMEN 9	ARTISANS-WORKERS 7	TEACHERS 5	WOMEN 7	NATURALIZED CITIZENS 5

Total number of Turkish participants: 78 (12 FGD, average participant number: 6.5)

Total number of Syrian participants: 47 (8 FGD, average participant number: 5.9)

SB-2019 study has used a mixed research methodology employing a range of data collection and analysis techniques:

- A detailed literature review,
- A review of existing statistical data, including official sources and others,
- Examination of relevant legal texts,
- Review of SB-2017 data to prepare/update survey questionnaires.
- Conducting the comprehensive SB surveys:
 - o Using Computer-assisted personal interviewing
 - o Survey on Syrians (15 cities): 1-20 May 2019
 - o Survey on Turkish citizens (26 cities): 18 April – 1 May 2019
- Conducting Focus Group Discussions
 - o 20 FGDs (12 with Turkish participants + 8 with Syrians), in 4 cities
- Sharing the research findings with the SB-Academic Advisory Board and receiving their input.

As the above time frame demonstrates, the bulk of data collection from the field took place between April and August 2019. Undoubtedly, there have been important developments concerning the subject matter of this study. However, the findings of the study naturally reflect and represent the context of the time that the data was collected.

Turkish Society (Citizens of Republic of Turkey)

Research Findings

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

4

III-SB-2019: TURKISH SOCIETY (CITIZENS OF REPUBLIC OF TURKEY)

Syrians Barometer is one of the most comprehensive research studies conducted in Turkey that investigate both the Turkish society and the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. The most important characteristic of this type of a study is that it allows one to track various changes and transformations. In this framework, SB will be repeated in the next years using the same model of research and asking, to the most extent, the same questions. This study uses data from two previously conducted studies by M. Murat Erdogan, "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration" that was published in 2014 and "SB-2017", as reference points. Some data and findings from the 2014 and SB-2017 studies are presented here in comparison to the findings of SB-2019 to allow interested researchers to engage with all the data from these three studies.

The survey findings are presented both through absolute number of respondents and percentages. In addition, in the analysis and presentation of the responses to some specific questions, particularly when responses are collected on a "Likert" scale for more advanced comparison, a special system of point-based assessment is also used.

III-A. SB-2019: TURKISH SOCIETY RESEARCH PROFILE

1. Research Background and Profile

The Survey on Turkish citizens was conducted in 26 cities with 2.271 individuals. Specific quotas have been applied for geographical regions, socio-economic status, sex, and age groups. The surveys were conducted through Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing-CAPI. The confidence level of the research is %95, and the confidence interval is $\pm 2,06$.¹⁰⁶

106) In some of the questions that used a 5-point Likert scale, a scoring was conducted in order to simplify the presentation of the findings and make it easier for them to be comparatively analyzed. This scoring was done in the following way:

A point-score from 1 to 5 was assigned for each response option on the relevant scale, i.e.

1= Very insufficient/ completely disagree/ not worried at all, etc.

2=Insufficient/ disagree/ not worried, etc.

3=Neither sufficient, nor insufficient/ neither agree, nor disagree/ neither worried, nor not worried, etc.

4=Sufficient/ agree/ worried, etc.

5=Very sufficient/ completely agree/ very worried, etc.

6= No idea/ Don't know

7= No response

When calculating the scores, the numerical codes were given weight in the following way:

1→1, 2→2, 3→3, 4→4, 5→5, 6→0, 7→0

Using these weights, arithmetic mean was calculated for every relevant statement/question.

These calculations were made automatically on the SPSS software.

Lastly, depending on the scale used in each statement/question, the scoring was evaluated to be either on the "negative" or "positive" side of the scale.

a) 0,0-2,99: Negative side- i.e. Insufficient, disagree, not worried, etc.

b) 3,0-5,0: Positive side- i.e. Sufficient, agree, worried, etc.

SB-2019-TABLE 4: SB-2019 City-Based Turkish Society Sample

Cities							
		#	%			#	%
1	İstanbul	362	15,9	14	Trabzon	74	3,3
2	Ankara	133	5,9	15	Konya	68	3,0
3	Adana	128	5,6	16	Kayseri	67	3,0
4	İzmir	105	4,6	17	Van	65	2,9
5	Kocaeli	102	4,5	18	Mardin	60	2,6
6	Şanlıurfa	100	4,4	19	Tekirdağ	58	2,6
7	Bursa	99	4,4	20	Balıkesir	57	2,5
8	Hatay	91	4,0	21	Kırkkale	53	2,3
9	Manisa	90	4,0	22	Ağrı	46	2,0
10	Samsun	85	3,7	23	Erzurum	45	2,0
11	Aydın	84	3,7	24	Kastamonu	45	2,0
12	Antalya	83	3,7	25	Malatya	44	1,9
13	Gaziantep	83	3,7	26	Zonguldak	44	1,9
Toplam						2271	100,0

To be able to provide a more thorough and accentuated analysis, the findings from this representative sample were further broken down into various categories based on sex, age group, geographic location (i.e. border cities / metropolitan cities / others)¹⁰⁸, educational attainment, and ethnic origin. Where relevant and significant, cross-tabulations are presented to show differences in data according to these categories.

5 out of the 26 cities in which the survey on Turkish society was implemented - Adana, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Mardin - are located very close to Turkey's Syrian border and they host large numbers of Syrian refugees relative to their populations. The social context in these cities, where cohabitation emerges more intensely and quickly, is different and therefore data from these cities was investigated in isolation at times to see whether this leads to significantly different perceptions and attitudes. The 3 big cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir) were considered within the category of "metropolitan cities" while the remaining 18 cities covered in this study were categorized as "other cities". How many surveys to apply in each city was determined in accordance with their respective populations and numbers of Syrians hosted by them. Thus, 20,33% of the surveys were applied in the border cities; 26,4% in the metropolitan cities; and 53% in the other cities.

SB-2019-TABLE 5: Sample by Geographic Location

Category	Number os Surveys Applied	% in all Surveys
Border Cities	462	20,3
Metropolitan Cities	600	26,4
Other Cities	1209	53,3

108 In SB-2017, the regional/geographical categorization only included a binary distinction between "border cities" and "other cities". In SB-2019, Turkey's biggest cities of Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara were also grouped together and the new regional category of "metropolitan cities" was added.

SB-2019-TABLE 6: The Cities in which SB-2019 Surveys were Administered by Category

Border Cities	Metropolitan Cities	Other Cities		
Adana	İstanbul	Kocaeli	Trabzon	Kırıkkale
Şanlıurfa	Ankara	Bursa	Konya	Ağrı
Hatay	İzmir	Manisa	Kayseri	Erzurum
Gaziantep		Samsun	Van	Kastamonu
Mardin		Aydın	Tekirdağ	Malatya
		Antalya	Balıkesir	Zonguldak

SB-2019-TABLE 7: Profile and Demographic Characteristics of Participants in SB-2019 Survey on Turkish Society

	#	%		#	%
Sex			Geographical Location		
Female	1136	50,0	Border Cities	462	20,3
Male	1135	50,0	Metropolitan Cities	600	26,4
Age Groups			Other Cities	1209	53,3
18-24	426	18,8	Occupations		
25-34	508	22,4	Housewife	546	24,0
35-44	541	23,8	Private sector employee	494	21,8
45-54	428	18,8	Artisans/Tradesmen	438	19,3
55-64	254	11,2	Student	245	10,8
65 and above	114	5,0	Retired	224	9,9
Educational Attainment			Public sector employee	109	4,8
Illiterate	28	1,2	Unemployed	108	4,8
Literate but not graduate of any school	39	1,7	Self-employed	82	3,6
Primary school graduate	578	25,5	Other	25	1,0
Middle-school graduate	382	16,8			
High-school or equivalent school graduate	752	33,1			
University graduate /Holder of graduate degree	492	21,7			

In addition to the surveys, a more in-depth understanding of the attitudes, experiences, and expectations of Turkish society was sought through conducting 12 FGDs. While representativeness was not aimed in the FGDs, a significant degree of diversity was intended so that different opinions and experiences of various groups of specific attention would be obtained. Therefore, instead of inviting random groups, each FGD aimed at bringing together individuals with specific profiles.

In determining these groups, the aim was to include groups that were or could be specifically affected by the

arrival and presence of Syrian refugees. The gender aspect was given particular attention and the greatest number of FGDs were conducted with groups of women. The reason for this was the desire to be aware of gender-specific experiences as well as to include women's perspectives, expectations, and opinions. Besides women, FGDs included groups of teachers, students, workers and artisans, and NGO workers.

Lastly, it was believed that individuals in different cities could have significantly different experiences and expectations which, in turn, would affect perceptions and attitudes. Therefore, FGDs were conducted in different cities with their respective residents. In this context, representation of border cities and metropolitan cities was targeted by conducting FGDs in two cities from each category: Hatay and Gaziantep representing border cities, and Istanbul and Ankara as metropolitan ones. These FGDs were conducted between 10 July 2019 and 10 August 2019 (Table-3).

The analysis of the comprehensive data collected from FGDs was made using the qualitative data analysis software, MAXQDA. In this context, the full transcript of each FGD was uploaded to the program to be coded by a list of codes and sub-codes. Later, retrieving the coded segments of texts across all FGDs allowed a thorough and comparative analysis of the collected data, including specialized analyses based on the FGD type and city.

In the present SB-2019 study, data and findings from both the surveys and the FGDs were used in conjunction with one another. The empirical base of the study was provided by the survey findings while FGD data was instrumental in interpreting various findings and reaching a deeper understanding.

SB-2019-TABLE 8: 12 FGDs, 78 FGD Participants

City	TURKISH CITIZEN		
	İSTANBUL	WOMEN 5	ARTISANS-WORKERS 6
ANKARA	WOMEN 6	STUDENTS 9	ACADEMICS 6
GAZİANTEP	WOMEN 5	STUDENTS 8	NGO WORKERS 6
HATAY	WOMEN 9	ARTISANS-WORKERS 7	TEACHERS 5

III-B. SB-2019- TURKISH SOCIETY RESEARCH FINDINGS

1. Spatial Proximity with Syrians and Awareness

The initial questions of the SB survey asked the respondents to what extent they were sharing the living spaces with Syrians. The answers to the question “Are there Syrians living in your neighborhood/district/region?” reflected that 83,2% of the respondents suggested either “Yes, there are many” or “Yes, there is a few”, which slightly increased from 82,1% in SB-2017. This shows that a vast majority of Turkish society is not only aware of the presence of Syrians in the country, they also share living spaces with them. In addition, this finding does not only come from the border cities, but is valid for all of Turkey.

SB-2019-TABLE 9: Are there Syrians living in your neighborhood/district/region?

	SB-2017		SB-2019	
	#	%	#	%
Yes	1715	82,1	1890*	83,2*
No	297	14,2	311	13,7
No idea/ No response	77	3,7	70	3,1
Total	2089	100,0	2271	100,0

* In SB-2019, “Yes” category presents the sum of “Yes, there are many” and “Yes, there is a few” responses.

FGD Findings: Perception of Syrians

FGD participants were also asked whether they had any interactions with Syrians in their daily lives. In this context, they were asked to what extent they interacted with Syrians and what their personal observations and experiences are with respect to them. The participants in Istanbul and Ankara FGDs generally stated that they don’t encounter many Syrians in their living spaces, and that they usually report witnessing Syrians in the streets and in public places like shopping malls.

In the border city FGDs, in Hatay and Gaziantep, where there are denser Syrian communities relative to city populations, almost all of the participants suggested that they regularly see Syrians in where they lived. The interactions of Turkish citizens in the metropolitan cities are much more restricted and superficial compared to those of individuals living in border cities.

A majority of people in the metropolitan cities know about Syrians from what they see in the media and social media or from their brief encounters in public places.

2. How do Turkish Society See the Syrians?

The respondents were asked to suggest the most appropriate expression to describe Syrians in Turkey from a list of 10 options, from which they can provide multiple responses. This question, which has produced one of the most striking differences in the answers given in SB-2017 and SB-2019, reveals the changing perception of the Turkish society. In SB-2017 the top answer to this question was that “They are victims who escaped persecution/war” with 57,8%. This option appears to have significantly regressed over the past 2 years, as it was only the fourth most frequently mentioned answer with 35% in SB-2019. The responses that appear to be at the top are those that reflect perceptions of threat, social distance, and anxieties.¹⁰⁹

109 The question in Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014: 2014 was asked with a single response option and the first was “People fleeing from persecution” (41.1%) alırken, followed by “guests in our country” (% 20.8), “brothers and sisters with the same religion” (12.1%) “burdens on us” (20.1%), “They are beggars/people who entirely rely on assistance” with 5.9%.

At the top of the list of responses is “They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of troubles in the future” with 42%. This was followed by “They are people who were did not protect their homeland” (41,4%) and “They are burdens on us” (39,5%). While the share of those who described Syrians as “beggars/people who rely entirely on assistance” was 24,1% in 2017, it decreased to 15% in SB-2019. An increase is observed in the share of the answer “They are different from and strangers to us”. Overall, these responses demonstrate that there is an increase in the social distance that the Turkish society places between itself and Syrians; while the feelings of closeness and “compassion” are being replaced by various anxieties.

SB-2019-TABLE 10: Most appropriate expressions to describe Syrians (Multiple Responses)

		SB-2017		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of troubles in the future	814	39,0	954	42,0
2	They are people who were did not protect their homeland	-	-	940	41,4
3	They are burdens on us	899	43,0	896	39,5
4	They are victims who escaped persecution/war	1208	57,8	794	35,0
5	They are guests in our country	424	20,3	495	21,8
6	They are different from and strangers to us	376	18,0	448	19,7
7	They are our brothers and sisters with the same religion	433	20,7	446	19,6
8	They are beggars/people who entirely rely on assistance	509	24,4	343	15,1
9	They are exploited people as cheap labor	298	14,3	308	13,6
10	They are harmless people	306	14,6	158	7,0
11	Other	15	0,7	42	1,8
	No idea/ No response	32	1,5	20	0,9

SB-2019-TABLE 11: Most appropriate expressions to describe Syrians (Multiple Responses)

	They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of troubles in the future	They are people who were did not protect their homeland	They are burdens on us	They are victims who escaped persecution/war	They are guests in our country	They are different from and strangers to us	They are our brothers and sisters with the same religion	They are beggars/people who entirely rely on assistance	They are exploited people as cheap labor	They are harmless people	Other	No idea/No response
Sex												
Female	41,2	39,3	39,2	33,9	21,7	21,0	18,2	15,1	11,7	7,4	2,4	1,5
Male	42,8	43,4	39,7	36,0	21,9	18,5	21,1	15,2	15,4	6,5	1,3	0,3
Age Group												
18-24	35,2	35,0	34,7	42,5	23,9	19,0	21,4	17,8	17,6	6,3	2,3	0,5
25-34	39,2	36,8	37,6	38,8	23,6	18,7	19,9	12,2	16,7	7,7	2,2	1,4
35-44	43,4	41,6	40,1	34,2	22,2	21,8	21,8	12,9	12,6	6,3	2,4	0,6
45-54	43,7	48,1	39,0	30,4	18,7	17,8	18,7	16,1	10,7	7,5	0,9	1,2
55-64	53,1	47,2	46,5	27,2	20,9	21,7	14,2	16,1	11,0	5,5	1,6	-
65 +	42,1	46,5	48,2	28,1	17,5	20,2	17,5	21,9	5,3	10,5	-	2,6
Educational Attainment												
Illiterate*	25,0	25,0	25,0	39,3	17,9	21,4	17,9	7,1	7,1	14,3	-	10,7
Literate but not graduate of any school	43,6	28,2	38,5	41,0	30,8	23,1	30,8	7,7	7,7	7,7	-	-
Primary school	45,5	43,9	42,6	29,8	19,2	20,9	19,9	14,9	10,2	7,6	2,1	0,9
Middle-School	46,1	40,6	38,5	35,9	21,7	19,6	19,1	14,4	11,3	8,9	2,1	0,8
High-School or equivalent	40,8	45,1	39,1	36,8	20,6	19,9	19,3	14,8	16,9	6,0	1,2	0,5
University/Graduate Degree	37,4	35,4	38,0	36,8	26,2	17,7	19,5	17,5	15,0	5,7	2,6	1,0
Region												
Border cities	46,1	43,1	29,4	37,4	19,0	25,5	19,5	8,2	11,9	6,5	0,4	1,7
Other cities**	41,0	41,0	42,0	34,3	22,5	18,2	19,7	16,9	14,0	7,1	2,2	0,7
Metropolitan cities	40,8	40,3	47,8	31,2	19,7	16,8	13,7	20,8	11,0	4,7	0,3	0,3
Non-metropolitan cities	41,0	41,3	39,1	35,9	23,9	18,9	22,7	14,9	15,5	8,3	3,1	0,8
Occupations												
Housewife	43,6	40,1	40,7	33,2	20,9	20,1	20,3	15,0	9,2	9,2	1,6	1,8
Private sector employee	41,3	44,9	39,1	35,2	22,1	19,8	20,9	12,6	15,8	6,5	2,8	0,2
Artisan/Tradesman	44,3	42,0	36,5	37,7	22,1	17,6	22,1	14,6	15,3	5,7	1,6	0,7
Student	36,7	32,7	32,2	46,5	26,5	19,6	21,2	18,8	17,1	6,1	1,6	0,4
Retired	45,1	50,9	47,8	25,9	17,9	19,6	14,7	21,4	9,4	8,5	0,4	0,4
Public sector employee	33,9	30,3	37,6	33,0	28,4	18,3	17,4	13,8	16,5	4,6	3,7	3,7
Unemployed	38,0	43,5	44,4	36,1	21,3	15,7	17,6	12,0	18,5	5,6	-	-
Self-employed	54,9	42,7	48,8	19,5	12,2	32,9	8,5	13,4	13,4	4,9	2,4	-
Other***	16,0	24,0	24,0	44,0	24,0	28,0	20,0	8,0	4,0	8,0	4,0	-

SB-2019-TABLE 12: Cross-Tabulation: Most appropriate expressions to describe Syrians? / Are there Syrians in your neighborhood/district?

	Most appropriate expressions to describe Syrians? (Multiple responses %)	Are there Syrians in your neighborhood/district?				
		Yes, there are many	Yes, there is a few	No	No idea/ no response	General
1	They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of troubles in the future	47,4	38,4	34,1	25,7	42,0
2	They are people who were did not protect their homeland	45,6	38,3	34,4	35,7	41,4
3	They are burdens on us	41,9	40,3	31,2	27,1	39,5
4	They are victims who escaped persecution/war	28,3	38,6	48,2	47,1	35,0
5	They are guests in our country	16,9	25,2	29,3	32,9	21,8
6	They are different from and strangers to us	22,8	18,4	11,6	18,6	19,7
7	They are our brothers and sisters with the same religion	15,0	23,7	27,3	18,6	19,6
8	They are beggars/people who entirely rely on assistance	14,5	16,9	13,8	11,4	15,1
9	They are exploited people as cheap labor	11,2	14,5	17,0	27,1	13,6
10	They are harmless people	4,3	9,3	10,6	8,6	7,0
11	Other	2,9	0,4	1,6	1,4	1,8
	No idea/ No response	0,7	0,7	1,0	5,7	0,9

Another noteworthy finding is that the share of those who suggest that “Syrians are harmless people” has declined from 14,6% in 2017 to 7% in 2019. This change is another clear manifestation of the change in Turkish society’s perceptions. It also shows that there is a significant need to study the reasons for this change.

3. The Adjectives / Labels that Fit Syrians According to the Turkish Society

When the adjectives and labels suggested by the Turkish society to describe Syrians are considered, it can be seen that there is a significant social distance and prejudice, evident in both SB-2017 and, to a slightly stronger extent, SB-2019. The survey has found that Turkish respondents refrain from describing Syrians using positive adjectives such as “hard-working”, “clean”, “polite”, “trustworthy”, and “nice”. They tend to use more negative adjectives and labels in this context. This is another indicator of the “social distance”.

When the answers to this question were assigned scores based on a 5-point system, a comparison of SB-2017 and SB-2019 findings shows that negative labels are becoming more prominent. The top negative adjective in SB-2017, “untrustworthy/dangerous”, has regressed to the second rank in SB-2019. On the other side, the top positive adjective suggested for Syrians has remained “hard-working” in both studies.

SB-2019-TABLE 13: To what extent of Syrians in Turkey do the following characteristics fit? (%)

		All of them	Majority of them	All + Majority	Half of them	Minority of them	None of them	Minority + None	No idea/ No response
1	Dirty/ Filthy	30,1	27,3	57,4	18,7	7,9	8,7	16,6	7,3
2	Unreliable/ Dangerous	31,1	25,1	56,2	17,9	7,6	8,6	16,2	9,7
3	Rude	28,0	25,9	53,9	18,2	10,3	8,9	19,2	8,7
4	Lazy	28,7	24,6	53,3	18,2	10,2	10,7	20,9	7,6
5	Distant	23,6	24,2	47,8	22,1	9,0	10,4	19,4	10,7
6	Bad	25,3	21,9	47,2	21,6	9,4	9,3	18,7	12,5
7	Hard-working	5,5	8,7	14,2	16,6	22,4	39,8	62,2	7,0
8	Friendly	2,6	6,1	8,7	17,0	22,2	41,6	63,8	10,5
9	Nice	2,1	5,8	7,9	18,9	22,3	39,2	61,5	11,7
10	Kind	2,4	4,7	7,1	15,6	23,2	45,2	68,4	8,9
11	Clean	1,9	4,0	5,9	14,8	23,3	48,7	72,0	7,3
12	Reliable	1,7	4,0	5,7	12,9	21,4	49,5	70,9	10,5

SB-2019-TABLE 14: To what extent do the following qualities describe Syrians in our country? (Scored)

		SB-2017	SB-2019
1	Messy/dirty	2,9	3,4
2	Untrustworthy/dangerous	2,9	3,3
3	Rude	2,8	3,3
4	Lazy	2,8	3,3
5	Distant	2,8	3,1
6	Bad	2,7	3,1
Average Score		2,3	2,5
7	Hard-working	2,0	2,0
8	Sincere	1,9	1,7
9	Nice	1,9	1,7
10	Polite	1,7	1,7
11	Clean	1,7	1,7
12	Trustworthy	1,7	1,6

■ 0-2,99 ■ 3,0-5,0

When the responses are cross-tabulated according to sex, age, educational attainment, and region of the respondents, the picture does not change significantly. It is important, however, to note that relatively lower levels of negative perceptions are reported in the border cities where Syrians live more intensely compared to the cities with relatively lower Syrian populations both among the “non-metropolitan cities” and “metropolitan cities”, where a much larger degree of tension and reactions can be detected.

While the results might appear to conflict with some of the responses provided for the previous question of most appropriate expressions to describe Syrians, there is ample ground to make a clear observation of nervousness and exclusion. The difference between the findings of SB-2017 and SB-2019 appears minimal, with a trend of increase in the shares of negative adjectives.

SB-2019-TABLE 15: To what extent do the following qualities describe Syrians in our country? X Demography (Scored)

	Messy/ Dirty	Untrustworthy/ Dangerous	Rude	Lazy	Distant	Bad	Hard-working	Sincere	Nice	Polite	Clean	Trustworthy	Average Score
Sex													
Female	3,3	3,3	3,2	3,2	3,0	2,9	1,9	1,7	1,7	1,6	1,6	1,5	2,4
Male	3,5	3,4	3,3	3,4	3,1	3,2	2,0	1,8	1,8	1,7	1,7	1,6	2,5
Age Groups													
18-24	3,3	3,2	3,2	3,2	3,0	3,0	2,1	1,7	1,8	1,7	1,7	1,5	2,5
25-34	3,3	3,1	3,1	3,2	2,9	2,9	2,0	1,9	1,9	1,8	1,7	1,6	2,4
35-44	3,4	3,3	3,3	3,2	3,2	3,0	2,0	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,6	2,5
45-54	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,1	3,1	1,9	1,7	1,7	1,6	1,6	1,5	2,5
55-64	3,6	3,6	3,4	3,5	3,2	3,4	1,8	1,7	1,6	1,7	1,5	1,6	2,6
65+	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,5	3,1	3,3	1,8	1,7	1,7	1,6	1,6	1,6	2,5
Educational Attainment													
Illiterate*	3,3	3,3	3,0	3,0	3,1	3,0	2,4	2,3	2,2	2,1	2,3	2,1	2,7
Literate but not graduate of any school	3,1	3,2	3,0	3,2	2,8	2,8	1,9	1,9	2,0	1,8	1,8	1,8	2,4
Primary school	3,4	3,4	3,2	3,3	3,2	3,1	2,0	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,6	1,6	2,5
Middle-School	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,3	3,2	3,1	2,0	1,8	1,7	1,7	1,6	1,5	2,5
High-School or equivalent	3,5	3,4	3,3	3,3	3,1	3,1	2,0	1,7	1,8	1,7	1,6	1,5	2,5
University/Graduate Degree	3,3	3,2	3,2	3,2	2,9	2,9	1,9	1,8	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,6	2,4
Region													
Border cities	2,9	3,1	2,9	2,9	2,9	2,8	2,3	1,9	1,9	1,8	1,7	1,7	2,4
Other cities**	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,1	3,1	1,9	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,6	1,5	2,5
Metropolitan cities	3,4	3,5	3,3	3,4	3,1	3,1	1,8	1,6	1,6	1,6	1,6	1,5	2,4
Non-metropolitan cities	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,2	3,1	2,0	1,8	1,8	1,7	1,7	1,5	2,5
Occupation													
Housewife	3,3	3,3	3,2	3,2	3,0	3,0	1,9	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,6	2,4
Private sector employee	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,3	3,2	3,2	2,0	1,7	1,7	1,6	1,6	1,5	2,5
Artisan/Tradesman	3,5	3,2	3,3	3,3	3,1	2,9	2,0	1,9	1,8	1,8	1,7	1,6	2,5
Student	3,2	3,1	3,1	3,1	2,9	2,9	2,1	1,7	1,8	1,8	1,8	1,6	2,4
Retired	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,1	3,3	1,8	1,7	1,7	1,6	1,6	1,5	2,6
Public sector employee	3,1	2,9	2,9	2,9	2,9	2,9	1,9	1,8	1,8	1,7	1,7	1,7	2,3
Unemployed	3,4	3,5	3,2	3,4	3,1	3,1	2,0	1,6	1,8	1,7	1,7	1,5	2,5
Self-employed	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,4	1,7	1,5	1,5	1,4	1,4	1,4	2,5
Other***	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,3	3,3	3,1	2,2	1,9	2,1	2,0	2,1	1,9	2,7
General	3,4	3,3	3,3	3,3	3,1	3,1	2,0	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,6	2,5

FGD Findings: Perceptions

Discussing how the FGD participants perceived Syrians and which expressions and labels they used describing them is illuminating for a better understanding of the survey findings. In this way, it is possible to better comprehend in which context and depending on which experiences such expressions/labels were expressed.

It was very interesting that, in the absence of a pre-formed list of responses, many of the same expressions and adjectives came to dominate the FGD discussions as the ones most frequently used in the Survey. The most frequently expressed and most intensely discussed expressions can be summarized in the following categories:

Negative expressions related to socio-economic status: Many FGD participants suggested that the first adjectives that come to their minds related to Syrians were associated with their perceived negative socio-economic status such as *needy, poor, helpless, and beggar*.

Expressions related to victimhood: Another common theme related to Syrians in the FGDs emphasized their victimhood. Accordingly, many participants suggested that the image of Syrian in their minds was of a victim. In this context the most frequently mentioned concepts were *victim, war victim, unlucky, and refugee*. While Syrians' perception as victims might be fading away through time, FGDs have shown that this is still one of the key themes.

- "I see them as displaced, war victims who were driven out of their homelands. In addition, they are being used as instruments in service of political agendas." Istanbul-Artisans/Employees
- "I think they are unlucky people, who had to leave their country not because they wanted to but because they had to." Ankara-Academics
- "At the end of the day, they escaped war to find themselves in a different culture, where a different language is being spoken. Of course, they are victims." Ankara-Students
- **"They came as guests and they are still in a very difficult situation. There is a very significant language barrier. There are also bureaucratic barriers. A Syrian doctor cannot work here without obtaining equivalency. Many people who had quite comfortable lives there become 'socially dead' here."** Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- "I call it 'being forced'. They didn't choose to be here." Istanbul-Women

Expressions that are believed to be in conflict with Syrians' victimhood: Some other participants, in contrast, argued that Syrians cannot be seen as victims. According to these participants the way Syrians live in Turkey, their attitudes and behaviors are not the ones that can be expected from victim individuals or groups. Therefore, they cannot be called victims. To support this argument, these participants mentioned expressions such as *carefree, ungrateful, polygamous, lazy, noisy, and self-indulgent*.

- "I don't think they are victims. A victim wouldn't have a lifestyle like this. I don't feel safe and secure in my own street, my own home." Hatay-Artisans/Employees
- "I see them as lazy and self-indulgent. Because they would have stayed in their homelands and protected it if they weren't lazy. When I have a look at what's going on in my own neighborhood, I see a group that is enjoying their shishas in pleasure." Hatay-Women
- "Even in such negative and poor conditions, they are much more fond of their pleasure, their entertainment than we are." Hatay-Teachers
- "They are not content with anything. Not the economy, not their social life, not with all the assistance they get. They act like they migrated to Canada, not Turkey. They have such expectations as if we invited them or welcomed them with red carpets." Hatay-Teachers
- "They are not grateful for anything, they wouldn't appreciate anything you give them." Hatay-Teachers

Expressions related to foreignness: Another frequently mentioned group of concepts revolved around the argument that Syrians are foreign people, who are very different and who don't belong here. The concepts voiced in this context included *foreigner, alien, unknown, uneasy, different from us, resistant to change, temporary, and not belonging here*.

"I see them as aliens. What I mean by that is unknown. People complain about them but nobody actually knows them, I mean personally. Perhaps ghettoization is a reason for that. Actual interaction is extremely limited and that is a very big reason why they are not known." Ankara-Academics

- "What I can think of is the concept temporary." Ankara-Students
- "Syrians have different culture than the Turkish culture. That is why there is a lack of communication. They appear as though they are adapted but there is no adaptation." Gaziantep-Women
- "I see them as dominant people. They are resistant to change. They have been in Turkey for 9 years but a majority of them don't speak a word of Turkish." Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- "Their lifestyles don't match with ours. They sleep in till afternoon and then live until the morning. We are not like that." Hatay-Artisans/Employees

Expressions related to perceived unfair treatment of Syrians: It needs to be mentioned that there was a significant number of FGD participants who openly objected to the above discussed

mostly negative expressions for Syrians. According to these participants, Syrians in Turkey do not deserve this negative perception about them as the involuntary victims of a process on which they had no control. These participants used expressions including scape goats, excluded, exploited cheap labor, contempted, and otherized.

- "I think they conveniently became the scape goats for everything that is going bad in the political conjuncture, especially the economic stagnation." Ankara-Academics
- "People have prejudice against them. They say 'they get sick and don't pay a dime. They enjoy all the services', as if they are leading such comfortable lives with what we offer for free." Ankara-Academics
- "The society wants them to feel like they are under a yoke because they escaped from a war. They feel upset when they see Syrians go and walk outside." Ankara-Students
- "I think they are being exploited as cheap labor." Gaziantep-Women

Positive expressions related to Syrians: There were also participants who used positive expressions while describing Syrians. Some of these participants stated that they developed certain personal relations with Syrians which made it possible for them to get to know Syrians better. These positive expressions included hard-working, positive, optimistic, self-confident, curious, and sources of cultural richness

4. Perception of Cultural Similarity

It is observed that the Turkish society places a significant social distance between them and the Syrians. While the political discourse makes frequent references to "religious fellowship", "neighborhood", and "common history", it appears that these are not fully embraced by the society. In addition, the passing time seems to make them increasingly less appealing to people. When asked the question "To what extent do you think Syrians in Turkey are culturally similar to us?", the combined share of those replied with "they are not similar at all" and "they are not similar" is 81,9%. Those who suggested that "they are similar" and "they are very similar" constitute only 7% of the respondents.¹¹⁰ It appears that the trend of seeing the Syrians as cultural other is growing over the years. Between SB-2017 and SB-2019, the combined share of those who suggested that "they are not similar" increased from 80,2% to 81,9%, while that of those who suggested that "they are similar" remained at 7%. Another indicator of this growing trend is the finding that while the percentage of those who suggested that "they are not similar at all" increased from 40,8% in 2017 to 50,5% in 2019, the percentage of those who responded with the softer option of "they are not similar" decreased from 39,4% to 31,4% in the same time frame.

SB-2019-TABLE 16: To what extent do you think Syrians in Turkey are culturally similar to us? (SB-2017/SB-2019)

	SB-2017		SB-2019			
	#	%	#	%		
They are not similar at all	853	40,8	80,2	1147	50,5	81,9
They are not similar	823	39,4		712	31,4	
They are neither similar, nor not similar	185	8,9	8,9	196	8,6	8,6
They are similar	152	7,3	7,8	153	6,7	7,0
They are very similar	10	0,5		7	0,3	
No idea/ No response	66	3,1	3,1	56	2,5	2,5
Total	2089	100,0		2271	100,0	

When the responses to this question were broken down demographic and socio-economic categories of the respondents, very similar reactions are observed. However, it is observed that those who suggest that Syrians are not culturally similar are more heavily concentrated among women, those in the 55-64 age group, those with a primary school degree, and those who live in metropolitan cities. On the other end, men, those in the 35-44 age group, those with a primary school degree, and those who live in border cities are more represented among those who suggest that Syrians are culturally similar to Turkish society.

¹¹⁰ In the 2014 study, "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration", the rate of those who "completely disagreed" with the statement "I believe we are culturally similar with Syrians" was 45,3%, while 25,3% "disagreed" with this statement (in total 70,6%). The total share of those who "agreed" and "completely agreed" with the statement was 17,2%. By region, those who disagreed was 75,6% at the border cities and 69,6% at the other cities. See: pp.139

SB-2019-TABLE 17: To what extent do you think Syrians in Turkey are culturally similar to us? (%)

	Not similar at all	Not similar	Combined Not Similar	Neither similar, nor not similar	Similar	Very Similar	Combined Similar	No idea/ No response
Sex								
Female	49,8	33,2	83,0	8,5	5,1	0,3	5,4	3,1
Male	51,2	29,5	80,7	8,8	8,4	0,4	8,8	1,7
Age Groups								
18-24	47,9	32,6	80,5	12,0	4,9	0,5	5,4	2,1
25-34	52,8	29,3	82,1	9,3	5,9	0,4	6,3	2,3
35-44	48,4	33,3	81,7	8,1	7,9	0,2	8,1	2,1
45-54	53,0	29,4	82,4	7,0	7,9	-	7,9	2,7
55-64	50,0	33,1	83,1	6,3	6,3	0,8	7,1	3,5
65+	51,8	29,8	81,6	7,0	7,9	-	7,9	3,5
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate*	32,1	50,0	82,1	3,6	7,1	-	7,1	7,2
Literate but not graduate of any school	51,3	30,8	82,1	12,8	5,1	-	5,1	-
Primary school	50,7	31,8	82,5	6,7	7,8	0,2	8,0	2,8
Middle-School	53,7	32,5	86,2	5,5	6,0	-	6,0	2,3
High-School or equivalent	48,5	33,6	82,1	9,3	6,0	0,3	6,3	2,3
University/Graduate Degree	51,8	25,4	77,2	12,2	7,3	0,8	8,1	2,5
Region								
Border cities	49,6	29,4	79,0	9,7	8,4	0,9	9,3	2,0
Other cities**	50,7	31,8	82,5	8,3	6,3	0,2	6,5	2,7
Metropolitan cities	47,0	35,8	82,8	10,7	4,2	0,2	4,4	2,1
Non-metropolitan cities	52,6	29,9	82,5	7,2	7,4	0,2	7,6	2,7
Occupation								
Housewife	46,5	36,1	82,6	7,5	5,9	-	5,9	4,0
Private sector employee	57,1	28,7	85,8	7,5	4,9	-	4,9	1,8
Artisan/Tradesman	53,9	25,6	79,5	8,4	10,7	0,9	11,6	0,5
Student	37,6	38,8	76,4	15,1	4,9	0,8	5,7	2,8
Retired	52,2	29,5	81,7	6,7	8,5	-	8,5	3,1
Public sector employee	42,2	35,8	78,0	11,9	4,6	0,9	5,5	4,6
Unemployed	52,8	27,8	80,6	11,1	6,5	-	6,5	1,8
Serbest meslek erbabı	67,1	22,0	89,1	2,4	6,1	-	6,1	2,4
Self-employed	32,0	52,0	84,0	8,0	8,0	-	8,0	-
General	50,5	31,4	81,9	8,6	6,7	0,3	7,0	2,5

Another related question in the context of perceived cultural similarity is asked through a statement on which the survey respondents were asked to suggest their level of agreement. The statement was "Syrians are culturally enriching us". While the percentage of those who supported this statement was merely 4,3%, that of those disagreeing with this statement was 90,4%. This finding suggests that discussions stemming from social and class-based differences as well as debates concerning cultural domination would be experienced soon.

SB-2019-TABLE 18: To what extent do you agree with the following statement concerning the impact of Syrians living in Turkey? (%)

"Syrians are culturally enriching us"	Completely Disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither Agree, Nor Disagree	Disagree	Completely Agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
SB-2017	52,8	31,8	84,6	7,7	5,7	0,5	8,2	1,5
SB-2019	79,3	11,1	90,4	3,3	3,7	0,6	4,3	2,0

FGD Findings: Cultural Similarity

Similar to the survey findings, a majority of FGD participants appear to suggest that Syrians are not culturally similar to the Turkish society. In terms of perceived cultural differences, 4 themes can be identified. In participants' own words, these include (i) place of women and the value given to women among Syrians, (ii) the daily living cycle, sleeping and waking up late, (iii) different working cultures, Syrians being lazy, and (iv) despite religious commonality, the very different interpretation and practice of Islam by Syrians.

(i)

"Women have a very high place in the Turkish culture since ancient Turkish civilizations. It is the opposite among Arabs. Their perspective on women is deplorable."
Istanbul-Women

"We don't share any cultural commonality with them. There is especially a huge difference concerning the place of women. In fact, for them, the place of a woman is her home. What a woman can do is severely restricted. In our culture, women have much more freedom." Hatay-Women

(ii)

"They were listening to music until 3 o'clock in the morning, they were dancing. A relative of mine went up to them and said 'we are disturbed by the music that you listen to until this late. We don't have to listen to your music, we go to work very early in the morning'." Gaziantep-Women

"Their expectations from life, their lifestyles are very different. They are so self-indulgent. I would wake up to sounds of loud music at 2 am, 3 am in the night. There is a war going on in their country and they can still think about music. They are very relaxed and they carry on with their lives. It would be unthinkable for us in the same situation."
Hatay-Teachers

(iii)

"Their working culture is nothing like ours. They open their stores late and remain open until very late." Gaziantep-NGO Workers

"Well, there are some similarities but their perspective towards life is so different. For example, you can find their stores open until the middle of the night. The man works for four hours and then just stops. He says that was the way back in Syria." Hatay-Teachers

(iv)

"There is no similarity except for religion. And I think even with the religion, only the name is the same, the living is different. What they practice as religion and what is practised here is not the same at all." Gaziantep- NGO Workers

"We have seen that only saying 'we are all Muslim' is not enough. We have seen that there are so many huge differences behind it all, huge social and cultural differences."
Istanbul-NGO Workers

There were also some participants who took issue with this question itself suggesting that what we call “the Syrians” are not a homogenous group. Accordingly, **just like the Turkish society, Syrians are also a group that contains high degrees of diversity. Therefore, there cannot be a singular and simple answer to the question to what extent Syrians are culturally similar to us.** Instead, according to these participants, it should be acknowledged that there are extremely similar and radically different groups within both communities.

“When we look at different regions in Turkey, I don’t find Syrians to be culturally dissimilar to the Turkish people living in rural contexts. They are similar from their cuisine and eating habits to how they behave. I am not talking about all of Turkey, but the rural places. And there is not a single culture among us, either. When we look at more urbanized contexts, the difference naturally increases.” Hatay-Teachers

“I think they are both similar and not similar. This is because we see a great deal of cultural diversity emerging as a result of urbanization here in Turkey.” Istanbul-Women

“They are very similar to us from our cuisine to a lot of different things... I believe there are many similarities from how we dress to how women are treated in society. There are many differences as well.” Istanbul-Women

A relatively minor group of participants suggested that they find Syrians to be culturally similar to themselves. In this context, they especially mentioned the common religion, very similar culinary culture, music, and the patriarchal social structure.

“When we look at the Turkish people of same socio-economic level, we see that they are very similar.” Ankara-Academics

“Our music culture is similar, our culinary culture is very similar... Things like underage marriages, problems experienced by women, these are all similar.” Gaziantep-NGO Workers

“I’ve been to Kilis and Gaziantep recently. Previously I was in Sanliurfa. When I go to these places I don’t see any of these differences [referring to statements by other participants]. I couldn’t even recognize whether someone was from Gaziantep or Syria. This is how similar we are.” Istanbul-NGO Workers

5. Interactions and Communication with Syrians

The number of Syrians under temporary protection has exceeded 4,4% of Turkish population as of November 2019, while only 1,6% of the Syrians live in camps. This means that Syrians live in urban settings all across Turkey, although there are significant differences concerning the respective Syrian populations among regions, cities, districts, and even neighborhoods. The available data shows that the society is very much aware of Syrians and cohabitation is already underway. Beyond this awareness, however, when the “quality and intensity of relations” are concerned, a significance distance is observed. More importantly, while the relations can be expected to improve and become strengthened through time, it appears that there is a trend of receding and deterioration in the relations since SB-2017. There is also a divergence of opinions between Turks and Syrians on this matter. Still, however, if social relations get increasingly weaker, instead of stronger, then there is a significant risk of social exclusion, segregation, and ghettoization. There are all reminiscent of the well-known discussions of “parallel societies”, those different communities who share the same physical space but live in isolation, not “together”.

SB-2019-TABLE 19: Please state whether or not you have ever established the following types of social relationship with Syrians? (%)

		SB-2017			SB-2019		
		Yes	No	No idea/ No response	Yes	No	No idea/ No response
1	To have a conversation	46,1	53,0	0,9	38,0	61,5	0,5
2	To shop (from a Syrian)	26,5	72,7	0,8	19,6	79,9	0,5
3	To establish a business relationship	15,6	82,8	1,6	12,2	87,3	0,5
4	To be friends	14,2	84,0	1,8	12,1	87,5	0,4
5	To have a problem*	10,6	87,2	2,2	12,9	86,7	0,4
6	To fight*				7,7	91,9	0,4
7	To flirt	3,4	94,9	1,7	0,6	99,0	0,4
8	To get married	2,9	95,6	1,5	0,4	99,2	0,4

* "To have a problem" and "to fight" were included within a single statement in SB-2017.

When the respondents were asked to state whether they established several different types social relations with Syrians, the most frequently established type of social relationship appears to be "having a conversation" with 38% of the respondents replying affirmatively (it was 46,1% in SB-2017). The more practical types of social relations, however, such as "shopping (from a Syrian)" or "establishing a business relationship", the percentages significantly fall. Another interesting finding is the low placement of "being friends" in the list of relationships, which was mentioned by 12,1% of the respondents, down from 14,2% in SB-2017 (Table 19). The more intimate types of social relations, as might be expected, are further down the list and also suffering from a decline from 2017. Included as examples of "negative social relations", both "having a problem (with a Syrian)" and "fighting" are in a trend of increase between 2017 and 2019, while still reported by relatively fewer respondents.

The findings suggest that while negative social relations are not reported on a very large scale, the increasing trend in them is quite strong. While in SB-2017 only 10,6% of Turkish respondents suggested having had a problem or fight with Syrians, this figure has increased to 20,6% in SB-2019. The consecutive questions attempted to clarify the problem/conflict areas for a better understanding. One of the most serious anxieties in Turkish society concerning Syrians, as evidenced by data, is that Syrians would bring harm to them. While whether or not there is any objective basis for such a fear is separate question, it is clear that this perception is strong and visible.

In all types of social relations, whether positive or negative, it appears that men are more involved than women and those in the 18-24 age group are more involved than all other age groups. Illiterate respondents display a much higher propensity to establish friendships with Syrians compared to other groups, while high-school graduates are the group that reported most "problems" and "fights". Both "friendships" and "problems/fights" are reported most frequently in the border cities.

SB-2019-TABLE 20: Please state whether or not you have ever established the following types of social relationship with Syrians? (Demography) (%)

		To have a conversation	To shop (from a Syrian)	To establish a business relationship	To be friends	To have a problem	To fight	To flirt	To get married
Sex									
Female	Yes	29,8	12,4	6,9	8,8	9,0	4,8	0,4	0,1
	No	69,6	86,9	92,6	90,6	90,6	94,5	99,1	99,4
	No idea/ No response	0,6	0,7	0,5	0,6	0,4	0,7	0,5	0,5
Male	Yes	46,3	26,9	17,4	15,3	16,7	10,6	0,9	0,8
	No	53,4	72,9	82,0	84,3	82,8	89,3	98,9	99,0
	No idea/ No response	0,3	0,2	0,6	0,4	0,5	0,1	0,2	0,2
Age Groups									
18-24	Yes	41,3	13,6	11,0	13,4	20,9	14,6	1,2	0,9
	No	58,5	85,7	88,5	86,4	78,4	85,0	98,6	99,1
	No idea/ No response	0,2	0,7	0,5	0,2	0,7	0,4	0,2	-
25-34	Yes	40,0	20,7	12,0	12,6	14,4	7,9	0,8	0,4
	No	59,1	78,9	86,8	86,4	85,0	91,5	98,6	98,8
	No idea/ No response	0,9	0,4	1,2	1,0	0,6	0,6	0,6	0,8
35-44	Yes	39,0	24,6	12,8	13,3	11,6	6,5	0,9	0,4
	No	60,6	75,0	87,1	86,3	87,8	93,3	99,1	99,6
	No idea/ No response	0,4	0,4	0,1	0,4	0,6	0,2	-	-
45-54	Yes	37,9	21,0	13,3	11,7	8,4	4,4	-	-
	No	61,9	78,3	86,2	87,9	91,4	95,1	99,5	99,5
	No idea/ No response	0,2	0,7	0,5	0,4	0,2	0,5	0,5	0,5
55-64	Yes	31,9	18,1	11,8	8,3	10,2	5,9	-	0,4
	No	67,7	81,5	87,8	91,3	89,8	93,7	99,6	99,2
	No idea/ No response	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,4	-	0,4	0,4	0,4
65 +	Yes	27,2	12,3	10,5	8,8	4,4	3,5	-	0,9
	No	72,8	87,7	89,5	91,2	95,6	95,6	99,1	98,2
	No idea/ No response	-	-	-	-	-	0,9	0,9	0,9
Educational Attainment									
Illiterate	Yes	28,6	17,9	10,7	21,4	7,1	7,1	3,6	-
	No	71,4	82,1	89,3	78,6	92,9	92,9	96,4	100,0
	No idea/ No response	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Literate but not graduate of any school	Yes	38,5	10,3	7,7	10,3	2,6	2,6	-	-
	No	61,5	89,7	92,3	89,7	97,4	94,9	100,0	100,0
	No idea/ No response	-	-	-	-	-	2,5	-	-
Primary school	Yes	34,9	16,8	10,4	11,4	11,2	6,9	0,5	0,5
	No	64,9	82,9	89,3	88,2	88,8	92,7	99,1	99,1
	No idea/ No response	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,4	-	0,4	0,4	0,4
Middle-School	Yes	37,4	20,7	14,1	12,6	14,4	8,1	0,3	0,3
	No	62,0	78,5	85,6	87,2	85,1	91,6	99,2	99,2
	No idea/ No response	0,6	0,8	0,3	0,2	0,5	0,3	0,5	0,5
High-school or equivalent	Yes	38,0	20,6	11,3	11,0	13,7	8,6	0,5	0,4
	No	61,6	79,1	88,4	88,7	86,0	91,4	99,5	99,6
	No idea/ No response	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	-	-	-
University/ Graduate degree	Yes	42,7	21,5	14,4	13,6	13,4	7,3	1,0	0,6
	No	56,5	77,6	84,1	85,2	85,4	91,5	98,2	98,6
	No idea/ No response	0,8	0,9	1,5	1,2	1,2	1,2	0,8	0,8

SB-2019-TABLE 20: Please state whether or not you have ever established the following types of social relationship with Syrians? (Demography) (%)

		To have a conversation	To shop (from a Syrian)	To establish a business relationship	To be friends	To have a problem	To fight	To flirt	To get married
Region									
Border cities	Yes	39,8	27,3	19,3	16,9	14,3	10,2	0,6	0,9
	No	60,0	72,5	80,1	82,7	85,5	89,6	99,1	98,9
	No idea/ No response	0,2	0,2	0,6	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,2
Other cities	Yes	37,6	17,7	10,3	10,8	12,5	7,1	0,6	0,3
	No	61,9	81,8	89,2	88,7	87,0	92,4	99,0	99,3
	No idea/ No response	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,4	0,4
Metropolitan cities	Yes	31,2	16,3	9,5	8,2	10,2	7,2	0,5	0,5
	No	68,3	83,2	90,2	91,5	89,5	92,3	99,0	99,0
	No idea/ No response	0,5	0,5	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,5	0,5	0,5
Non-metropolitan cities	Yes	40,8	18,4	10,8	12,2	13,6	7,0	0,7	0,2
	No	58,7	81,1	88,7	87,3	85,8	92,5	99,0	99,4
	No idea/ No response	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,6	0,5	0,3	0,4
Occupation									
Housewife	Yes	25,5	7,5	4,4	7,5	4,8	2,2	0,4	0,2
	No	74,2	91,9	95,2	92,3	94,7	97,3	99,4	99,6
	No idea/ No response	0,3	0,6	0,4	0,2	0,5	0,5	0,2	0,2
Private sector employee	Yes	37,9	19,0	12,1	10,7	16,4	10,3	0,4	0,6
	No	62,1	81,0	87,4	88,9	83,6	89,7	99,6	99,4
	No idea/ No response	-	-	0,5	0,4	-	-	-	-
Artisan	Yes	55,7	44,3	21,9	18,0	17,4	8,4	0,7	0,5
	No	44,1	55,3	77,9	81,7	82,6	91,6	99,3	99,5
	No idea/ No response	0,2	0,4	0,2	0,3	-	-	-	-
Student	Yes	40,4	12,7	10,6	17,6	20,4	13,1	2,4	1,6
	No	58,4	86,1	88,2	81,6	78,4	86,1	97,1	98,0
	No idea/ No response	1,2	1,2	1,2	0,8	1,2	0,8	0,5	0,4
Retired	Yes	30,4	15,6	11,2	8,5	8,5	4,9	-	-
	No	69,2	83,9	88,4	91,1	91,5	94,2	98,7	98,7
	No idea/ No response	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,4	-	0,9	1,3	1,3
Public employee	Yes	44,0	13,8	16,5	12,8	11,9	8,3	-	-
	No	55,0	84,4	81,7	84,4	86,2	89,0	97,2	97,2
	No idea/ No response	1,0	1,8	1,8	2,8	1,9	2,7	2,8	2,8
Unemployed	Yes	34,3	12,0	8,3	8,3	16,7	15,7	0,9	-
	No	64,8	88,0	90,7	91,7	82,4	84,3	99,1	100,0
	No idea/ No response	0,9	-	1,0	-	0,9	-	-	-
Self-employed	Yes	40,2	24,4	17,1	17,1	8,5	4,9	-	-
	No	58,5	75,6	82,9	81,7	90,2	95,1	100,0	100,0
	No idea/ No response	1,3	-	-	1,2	1,3	-	-	-
Other	Yes	36,0	12,0	16,0	8,0	8,0	8,0	-	-
	No	64,0	88,0	84,0	92,0	92,0	92,0	100,0	100,0
General	Yes	38,0	19,6	12,2	12,1	12,9	7,7	0,6	0,4
	No	61,5	79,9	87,3	87,5	86,7	91,9	99,0	99,2
	No idea/ No response	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,4

FGD Findings: Relations with Syrians

FGD participants were also asked about their relations with Syrians and they shared a great variety of experiences and opinions. Within this great diversity, however, the relations between Turkish citizens and Syrians were defined primarily in terms of mistrust, tension, and uneasiness.

- *"I made this observation at a school. The recess bells for the Turkish and Syrian children are different. When it is time for Syrian students to go out for recess, the teacher let the Turkish students back in. They don't want them to interact with one another."* Ankara-Women
- *"When I first met my Syrian friends, to be frank, there was this lack of mutual trust. They were nice people but they were working differently than we do. They were always trying to slack off. They never took work seriously."* Ankara-Women
- *"There are several neighborhoods in Antakya where people just sell of their homes and belongings just to move away. My brother, for example, moved away from a neighborhood where lots of Syrians lived because he was afraid."* Hatay-Artisans/Employees

Moreover, for some participants, defining the relations as distant was increasingly an understatement. Accordingly, they suggested that aloof and uneasy social relations were being replaced by growing anti-Syrian sentiments and small-scale social conflicts.

- *"I was in Sanliurfa the last summer. There was a big incident there. Two young people fought and it ended up with someone dying. The Governorate immediately took the matter into their hands so that it would spin out of control. Because they know if things get out of hand, there is such a big risk."* Ankara-Women
- *"There was a fight in Demetevler. First, Syrians had attacked Turks. Then, Turks gathered around attacked Syrians' shops. There were bats and sticks and stones involved. When this kind of things happen, it affects people negatively."* Ankara-Students

Some participants suggested that they do not establish any form of social relations with Syrians because they believe Syrians to be only temporary in Turkey. Another significant theme suggested by some participants was that the trend of deteriorating relations was not the fault of Syrians:

- *"I think they are being labeled and stereotyped by the society. That is why they turn toward inside and get isolated from the society."* Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- *"Our society is a bit intolerant. And if Syrians leave, we will not be a very tolerant society all of a sudden. There will be a new address for the reactions."* Ankara-Academics
- *"Let me give you an example from the owner of my shop. He wants to exploit Syrians. He says the next shop was rented out for 2000 lira, why would I rent mine out for 1000? He knows that he is in the wrong but does this anyway."* Gaziantep-Women

6. Support to Syrians

Since the arrival of first Syrian groups in 2011, there was a considerable degree of social solidarity towards Syrian, particularly in the first few years. A more concrete form of such solidarity is through assistance, either in cash or in kind. The survey respondents, thus, were asked "Have you ever provided in cash or in kind assistance to Syrians (except for giving money to beggars)?" A quite high percentage of 34,1% of respondents responded affirmatively.¹¹¹

111 In the 2014 study "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration", those who stated that they have provided assistance to Syrians was around 30%. See: p.129.

SB-2019-TABLE 21: Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians?

	#	%
Yes	774	34,1
No	1.446	63,7
Don't remember/ No response	51	2,2
Total	2.271	100,0

Undoubtedly, the quality of the assistance is also very important. Those who said that they have provided a form of assistance to Syrians were further asked how they provided the assistance. The respondents, being able to provide multiple responses, suggested that they have provided such assistance multiple times (82,3%), while providing assistance in kind appears to be more common than providing assistance in cash, 72,9% and 58,3%, respectively. These figures display a very remarkable level of solidarity.

SB-2019-TABLE 22: What kind of an assistance have you provided? (%) (Multiple responses)

In Kind*	In Cash*
72,9	58,3
Directly*	Through an individual/institution*
88,8	16,1
Once	Multiple times
17,7	82,3

*Multiple Responses / Note: These are the results of 774 people who stated that they have provided in-kind or cash aid to Syrians so far.

The demographic profile of those who provided assistance to Syrians is also interesting. It appears that men more than women, those in the 25-34 age group more than the individuals in other age groups, and those living in the border cities more than the ones living in other regions provide more assistance to Syrians.

SB-2019-TABLE 23: Have you ever provided in cash or in kind assistance to Syrians? (%)

	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response
Sex			
Female	30,5	67,7	1,8
Male	37,7	59,6	2,7
Age Groups			
18-24	32,9	63,1	4,0
25-34	39,8	58,3	1,9
35-44	34,4	63,6	2,0
45-54	32,0	65,9	2,1
55-64	29,5	69,7	0,8
65 +	29,8	68,4	1,8
Educational Attainment			
Illiterate	32,1	64,3	3,6
Literate but not graduate of any school	43,6	56,4	-
Primary school graduate	31,8	65,9	2,2
Middle-school graduate	34,3	64,4	1,3
High-school or equivalent school graduate	34,4	63,2	2,4
University graduate / Holder of graduate degree	35,4	61,8	2,8
Region			
Border cities	46,1	50,9	3,0
Other cities	31,0	66,9	2,0
Metropolitan cities	29,0	69,5	1,5
Non-metropolitan cities	32,0	65,7	2,3
Occupation			
Housewife	30,2	68,3	1,5
Private sector employee	30,2	67,6	2,2
Artisans/Tradesmen	43,8	54,3	1,9
Student	31,4	64,5	4,1
Retired	28,1	69,6	2,3
Public sector employee	42,2	54,1	3,7
Unemployed	40,7	55,6	3,7
Self-employed	32,9	65,9	1,2
Other	44,0	56,0	-
General	34,1	63,7	2,2

7. Social Distance

Considering the fact that more than 98% of the 3.6 million Syrians live outside of camps all across Turkey, “social distance” is a very important concept in the framework of SB research and producing a reliable measurement of social distance between the Turkish society and Syrians under temporary protection was determined as one of its key objectives. The concept of “social distance”, developed by Emory S. Bogardus in 1925, provides a very useful tool for discussing the terms of social cohesion.¹¹² In calculating a social distance measure with Syrians, Cluster and Discriminant analyses were used. In this framework, scoring was conducted by assigning “1” to those who said “I agree”, “0” to those who said “I partly agree”, and “-1” to those who said “I disagree”. Next, the average score for each question was calculated to reach the overall social distance score. In this calculation, considering the distribution of the data, the “Cluster analysis” was used to form 5 groups. The appropriateness of these groups was confirmed by the “Discriminant analysis”. A strong correlation of 98,5% was found between the scoring and these 5 groups.¹¹³

To measure social distance, the respondents were given 10 statements in this context and asked to state to what extent they agreed with each of these. The findings suggest that there is a significant social distance put forth by Turkish society towards Syrians. As it will be elaborated in detail while presenting the findings of the Survey conducted with Syrians, concerning social distance, Syrians demonstrate an almost completely opposite approach (see SB-2019-Table:97 et al.). In addition, the social distance displayed by Turkish society has grown compared to two years ago. While in SB-2017 the percentage of those in the “very distant” category was 36,1%, it increased to 51% in SB-2019. Those in the “distant” category decreased in their share, from 26,8% in SB-2017 to 15,3% in SB-2019; while the respective shares of other 3 categories showed only minimal change.

When specific statements in the context of social distance are examined, the highest level of acceptance appears to come concerning education. The statement “It wouldn’t disturb me if Syrian children enrolled to the same school as my children” received the 32,3% agreement from the Turkish respondents. This was followed, displaying less and less agreement, by “working in the same work place”, “living in the same neighborhood”, and “living in the same building”. Where the agreement falls shortest and social distance grows largest are the statements related to “marriage” (for themselves, their children, their siblings) and “business partnership”.

112 Emory S. Bogardus (1925) “Social Distance and Its Origins.” *Journal of Applied Sociology* 9 (1925): 216-226.

113 For more details on Cluster and Discriminant Analysis See: C. Fraley and A. E. Raftery (1999) Software for Model-Based Cluster and Discriminant Analysis (<http://132.180.15.2/math/statlib/S/mclust/old/mclust.pdf>)

SB-2019-TABLE 24: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (%)

		I Disagree	I Partially Agree	I Agree	No idea/ No response
1	It wouldn't disturb me if Syrian children would enroll to the same school as my children	52,0	13,2	32,3	2,5
2	It wouldn't disturb me to work with a Syrian in the same work place	56,3	12,6	28,2	2,9
3	It wouldn't disturb me if some Syrian families would settle down in the neighborhood that I live	59,4	14,2	24,7	1,7
4	It wouldn't disturb me to live with a Syrian in the same building	60,4	14,8	23,3	1,5
5	I can be friends with a Syrian	61,1	15,4	21,8	1,7
6	It wouldn't disturb me to settle down in a neighborhood where the majority of residents are Syrian	70,5	11,3	16,7	1,5
7	I can form a business partnership with a Syrian	75,3	10,2	12,1	2,4
8	It wouldn't disturb me if my brother/sister gets married with a Syrian	81,3	8,5	8,2	2,0
9	I would allow my child to get married with a Syrian	81,5	8,5	7,6	2,4
10	I can get married with a Syrian	86,9	6,6	5,0	1,5

SB-2019-TABLE 25: Social Distance Groups

	#	%	Social Distance Score
Very distant	1157	51,0	-0,97
Distant	347	15,3	-0,55
Neither distant, nor close	383	16,9	-0,10
Close	244	10,8	0,36
Very close	135	6,0	0,87
General	2266	100,0	-0,51

Note: 5 respondents didn't answer social distance questions and therefore were not included in the grouping.

Scores bt -1,00;
-0,80 Very Distant

Scores bt -0,79;
-0,40 Distant

Scores bt -0,39; -0,19
Neither Distant, Nor Close

Scores bt -0,20;
-0,69 Close

Scores bt -0,70;
-1,00 Very Close

As stated, when the findings of SB-2017 and SB-2019 are compared, there is a trend of increasing social distance. When the overall social distance scores are considered, it can be observed that the overall social distance has increased from -0,36 in SB-2017 to -0,51 in SB-2019 (see SB-2019-Table 25).

SB-2019-TABLE 26: Social Distance Groups, SB-2017 and SB-2019

	SB-2017			SB-2019		
	#	%	Social Distance Score	#	%	Social Distance Score
Very distant	748	36,1	-0,95	1.157	51,0	-0,97
Distant	555	26,8	-0,51	347	15,3	-0,55
Neither distant, nor close	363	17,5	-0,02	383	16,9	-0,10
Close	220	10,6	0,44	244	10,8	0,36
Very close	186	9,0	0,88	135	6,0	0,87
General	2.072	100,0	-0,36	2.266	100,0	-0,51

The growing social distance is apparent in the responses of Turkish society to individual statements. For instance, the share of those who “agreed” or “partially agreed” with the statement “I can get married with a Syrian” was 20,3% in 2017, but it decreased to 11,6% in 2019. 86,9% of the respondents clearly suggest that they wouldn’t consider such a marriage. A similar decreasing trend is visible in the other statements involving marriage where those agreeing to their siblings getting married to a Syrian decreased from 25,4% to 16,7% and those suggesting they would allow their children to get married to a Syrian decreased from 26,3% to 16,7%. It needs to be stated, however, considering the intimate nature of these statements, these small and decreasing percentages are still not negligible. The support for “friendship” is similarly receding, fallen from 49,2% in 2017 to 37,2% in 2019, manifesting once again the growing social distance from the perspective of Turkish society.

As the ages of the respondents increase the social distance appears to grow. Similarly, women appear to display a larger social distance compared to men, and those in the metropolitan cities do so more than those in the border cities. This confirms the finding of a large and growing social distance that emerged in the “cultural similarity” question.

SB-2019-TABLE 27: Social Distance Groups (%) X Demography

Distant	Very	Distant	Neither Distant, Nor Close	Close	Very Close
Sex					
Female	53,3	15,3	16,2	10,2	5,0
Male	48,9	15,3	17,6	11,3	6,9
Age Groups					
18-24	42,6	15,3	23,5	12,5	6,1
25-34	46,7	15,8	20,4	11,5	5,6
35-44	49,5	16,1	17,2	10,5	6,7
45-54	54,0	16,4	11,9	11,7	6,0
55-64	67,6	11,1	8,3	7,1	5,9
65 +	61,4	14,9	13,2	7,0	3,5
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	60,7	14,3	17,9	7,1	-
Literate but not graduate of any school	59,0	5,1	15,4	12,8	7,7
Primary school	57,2	15,6	12,3	9,0	5,9
Middle-School	48,7	16,0	19,6	11,3	4,4
High-School or equivalent	50,1	14,0	17,8	12,0	6,1
University/Graduate Degree	45,9	17,4	18,9	10,7	7,1
Region					
Border cities	47,8	14,8	18,9	13,9	4,6
Other cities	51,9	15,4	16,4	10,0	6,3
Metropolitan cities	52,8	16,5	16,2	7,5	7,0
Non-metropolitan cities	51,4	14,9	16,5	11,2	6,0
Occupation					
Housewife	55,0	13,7	16,7	10,4	4,2
Private sector employee	52,2	15,6	17,8	9,9	4,5
Artisan/Tradesman	50,1	14,7	14,4	11,2	9,6
Student	35,6	15,2	26,2	14,8	8,2
Retired	61,1	15,2	9,4	9,4	4,9
Public sector employee	50,0	15,7	15,7	13,9	4,7
Unemployed	48,1	21,7	17,0	6,6	6,6
Self-employed	52,4	18,3	18,3	8,5	2,5
Other	32,0	20,0	24,0	12,0	12,0
General	51,0	15,3	16,9	10,8	6,0

* Results for 28 illiterate people.

** Other provinces include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

*** The results belonging to 25 people expressed with "Other".

FGD Findings: Social Distance

To substantiate the Survey findings, FGD participants were also asked how they would approach various hypothetical social relationships. These questions stirred quite heated discussions. A summary of main findings is presented in the following.

- **“I would become friends/do business/become neighbors with a Syrian”**

The most frequently endorsed type of social relationship in this group has been becoming friends. Almost no participant objected in strong terms to the prospect of becoming friends with Syrians. However, when it comes to doing business and becoming neighbors with Syrians, there were positive and negative responses.

- *If they cause tension or uneasiness as neighbor, of course I wouldn't want it. But if they are nice, considerate people, why not?” Ankara-Academics*
- *I have Syrian neighbors. I consider it as an opportunity, a privilege. I even sometimes get recipes from them. I think it is cultural richness.” Gaziantep-Women*
- *I have worked with them, done business with them. I can't say I experienced any troubles. But those who have worked with them more said they experienced problems.” Ankara-Women*

- **“I would not become friends/do business/become neighbors with a Syrian”**

Those participants who suggested that they wouldn't want to do business or become neighbors with Syrians justified themselves putting forward several arguments. Those who wouldn't want to do business with Syrians, for instance, suggested two main reasons: (i) Syrians have a bad work ethic and they are not hard-workers, and (ii) Syrians are not trustworthy. Those who wouldn't want to be neighbors, similarly, justified their attitude by suggesting that Syrian households are too crowded with many individuals living in a single home and that they stay up until very late and make a lot of noise. Some other participants further suggested that Syrians do not abide by the rules and have the culture of living together.

- *My father used to be a realtor in Batikent [a district in Ankara]. He would be very uneasy with Syrian renters, wondering whether they would pay the rent. At the end of the day, I don't know these people. In as much as I am humanist, I still get nervous.” Ankara-Academics*
- *I wouldn't want to do anything with them. Not business, nothing.” Hatay-Women*
- *It is not a good idea to do business with them. Let's say you open up a new company together. How will it be? The guy is under temporary protection, his rights and obligations are different, limited. Also, how can you trust him? He is here today but maybe tomorrow he will be gone. How will you find him?” Gaziantep-Students*

- **“I wouldn't mind my children to be in the same classroom as Syrian children”**

Those participants who suggested this usually explained that they would consider this to be an advantage for their children since they would be introduced to social and cultural diversity at a young age. In other words, these participants usually justified their answer by referring to moral ideals rather than any expectation of a better-quality education.

- *I would want it because it would be good for him to get to know other cultures. Personally, I would prefer a classroom with as much diversity as possible for my child.” Ankara-Students*
- *I have 4-year-old twins. They go to a preschool where they have Syrian friends. At the end of the day these are children. Their ethnicity, religion, language don't matter. As long as they can have good communication, that's what matters for me.” Hatay-Artisans/Employees*
- *My kid has Syrians in her classroom. Well, of course, there are some minor problems. Related to language here and there. But it has more to do with the character of the children, not with their nationality. There are naughty children in our society as well as in them. I don't see any issue whatsoever, they are kids at the end.” Hatay-Artisans/Employees*

- *I made students sit so that one Turkish student would sit next to a Syrian student. No two Syrian students sat together. I made them sit together so they can help each other, they can learn from each other. No parents objected to this. Initially they wouldn't play with each other but in time they started to get close and play with each other." Hatay-Teachers*

- ***"I wouldn't want my children to receive education in the same classroom as Syrian children"***

In contrast to above group of participants, almost all of the FGD participants who gave this response justified it on practical and pedagogical grounds.

- *Presence of students from many different cultures is very good and useful at the university level. But it makes things very difficult at the primary school level. I don't want to suggest a segregated education system. But when the students are receiving the fundamental, essential knowledge, this could make education very difficult." Ankara-Academics*
- *Not because they are Syrian, but I wouldn't want it because it would make the level of education of my child." Hatay-Women*
- *Our education system is based on placement examinations. There is this race in education in Turkey. So, this would put my child at a disadvantage. We are all so worried that our kids would be negatively affected in these exams because of Syrians in the schools." Hatay-Women*

- ***"I would get married with a Syrian, but-"***

A majority of participants, including those voicing very critical opinions about Syrians, suggested that when selecting a spouse, they wouldn't consider his/her nationality or ethnicity, they would consider his/her personality. Therefore, a majority of the respondents suggested that they would get married with a Syrian, provided s/he has the desired qualities. However, in many cases, the suggestion that they would marry a Syrian was followed with a "but". In most cases, that was followed by "but my family would never agree to it".

- *Personally, it is not an issue for me but my family would object." Ankara-Academics*
- *I think I wouldn't care about his race as long as I am in love. Of course, there could be some problems, my family definitely being a big one." Ankara-Students*
- *My family wouldn't be too happy with it but I would go ahead anyway. And I wouldn't mind my children to get married to whomever they loved." Gaziantep-Women*

- ***"I wouldn't get married with a Syrian"***

Some other participants suggested that they would not consider marriage with a Syrian. It is interesting to note that this group is constituted almost exclusively by female respondents. Some of these participants explained that their answers were not specifically related to Syrians, but that they wouldn't consider marriage with any foreigner due to their fear of potential complications deriving from cultural differences. Some others, however, suggested that their answer was not due to a principled objection against marrying a foreigner. Instead, they argued that because they knew Syrians, they can say that they wouldn't marry a Syrian.

- *I wouldn't want it because we are very culturally different. The same goes for other foreigners, too. It is not about Syrians." Gaziantep-NGO Workers*
- *I wouldn't. I don't think we are culturally compatible. I am not saying this only for Syrians, I wouldn't marry any foreigner." Hatay-Artisans/Employees*
- *I wouldn't want it. We are very different people. I don't think we can form a healthy relationship. To be honest, I wouldn't want my loved ones to get married to them either." Gaziantep-Students*
- *"I would rather remain unmarried at home for 40 years than marry a Syrian" Istanbul-Artisans/Employees*

8. Livelihood: How Syrians in Turkey earn their living

SB studies have shown that despite years of living together, a significant part of perceptions related to how Syrians live is based on incomplete and inaccurate information, which are often determined by prejudices and misinformation. One of the most important issues in this context is the widespread belief about “state’s financial involvement”, which hardly reflects the actual situation. Both SB studies show that around 85% of Turkish society believes that Syrians in Turkey make their living through state assistance. When the Turkish respondents were asked the question “How are the Syrians in Turkey making their living?”, 84,5% of the respondents included “through assistance of the Turkish state” in their responses. This figure was 86,2% back in SB-2017. This strong belief among society could prove to be one of the important obstacles before integration policies. The belief that Syrians are earning their living through working is reported by a significantly smaller group of respondents. While in SB-2017 49,8% of the respondents suggested that Syrians are making their living through working, this figure has slightly increased in SB-2019 to 50,9%. The response “by begging” is mentioned by 54,2% of the respondents and ranked second, demonstrating once again the importance of negative perceptions. The increase in the share of the response “through support from international organizations/foreign states” from 4,8% to 8% is also noteworthy. It can be suggested that the recent initiatives by various EU institutions have been effective in this increase. In addition, the enhanced policy of introducing various programs towards Syrians might have also been effective. There is a significant 10 percentage point decrease (from 31,9% to 21%) in the share of the response “through support from charitable people”. This points at the decay in emotional solidarity.

When Syrian respondents were asked how they are making their living, however, both in SB-2017 and SB-2019, more than 38% of them mentioned “by working” which would mean that around 1 million Syrians in Turkey are actively working (see SB-2019-Table-87). This finding clearly shows that the reality in the field is significantly different from the perceptions of Turkish society. An ILO study similarly suggests that among Syrians of 15 years of age or older, there are around 930 thousand Syrians who are working in Turkey.¹¹⁴ Therefore, this misleading yet widespread perception concerning how Syrians in Turkey make a living reflects the inadequacies within the communication strategy.

SB-2019-TABLE 28: How are the Syrians in Turkey making their living? (Multiple Responses)

		SB-2017		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	Through assistance from the Turkish state	1.801	86,2	1.918	84,5
2	By begging	1.359	65,1	1.231	54,2
3	By working	1.040	49,8	1.155	50,9
4	Through support from charitable people	666	31,9	478	21,0
5	Through NGO (associations/foundations) support	170	8,1	218	9,6
6	Through support from international organizations/ foreign states	101	4,8	181	8,0
7	Other	-	-	22	1,0
	No idea/ No response	19	0,9	31	1,4

114 ILO Syrians in The Turkish Labour Market, Data from TURKSTAT Household Labour Force Survey (HHLFS) 2017, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-ankara/documents/genericdocument/wcms_738618.pdf (Erişim: 18.03.2020)

SB-2019-TABLE 29: How are the Syrians in Turkey making their living? (%) (Multiple Responses)

	Assistance from the Turkish state	Begging	Working	Support from charitable people	NGO (Associations/ foundations) support	Support from international organizations/ foreign states	Other	No idea / No response
Sex								
Female	85,4	53,7	46,7	22,3	8,9	7,3	0,6	1,8
Male	83,5	54,7	55,0	19,8	10,3	8,6	1,3	0,9
Age Groups								
18-24	80,3	57,0	50,0	20,4	7,5	5,2	1,6	1,4
25-34	85,4	58,7	49,4	21,7	9,3	9,4	0,4	1,2
35-44	85,2	47,3	54,9	23,1	12,9	10,4	0,6	0,9
45-54	83,2	51,4	51,4	18,5	9,1	7,5	0,9	1,9
55-64	89,4	55,5	45,7	19,3	8,3	7,1	1,6	2,4
65 +	86,0	64,0	50,9	24,6	7,9	4,4	1,8	-
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate	78,6	50,0	32,1	10,7	3,6	3,6	-	7,1
	89,7	66,7	46,2	7,7	2,6	5,1	-	5,1
Primary school	83,6	50,3	47,4	19,7	8,7	8,1	1,0	2,1
Middle-School	84,3	53,4	52,1	16,8	7,9	4,7	1,0	1,0
High-School or equivalent	85,6	51,1	52,8	21,7	10,2	7,3	0,8	0,8
University/Graduate Degree	83,7	63,4	52,4	26,6	12,0	11,8	1,2	1,0
Region								
Border cities	82,9	34,2	53,2	13,9	15,4	15,4	-	2,4
Other cities	84,9	59,3	50,2	22,9	8,1	6,1	1,2	1,1
Metropolitan cities	85,2	66,7	57,2	23,8	12,3	4,0	1,8	0,8
Non-metropolitan cities	84,7	55,7	46,8	22,4	6,0	7,1	0,9	1,2
Occupation								
Housewife	84,6	49,3	48,7	24,0	7,9	6,2	0,2	2,6
Private sector employee	85,8	58,1	50,4	20,0	11,5	8,9	0,6	0,8
Artisan/Tradesman	82,0	51,4	58,7	19,9	9,8	11,0	1,8	0,9
Student	82,9	58,0	54,3	23,3	8,2	5,7	1,6	0,4
Retired	87,9	60,3	45,1	21,0	8,9	7,6	0,9	1,8
Public sector employee	85,3	55,0	46,8	23,9	13,8	10,1	0,9	2,8
Unemployed	88,0	58,3	45,4	16,7	13,0	3,7	0,9	0,9
Self-employed	79,3	47,6	46,3	13,4	7,3	6,1	2,4	-
Other	80,0	44,0	44,0	8,0	-	16,0	-	-
General	84,5	54,2	50,9	21,0	9,6	8,0	1,0	1,4

The reason why the option of “begging” is so prominent among the responses is apparently a matter of perception. Following their movement towards Turkish cities in 2013-2014, the most specific image of Syrians becomes associated with begging. In other words, begging became a labelling instrument in the cities. While this image of begging Syrians at the traffic lights or city centers became widespread between 2011 and 2014, it is obvious that among 3,6 million Syrians those who make their living through begging can only be a marginally small group.

9. Looking at the Society from Outside

Survey respondents were asked some questions designed to understand how they would see their own society from an external perspective. These questions enable the respondents to individually evaluate the society as well as to voice certain things, which they may refrain from mentioning as individuals, on behalf of the society.

The responses to the question “How is our society treating Syrians in Turkey?” are noteworthy. For a majority of the respondents, “Turkish society embraced Syrians” (29,1%) and “The society is doing everything it can for Syrians” (30,8%). In other words, in combination, 60% of the respondents believe that the Turkish society is in a positive attitude towards Syrians. Despite this overall positive outlook, some negative treatment is also mentioned. While 18% of the respondents agreed with the statement “Syrians are exploited as cheap labor”, 6% suggest that “Turkish society looks down on Syrians”. Those who believe that “Turkish people treat Syrians badly” constitute 5,8% of the respondents. These findings can be interpreted as demonstrating, on the one hand, a significant support for Syrians in Turkish society, and on the other, the existence of a critical perspective. This is evident in the change that is seen between SB-2017 and SB-2019. There is a decrease in the percentages of the responses “Turkish society embraced Syrians” and “The society is doing everything it can for Syrians”, which indicates the growing internal critique.

SB-2019-TABLE 30: Which one of the following statements best reflects how our society treats Syrians?

		SB-2017		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	Turkish society is doing everything it can for Syrians	681	32,6	699	30,8
2	Our society has embraced Syrians	687	32,9	660	29,1
3	Syrians are exploited as cheap labor	391	18,7	410	18,0
4	Our society looks down on Syrians	144	6,9	137	6,0
5	Our society treats Syrians badly	121	5,8	131	5,8
	No idea/ No response	65	3,1	234	10,3
Total		2.089	100,0	2.271	100,0

SB-2019-TABLE 31: Which one of the following statements best reflects how our society treats Syrians? (%)

	Turkish society is doing everything it can for Syrians	Our society has embraced Syrians	Syrians are exploited as cheap labor	Our society looks down on Syrians	Our society treats Syrians badly	No idea / No response
Sex						
Female	29,2	30,0	15,5	6,3	6,0	13,0
Male	32,3	28,1	20,6	5,8	5,6	7,6
Age Groups						
18-24	24,6	25,1	24,6	8,7	7,5	9,5
25-34	28,3	27,8	19,7	7,7	7,3	9,2
35-44	35,5	29,6	14,6	5,0	5,9	9,4
45-54	30,8	29,2	17,8	5,4	4,2	12,6
55-64	36,2	32,7	15,4	3,1	3,1	9,5
65 +	29,8	38,6	9,6	2,6	3,5	15,9
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	46,4	39,3	-	3,6	-	10,7
	25,6	56,4	10,3	-	2,6	5,1
Primary school	34,1	32,7	13,1	4,7	4,8	10,6
Middle-School	34,6	31,4	14,7	4,2	6,3	8,8
High-School or equivalent	29,0	25,5	20,3	6,8	5,5	12,9
University/Graduate Degree	26,2	25,6	24,6	8,5	7,5	7,6
Region						
Border cities	40,7	35,7	12,3	3,0	1,3	7,0
Other cities	28,2	27,4	19,5	6,8	6,9	11,2
Metropolitan cities	31,5	31,2	15,5	3,5	8,0	10,3
Non-metropolitan cities	26,6	25,5	21,5	8,4	6,4	11,6
Occupation						
Housewife	33,0	34,2	10,7	5,1	4,4	12,6
Private sector employee	28,1	24,3	22,3	8,7	4,7	11,9
Artisan/Tradesman	37,0	28,3	16,2	6,4	6,8	5,3
Student	22,9	23,7	25,6	7,8	9,0	11,0
Retired	31,3	32,1	16,6	3,1	4,0	12,9
Public sector employee	32,1	28,4	19,3	3,7	6,4	10,1
Unemployed	29,6	31,5	27,7	3,7	5,6	1,9
Self-employed	25,6	32,9	20,7	3,7	9,8	7,3
Other	16,0	28,0	12,0	4,0	8,0	32,0
General	30,8	29,1	18,0	6,0	5,8	10,3

More than average support for the statement “Turkish society is doing everything it can for Syrians” comes from those in the 55-64 age group, males, illiterates, and those who live in border cities, while males, over 65 year-olds, and those in the border cities give significant support to the statement “our society has embraced Syrians”. Those who more strongly supported the statements “our society looks down on Syrians” and “our society treats Syrians badly” are those in the 18-24 age group, university graduates, and those who live in non-metropolitan cities.

FGD Findings: Looking at the society from outside

The participants were asked about their evaluations on how the society has approached Syrians specifically concerning each of the cities where the FGDs were conducted.

Approach of People of Hatay towards Syrians: *The most significant theme in the FGD discussions in Hatay was that the way citizens in Hatay was treating Syrians has been in a transformation over the years and the relations were very tense at the moment. Accordingly, in the initial years of the crisis, people of Hatay, a city on the Syrian border, displayed a lot of sympathy and compassion towards Syrians. However, as years passed, this positive approach started to be replaced by a cynical distance, and even uneasiness and hostility.*

Approach of People of Gaziantep towards Syrians: *In Gaziantep, another border city, the experience was reported to have been very similar to that of Hatay. According to some participants, again similar to Hatay's experience, the initial very positive approach of the people started to change in time. However, some other participants suggested that people of Gaziantep still treat Syrians in a very positive way. The larger concern in Gaziantep was reported to be the significant degree of ghettoization of Syrians and the lack of communication between them and Turkish citizens.*

Approach of People of Istanbul towards Syrians: *As the largest of metropolitan cities in Turkey, the experiences of the people of Istanbul were different. It was suggested by a majority of FGD participants that for a long time, residents of this gigantic city, and particularly those who live in the more westernized or “modern” districts, didn't even feel the presence of Syrians. In fact, according to these participants, in districts like Besiktas and Mecidiyekoy, the residents of Istanbul barely see any Syrians even today. In terms of how the society and local people treat Syrians, the most significant issue raised in Istanbul FGDs was that Syrians were being exploited by employers in the informal market as cheap labor.*

Approach of People of Ankara towards Syrians: *A smaller metropolitan city and the capital of Turkey, participants of the Ankara FGDs generally mentioned the negative approach of the people of Ankara towards Syrians. Accordingly, the negative perspective and treatment are based much more on prejudices than on any actual experiences.*

10. Anxieties: Security, Serenity and Social Acceptance

The argument that Turkish society has displayed a remarkable degree of support and acceptance towards Syrians has been tested and approved by this study as well. However, this “still very high level of social acceptance” is not based on “love” or “support”, but on “toleration”. It is a fact that there is a significant uneasiness and growing anxieties within the Turkish society. The “high level yet fragile acceptance” was tested through various questions and within different formats in SB-2019, as it was in SB-2017. In this way, it was attempted to uncover the reasons, types, and scope of the anxieties that Turkish society has regarding Syrians. At the most general level, it needs to be clearly stated that the increase in the anxieties of Turkish society is visible through all the statements. While the general level of anxiety in SB-2017 was 3,22 out of 5, it increased to 3,58 in SB-2019.¹¹⁵ However, it appears that this increasing level of anxiety is not perceived by Syrians. This, in turn, shows that there is another reality in the daily life where social acceptance is still strong, albeit in the form of toleration, despite harsh discourses and increasing anxieties.

¹¹⁵ SB-2017 6 included statements on anxieties over Syrians in different areas, while SB-2019 included 9.

The responses to the question "To what extent do you feel the below anxieties regarding Syrians in our country?" show that anxieties among Turkish society are at a high level and in an increasing trend, while the existing social acceptance is becoming increasingly fragile. One of the most significant of these anxieties relates to the "perception" of potential "harm" to be caused by Syrians. The level of anxiety caused by Syrians among Turkish society is 3,6 (72%) in a 5-point system.¹¹⁶ Among specific anxieties, "economy" (i.e. "I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy") is at the top with a score of 3,8 (76%). It is obviously not clear what is meant by "harm" in this statement. In other words, it is not clear whether harm refers to the cost on the budget caused by Syrians, or the effect on the informal economy, or loss of jobs for local population, or something else. What is clear, however, is that this economic concern is growing. The next two statements, "I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution" and "I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians", received 3,7 points (74%) each. The statements "I think that Syrians will harm our society" and "I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure" both received 3,6 points, which means a support of 72% of respondents.

SB-2019-TABLE 32: To what extent are you worried about the following regarding Syrians? (%)

		Not worried at all	Not worried	Combined not worried	Neither worried, nor not worried	Worried	Very worried	Combined worried	No idea/ No response
1	I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	7,4	8,9	16,3	8,1	39,1	35,0	74,1	1,5
2	I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	10,2	9,4	19,6	7,7	41,2	29,3	70,5	2,2
3	I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	9,0	9,7	18,7	7,8	38,6	31,7	70,3	3,2
4	I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	8,8	8,8	17,6	9,2	37,6	32,2	69,8	3,4
5	I think that Syrians will harm our society	10,2	9,2	19,4	9,9	38,0	30,8	68,8	1,9
6	I think that Syrians will disturb Turkish society's identity	11,3	11,2	22,5	7,7	39,9	27,0	66,9	2,9
7	I think that they will become citizens and play a role on deciding Turkey's destiny and future	11,2	11,0	22,2	8,4	35,6	30,4	66,0	3,4
8	I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	12,9	12,4	25,3	8,2	38,4	26,6	65,0	1,5
9	I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	15,9	11,8	27,7	9,1	35,1	26,0	61,1	2,1

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"I think that It is damaging Turkey's economy to take care of this many asylum-seekers"

Combined Agree: 70,8% / Combined Disagree: 21,4%

"I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution"

Combined Agree: 62,3% / Combined Disagree: 23,1%

"It may lead to big problems if Syrians stayed in Turkey"

Combined Agree: % 76,5 / Combined Disagree: 16,5%

SB-2019-TABLE 33: To what extent do you feel the below anxieties regarding Syrians in our country? (Score)

		SB-2017	SB-2019
1	I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	3,4	3,8
2	I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	3,4	3,7
3	I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	-	3,7
4	I think that Syrians will harm our society	3,3	3,6
5	I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	3,3	3,6
Average Score		3,2	3,6
6	I think that they will become citizens and play a role on deciding Turkey's destiny and future	-	3,5
7	I think that Syrians will disturb Turkish society's identity	-	3,5
8	I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	3,1	3,5
9	I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	2,9	3,4
Average		3.22	3.58

■ 0-2,99 ■ 3,0-5,0

SB-2019-TABLE 34: To what extent do you feel the below anxieties regarding Syrians in our country? (Score)

	I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	I think that Syrians will harm our society	I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	I think that they will become citizens and play a role on deciding Turkey's destiny and future	I think that Syrians will disturb Turkish society's identity	I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	Average Score
Sex										
Female	3,8	3,6	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,6
Male	3,8	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,3	3,6
Age Groups										
18-24	3,8	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,6	3,4	3,5	3,5	3,2	3,5
25-34	3,8	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,4	3,5	3,4	3,3	3,5
35-44	3,8	3,6	3,6	3,7	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,6
45-54	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,7
55-64 arası	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,7
65 +	3,9	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,6
Educational Attainment										
Illiterate	3,1	3,0	2,8	2,8	3,1	2,8	3,0	3,1	2,8	2,9
	3,7	3,4	3,6	3,6	3,4	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,5	3,5
Primary school	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,6	3,5	3,6
Middle-School	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,6
High-School or equivalent	3,9	3,7	3,6	3,7	3,7	3,5	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,6
University/Graduate Degree	3,8	3,6	3,7	3,5	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,3	3,5
Region										
Border cities	3,4	3,3	3,3	3,3	3,2	3,3	3,2	3,2	3,0	3,2
Other cities	3,9	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,7
Metropolitan cities	4,0	3,9	3,9	3,9	3,9	3,9	3,8	3,7	3,6	3,8
Non-metropolitan cities	3,9	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,4	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,6
Occupation										
Housewife	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,6	3,5	3,6
Private sector employee	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,4	3,7
Artisan/Tradesman	3,8	3,5	3,5	3,6	3,6	3,4	3,4	3,3	3,2	3,5
Student	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,1	3,4
Retired	3,9	3,7	3,8	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,7
Public sector employee	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,2	3,2	3,4	3,3	3,4
Unemployed	4,0	3,9	3,8	3,8	3,9	3,7	3,8	3,7	3,4	3,8
Self-employed	4,0	4,0	4,0	4,0	4,0	3,8	3,9	3,7	3,7	3,9
Other	3,2	3,2	3,1	2,9	3,0	3,1	3,1	2,8	2,8	3,0
General	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,6

0-2,99 3,0-5,0

When the responses of specific groups of respondents are examined, it appears that those groups that are more worried than others include women, those in the 45-54 age group, high-school graduates, and those who live in metropolitan cities. At the bottom of the least, i.e. those with least amount of anxieties, are illiterate respondents.

One interesting finding in this context is that the survey respondents placed their anxiety over losing their jobs at one of the bottom ranks. This concern over loss of jobs is observed to be one of the most prominent of anxieties during such mass migration contexts. It appears, however, in the Turkish context it was outranked by anxieties concerning “increasing crime rates”, “reduction and deterioration of public services”, and “loss of identity”.

11. Experiencing “personal harm” from Syrians

As presented above, while in SB-2017 57,4% of the respondents thought that Syrians would harm the society, this figure rose up to 61,1% in SB-2019. The high level of anxieties seen in all these findings is also confirmed by the responses to the question “Have you experienced harm caused by a Syrian in the last 5 years?”. While the share of those who suggested that they have experienced personal harm from a Syrian in the last 5 years was 9,4% in SB-2017, it increased to 13,7% in SB-2019. Those who reported having experienced harm within their families increased from 7,7% to 8%. It is highly interesting that 21,2% of the respondents in the border cities suggested that they experienced personal harm from a Syrian. When further asked about what that harm was, however, one of the most frequently given responses is “noise” (38%).

SB-2019-TABLE 35: In the last 5 years, have you experienced the following caused by a Syrian? (%)

	SB-2017			SB-2019		
	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response
Personal harm	9,4	90,4	0,2	13,7	86,0	0,3
Harm to someone within your family	7,7	92,0	0,3	8,0	91,1	0,9
Harm to someone in your personal environment	38,0	57,4	4,6	34,7	63,5	1,8

To better understand the anxieties, an additional question was asked in SB-2019, which was not asked in SB-2017, concerning the “quality of the harm”. Asked to those who suggested to have experienced harm, personally or through members of family/personal environment, the question “What kind of a harm was that?” included a list of 9 items and allowed respondents to provide multiple responses. Among these 9 options, 4 issues can be distinguished. These are “theft” (43,5%), “bullying/harassment” (40,5%), “violence” (38,2%), and “unrest/noise” (38%). Actual available data shows that crime rates among Syrians are under average. In contrast, overall one in ten respondents, and in the border cities two in ten respondents, suggest that they experienced personal harm caused by a Syrian. Among those who reported having experienced harm, 38,2% suggested that it involved violence. Interestingly, respondents suggesting this are not usually from border cities where greater concentrations of Syrians live, but from other cities. Although the crime records don’t exactly confirm them, these findings need to be taken seriously. In addition, harm could be emotional as much as it can be physical. In this context, the prominent complaint of “unrest/noise” should also be considered seriously.

SB-2019-TABLE 36: In the last 5 years, have you experienced the following caused by a Syrian? (%)

		Personal harm	Harm to someone within your family	Harm to someone in your personal environment
Cinsiyet				
Female	Yes	10,1	7,7	29,5
	No	89,4	91,4	68,7
	Don't remember/ No response	0,5	0,9	1,8
Male	Yes	17,2	8,3	39,8
	No	82,6	90,9	58,4
	Don't remember/ No response	0,2	0,8	1,8
Age Groups				
18-24	Yes	18,5	8,9	39,4
	No	81,2	89,9	59,2
	Don't remember/ No response	0,3	1,2	1,4
25-34	Yes	14,0	7,9	36,4
	No	84,8	90,7	61,4
	Don't remember/ No response	1,2	1,4	2,2
35-44	Yes	12,6	8,7	34,8
	No	87,4	90,8	64,0
	Don't remember/ No response	-	0,5	1,2
45-54	Yes	14,3	8,2	32,5
	No	85,7	91,6	65,0
	Don't remember/ No response	-	0,2	2,5
55-64	Yes	9,1	6,3	31,9
	No	90,9	92,5	66,1
	Don't remember/ No response	-	1,2	2,0
65 +	Yes	7,0	5,3	22,8
	No	93,0	94,7	76,3
	Don't remember/ No response	-	-	0,9
Educational Attainment				
Illiterate	Yes	7,1	10,7	32,1
	No	89,3	85,7	60,7
	Don't remember/ No response	3,6	3,6	7,2
Literate but not graduate of any school	Yes	2,6	5,1	35,9
	No	97,4	92,3	64,1
	Don't remember/ No response	-	2,6	-
Primary school	Yes	14,4	9,3	32,4
	No	85,6	90,0	66,1
	Don't remember/ No response	-	0,7	1,5
Middle school	Yes	15,2	9,2	35,3
	No	84,8	90,6	62,6
	Don't remember/ No response	-	0,2	2,1
High-school or equivalent	Yes	15,4	8,0	36,2
	No	84,2	91,4	62,1
	Don't remember/ No response	0,4	0,6	1,7
University/ Graduate degree	Yes	10,2	5,7	34,6
	No	89,2	92,9	63,6
	Don't remember/ No response	0,6	1,4	1,8

SB-2019-TABLE 36: In the last 5 years, have you experienced the following caused by a Syrian? (%)

		Siz bizzat bir zarar gördünüz mü?	Ailenizde zarar gören oldu mu?	Çevrenizde zarar gören oldu mu?
Region				
Border cities	Yes	21,2	12,3	45,9
	No	78,6	87,0	52,4
	Don't remember/ No response	0,2	0,7	1,7
Other cities	Yes	11,7	6,9	31,8
	No	87,9	92,2	66,4
	Don't remember/ No response	0,4	0,9	1,8
Metropolitan cities	Yes	8,5	6,0	27,3
	No	91,3	93,5	70,5
	Don't remember/ No response	0,2	0,5	2,2
Non-metropolitan cities	Yes	13,3	7,4	34,0
	No	86,3	91,6	64,4
	Don't remember/ No response	0,4	1,0	1,6
Educational Attainment				
Housewife	Yes	7,9	6,6	27,1
	No	91,8	92,7	70,9
	Don't remember/ No response	0,3	0,7	2,0
Private sector employee	Yes	15,6	8,7	38,7
	No	84,4	91,1	60,1
	Don't remember/ No response	0,0	0,2	1,2
Artisan	Yes	17,8	8,0	36,3
	No	81,7	91,6	62,8
	Don't remember/ No response	0,5	0,4	0,9
Student	Yes	16,3	8,6	36,3
	No	83,3	89,4	61,2
	Don't remember/ No response	0,4	2,0	2,5
Retired	Yes	8,0	4,9	28,6
	No	92,0	94,6	69,2
	Don't remember/ No response	-	0,5	2,2
Public sector employee	Yes	15,6	13,8	41,3
	No	83,5	83,5	55,0
	Don't remember/ No response	0,9	2,7	3,7
Unemployed	Yes	17,6	10,2	38,9
	No	81,5	88,0	57,4
	Don't remember/ No response	0,9	1,8	3,7
Self-employed	Yes	19,5	8,5	50,0
	No	80,5	90,2	48,8
	Don't remember/ No response	-	1,3	1,2
Other	Yes	8,0	12,0	32,0
	No	92,0	88,0	68,0
General	Yes	13,7	8,0	34,7
	No	86,0	91,1	63,5
	Don't remember/ No response	0,3	0,9	1,8

In terms of what is meant by harm, it is interesting that “loss of a job” is only ranked sixth and only 6,4% of those who said they experienced harm suggest that they lost their job because of a Syrian. This finding confirms and supports our argument that Syrians have not yet played a significant role in loss of jobs for Turkish citizens.

SB-2019-TABLE 37: What kind of harm have you experienced because of a Syrian?* (Multiple responses)

		#	%
1	Theft	386	43,5
2	Bullying/Harrasment	360	40,5
3	Violence	339	38,2
4	Unrest/Noise	337	38,0
5	Occupation of property	87	9,8
6	Loss of a job	57	6,4
7	Disruption of family order due to affair/marriage	45	5,1
8	Financial/economic damage	17	1,9
9	Other	48	5,4
	No response	8	0,9

* Results from respondents who suggested that they have experienced harm, personally or through a member of family/personal environment, from a Syrian in the last 5 years.

SB-2019-TABLE 38: What kind of harm have you experienced because of a Syrian? (Multiple responses)

	Theft	Bullying/ Harassment	Violence	Unrest/ Noise	Occupation of property	Loss of a job	Disruption of family order due to affair/ marriage	Financial/ economic damage	Other	No response
Sex										
Female	41,0	40,5	36,0	37,1	9,7	6,8	6,8	0,5	5,7	1,0
Male	45,3	40,6	39,8	38,6	9,9	6,1	3,8	3,0	5,1	0,8
Age Groups										
18-24	37,2	50,8	38,7	36,1	13,1	8,4	3,7	0,5	3,7	3,1
25-34	39,4	45,3	40,4	37,9	10,3	5,4	4,4	1,5	7,4	-
35-44	43,9	37,7	38,7	38,7	9,0	6,1	8,0	3,3	6,6	0,9
45-54	46,6	34,4	42,3	41,7	8,0	6,1	4,9	3,1	2,5	-
55-64	56,3	31,0	28,7	36,8	5,7	5,7	3,4	-	6,9	-
65 +	53,1	25,0	21,9	28,1	12,5	6,3	3,1	3,1	6,3	-
Educational Attainment										
Illiterate	36,4	27,3	9,1	36,4	-	9,1	27,3	-	9,1	-
Literate but not graduate of any school	57,1	21,4	28,6	42,9	-	7,1	35,7	-	-	-
Primary school	47,2	36,2	33,9	35,3	8,3	4,6	4,6	1,8	5,0	-
Middle-School	37,5	34,4	43,1	34,4	5,6	7,5	5,6	1,9	7,5	0,6
High-School	42,9	44,6	39,9	36,6	11,9	6,6	4,3	2,6	6,6	0,7
University/Graduate Degree	44,5	46,7	38,5	46,2	13,2	7,1	2,7	1,1	2,2	2,7
Region										
Border cities	42,4	37,2	27,7	37,2	7,4	10,4	15,6	3,5	4,3	-
Other cities	43,8	41,7	41,9	38,2	10,7	5,0	1,4	1,4	5,8	1,2
Metropolitan cities	44,6	40,4	39,4	40,4	8,3	3,6	1,0	0,5	3,1	-
Non-metropolitan cities	43,5	42,2	42,9	37,3	11,6	5,6	1,5	1,7	6,9	1,7
Occupation										
Housewife	37,1	34,7	32,9	34,7	6,0	7,2	9,6	-	7,2	0,6
Private sector employee	42,4	45,7	47,6	38,1	11,0	6,2	1,0	1,9	4,8	0,5
Artisan/Tradesman	45,6	37,9	32,4	35,2	6,6	6,0	8,2	5,5	8,2	1,1
Student	37,3	57,8	36,3	36,3	13,7	8,8	3,9	1,0	3,9	3,9
Retired	58,1	32,4	32,4	40,5	12,2	1,4	-	1,4	2,7	-
Public sector employee	42,6	31,9	38,3	57,4	14,9	6,4	8,5	-	2,1	-
Unemployed	54,2	43,8	41,7	37,5	14,6	10,4	4,2	-	-	-
Self-employed	43,8	33,3	50,0	39,6	10,4	2,1	2,1	-	8,3	-
Other	40,0	20,0	20,0	40,0	-	20,0	10,0	10,0	-	-
General	43,5	40,5	38,2	38,0	9,8	6,4	5,1	1,9	5,4	0,9

FGD Findings: Experiencing Harm from Syrians

It is safe to suggest that a vast majority of FGD participants looked convinced that they have "somehow" experienced harm from Syrians. When they are asked to elaborate what kind of harm they have suffered from, however, most participants revised their statement by saying that although they haven't personally experienced harm themselves, they have either witnessed someone being harmed or heard from others about such incidents. A fewer number of participants suggested that they have personally been harmed. According to these participants who said they have experienced harm, either through direct or indirect experiences, it included theft, sexual harassment, and polluting public spaces as examples.

12. Right to Work and Anxiety over Loss of Jobs

During mass migration inflows, anxiety over loss of jobs in the face of newly arrived cheap labor emerges in all receiving societies and it plays a significant role in galvanizing reactions against the newcomers. While this issue is often mentioned in the context of discussions about Syrians in Turkey, SB research as well as many other studies have found that it is only a "limited anxiety" among Turkish society. They are, however, being voiced by different segments of society from time to time.

The question "What kind of an arrangement should be made concerning the working of Syrians in Turkey?" was asked in 2014, 2017, and 2019. When the responses are examined, it is seen that the share of those who said "Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits" was 47,4% in 2014, 54,6% in 2017, and 56,8% in 2019.¹¹⁷ Those who recommend giving Syrians "work permits only for specific jobs" constitute 29,7% and 29,8% of the respondents in 2014 and 2017, respectively, to decrease to 21,4% in 2019. The share of those who argued for giving "permanent" work permits to Syrians to be valid for any kind of jobs was 5,4%, 5,5%, and 3,8% in 2014, 2017, and 2019, respectively. In other words, Turkish society displays a high level of anxiety concerning the working rights of Syrians in Turkey, pushing them to support quite restrictive measures in this issue area.

SB-2019-TABLE 39: What kind of an arrangement should be made concerning the working of Syrians in Turkey?

	SB-2017		SB-2019	
	#	%	#	%
Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits	1.141	54,6	1.290	56,8
They should be given work permits to work only in specific jobs ¹¹⁸	621	29,8	487	21,4
They should be given temporary work permits to work in any job	169	8,1	336	14,8
They should be given permanent work permits to work in any job	115	5,5	85	3,8
No idea/ No response	43	2,0	73	3,2
Total	2.089	100,0	2.271	100,0

117 Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014: Working Rights: Under no circumstance they should be allowed to work (47,4%), They should be given temporary work permits to work only in specific jobs (29,5%), They should be given temporary work permits to work in any job (13,2%), They should be given permanent work permits to work in any job (5,4%), they should be given permanent work permits to work only in specific jobs (4,5%).

118 The 2017 value of "They should be given work permits to work only in specific jobs" is calculated by adding "They should be given temporary work permits to work only in specific jobs" and "they should be given permanent work permits to work only in specific jobs".

SB-2019-TABLE 40: What kind of an arrangement should be made concerning the working of Syrians in Turkey? (%)

	Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits	They should be given work permits to work only in specific jobs	They should be given temporary work permits to work in any job	They should be given permanent work permits to work in any job	No idea/ No response
Sex					
Female	57,2	21,4	14,7	3,1	3,6
Male	56,4	21,5	14,9	4,4	2,8
Age Groups					
18-24	44,4	32,4	17,4	3,5	2,3
25-34	51,8	24,4	16,3	3,5	4,0
35-44	56,9	19,2	16,3	4,3	3,3
45-54	63,3	16,4	13,6	3,3	3,4
55-64	72,8	9,8	9,4	4,7	3,3
65 +	64,9	22,8	7,9	2,6	1,8
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	67,9	25,0	7,1	-	-
	59,0	15,4	10,3	7,7	7,6
Primary school	64,9	15,2	11,4	4,2	4,3
Middle-School	59,4	21,5	14,7	2,6	1,8
High-School or equivalent	53,3	23,8	16,1	3,7	3,1
University/Graduate Degree	49,8	25,4	17,7	4,1	3,0
Region					
Border cities	56,9	21,9	13,9	3,2	4,1
Other cities	56,8	21,3	15,0	3,9	3,0
Metropolitan cities	58,0	21,7	14,0	3,7	2,6
Non-metropolitan cities	56,2	21,2	15,6	4,0	3,0
Occupation					
Housewife	60,1	19,2	13,6	2,9	4,2
Private sector employee	56,1	20,9	16,2	3,8	3,0
Artisan/Tradesman	55,9	17,8	18,5	5,9	1,9
Student	40,8	33,9	19,6	2,4	3,3
Retired	67,9	16,1	10,3	2,7	3,0
Public sector employee	51,4	30,3	9,2	3,7	5,4
Unemployed	58,3	25,9	11,1	1,9	2,8
Self-employed	68,3	19,5	6,1	3,7	2,4
Other	52,0	20,0	12,0	12,0	4,0
General	56,8	21,4	14,8	3,8	3,2

The most anxious groups concerning working of Syrians appear to include women, those in the 45-54 age group, illiterates, and the self-employed. Similarly, the findings suggest that unemployed respondents have shown the highest degree of objection to giving Syrians working permits without any restrictions. Another interesting finding is to see the female and self-employed respondents among the most worried.

Underlying anxieties concerning the working of Syrians are the fear of losing one's job or the risk of working for cheaper because of the newcomers.¹¹⁹ 51,4% of the respondents in SB-2017 confirmed that they were worried about Syrians stripping them of their jobs, while the rate of those who didn't share this concern was 31,5%. In SB-2019, this anxiety appears to have been grown. The share of those who agreed with the statement "I think Syrians will strip us of our jobs" is 65%, while that of those who disagreed is 25,3%. While this might be seen as a high level of anxiety, the interesting finding is that, in both SB-2017 and SB-2019, it was significantly overshadowed by other anxieties of the Turkish society. So much so that, in SB-2017 it was ranked 5th out of 6 concerns listed and ranked 8th in SB-2019 out of 9 items on the list. So, while Turkish society appears to be concerned about potential loss of jobs, this concern is relatively smaller when compared to the other anxieties such as ones over identity or cultural structure.

The fact that while, on the one hand, Syrians are perceived as a "burden" on the country; there is a very clear objection, on the other, to their working is very significant. This issue deserves to be examined in detail and should be kept in mind in the framework of integration efforts.

13. Opening Workplaces / Entrepreneurship

A closely related issue with working is the issue of Syrians opening workplaces in Turkey. Very interestingly, Turkish society's objection to Syrians' opening workplaces (67,2%) is stronger than their objection to giving Syrians rights to work. It can be suggested that this is related to an objection in the background to "permanent stay" of Syrians.

SB-2019-TABLE 41: Should it be allowed for Syrians to open workplaces?

	#	%
It definitely shouldn't be allowed	1.526	67,2
It should be allowed but they should be registered to the Ministry of Finance and pay their taxes	469	20,6
It should be allowed only for specific work fields It should only be allowed if they will open large workplaces	193	8,5
where Turkish citizens will also work	38	1,7
No idea/ No response	45	2,0
Total	2.271	100,0

119 Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:

"I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs": Agreed: 61,2% / Disagreed: 27,1%

SB-2019-TABLE 42: Should it be allowed for Syrians to open workplaces? (%)

	It definitely shouldn't be allowed	It should be allowed but they should be registered to the Ministry of Finance and pay their taxes	It should be allowed only for specific work fields	It should only be allowed if they will open large workplaces where Turkish citizens will also work	No idea/ No response
Sex					
Female	69,1	17,8	8,7	1,8	2,6
Male	65,3	23,5	8,3	1,5	1,4
Age Groups					
18-24	60,8	21,6	14,3	2,6	0,7
25-34	65,4	21,7	9,3	0,8	2,8
35-44	67,7	21,6	7,0	1,8	1,9
45-54	69,9	20,8	5,6	2,3	1,4
55-64	78,0	14,6	4,3	0,8	2,3
65 +	63,2	21,1	10,5	0,9	4,3
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	64,3	10,7	17,9	-	7,1
	69,2	23,1	5,1	-	2,6
Primary school	72,8	18,3	3,8	1,6	3,5
Middle-School	72,3	17,3	8,9	0,8	0,7
High-School or equivalent	66,5	22,6	8,2	1,7	1,0
University/Graduate Degree	57,7	23,4	13,8	2,6	2,5
Region					
Border cities	67,7	21,9	6,9	0,9	2,6
Other cities	67,1	20,3	8,9	1,9	1,8
Metropolitan cities	64,7	18,5	13,2	2,5	1,1
Non-metropolitan cities	68,2	21,3	6,8	1,6	2,1
Occupation					
Housewife	71,6	16,5	6,4	2,2	3,3
Private sector employee	70,4	18,2	9,5	1,2	0,7
Artisan/Tradesman	66,0	28,5	3,9	0,5	1,1
Student	54,7	25,3	16,7	2,4	0,9
Retired	68,8	18,3	7,6	1,8	3,5
Public sector employee	54,1	19,3	15,6	5,5	5,5
Unemployed	66,7	20,4	10,2	0,9	1,8
Self-employed	76,8	13,4	7,3	1,2	1,3
Other	64,0	28,0	8,0	-	-
General	67,2	20,6	8,5	1,7	2,0

FGD Findings: Opinions on Syrians' Economic Activities

In comparison to the survey results, it can be suggested that FGDs did not find much disagreement among participants concerning the issue of Syrians working, where a large majority of the participants suggested that Syrians should be allowed to work. In the meantime, there was a near-consensus agreement on the need for the state to take necessary precautions to protect its own citizens as well as to prevent informal working. Another interesting theme that came up quite often in different FGDs was the "security risks" that may emerge should the Syrians were not allowed to work to financially support themselves.

- "I think they should be allowed to work. Let me give you an example: a Syrian woman was selling the needlework she produces at home. I think this is a great thing. All registered Syrians should be allowed to work. Otherwise they will have to either beg or be dependent on support of others. Let's think this way: there are two unemployed individuals, one is Turkish and the other is Syrian. Considering the circumstances in Turkey, who has it worse? The Turkish citizen can find a way to get by, perhaps through family or acquaintances. But the Syrian would more easily lose its path. He will either beg or find illegal ways." Ankara-Women
- "I think work permits could be given to those who haven't been involved in any crime if they are registered. If it is not registered, this would make Turkish people suffer because Syrians work for so cheap in the informal economy." Ankara-Students
- "I think we need to utilize especially the skilled ones. Because if we don't give them the chance to work, the skilled refugees are picked up by other countries." Ankara-Students
- "I think everyone should do their own job. If they are teachers, then let them work as teachers. If they are farmers, they should be farmers." Gaziantep-Women

14. The Future: "Will Syrians Return?"

In 2014, when there were only 1.6 million Syrians in the country, 45,1% of Turkish participants of a large-scale survey suggested that they believed all Syrians in Turkey would return.¹²⁰ By 2017, 70% of the society was already convinced that all or a large part of Syrians would remain in Turkey, as found by SB-2017, while 6,7% suggested that they thought "almost all Syrians would return". According to SB-2019 data, almost half of Turkish society, 48,7%, believes that no Syrians will return. In addition, 29,7% of the respondents suggested that "even if some of them return, majority of them will remain in Turkey" and another 8,9% said "half of them will return, half of them will stay". This means that those who believe that Syrians will return to Syria (combination of those who stated "Majority of them will return, less than half will stay" (6,4%), "almost all of them will return, only few will stay" (2,8%) and "All of them will return" (1,8%)) is around 10%. These findings suggest that while the objections of Turkish society against the prospects of permanent stay of Syrians continue to be strong, their hope and belief in the prospects of Syrians' return are diminishing. Interestingly, while more and more Turkish people appear to believe in and acknowledge the prospects of Syrians' permanent stay, they still insist on opposing integration processes.

120 Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:

"There are over 1,5 million Syrian asylum-seekers in Turkey at the moment. Which of the following statements best describes your opinion on the return of Syrians after the war is over?":

I expect all of them to return (45,1%)

I expect less than half of them to stay in Turkey (9,4%)

I expect all of them to stay (12,1%)

I expect more than half of them to stay in Turkey (15,7%)

SB-2019-TABLE 43: Do you believe that Syrians in Turkey will return to their country when the war is over?

		SB-2017		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	None of them will return	793	38,0	1.106	48,7
2	Even if some of them return, majority of them will remain in Turkey	679	32,5	674	29,7
3	Half of them will return, half of them will stay	238	11,4	203	8,9
4	Majority of them will return, less than half will stay	189	9,0	145	6,4
5	Almost all of them will return, only few will stay	141	6,7	63	2,8
6	All of them will return	-	-	42	1,8
	No idea/ No response	49	2,4	38	1,7
Total		2.089	100,0	2.271	100,0

SB-2019-TABLE 44: Do you believe that Syrians in Turkey will return to their country when the war is over? (%)

	None of them will return	Even if some of them return, majority of them will remain in Turkey	Half of them will return, half of them will stay	Majority of them will return, less than half will stay	Almost all of them will return, only few will stay	All of them will return	No idea/ No response
Sex							
Female	48,9	30,4	8,6	5,3	3,0	1,7	2,1
Male	48,5	29,0	9,3	7,5	2,6	2,0	1,1
Age Groups							
18-24	55,2	24,2	9,2	4,9	3,3	1,2	2,0
25-34	51,0	30,1	8,5	5,9	1,2	1,6	1,7
35-44	47,0	31,1	9,2	5,7	3,1	1,8	2,1
45-54	46,7	29,4	8,2	7,9	3,7	2,8	1,3
55-64	42,9	37,4	8,3	5,9	3,1	1,6	0,8
65 +	43,0	25,4	13,2	12,3	1,8	2,6	1,7
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate	42,9	32,1	3,6	14,3	-	3,6	3,5
Literate but not graduate of any school	53,8	25,6	2,6	7,7	-	7,7	2,6
Primary school	49,1	28,5	9,0	5,2	3,6	1,9	2,7
Middle-School	49,5	28,8	9,2	7,1	0,5	3,1	1,8
High-School or equivalent	51,6	28,5	8,4	5,7	3,5	1,5	0,8
University/Graduate Degree	43,1	33,7	10,4	7,7	2,8	0,8	1,5
Region							
Border cities	49,4	27,5	8,7	7,6	1,1	2,6	3,1
Other cities	48,5	30,2	9,0	6,1	3,2	1,7	1,3
Metropolitan cities	34,5	41,0	11,5	7,8	3,5	1,0	0,7
Non-metropolitan cities	55,5	24,9	7,8	5,2	3,1	2,0	1,5
Occupation							
Housewife	47,1	29,3	9,5	6,0	3,1	2,6	2,4
Private sector employee	52,0	31,6	7,9	4,0	1,8	1,4	1,3
Artisan/Tradesman	49,3	27,4	7,8	8,7	3,2	2,1	1,5
Student	51,8	27,3	10,2	4,9	3,7	0,8	1,3
Retired	44,2	29,5	12,5	8,5	3,1	0,9	1,3
Public sector employee	46,8	28,4	7,3	10,1	2,8	0,9	3,7
Unemployed	48,1	32,4	8,3	4,6	2,8	2,8	1,0
Self-employed	41,5	40,2	8,5	4,9	1,2	2,4	1,3
Other	52,0	24,0	4,0	12,0	-	8,0	-
General	48,7	29,7	8,9	6,4	2,8	1,8	1,7

FGD Findings: Will Syrians Return?

There were two main arguments that came to dominate the FGDs concerning the future of Syrians in Turkey and whether or not they are expected to return:

Most Syrians in Turkey will not Return

According to a large majority of FGD participants, most of the Syrians in Turkey will not return to Syria. There were two main justifications for this argument. Firstly, according to these participants, Syrians have already established a new life here in Turkey. Accordingly, some of them opened workplaces, while others received their education here. This is especially the case for young Syrians, most of whom knew no homeland but Turkey. Secondly, participants underlined the destruction of war in Syria and suggested that even for the Syrians who sincerely want to return, there will be no Syria left to return to. Even with a swift end to the violence, the reconstruction of the country would take a very long time and it will be practically very difficult, if not completely impossible, to return for most Syrians.

- ▶ "I think more than half will remain here. More than 2 million Syrians will stay. Because people have a life now, they established an order, they see here as their home. I don't believe they will want to return and start over. They will prefer to stay and live here under much better conditions." Ankara-Women
- ▶ "If we left them the choice, I think most of them will choose to stay." Ankara-Students
- ▶ "Very few of them would return, I reckon, maybe not even them." Hatay-Artisans/Employees
- ▶ "Those who were born here, those who went to school here, those who are now in our universities... I don't think these young Syrians would return. Apart from them, those older ones would return." Ankara-Women
- ▶ "I think some will return and some will stay. Many of them got married with Turkish men. 50% would return and 50% would stay." Istanbul-Artisans/Employees

Most Syrians in Turkey will Return

A minority of the participants, on the other hand, suggested that they believed that most Syrians in Turkey will return to Syria as long as the war comes to an end and stability and security are ensured.

- ▶ "Turkey doesn't promise them the heaven. If the conditions in their country stabilize and improve, they would return." Ankara-Academics

15. "Where Should Syrians Live?": "Are We Ready for Living Together?"

Turkish society appears to be very much aware of the fact that prospects of Syrians' long-term presence in the country are growing. Almost 80% of the society seems convinced that at least half of Syrians will stay in Turkey. It should be noted that, however, despite this acknowledgement of permanent stay, the will and desire for living together is extremely weak. In other words, there appears to be a case of "involuntary acceptance" in Turkish society regarding Syrians. In this context, responses given to the question "where should Syrians live" are very interesting. The statement "they should live with Turkish society wherever they want" received 7,9% support in 2017, which further decreased to 5,3% in 2019. In a context where more than 98% of Syrians are already living with the Turkish society all across the country, this finding is very noteworthy. In addition, in 2017 7,7% and in 2019 5,5% of the respondents suggested that "Syrians should be distributed around Turkey in a balanced way". The remaining options include suggestions that do not embrace the vision of a life together. In other words, more than 80% of Turkish society support options that would segregate Syrians from the society. These options include "They should live in safe zones in Syria" (2017: 37,4%, 2019: 44,8%), "They should live only in camps" (2017: 28,1%, 2019: 15%), "They should definitely be sent back" (2017: 11,5%, 2019: 25%), "Special cities should be established for them in Turkey" (2017: 4,8%, 2019: 2,4%). These can be interpreted in a way to suggest that in 2017 81,8% and in 2019 87,2% of Turkish society doesn't look positively to living together with Syrians.¹²¹

121 Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:

"Asylum-seekers should only reside at the camps in Turkey": Agreed: 73,3% / Disagreed: 19%

"Asylum-seeker should reside at the camps that will be established within the buffer zone to be established in Syrian territories near border" Agreed: 68,8% / Disagreed: 18,1%

SB-2019-TABLE 45: Where should Syrians in Turkey live?

		SB-2017		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	They should be sent to safe zones to be established in Syria to live there	781	37,4	1.017	44,8
2	They should definitely be sent back	240	11,5	568	25,0
3	They should only live in camps	587	28,1	341	15,0
4	Special cities should be established for them in Turkey	100	4,8	54	2,4
5	They should be distributed around Turkey in a balanced way	161	7,7	126	5,5
6	They should be able to live in any city they want	166	7,9	120	5,3
	No idea/ No response	54	2,6	45	2,0
Total		2.089	100,0	2.271	100,0

SB-2019-TABLE 46: Where should Syrians in Turkey live? (%)

	They should be sent to safe zones to be established in Syria to live there	They should definitely be sent back	They should only live in camps	They should be distributed around Turkey in a balanced way	They should be able to live in any city they want	Special cities should be established for them in Turkey	No idea/ No response
Sex							
Female	44,7	26,6	13,3	5,0	5,3	2,6	2,5
Male	44,8	23,4	16,7	6,1	5,3	2,1	1,6
Age Groups							
18-24	44,6	17,6	18,8	8,5	6,3	2,1	2,1
25-34	43,9	24,4	16,3	4,9	4,9	3,7	1,9
35-44	44,4	25,9	15,3	4,8	5,9	1,8	1,9
45-54	43,5	30,1	12,9	5,4	4,0	2,3	1,8
55-64	50,0	26,4	11,4	3,9	4,3	2,0	2,0
65 +	44,7	28,9	9,6	5,3	7,0	0,9	3,6
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate	32,1	17,9	32,1	7,1	7,1	3,7	-
Literate but not graduate of any school	48,7	17,9	15,4	2,6	5,1	2,6	7,7
Primary school	43,6	28,9	14,5	3,8	5,0	1,9	2,3
Middle-School	40,3	27,0	17,5	5,5	5,0	2,9	1,8
High-School or equivalent	49,1	24,6	13,7	5,5	3,3	2,5	1,3
University/Graduate Degree	43,5	20,5	14,6	7,9	8,7	2,2	2,6
Region							
Border cities	39,4	18,8	31,4	3,2	2,8	2,8	1,6
Other cities	46,2	26,6	10,8	6,1	5,9	2,3	2,1
Metropolitan cities	51,3	16,0	15,7	5,2	7,0	3,0	1,8
Non-metropolitan cities	43,6	31,8	8,4	6,6	5,4	1,9	2,3
Occupation							
Housewife	43,8	26,9	14,1	4,6	5,1	3,7	1,8
Private sector employee	47,0	26,5	13,4	3,8	5,7	2,2	1,4
Artisan/Tradesman	47,7	22,6	15,8	6,4	4,6	2,1	0,8
Student	43,7	13,5	20,0	10,6	6,5	2,9	2,8
Retired	47,8	29,5	8,0	4,0	5,4	2,2	3,1
Public sector employee	42,2	21,1	19,3	7,3	4,6	0,9	4,6
Unemployed	43,5	19,4	24,1	3,7	5,6	0,9	2,8
Self-employed	30,5	47,6	9,8	4,9	4,9	-	2,3
Other	20,0	36,0	28,0	12,0	4,0	-	-
General	44,8	25,0	15,0	5,5	5,3	2,4	2,0

FGD Findings: Where Should Syrians in Turkey Live?

FGD participants were asked to discuss where Syrians in Turkey should live and how this decision should be made. Should Syrians make this decision themselves with their freewill or should the state make this decision with economic, social, and security-based considerations? A very brief summary of the discussions is presented in the following.

The State Should Centrally Plan Where Syrians Will Live

Some participants suggested that in some countries like Germany refugees are not given freedom of choice to decide where they will live. Instead, the state strategically decides for them through a central planning process. It was suggested that a similar policy would be useful in Turkey. This argument was supported by 3 justifications: (i) the density that emerged in some cities should be dispersed, (ii) considering the importance of international tourism in the national economy, Syrians should be moved away from touristic hotspots, and (iii) the central planning process should take into consideration the respective populations, surface area, and the economic conditions in each city.

(i)

"They shouldn't be able to live wherever they want. Because everybody wants to live in Izmir or Istanbul. And this create an immense density in some cities. I think they should be distributed according to the populations of cities". Ankara-Students

"The bulk of this burden was shouldered by cities like Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis, which are closer to the Syrian border. I think this burden needs to be spread out and distributed. But we need to be careful. Not every city in Turkey would welcome Syrians like Hatay did. So, distribution should take sensitivities, cultural structures of different cities into account. A fair distribution should be made." Hatay-Artisans/Employees

(ii)

"I definitely don't want them to live in touristic regions. Because foreign tourists are so important for our economy. They should be settled outside of the touristic regions according to their populations and areas." Ankara-Students

(iii)

"I think the planning needs to take account of so many factors. If necessary it should be done at the level of single neighborhoods. 'Ankara has such an economy, such is the employment rate, this and that districts could have this many people'... So, it should be about the capacity of each city." Ankara-Students

It is Now Too Late for the State to Centrally Manage Settlement of Refugees

Some participants suggested that it was too late for such a policy of central planning. While agreeing with its central logic, accordingly, such a policy should have adopted very early on in the process. Now that millions of Syrian refugees have dispersed throughout all 81 provinces of Turkey, it is impossible to implement such a comprehensive resettlement of so many people.

"People have settled down now. They established their order. I don't think this can change anymore. I think it is impossible." Ankara-Students

"It is too late to just tell people things like 'you will have to move, you will live in that city from now on'. It is not easy to move all these people from where they live." Istanbul-Artisans/Employees

Syrians Should Be Free to Choose Where They Live

A small number of participants, lastly, argued that such a policy of centrally planning where people live is not only practically difficult to implement, it is also ethically wrong and anti-democratic. Therefore, they argued, Syrians should be free to choose where they live, just like all members of society.

"I think it is wrong to force people to settle in a certain place. The idea of deciding where people live and sending them in masses from one place to another. What is this a Nazi camp? I think they should be free on this matter." Ankara-Students

16. A Look on Common Future

As it was presented above, a very large majority of Turkish society believes that most Syrians will stay in Turkey permanently. Despite this common belief, however, the lack of support to the statement “We can live together with Syrians in serenity” manifests the existence of widespread anxieties concerning the future. In SB-2017, 11,8% of the respondents suggested that they either “agreed completely” or “agreed” with that statement. 2 years later, the same figure has decreased even further to 8,6% in SB-2019.¹²²

When the collected findings are scored using a points-based system, the same negative trend is apparent. Accordingly, the score of support for the statement “We can live together with Syrians in serenity” is 1.5 out of 5. When it is considered that this score was 1.9 in SB-2017, the growing anxieties among Turkish society become evident once again.

SB-2019-TABLE 47: To what extent would you agree with the following statement? (%)

“We can live together with Syrians in serenity”									
	Completely disagree	Disagree	COMBINED DISAGREE	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	COMBINED AGREE	No idea/ No response	SCORE (out of 5)
SB-2017	70,8	11,8	82,6	7,0	7,7	0,9	8,6	1,8	1,9
SB-2019	46,5	28,5	75,0	11,8	10,3	1,1	11,4	1,8	1,5

122 Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014: “It would cause big problems for Syrians to stay in Turkey”: Agreed: 76,5% / Disagreed: 16,5%

The findings from all the questions concerning living together with Syrians are similarly negative, and more importantly, they are becoming worse through the passing years. Turkish society does not respond positively to the statements “We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees”, “Syrian refugees are good for our country’s economy”, and “Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us”.

The share of those who agreed with the statement “Syrian refugees are good for our country’s economy” was 6%¹²³, while those who agree with the statement “Syrians are culturally enriching us” constitute only 4,3% of the respondents. The most significant support has been given to the statement “We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees”, which received agreement from 21% of the respondents.

SB-2019-TABLE 48: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (Scores)

		SB-2017	SB-2019
1	We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	2,4	1,8
2	We can live together with Syrians in serenity	1,9	1,5
Average Score		1,9	1,5
3	Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	1,7	1,4
4	Syrians are culturally enriching us	1,6	1,3

■ 0-2,99 ■ 3,0-5,0

123 Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:
 "It is damaging Turkey's economy to take care of this many asylum-seekers"
 Agreed: 70,8% / Disagreed: 21,4%

SB-2019-TABLE 49: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (Scores)

	We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	We can live together with Syrians in serenity	Suriyeliler Türkiye ekonomisi için yararlıdır	Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	Average Score
Sex					
Female	1,8	1,5	1,3	1,3	1,5
Male	1,9	1,5	1,4	1,3	1,5
Age Groups					
18-24	1,8	1,5	1,3	1,3	1,5
25-34	1,8	1,5	1,3	1,3	1,5
35-44	1,9	1,6	1,4	1,3	1,6
45-54	1,9	1,4	1,3	1,2	1,5
55-64	1,9	1,5	1,4	1,4	1,5
65 +	1,9	1,5	1,3	1,3	1,5
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	2,1	1,6	1,3	1,4	1,6
Literate but not graduate of any school	2,0	1,5	1,3	1,4	1,5
Primary school	1,9	1,5	1,3	1,3	1,5
Middle-School	1,9	1,5	1,4	1,3	1,5
High-School or equivalent	1,8	1,5	1,3	1,3	1,5
University/Graduate Degree	1,7	1,6	1,4	1,4	1,5
Region					
Border cities	2,0	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,5
Other cities	1,8	1,5	1,3	1,3	1,5
Metropolitan cities	1,7	1,5	1,4	1,4	1,5
Non-metropolitan cities	1,9	1,5	1,3	1,3	1,5
Occupation					
Housewife	1,9	1,5	1,3	1,3	1,5
Private sector employee	1,7	1,4	1,3	1,2	1,4
Artisan/Tradesman	2,0	1,5	1,5	1,3	1,6
Student	1,9	1,7	1,4	1,4	1,6
Retired	1,8	1,4	1,3	1,3	1,5
Public sector employee	2,0	1,7	1,4	1,4	1,6
Unemployed	1,7	1,6	1,4	1,3	1,5
Self-employed	1,4	1,2	1,1	1,1	1,2
Other	2,4	2,2	1,6	1,6	1,9
General	1,8	1,5	1,4	1,3	1,5

0-2,99 3,0-5,0

17. Integration: Integration of Syrians to Turkish Society

The concept of “integration” has become the subject of crucial discussion particularly in the context of ethnic and cultural diversity created by mass migrations. There are many related and/or alternative concepts used in the literature in this context. In Turkish, while the concept itself exists (i.e. entegrasyon), “uyum” is used in its stead and social cohesion is used as “sosyal uyum”. However, the concept of integration has been frequently criticized for having a necessarily “hierarchical” essence and for inevitably leading to “assimilation”. Therefore, in the Turkish context the concept of “uyum” (which could be more closely translated to “harmony”) is preferred over integration.¹²⁴ In addition to “uyum”, the official discourse in Turkey occasionally also uses “harmonization” and “adaptation”. In fact, more than which concept is being used, what matters is what kind of meaning and definition is given to the concept. Even though the general expectation and desire in Turkey is for Syrians to return to their homes as soon as possible, issue of integration has inevitably come to the agenda through time with prospects of permanent stay getting stronger. In this context, many of the projects on Syrians and other foreign communities in Turkey, conducted by DGMM, MoNE, and the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services, are conducted in the framework of integration policies. Even though some of these policies are built on the expectation of “temporariness” due to the dynamism of the process and uncertainties, it can be suggested that significant “de facto integration” programs have been implemented. Some of the works conducted in this framework, such as access to education of school-age children, are conducted on the basis of basic rights and freedoms, instead of integration policies. In the 11th Development Plan covering the years of 2019-2023, “integration of foreigners” was mentioned as an important issue several times and identified as a mission for public institutions.¹²⁵ As very well-known by now, integration processes are very complex and by their nature they involve many different actors. Therefore, they involve “host society”, “host state”, “newcomers”, “developments in the host country”, and “other international factors” with various functionalities. Undoubtedly, as much as the institutional and legislative regulations -and even more than them- the determinant in this process is the level of acceptance of the host (local) society.

The responses provided for the question “To what extent have Syrians integrated into Turkish society/Turkey?” suggest a serious problem. While only 2,3% of Turkish society believes That Syrians have completely integrated and 10,9% believes that they have “integrated to a large extent”; the share of those who suggest that they have integrated to “a little extent” (18,2%) or “haven’t integrated at all” (46,2%) is in total 64,4%. Interestingly, when the same question is directed at the Syrians, they produce a completely different picture where they believe themselves to have been successfully integrated into Turkish society (see SB-2019-TABLE-113). This point is exactly where the questions “integration to what, integration to whom” become relevant. It also needs to be mentioned here that there are other examples around the world where the “newcomers” consider themselves to be “well-integrated”, while the host society see them as “unintegrated”.¹²⁶

124 Law on Foreigners and International Protection- Article 96 – (1) “The Directorate General may, to the extent that Turkey’s economic and financial capacity deems possible, plan for harmonization activities in order to facilitate mutual harmonization between foreigners, applicants and international protection beneficiaries and the society as well as to equip them with the knowledge and skills to be independently active in all areas of social life without the assistance of third persons in Turkey or in the country to which they are resettled or in their own country. For these purposes, the Directorate General may seek the suggestions and contributions of public institutions and agencies, local governments, non-governmental organizations, universities and international organizations.

125 11th Development Plan (2019-2023), Directorate of Strategy and Budget, Turkish Presidency; Article 96 “... increasing international immigration partly as a result of the growing instabilities in neighboring countries and concentration of immigrants in certain cities requires effective policies regarding population distribution and integration of immigrants to city life (pp.22); Article 546 “integration of immigrants will be ensured and capacity of migration management will be developed (pp.145); Article 661 “the institutional structure of migration management will be strengthened to facilitate integration of foreigners in the country into economic and social life. See: (<http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/OnbirinciKalkinmaPlani.pdf>) (Access: 12.10.2019)

126 The Euro-Turks-Barometer study on the integration processes of Turks in Europe has found that Turks consider themselves to be very-well integrated to the countries in which they live. See: Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan (2013) Euro-Turks-Barometer. http://fs.hacettepe.edu.tr/hugo/dosyalar/ETB_rapor.pdf (Access: 12.10.2019)

SB-2019-TABLE 50: To what extent have Syrians integrated into Turkish society/Turkey?

	#	%
Completely	52	2,3
To a large extent	248	10,9
Partially	452	19,9
To a little extent	413	18,2
None at all	1050	46,2
No idea/ No response	56	2,5
Total	2271	100,0

When the demographic and socio-economic profiles of the respondents are considered, it appears that those who more than averagely believe that Syrians have not been integrated include men, those over the age of 55, and primary school, middle school, and high-school graduates.

SB-2019-TABLE 51: To what extent have Syrians integrated into Turkish society/Turkey? (%)

	Completely	To a large extent	Partially	To a little extent	None at all	No idea/ No response
Sex						
Female	2,4	10,1	21,0	18,0	45,2	3,3
Male	2,2	11,7	18,8	18,3	47,3	1,7
Age Groups						
18-24	2,1	11,5	23,7	19,0	42,3	1,4
25-34	3,0	10,8	20,9	15,9	46,3	3,1
35-44	1,8	12,6	20,5	17,4	45,7	2,0
45-54	3,0	10,7	19,4	17,5	47,0	2,4
55-64	1,6	9,1	13,4	22,8	50,8	2,3
65 +	0,9	6,1	14,9	21,1	50,9	6,1
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	-	14,3	21,4	10,7	50,0	3,6
Literate but not graduate of any school	5,1	7,7	17,9	17,9	46,2	5,2
Primary school	2,6	12,3	16,8	16,3	48,4	3,6
Middle-School	2,1	9,9	19,6	18,3	47,9	2,2
High-School or equivalent	1,5	11,8	20,3	20,1	44,5	1,8
University/Graduate Degree	3,3	8,7	23,2	17,9	44,7	2,2
Region						
Border cities	2,6	10,2	19,7	11,9	52,4	3,2
Other cities	2,2	11,1	20,0	19,8	44,7	2,2
Metropolitan cities	2,8	6,7	20,0	25,3	42,8	2,4
Non-metropolitan cities	1,9	13,3	19,9	17,0	45,6	2,3
Occupation						
Housewife	2,2	12,5	20,3	18,7	42,1	4,2
Private sector employee	2,8	9,5	18,4	17,0	49,6	2,7
Artisan/Tradesman	1,8	13,2	20,5	13,9	49,5	1,1
Student	2,9	10,6	28,2	21,6	34,3	2,4
Retired	0,4	8,0	14,7	24,1	50,4	2,4
Public sector employee	3,7	9,2	17,4	22,0	45,0	2,7
Unemployed	3,7	8,3	18,5	19,4	49,1	1,0
Self-employed	2,4	13,4	14,6	12,2	56,1	1,3
Other	-	4,0	28,0	16,0	52,0	-
General	2,3	10,9	19,9	18,2	46,2	2,5

FGD Findings: Integration of Syrians

The issue of integration and the question of whether or not Syrians have integrated in Turkey have been one of the most heavily discussed themes throughout the FGDs. The major headlines from these heated discussions are presented below.

Syrians are not a homogenous group: Some participants have taken issue with way the question was posed by suggesting that Syrians cannot be considered as a single and homogenous community. Therefore, accordingly, it is only natural that different members of this large and diverse community would have very diverse experiences with respect to integration.

- **"Syrians are not a homogenous group. Which Syrians are we talking about? There are Syrians who speak three languages, those with very advanced education. Those people, of course, have integrated." Ankara-Academics**
- "The more educated Syrians can have integration; it is very difficult for the others." Hatay-Women
- "As the level of education increases, I think, not only can they more easily integrate, they also pay more effort to integrate. As the level of education decreases, they don't try, they don't make an effort." Hatay-Teachers

Integration depends on mutual will and interaction: Another often visited theme was the argument that integration is a process that's based on a mutual will, of the newcomers and the hosts, and that it is not fair to only expect the refugees to bear all the responsibility for integration. In other words, some participants argued, Turkish society also needs to display a will for integration of Syrians. According to a majority of these participants, so far, such a will is missing on the part of Turkish society, which prevents the necessary interaction and dialogue and leads to ghettoization and social isolation of Syrians.

- "In our studies, we found that 80% of the surveyed women said they didn't have any Turkish friends. Of course, integration is not a one-sided affair. Turkish society is not willing. Syrians, likewise, tend to be introverted. So, the relations between the two community are very weak." Ankara-Academics
- "Syrians believe that they have integrated because they are receiving such public services in health, in education that they hadn't seen in their own country. I don't think they have integrated. We can look at it from the Turkish side as well, because integration is not one-sided. We have not adapted to them, either." Ankara-Women
- "There is a huge ghettoization. Unless and until this is resolved, integration is very difficult." Gaziantep-Students

The state needs to project a strong will and form a strategic vision for integration: One of the few points of near-consensus in FGDs was the central place that the state has for the integration of Syrians. Accordingly, integration is only possible through strong policies determined by a long-term, strategic vision of the state.

- "They haven't integrated at all. From the beginning of the process, everything is moving on it own. Integration is something that can shaped and managed by the state. In the absence of this, everyone just lives in their own shell." Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- "They came to Turkey in such a rush without developing an integration policy. These people suffered from a culture shock. Developed countries implement an integration policy for this." Istanbul-Artisans/Employees
- "Yes, they haven't integrated but I don't think they are the ones who are responsible. Because they came here in traumatized way escaping a war. Without treating their traumas, giving them the chance to heal, how can we expect them to just join the social life and communicate with us?" Istanbul-Women

Most Syrians have integrated into Turkey: Some participants suggested that, although there hasn't been sufficient time to properly address this question of integration, most Syrians have adapted to the life in Turkey. Especially in the daily life practices, relationships, resilience and increasing self-reliance, most Syrians can be said to have integrated into life in Turkey.

Most Syrians have not integrated into Turkey: A larger number of FGD participants, however, depicted a much more pessimistic panorama concerning integration of Syrians. Accordingly, on the one hand, Syrians deliberately refuse to integrate and, on the other hand, Turkish state and society have failed to take the necessary steps for integration.

- "A lot of Syrian families don't send their children to school because they don't want them to be educated in Turkish. There is an effort to avoid integration and some of them justify that by saying things like 'if we return to Syria in a few years, we will have to teach them Arabic all over again'." Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- **"We cannot say they have failed to integrate. They have never meant to. They are completely relaxed people, and their population is large. We thought in the beginning 'these people are from a neighboring country, we are culturally close. We won't have many problems.' But as their population grew, we started to see that we were wrong."** Ankara-Women

Importance of Turkish language in integration of Syrians: The importance of language and teaching Syrians Turkish has been mentioned many times. Accordingly, being able to speak the language is a major advantage and instrument for integration as it will enable the refugees to better engage and interact with the society and be more employable. So, it will prevent Syrians from social isolation. In addition, the participants suggested that speaking Turkish is perceived as a proof that shows the individual has indeed integrated and will diminish prejudices against that person.

- "They speak their own language and eat their own food. I don't think they have integrated". Hatay-Teachers
- "I don't think they have fully integrated. There is a major language problem to begin with. There still individuals who haven't learnt Turkish. And they refuse to learn it. Some of them say things like 'why would I learn Turkish? They can learn Arabic if they want.' It is hard to talk about integration with such a mentality." Istanbul-NGO Workers
- "Hatay is a city whose native language is Arabic. I think the most important reason why we have been unable to integrate them is this. That the local people know Arabic. It is difficult for them to learn Turkish in Hatay because they don't need to." Hatay-Teachers

Objections to integration of Syrians: Some participants took issue with the concept of integration and the seemingly accepted premise that integration of Syrians is good and necessary. There were two main objections in this context. One, small, group of participants invoked the "assimilationist" connotations of the concept and said cultural diversity should be embraced as richness and integration should be rejected as apolitical project. The other, larger, group argued that integration of Syrians will mean that they will stay in Turkey permanently, which is not desirable for them. Therefore, according to these participants, integration of Syrians should not be supported, it should be prevented.

- "I don't want Syrians to integrate in Turkey. I don't want them to remain here permanently. Instead, it would be better for them to make an effort to win their homeland back." Ankara-Students

18. How do Syrians Treat Turkish Society?

Survey participants were asked to reflect on some positive and negative statements concerning Syrians. In this context, those statements which might be considered to be positive (“Syrians pay efforts to integrate”, “they are grateful to Turkish society”, “they treat Turkish society with respect”, and “they love Turkish society”) were not supported by the respondents. But the two negative statements, “Syrians are exploiting Turkish society” and “Syrians do not like Turkish society at all”, both received very strong agreement from the respondents. In other words, Turkish society doesn’t seem to notice the positive behaviors of Syrians towards them but overemphasize the negative ones.

SB-2019-TABLE 52: Which of the following statements best describe how Syrians treat Turkish society?

	#	%
Syrians are exploiting Turkish society	731	32,2
Syrians do not like Turkish society at all	702	30,9
Syrians are making an effort to integrate into Turkish society	302	13,3
Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	132	5,8
Syrians are treating Turkish society with respect	90	4,0
Syrians love Turkish society very much	66	2,9
No idea/ No response	248	10,9
Total	2271	100,0

As a general conclusion, regarding the responses given in the focus groups by the participants, it appears that the ideas revolving around that Syrians influence Turkey in a “negative” way, are much higher than the belief that Syrians have a positive influence on Turkey.

The largest share of the negative impacts (which corresponds to the survey data) is in the “social” and “economic” domains. As a second general observation, when discussing the Syrians effects on Turkey, many participants rightly indicated that this problem is a subjective and changeable problem in nature. In other words, while discussing “the economic impact of the Syrians,” it cannot be expected that Landlords and tenants or employers and workers have the same opinions. However, the spread of negative views are showing up as another important finding.

SB-2019-TABLE 53: Which of the following statements best describe how Syrians treat Turkish society? (%)

	Syrians are exploiting Turkish society	Syrians do not like Turkish society at all	Syrians are making an effort to integrate into Turkish society	Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	Syrians are treating Turkish society with respect	Syrians love Turkish society very much	No idea/ No response
Sex							
Female	33,5	28,7	12,4	5,2	4,1	2,5	13,6
Male	30,8	33,1	14,2	6,4	3,8	3,3	8,4
Age Groups							
18-24	36,6	28,4	13,6	4,7	4,5	3,1	9,1
25-34	33,9	29,1	12,0	8,5	3,1	2,6	10,8
35-44	30,5	32,0	13,5	5,2	4,4	2,8	11,6
45-54	30,1	32,0	13,6	6,1	4,0	3,5	10,7
55-6	29,9	34,6	14,6	3,5	3,5	3,5	10,4
65 +	28,9	30,7	13,2	5,3	4,4	0,9	16,6
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate	21,4	50,0	3,6	3,6	14,3	-	7,1
Literate but not graduate of any school	30,8	33,3	15,4	2,6	7,7	-	10,2
Primary school	29,9	33,4	11,9	4,7	3,5	3,8	12,8
Middle-School	31,2	35,1	12,6	5,2	3,4	2,9	9,6
High-School or equivalent	35,6	27,3	15,6	5,6	3,2	3,1	9,6
University/Graduate Degree	31,1	29,1	12,4	8,3	5,3	2,0	11,8
Region							
Border cities	23,6	40,5	17,1	2,8	1,9	2,6	11,5
Other cities	34,4	28,5	12,3	6,6	4,5	3,0	10,7
Metropolitan cities	30,2	31,3	12,2	5,0	4,3	2,2	14,8
Non-metropolitan cities	36,5	27,0	12,4	7,4	4,5	3,4	8,8
Occupation							
Housewife	34,2	28,2	12,5	5,3	4,6	2,2	13,0
Private sector employee	34,8	30,2	13,4	6,3	2,4	2,0	10,9
Artisan/Tradesman	29,0	31,3	16,0	6,2	3,9	5,9	7,7
Student	36,7	24,9	11,4	6,9	4,5	4,1	11,5
Retired	29,5	35,7	11,2	4,9	3,1	1,8	13,8
Public sector employee	21,1	35,8	12,8	8,3	9,2	1,8	11,0
Unemployed	27,8	40,7	13,9	5,6	4,6	-	7,4
Self-employed	34,1	36,6	13,4	1,2	2,4	2,4	9,9
Other	32,0	32,0	20,0	4,0	4,0	-	8,0
General	44,8	25,0	15,0	5,5	5,3	2,4	2,0

FGD Findings: How have Syrians Affected Turkey

In the FGDs, the issue has been discussed in broader terms and the participants were asked how they evaluated the overall effects of Syrians in Turkey. As a general finding, it appears that the negative influences of Syrians were seen to be more prominent than their positive effects. Among these negative effects, the biggest ones were suggested to be the "economic" and "social" impacts, which confirm the survey findings. A second general observation is that many participants suggested that this question is quite subjective. In other words, when the economic impacts of Syrians are being discussed, it cannot be expected that the impacts would be the same on the employers and employees or the landlords and renters. However, it is still noteworthy that the general opinion holds that the impact has been negative.

Negative Effects on the Economy: In terms of the negative effects on the economy, participants have underlined three main issues:

(i) Due to their low socio-economic profile and in the absence of access to formal employment, many Syrians agree to work for **extremely low wages**. As a result, it has been suggested, they take the jobs of Turkish citizens who work in similar low-wage sectors. In addition, they cause a general decrease in the wages by providing a large pool of cheap and flexible labor. In a similar manner, it was argued that those Syrians who open their own workplaces are free of taxes and legal fees, which create an unfair competition for the Turkish workplace owners who have to pay their taxes and fees. Some participants, while acknowledging these as significant problems for the Turkish economy and certain groups, argued that they are not Syrians' fault. Instead, these problems are created by opportunist Turkish employers or lack of sufficient controls by state authorities.

- "People believe that their jobs are being taken away by Syrians. Artisans are quitting. Syrians are working informally, off-the-records..." Ankara-Academics
- "I conducted a research on the workers who collect waste papers out on the street before 2016. They told me that their monthly income was 2000-3000 Turkish Lira. After the arrival of Syrians, with the entrance of Syrians into this sector, they told me that their monthly income has dropped to 500 TL. When you go to the bazaar, for example, you see many Syrians instead of Turkish sellers. Because they work for much lower wages." Ankara-Women
- "In a country with such high level of unemployment, arrival of such a young Syrian population is naturally preventing the reduction of unemployment." Gaziantep-Students

(ii) A second major negative impact on the economy was argued to **include increasing of prices and life expenses**. Participants suggested that prices, especially including the rents, are increasing in places with a large number of Syrians and this is creating a major disadvantage for particularly low-income groups. Similar to the point made above, some participants blamed opportunist landlords and sellers, instead of Syrians, for this increase in rents and prices.

- "Not only concerning rented houses, an imbalance between supply and demand emerged concerning food, clothes, etc. Gaziantep used to be a cheaper city than many others but now it became one of the most expensive because of Syrians." Gaziantep-Women
- "Before they came, the rent was 1000 lira. Now, rent increases and inflation... 3 families get together to live there now." Istanbul-Artisans/Employees

(iii) Lastly, many FGD participants mentioned the **additional economic burden on public budgets brought** by Syrians as a significant negative impact on Turkish economy. Accordingly, the state provides services to Syrians in terms of accommodation, subsistence, education, and health, using the tax money that is collected from Turkish citizens.

- *"I don't think they are the ones who caused the economic crisis, but they certainly contribute in it." Ankara-Women*
- *"At the micro level, they provided a benefit for the Turkish economy as cheap labor but at the macro level they, of course, had a damaging influence. I mean the extra burden on the budget. The President said it, that we already spent 38 billion US dollars for Syrians." Ankara-Academics*

Positive Effects on the Economy: Some participants suggested that arrival of Syrians also had significant positive effects on the economy. These argued positive effects were also discussed under three main titles.

(i) Firstly, it was often argued that Syrians have **filled several gaps in the labor market through supplying the needed cheap and qualified labor power.** In this context, it was emphasized that besides providing a large pool of cheap labor, Syrian workers were willing to do a lot of jobs that Turkish workers were unwilling to do.

- ***"Before Syrians came, the farmers in Hatay couldn't find workers to hire. They couldn't find workers to pick the olives from their trees. In the same way, you couldn't find workers at the industrial park. Now, because of Syrians, you can quickly find workers to work at anything." Hatay-Teachers***
- *"They filled the labor gaps in Turkey. My family's business is industrial production. No chemical engineer in Turkey wants to work at the workshops. Therefore, Syrians do jobs that Turks won't." Ankara-Students*
- *"I think, Syrians fill the gaps in labor market. In my hometown and that region there is tea and nuts farming. Since the young populations move to the big cities, the remaining more senior people cannot do it on their own. In the past, there were Georgian seasonal workers there but they work for dollars. Now, Syrians moved there and they are doing these works for much cheaper. I think they had a very positive impact." Ankara-Students*

(ii) Some participants underlined the **expansion and added dynamism in the economy due to addition of millions of new people.** Accordingly, Syrians are producing employment opportunities with the workplaces they open, they create turnover in economy by buying and selling products and services.

- *"There are many Syrian workplaces especially here in Gaziantep. Of course, this creates employment." Gaziantep-NGO Workers*
- *"Let's say there are 300.000 Syrians living in Hatay. This means 300.000 loaves of bread every day. This is how I see it. They are contributing in our economy as consumers. 50.000 Syrians were sent away from Kilis to the buffer zone and the city's economy got shaken. People of Kilis were complaining about Syrians but they started saying things like 'oh, how I wish Syrians would be back'." Hatay-Artisans/Employees*

(iii) A last argument for the positive economic impact of Syrians concerned the **foreign currency sent to Turkey through funds for various projects on Syrians.**

- *"I don't think they constitute an additional burden. Because most of the assistance given to them by the state comes United Nations, World Bank or European Union. They provide cheap labor, they produce and generate additional value in this country. That's why I think they contributed in Turkish economy positively." Istanbul-Artisans/Employees*
- *"I think they had a very positive effect in the short run because money came from*

Europe for Syrians. But, I think, in the long run this money will be cut down and then it will be negative for our economy." *Istanbul-NGO Workers*

Negative Effects on Society and Culture: These negative influences were discussed under 4 main headings in the FGDs.

(i) Firstly, participants suggested that the arrival of so many refugees in a short period and the **perception that the state is favoring these people against its own citizens** created a significant sense of tensions, disturbance, and anxieties. Some participants even argued that the course of events appears to move toward hostility.

- "Let me tell you about the harm that Syrians, who came from outside, give to us. We started to be treated like a second-class citizen in our own country. I went to the hospital yesterday and paid 75 lira for my child's treatment. I have social security insurance, I pay 750-800 lira every month to the state in insurance premiums. And still I had to pay 75 lira at the hospital. Now, think of a Syrian going to a hospital or a pharmacy. Do you think they pay this fee? In the best case scenario, they might pay 25 lira instead of 75. I am a Turkish citizen. I was born here, I didn't come later. You have to first take care of me. You have to first look after, protect me." *Hatay-Artisans/Employees*
- "I think their arrival has caused for the sense of justice to be weakened. Because when we look at the opportunities provided for them, the state should first think about its own citizens. There are so many unemployed people in Turkey. But the state provides more services to Syrians than to its own citizens. This creates disturbance among society, it causes segregation. They have turned into the first class citizens now." *Hatay-Women*

(ii) A second often repeated argument was that **Syrians damaged Turkey's social structure and they are transforming and weakening it.**

- "Randomly accepting them into Turkey has harmed our social structure. Syrians will cause massive social problems in the future. Nobody thought about 3 years later or 5 years later when they opened the doors." *Hatay-Teachers*
- "They disturbed our peace. We had lived in Narlica for 30 years. We had wonderful relations with our neighbors. When Syrians started to come about 10 years ago, all of it was broken. Now there is no good neighborhood or anything left. We were having breakfast in the garden as a family and they could easily throw out dirty baby diapers from their balcony. We all have moved from our houses because of Syrians." *Hatay-Women*
- "I think they are very very conservative people. And they are making our society more and more conservative." *Gaziantep-NGO Workers*
- **"I think they will cause a falling backwards both socially and culturally."**
Gaziantep-Students

(iii) A more specific negative impact on Turkish society was argued to involve the family structure. Accordingly, Syrians have had a **negative influence on Turkish family structure and especially marriages.** Participants suggested that polygamy, under-age marriages, and religious weddings are very common among Syrians and these pose a threat to Turkish family structure. It was further suggested that an increasing number of Turkish men were marrying young Syrian women as second their second wives and that families were being destroyed as a result. Some participants suggested that Syrians women are not the perpetrators but victims here, while it is the men and the patriarchal social structure in Turkey to blame.

- "Relatively well-off Turkish men in Gaziantep took second wives from Syrians. I know one who has a wife and kids. He married a young Syrian girl and opened a

second home for her." Gaziantep-Women

- "Turkish men show Syrian women to their wives as a threat to them. They use Syrian women as an instrument of psychological pressure." Gaziantep-Women.

(iv) Lastly, some participants argued that **Syrians have brought significant risks concerning public security and health.** There is a widespread belief that crime is increasing in cities and districts where Syrians live in larger numbers. Some participants, additionally, mentioned that there are few diseases, posing a significant threat to public health, which had been previously eradicated in Turkey but came back with Syrians.

- "There has been an increase in the crime rates. Especially drug trafficking and smuggling increased immensely. And the Syrian criminals are not put in jail, they are deported. Many of them simply come back into Turkey later." Hatay-Artisans/Employees
- "I was at a public health clinic, talking to a doctor there. He said a disease that hasn't been seen in Turkey for decades, I don't remember its name, emerged again with the Syrians' arrival. Of course, hearing these things make people panic." Hatay-Artisans/Employees

Positive Effects on Society and Culture: A smaller group of participants claimed that Syrians have also brought positive contributions into Turkish society and culture. Accordingly, the biggest of these is the cultural diversity and richness that emerged with the arrival of Syrians. Some participants suggested that, as a communication strategy, these should be emphasized more.

- "There are many ways in which they enriched the society. For instance, in terms of music, I got to listen to some Syrian bands that I had never heard before." Istanbul-NGO Workers
- "I think it enriched us. For example, we got some senior year university students, studying social services, coming to us and asking how they could learn Arabic. Even this is a richness." Istanbul-NGO Workers
- "There are many Syrians in the Onder neighborhood. They have many shops there, many restaurants. There is this very famous dessert that we once tried with a friend of mine. We both liked it very much. I had never thought that I would try it, let alone like it. But I am glad that I did. It changed a lot in me." Ankara-Women

19. How Significant a Problem are Syrians?

Turkish society has been dealing with a number of significant problems over the last few years. These include the fight against terror, economic troubles, employment issues, and complications in foreign policy, among others. To understand whether or not issue of Syrians is perceived by the Turkish society as a major problem, SB research included the question "Among the top 10 problems of Turkey, how would you rank the priority of the issue of Syrians?". Accordingly, the combined rate of those who consider the issue of Syrians as Turkey's "most important", "second most important", and "third most important" problem exceeds 60%. The average rank is calculated from the responses to be 3.3. It appears that Turkish society considers the issue of Syrians as one of its top 3 problems. The share of those who suggested that "Syrians are not a problem/The issue of Syrians wouldn't be in the top 10" is 5,4%. There is no significant differentiation among the respondent related to their socio-economic or demographic characteristics.

SB-2019-TABLE 54: Among the top 10 problems of Turkey, how would you rank the priority of the issue of Syrians?

	#	%	%
1 st rank	617	27,2	60,3
2 st rank	325	14,3	
3 st rank	426	18,8	
4 st rank	196	8,6	8,6
5 st rank	191	8,4	8,4
6 st rank	64	2,8	2,8
7 st rank	61	2,7	2,7
8 st rank	44	1,9	1,9
9 st rank	17	0,7	0,7
10 st rank	115	5,1	5,1
Syrians are not a problem/The issue of Syrians wouldn't be in the top 10	123	5,4	5,4
No idea/No response	92	4,1	4,1
Total	2271	100,0	100,0
Average rank	3,3		

Note: Average rank is calculated from the data of those who suggested a rank.

SB-2019-TABLE 55: Among the top 10 problems of Turkey, how would you rank the priority of the issue of Syrians?

	Average Rank		Average Rank
Sex		Region	
Female	3,5	Border cities	3,3
Male	3,4	Other cities	3,3
Yaş		Metropolitan cities	3,5
18-24	3,6	Non-metropolitan cities	3,2
25-34	3,3	Occupation	
35-44	3,1	Housewife	3,7
45-54	3,2	Private sector employee	3,7
55-64	3,3	Artisan/Tradesman	3,4
65 +	3,4	Student	3,4
Educational Attainment		Retired	3,3
Illiterate	2,7	Public sector employee	3,2
Literate but not graduate of any school	3,3	Unemployed	3,1
Primary school	3,0	Self-employed	2,5
Middle-School	3,1	Other	3,9
High-School or equivalent	3,3		
University/Graduate Degree	3,7		
General		3,3	

20. Political Rights and Citizenship

The respondents were asked the question "What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and political rights?". Consistently, 85,6% and 87,1% of the respondents in 2017 and 2019, respectively, suggested that "they should not be given any political rights". The same clear attitude is found with respect to citizenship as well. In the context of SB-2019 survey, a large majority of Turkish society believes that most of the Syrians will permanently stay in the country, and yet, they display a strong resistance to giving them political rights or citizenship. In fact, when asked the question "What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and Turkish citizenship?" and given the chance to provide multiple responses, 75,8% of the respondents suggested "none of them should be given citizenship" in SB-2017. In the past two years, during which time over 100 thousand Syrians obtained Turkish citizenship, this figure has increased to 76,5% in SB-2019. The share of those who replied "all of them should be given citizenship" also decreased from 4% in 2017 to 1,5% in 2019.¹²⁷

SB-2019-TABLE 56: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and political rights?

	SB-2017		SB-2019	
	#	%	#	%
They should not be given any political rights	1789	85,6	1979	87,1
They should be allowed to vote in all elections	84	4,0	67	3,0
They should be allowed to both vote and be candidates in all elections	33	1,6	67	3,0
They should be allowed to vote only in local elections	96	4,6	61	2,6
They should be allowed to both vote and be candidates only in local elections	25	1,2	6	0,3
No idea/ No response	62	3,0	91	4,0
Total	2089	100,0	2271	100,0

127 Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014: "Syrian asylum-seekers should be given Turkish citizenship": Agreed: 7,7% / Disagreed: 84,5%

SB-2019-TABLE 57: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and political rights? (%)

	They should not be given any political rights	They should be allowed to both vote and be candidates in all elections	They should be allowed to vote in all elections	They should be allowed to vote only in local elections	They should be allowed to both vote and be candidates only in local elections	No idea/ No response
Sex						
Female	85,8	2,6	3,3	3,5	-	4,8
Male	88,5	3,3	2,6	1,9	0,5	3,2
Age Groups						
18-24	86,4	3,1	3,1	3,3	0,2	3,9
25-34	86,0	2,4	3,1	3,3	-	5,2
35-44	86,9	3,3	3,1	2,0	0,2	4,5
45-54	87,9	2,8	2,3	3,5	0,5	3,0
55-64	90,2	3,9	2,4	1,2	0,8	1,5
65 +	86,8	1,8	4,4	0,9	-	6,1
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	92,8	-	3,6	3,6	-	-
Literate but not graduate of any school	84,5	5,1	2,6	2,6	2,6	2,6
Primary school	86,7	3,1	3,3	1,9	0,5	4,5
Middle-School	90,1	2,1	2,6	1,8	-	3,4
High-School or equivalent	87,2	3,1	2,7	2,8	0,1	4,1
University/Graduate Degree	85,2	3,3	3,3	4,1	0,2	3,9
Region						
Border cities	88,7	1,1	3,7	2,4	0,9	3,2
Other cities	86,7	3,4	2,8	2,8	0,1	4,2
Metropolitan cities	87,0	3,0	2,2	3,3	0,2	4,3
Non-metropolitan cities	86,6	3,6	3,1	2,5	0,1	4,1
Occupation						
Housewife	85,7	2,7	3,7	3,1	-	4,8
Private sector employee	86,8	3,4	3,0	1,8	0,2	4,8
Artisan/Tradesman	87,9	3,7	2,3	2,1	0,5	3,5
Student	86,5	2,4	2,9	4,9	0,4	2,9
Retired	89,3	3,6	1,8	0,4	0,9	4,0
Public sector employee	81,7	-	5,5	7,3	-	5,5
Unemployed	91,7	0,9	1,9	2,8	-	2,7
Self-employed	91,5	2,4	2,4	2,4	-	1,3
Other	88,0	8,0	4,0	-	-	-
General	87,1	3,0	3,0	2,6	0,3	4,0

SB-2019-TABLE 58: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and Turkish citizenship?

		SB-2017*		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	None of them should be given citizenship	1584	75,8	1737	76,5
2	Those who have been living in Turkey for a certain time period should be given citizenship	153	7,3	135	6,0
3	Those who were born in Turkey should be given citizenship	101	4,8	48	2,1
4	Well-educated ones should be given citizenship	124	5,9	114	5,0
5	Those who know/learn Turkish should be given citizenship	47	2,2	9	0,4
6	Turkish-origin ones/Turkomans should be given citizenship	63	3,0	53	2,3
7	Young ones should be given citizenship	11	0,5	-	-
8	Those who got married to a Turkish citizen should be given citizenship	-	-	65	2,9
9	All of them should be given citizenship	84	4,0	35	1,5
	No idea/ No response	61	2,9	75	3,3

* 2017 results present multiple responses

It can be observed in this table that the combined share of those who look positively to the Syrians' prospects of obtaining Turkish citizenship based on a condition, such as "being well-educated", "being born in Turkey", "ethnically being a Turkoman", "speaking Turkish", or "being young" increased from 17,3% in 2017 to 19,2% in 2019. When we add this figure approving a conditional naturalization to those who suggest that "all of the Syrians should be given citizenship", the combined rate was 21,3% in 2017, which has decreased to 20,7% in 2019.¹²⁸

The strong reservations expressed by Turkish society underline the necessity of reconsidering Turkey's citizenship policy as well as more regularly informing Turkish society on this matter. In addition, these concerns need to be kept in mind while thinking about the future status of Syrians in Turkey, possibly suggesting the need to consider some other options than citizenship.

128 Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:
"Syrian asylum-seekers should be given Turkish citizenship": Agreed: 7,7% / Disagreed: 84,5%

SB-2019-TABLE 59: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and Turkish citizenship? (%)

	None of them should be given citizenship	Those who have been living in Turkey for a certain time period should be given citizenship	Well-educated ones should be given citizenship	Those who got married to a Turkish citizen should be given citizenship	Turkish-origin ones/ Turkomans should be given citizenship	Those who were born in Turkey should be given citizenship	All of them should be given citizenship	Those who know/learn Turkish should be given citizenship	No idea/ No response
Sex									
Female	78,6	5,3	3,7	2,7	1,7	2,1	1,2	0,4	4,3
Male	74,4	6,6	6,3	3,0	3,0	2,1	1,9	0,4	2,3
Age Groups									
18-24	73,0	6,6	4,7	3,1	3,3	4,0	2,1	0,2	3,0
25-34	75,0	6,9	4,7	2,2	2,6	3,3	1,2	-	4,1
35-44	73,9	6,1	5,7	3,7	2,8	1,3	1,7	1,1	3,7
45-54	80,4	4,7	5,4	2,6	1,6	0,9	1,4	0,2	2,8
55-64	81,9	4,3	5,1	2,8	1,2	1,2	1,2	0,4	1,9
65 +	81,6	7,0	2,6	2,6	0,9	-	1,8	-	3,5
Educational Attainment									
Illiterate	82,1	7,1	-	3,6	-	3,6	-	-	3,6
	76,9	5,1	5,1	-	2,6	-	2,6	-	7,7
Primary school	80,6	3,1	4,2	2,6	0,9	0,7	1,9	0,9	5,1
Middle-School	81,2	3,7	1,8	3,4	2,9	2,6	1,8	-	2,6
High-School or equivalent	76,6	6,6	5,3	3,1	2,7	1,6	1,5	0,3	2,3
University/Graduate Degree	67,5	10,0	8,3	2,6	3,3	4,3	1,0	0,4	2,6
Region									
Border cities	76,2	4,8	6,7	1,3	1,7	3,0	1,9	0,4	4,0
Other cities	76,6	6,2	4,6	3,3	2,5	1,9	1,4	0,4	3,1
Metropolitan cities	77,8	7,8	5,8	1,7	0,7	1,3	1,2	0,3	3,4
Non-metropolitan cities	75,9	5,5	4,0	4,1	3,4	2,2	1,6	0,4	2,9
Occupation									
Housewife	81,1	3,8	2,7	2,2	1,5	1,5	1,5	0,5	5,2
Private sector employee	76,7	7,5	5,1	2,6	2,8	1,4	1,0	-	2,9
Artisan/Tradesman	71,5	4,3	6,4	5,5	3,0	3,7	3,0	0,7	1,9
Student	67,8	8,6	6,5	2,9	4,5	4,9	2,0	0,4	2,4
Retired	81,3	4,9	4,9	2,7	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,4	3,1
Public sector employee	71,6	12,8	7,3	-	0,9	0,9	-	0,9	5,6
Unemployed	82,4	3,7	3,7	0,9	2,8	1,9	0,9	-	3,7
Self-employed	84,1	3,7	7,3	2,4	-	-	1,2	-	1,3
Other	72,0	20,0	4,0	-	4,0	-	-	-	-
General	76,5	6,0	5,0	2,9	2,3	2,1	1,5	0,4	3,3

FGD Findings: Political Rights and Citizenship

The questions of whether and what type of political rights should be given to Syrians as well as that of citizenship were subject to intense discussions during the FGDs. The main headlines from these discussions are summarized below.

Syrians should not be given political rights or citizenship: A majority of the FGD participants was in this category. There were two main justifications to support this view. (i) Firstly, it was argued that giving the electoral rights as well as other rights tied to citizenship to millions of refugees would not be in the national interests. (ii) Secondly, many FGD participants suggested that it would be undemocratic to let individuals who arrived in the country recently and as foreigners to decide the fate of citizens.

- (i)
 - "From a humanist perspective, I would argue for them to have the right to vote. However, I think, their political consciousness would be too weak in Turkey. Also, there is a risk of them being instrumentalized by some political powers." Gaziantep-NGO Workers
 - "I think that they shouldn't be given political rights and they shouldn't be admitted to Turkish citizenship. I went to my uncle's shop a few days ago and a Syrian worker said 'if we had our own political party, the Turks wouldn't be able to oppress us'. If we give this right to Syrians, then, they would have 40 members in the parliament. I think, this would be a very bad thing." Ankara-Students
- (ii)
 - "I am someone who thinks that even uneducated Turkish citizens shouldn't vote. They should be able to vote if they are at least middle school graduates, for example. I definitely don't want Syrians to vote or stand as candidates in the elections." Ankara-Women
 - "How can people who escaped war or who were brought to here decide my future? How can someone who doesn't speak my language influence my politics? Not only language, they don't know anything. They don't know my culture, they don't know our political structure." Hatay-Teachers
 - "I don't believe any country would give citizenship to people who came through mass immigration escaping a war and who stayed in their country during the war because they couldn't go back to their country. These people are foreigners. So, they should have whatever rights the foreigners have in Turkey." Gaziantep-Students

Syrians Could be Given Citizenship but it Should Come at the End of Difficult Process: Some participants were not as harsh as the above discussed group. According to these participants, Syrians should be able to eventually obtain Turkish citizenship but only after a long and difficult process that ensures they deserved it.

- "We don't need to invent the wheel all over again. I am sure there are many examples to this. They shouldn't be citizens right away. It should happen in a process." Ankara-Academics
- "I think they should be eventually able to vote in elections and be elected to office. Why weren't the Turks who migrated to Germany given these rights right away? They could only obtain such rights in 30 years or so." Gaziantep-Women
- "It would crush the social structure in Turkey if Syrians would be given citizenship or the right to vote in elections right away. The first steps should include for them to create their civil society organizations, establish spaces where they can have their voices heard, and become more involved in local government structures. The rest could be considered in the future, eventually. We must be very careful in the beginning." Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- "This requires an integration process. Without sufficient integration, there shouldn't be political rights or citizenship. And I don't think political rights should be given to non-citizens. So, first integration, then citizenship, and thus political rights." Istanbul-Women
- "I don't think we, as Turkey, should give our citizenship so easily. Because other countries don't give us their citizenship easily. The main reason why Syrians are not returning to Syria is that they have it so comfortable here." Hatay-Artisans/Employees

- *"Let the war end first, then we see. If they are going to return to Syria, why would we give them citizenship? If we will give them citizenship, it should be regulated in a process. There should be criteria. If we will just give them right away, one would ask, why not Afghans or Somalians but Syrians?" Hatay-Artisans/Employees*

Syrians Should be Given Political Rights and/or Turkish Citizenship: *There are two main arguments put forward by those participants who suggested that Syrians should be given political rights and eventually citizenship. (i) Firstly, a democratic system requires all of its residents to have a say in their own life, and (ii) secondly, unless and until Syrians have the political power to vote, they will be unable to protect themselves or feel safe in Turkey. In addition, this is necessary so that the Turkish society finally admits that it needs to establish a new life together with Syrians.*

(i)

- *"All long-term residents, if they meet certain criteria, should be citizens and should have the same rights as I do." Ankara-Academics*
- *"Voting simply means that you decide how you want to be governed. So, I would demand my basic rights respected and the human right to be upheld. I don't think someone needs to know the history of the place they live to decide what kind of services they want. So, yes, right to vote and be elected should be given to Syrians. These people walk in the same streets and drink the same water as I do. They pay electricity and water bills as I do, although perhaps in a discounted rate. These people came in 2011. They have been here for 8 years." Istanbul-Women*

(ii)

- *"If they are here to stay permanently, they should become citizens. They should have the political power. These rights would be so important in making them feel they belong here. Perhaps this is not very realistic at the moment but this what is ideal, what is fair." Ankara-Academics*
- *"It seems to me that unless Syrians become citizens here, the local society will never face and accept the reality. We are unable to give these people a name." Ankara-Academics*

21. The View on Education Opportunities for Syrian Children

According to SB-2017 and SB-2019 data, Turkish society displays a high degree of "sensitivity" regarding the education of Syrian children. The survey respondents were asked the question "What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding education of Syrian children in public schools in Turkey?". The responses tend to be a bit "reluctant" and "restrictive". The most expansive statement, "they should be able to freely enjoy education opportunities at all levels including university education" received support from only 6% of the respondents in SB-2019, down from 9,5% in 2017. However, the share of those who suggested "they should be able to freely enjoy the 12-year mandatory education" has increased from 23,5% in 2017 to 26,8% in 2019. There is a relatively high level of support for the most restrictive statement "they shouldn't be able receive any education" from 16,7% of the respondents. While this can be seen as another demonstration of the anxieties among Turkish society, the fact that this figure has decreased from its 2017 level of 25,7% shows that Turkish society is moving on from their reservations regarding education of Syrian children.

As the prospects of Syrians to remain permanently in Turkey become stronger, the issue of children's education gets more prominent. As of December 2019, there were more than 1 million 80 thousand school-aged (5 to 17 years old) Syrians in Turkey. Currently, approximately 700 thousand of these children have been schooled. Also, work is underway for those who haven't been schooled. The temporary education centers, which used Arabic as the medium of instruction and which were common in the initial years, have largely been eliminated. Almost all of Syrian children are enrolled to Turkish public schools and receiving education in Turkish language.

SB-2019-TABLE 60: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding education of Syrian children in public schools in Turkey?

		SB-2017*		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	They should be able to freely enjoy the 12-year mandatory education	491	23,5	608	26,8
2	They shouldn't be able receive any education	537	25,7	380	16,7
3	Syrian children should be able to receive education in separate classes at public schools	-	-	355	15,6
4	They should only be taught Turkish language	680	32,6	326	14,4
5	They should receive education in Arabic at separate schools apart from Turkish children	-	-	218	9,6
6	They should be able to freely enjoy education opportunities at all levels including university education	198	9,5	136	6,0
7	They shouldn't be able go to public schools but should be able to receive vocational training	103	4,9	30	1,3
	No idea/ No response	80	3,8	218	9,6
Total		2089	100,0	2271	100,0

SB-2019-TABLE 61: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding education of Syrian children in public schools in Turkey? (%)

	They should be able to freely enjoy the 12-year mandatory education	They shouldn't be able receive any education	Syrian children should be able to receive education in separate classes at public schools	They should only be taught Turkish language	They should receive education in Arabic at separate schools apart from Turkish children	They should be able to freely enjoy education opportunities at all levels including university education	They shouldn't be able to go to public schools but should be able to receive vocational training	No idea/ No response
Sex								
Female	28,3	15,5	16,5	12,9	8,5	5,9	1,2	11,2
Male	25,3	18,0	14,8	15,8	10,7	6,1	1,4	7,9
Age Groups								
18-24	36,6	12,4	10,8	13,1	8,7	7,5	1,9	9,0
25-34	28,5	13,6	16,7	13,0	11,6	6,5	1,4	8,7
35-44	26,1	17,2	17,9	15,3	8,9	5,0	0,9	8,7
45-54	22,4	17,3	16,1	16,8	7,9	6,5	0,7	12,3
55-64	20,1	23,6	15,4	11,4	13,0	3,5	2,8	10,2
65 +	16,7	27,2	16,7	17,5	6,1	6,1	-	9,7
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate	7,1	7,1	39,3	7,1	14,3	3,6	-	21,5
Literate but not graduate of any school	30,8	15,4	28,2	10,3	2,6	2,6	-	10,1
Primary school	22,8	21,1	19,2	13,1	8,3	3,6	1,6	10,3
Middle-School	23,8	17,8	18,1	13,1	11,0	6,0	1,8	8,4
High-School or equivalent	29,3	16,2	11,8	15,0	9,8	6,3	1,3	10,3
University/Graduate Degree	30,7	12,2	13,0	16,5	10,0	8,7	0,8	8,1
Region								
Border cities	22,3	15,6	25,1	9,3	15,2	2,4	0,9	9,2
Other cities	27,9	17,0	13,2	15,6	8,2	6,9	1,4	9,8
Metropolitan cities	26,0	17,0	9,3	20,2	8,3	8,8	1,7	8,7
Non-metropolitan cities	28,9	17,0	15,1	13,4	8,1	6,0	1,3	10,2
Occupation								
Housewife	23,6	17,4	19,0	13,6	8,6	4,9	1,6	11,3
Private sector employee	29,6	13,6	13,2	14,6	9,3	8,5	1,0	10,2
Artisan/Tradesman	26,5	14,2	20,1	12,3	11,4	5,0	0,9	9,6
Student	38,4	10,2	7,8	14,7	9,0	7,8	2,0	10,1
Retired	17,4	26,8	13,4	19,6	10,7	4,5	0,9	6,7
Public sector employee	31,2	15,6	12,8	13,8	8,3	5,5	1,8	11,0
Unemployed	25,9	21,3	17,6	11,1	12,0	6,5	1,9	3,7
Self-employed	17,1	34,1	18,3	14,6	6,1	2,4	-	7,4
Other	32,0	12,0	4,0	28,0	8,0	4,0	4,0	8,0
General	26,8	16,7	15,6	14,4	9,6	6,0	1,3	9,6

* Results for 28 illiterate people.

** Other provinces include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

*** The results belonging to 25 people expressed with "Other".

FGD Findings: Education of Syrians

The issue of education of Syrians were more specifically discussed at the Teacher and Student FGDs. One of the first issues that was discussed was the strategy that needs to be followed concerning the education of Syrians. There were three main themes to be underlined. (i) Syrian children should receive education together with the Turkish children, in interaction with them. (ii) Teaching Turkish language to Syrian children is crucial and it needs to be done before Syrian children start their education. And lastly, (iii) it is important for Syrian children to not forget their mother tongue. So, participants argued for the importance of simultaneously teaching kids Turkish and supporting them with Arabic language classes.

- "I think that Syrian children need to be educated at Turkish schools for their integration. I mean, whether we accept it or not, whether we like it or not, we will be living together in the future with the Syrian children in Turkey. I think we need to come to terms with this." Ankara-Women
- "There should be a 1-year Turkish language preparatory class before they start school. Otherwise, it is impossible for them to follow the classes." Ankara-Students
- "Firstly, it is necessary for them to learn Turkish in the beginning. I think Syrian children should go to a Turkish kindergarten, like the case in Europe. This way they can have their first interactions very early on and learning the language would be easier." Hatay-Teachers
- "Being bilingual is very important. Yes, they definitely should learn Turkish. But there should also be more classes of Arabic at schools either as additional support classes or elective classes. Syrians should not be detached from their language. And Turkish students should also learn Arabic." Gaziantep-Students

These FGD participants were also asked about the current situation and the most significant problems regarding the education of Syrians. According to their experiences and observations, the most significant problem at the moment concerns access to education. In this context, participants suggested that financial problems appear to be the most important reason for this. Another significant problem was suggested to concern the capacity issues. Especially in Hatay and Gaziantep, participants reported that due to the high number of Syrian students in these cities, the local communities are also affected negatively. In particular, it was suggested that physical capacity problems regarding the number of teachers, classrooms, and material were negatively influencing the quality of education for the Turkish children. Lastly, an often-mentioned problem concern peer bullying and discrimination against Syrian children, which was becoming increasingly more common.

- "They have many problems. Economic difficulties are number one. Some teachers, knowingly or unknowingly, treat them badly. And children are much more cruel. There is a lot of exclusion." Ankara-Women
- "I heard somethings from a counselor teacher. For example, some teachers would make Syrian and Turkish students sit as separate groups. Some teachers would not control their home-works. Lots of discrimination. This kind of things." Istanbul-NGO Workers

**Syrians
(Under Temporary
Protection)
Research Findings**

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

5

IV- A. SB-2019: SYRIANS RESEARCH PROFILE

1. Research Background and Profile

In the framework of Syrians Barometer-2019, research on Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey included a “household-based surveys” conducted on a sample of 1.418 households outside of camps in 15 cities. 861 of these households were in border cities, 368 were in metropolitan cities (i.e. Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir), and 189 were in non-metropolitan cities. In addition to the region quota (i.e. “border cities”, “metropolitan cities”, and “non-metropolitan cities”), the sample included quotas on socio-economic status, sex, and age groups of the respondents in order to include sufficient diversity. The research was conducted on a representative sample, for which city-based representation was taken into consideration. Camps were left outside of the research scope in SB-2019, even though they were included as a special category in SB-2017 because Syrians living in camps had constituted 7% of the overall Syrian population back then. The main reason for this is the decrease in the number of Syrians living in camps to 60 thousand, constituting only 1,7% of Syrian population in Turkey. Since the essence of SB research is to offer a vision for integration, the selection of Syrians almost all of whom live in urban centers alongside with the Turkish society as the research subject reflects this mentality. In presenting comparisons between SB-2017 and SB-2019, only the data from Syrians living outside of camps were used for SB-2017.

SB-2019-TABLE 62: SB-2019 Syrians, City-based Sample

Cities				Region		
		#	%		#	%
1	Istanbul	260	18,3	Border cities	861	60,7
2	Gaziantep	189	13,3	Metropolitan cities	368	26,0
3	Hatay	188	13,3	Non-metropolitan cities	189	13,3
4	Şanlıurfa	182	12,8	Total	1.418	100,0
5	Adana	92	6,5			
6	Mersin	88	6,2			
7	Bursa	74	5,2			
8	İzmir	67	4,7			
9	Konya	47	3,3			
10	Kilis	46	3,2			
11	Mardin	41	2,9			
12	Ankara	41	2,9			
13	Kayseri	35	2,5			
14	Kahramanmaraş	35	2,5			
15	Kocaeli	33	2,4			
Total		1.418	100,0			

Border Cities		Other Cities	
		Metropolitan Cities	Non-metropolitan Cities
Adana	Kilis	Ankara	Bursa
Gaziantep	Mardin	Istanbul	Kayseri
Hatay	Mersin	İzmir	Kocaeli
Kahramanmaraş	Şanlıurfa		Konya

2. Profile and Demographic Characteristics of Participants in SB-2019 Survey on Syrians

SB-2019-TABLE 63: Profile of Syrians in SB-2019 Research (15 cities – 1.418 households – 6.526 individuals)

	#	%		#	%
Sex (Household Distribution)			Educational Attainment of Individuals in Households		
Female	3202	49,1	Illiterate	436	8,2
Male	3325	50,9	Literate but not graduate of any school	891	16,7
Total	6527	100,0	Primary school	1690	31,7
Age Groups in Households			Middle school	1170	22,0
0-5	1203	18,4	High-school or equivalent	608	11,4
6-11	981	15,0	2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	141	2,7
12-17	729	11,2	University degree	373	7,0
18-24	1064	16,3	Graduate degree/PhD	15	0,3
25-34	1116	17,1	Total	5324	100,0
35-44	727	11,1	Occupational Status of Individuals in Households		
45-54	406	6,2	Working	1648	37,9
55-64	198	3,0	Housewife	1420	32,7
65 +	103	1,7	Student	635	14,6
Total	6527	100,0	Unemployed	451	10,4
Status in Turkey of Individuals in Households			Unable to work/disabled or old	182	4,2
Temporary protection registration document	4407	67,5	Retired	7	0,2
Temporary protection identification document	1933	29,6	Total	4343	100,0
Residence permit	80	1,2	Type of Jobs of Individuals in Households		
Republic of Turkey citizenship identification	30	0,5	Regularly working employee	828	50,2
No documents/undocumented	77	1,2	Casual (daily) worker	553	33,6
Total	6527	100,0	Self-employed/artisan	184	11,2
Marital Status of Individuals in Households			Employer (Employing 1 or more individuals)	41	2,5
Single/Never married	1493	34,4	Seasonal worker	32	1,9
Married	2647	60,9	Unpaid family employee	10	0,6
Separated	7	0,2	Total	1648	100,0
Widowed	158	3,6			
Divorced	38	0,9			
Total	4343	100,0			

SB-2019 study covers Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. In this context, an individual with either a "Temporary Protection Identification Document" or a "Temporary Protection Registration Document" was considered to be included in the scope of the study. However, there were 37 "residence permit holder" and 15 "undocumented" Syrians included in the sample of 1.418 individuals surveyed in the households. The share of these individuals in the sample is 3,7%. Because the number is too small to influence any analysis and the surveys were conducted as "household-based", involving one person from the household to transmit information of the family, these 52 surveys were not excluded from the analysis.

SB-2019-TABLE 64: SB-2019 Distribution based on Sex

Sex of Interviewed Individuals			Sex of Individuals in Households		
	#	%		#	%
Female	540	38,1	Female	3202	49,1
Male	878	61,9	Male	3325	50,9
Total	1418	100,0	Total	6527	100,0

It is possible to divide Syrians in Turkey into 4 different categories. The largest group is composed of individuals with "Temporary Protection" identification holders or registration document holders. In addition to these two categories, there is a group of approximately 100 thousand Syrians with "residence permits", a majority of whom came to Turkey prior to 2011. The last category is that of naturalized Turkish citizens of Syrian origin, who are technically not Syrian anymore but who continue to be perceived as Syrian in the social context. There are more than 102 thousand naturalized Turkish citizens of Syrian origin, the majority of whom used to be under temporary protection before obtaining citizenship.¹²⁹

The household-based surveys with Syrians were conducted using Computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) method. The surveys were conducted with an individual authorized to give information on behalf of the household. When determining the universe of the research, the average size of a household was determined to be 6. Total number of households, in turn, was calculated by dividing the total number of Syrians in Turkey by this average household size- $3.476.327 / 6 = 579.221$. The sample size was determined, according to these figures on a 95% confidence level and $\pm 2,6$ confidence interval, to be 1.418. The surveys with Syrians were conducted between 1st and 20th of May, 2019.

Since SB-2019 was conducted on a representative sample selected on a $\pm 2,6$ confidence interval, it is believed that, with certain reservations, it provides the most reliable and accurate information concerning the profile of all Syrians under temporary protection living outside of camps in Turkey. However, it shouldn't be forgotten that the study bears no claim of presenting "the truths" or "absolute perceptions" or "the reality". Instead, being aware of its limitations, it attempts at approaching to the social reality the best way it can in such a dynamic and complex process.

One of the most significant problems experienced in Turkey concerning Syrians had been the lack of a central and regular registration until 2014 due to the expectation of temporariness. As it was discussed in earlier sections, the DGMM was only established with the adoption of LFIP. With DGMM establishing and activating its provincial branches in 2014, a new era has started regarding registrations. Following this date, registration of almost all Syrians living outside of camps has been complete within a few years by the DGMM. There have been, however, some minor issues and shortcomings related to the language barrier, the activation process of the Göç-NET system, and the reluctance of some Syrians to get registered for various reasons. Therefore, in the following years, efforts have been made to update and complete the registrations with significant support from the UNHCR. As of the end of 2019, it can be suggested that these efforts have been largely successful.

129 Director of Communication of Turkish Presidency, Fahrettin Altun, declared on 24 August 2019 that "102 thousand Syrians were given citizenship until today". <https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/turkiye-suriyelilere-yardim-etme-konusunda-kararli-adimlar-atti> (Access: 20.10.2019)

SB-2019-TABLE 65: SB-2019 Distribution based on Age Groups

Age Groups of Interviewed Individuals			Age Groups of Individuals in Households		
	#	%		#	%
18-24	245	17,3	0-5	1203	18,4
25-34	501	35,3	6-11	981	15,0
35-44	375	26,4	12-17	729	11,2
45-54	178	12,6	18-24	1064	16,3
55-64	84	5,9	25-34	1116	17,1
65 +	35	2,5	35-44	727	11,1
Total	1418	100,0	45-54	406	6,2
			55-64	198	3,0
			65 +	103	1,7
			Total	6527	100,0

SB-2019-TABLE 66: SB-2019 Distribution based on Marital Status

Marital Status of Interviewed Individuals (18 + year-olds)			Marital Status of Individuals in Households (12 + year-olds)		
	#	%		#	%
Single/Never married	181	12,8	Single/Never married	1493	34,4
Married	1134	80,0	Married	2647	60,9
Separated	7	0,5	Separated	7	0,2
Widowed	78	5,4	Widowed	158	3,6
Divorced	18	1,3	Divorced	38	0,9
Total	1418	100,0	Total	4343	100,0

SB-2019-TABLE 67: SB-2019 Distribution based on Educational Attainment

Educational Attainment of Interviewed Individuals (18 + year-olds)			Educational Attainment of Individuals in Households (6 + year-olds)		
	#	%		#	%
Illiterate	87	6,1	Illiterate	436	8,2
Literate but not graduate of any school	73	5,2	Literate but not graduate of any school	891	16,7
Primary school	405	28,6	Primary school	1690	31,7
Middle school	381	26,9	Middle school	1170	22,0
High-school or equivalent	219	15,4	High-school or equivalent	608	11,4
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	57	4,0	2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	141	2,7
University degree	186	13,1	University degree	373	7,0
Graduate degree/PhD	10	0,7	Graduate degree/PhD	15	0,3
Total	1418	100,0	Total	1418	100,0

Education and Knowledge of Language

The profile of Syrians captured by SB-2019 does to a great extent reflect the general profile of Syrians in Turkey. Among the group included in the research, the illiterate individuals constitute 8,2%, while those who are literate but not graduate of any schools make up of 16,7%. The total share of those with a 2-year associate degree/vocational school of higher education, university degree and graduate degrees appears to be 10%.

In SB-2019 research, a question on knowledge of different languages was added in the form of “at what level and which languages do you know?”, so that it could serve as a reference point in future studies. The received responses provide hints both on ethnic belonging and improvement of Turkish language knowledge. Accordingly, among Syrians in Turkey, the share of those whose mother tongue is Arabic is 81%, which is followed by Kurdish (16,1%), and Turkoman/Turkish (13,3%). What is interesting here is that while 12,9% of the respondents reported speaking Turkish “fluently” (not as their mother tongue), 27,9% said they spoke it on an intermediate level and another 21,7% reported speaking Turkish on a beginner level. This appears to show that a significant part of Syrians of Arab and Kurdish origin are progressing on their way to learning Turkish.

SB-2019-TABLE 68: At what level and which languages do you know? (%)

		Mother Tongue	Advanced	Intermediate	Beginner	Don't know
1	Arabic	81,0	13,5	3,9	1,1	0,5
2	Kurdish	16,1	1,6	1,5	1,6	79,2
3	Turkish	13,3	12,9	27,9	21,7	24,2
4	English	0,8	4,2	11,5	10,2	73,3
5	French	0,0	0,4	0,8	1,7	97,1
6	Other*	11,1	33,3	11,1	22,2	22,3

* Results belonging to 9 individuals.

SB-2019-TABLE 69: Demography of those who know Turkish.
At what level and which languages do you know? (Turkish %)

	Mother Tongue	Advanced	Intermediate	Beginner	Don't know
Cinsiyet					
Female	8,1	9,6	23,1	20,7	38,5
Male	16,5	14,9	30,9	22,3	15,4
Yaş					
18-24	15,1	18,8	30,2	17,1	18,8
25-34	11,4	14,4	33,1	21,4	19,7
35-44	14,4	9,3	27,5	25,3	23,5
45-54	18,5	10,7	21,9	20,2	28,7
55-64	8,3	10,7	10,7	26,2	44,1
65+	2,9	5,7	14,3	17,1	60,0
Öğrenim Durumu					
Illiterate	33,3	5,7	11,5	10,3	39,2
Literate but not graduate of any school	34,2	5,5	8,2	15,1	37,0
Primary school	16,8	8,9	21,2	23,0	30,1
High-school or equivalent	7,3	11,5	31,2	24,9	25,1
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	6,8	16,4	37,9	20,1	18,8
University degree	14,0	7,0	21,1	33,3	24,6
Region	8,2	27,6	40,8	18,9	4,5
Bölge					
Border cities	13,0	13,4	24,9	23,1	25,6
Other cities	13,8	12,2	32,7	19,6	21,7
Metropolitan cities	16,8	10,1	29,3	19,3	24,5
Non-metropolitan cities	7,9	16,4	39,2	20,1	16,4
General	13,3	12,9	27,9	21,7	24,2

Focus Group Discussions

In addition to the surveys, a more in-depth understanding of the attitudes, experiences, and expectations of Syrians was sought through conducting 8 FGDs. While representativeness was not aimed in the FGDs, a significant degree of diversity was intended so that different opinions and experiences of various groups of specific attention would be obtained. Therefore, instead of inviting random groups, each FGD aimed at bringing together individuals with specific profiles.

In this context, the greatest number of FGDs were conducted with groups of women. The reason for this was the desire to be aware of gender-specific experiences as well as to include women's perspectives, expectations, and opinions. Besides women, FGDs included groups of teachers, students, workers and employees, and NGO workers.

Lastly, it was believed that individuals in different cities could have significantly different experiences and expectations which, in turn, would affect perceptions and attitudes. Therefore, FGDs were conducted in different cities with their respective residents. In this context, representation of border cities and metropolitan cities

was targeted by conducting FGDs in two cities from each category: Hatay and Gaziantep representing border cities, and Istanbul and Ankara as metropolitan ones. These FGDs were conducted between 10 July 2019 and 10 August 2019.

SB-2019-TABLO 70: FGD List

City		
İSTANBUL	WOMEN 5	STUDENT 6
ANKARA	WOMEN 5	ARTISAN/EMPLOYEE 5
GAZİANTEP	WOMEN 9	NGO WORKER 5
HATAY	WOMEN 7	NATURALIZED CITIZEN 5

Total Syrian FGD Participants: 47 (8 FGDs, average number of participants: 5.9)

Each FGD was conducted with the participation of 5-9 Syrian participants, with the attendance of 2 members of the research team. An interview guide is formed with the main themes of SB-2019 and the FGDs were moderated using this guide without interrupting the interactive and dynamic flow of discussions. The FGDs were conducted in Arabic. The first parts of all FGDs were the same, the later parts being differentiated according to the specific profiles of each FGD (e.g. Students, Artisans/Employees, or Women) and the city in which the FGD was being organized. A copy of the used interview guide is presented in the Appendix 1.

Upon obtaining the prior informed consent of all participants, all FGDs were voice-recorded using digital recorders. The recordings were later fully transcribed into writing for analysis. The personal information of the specific participants are not included in this study. Instead, quotes from FGDs are presented here by giving reference to which FGD they are from (e.g. Istanbul-Women, Ankara-Student, Hatay-NGO Worker, etc.)

The analysis of the comprehensive data collected from FGDs was made using the qualitative data analysis software, MAXQDA. In this context, the full transcript of each FGD was uploaded to the program to be coded by a list of codes and sub-codes. Later, retrieving the coded segments of texts across all FGDs allowed a thorough and comparative analysis of the collected data, including specialized analyses based on the FGD type and city. The codebook including all the codes used in the analysis is presented in the Appendix 2.

Findings

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

6

IV- B. SB-2019: SYRIANS RESEARCH FINDINGS

1. Quality of Life in Syria

SB-2019 attempted to gather some information regarding Syrians' socio-economic situations of before they came to Turkey, through ownership of certain tangible assets back in Syria.

From this question, it appears that 68,1% of Syrians owned a house, 29,5% owned land/estate, 26,9% owned a car, and 24,8% owned a workplace back in Syria before they came to Turkey. This data allows us to suggest that Syrians belonged to the middle-income group before coming to Turkey.¹³⁰

SB-2019-TABLE 71: Please state which of the following your family owned while living in Syria. (%)

	Yes	No	No response
House	68,1	31,5	0,4
Land-Estate	29,5	69,2	1,3
Car	26,9	71,9	1,2
Workplace	24,8	73,8	1,4

2. Wholeness and Dividedness of Syrian Families

The number of Syrians who have escaped the civil war in Syria since April 2011 exceeded 6,5 million. There has also been a remarkable human mobility within the country. This situation is unfortunately still continuing in 2019 and, as a result, there are so many divided families. The questions concerning the wholeness and dividedness of the families of Syrians in Turkey, included both in SB-2017 and SB-2019, are important in terms of providing certain projections concerning the future plans of these individuals. In this context, the Syrian respondents were asked whether they had "any members of their nucleus/close family living in Syria". Almost half of the respondents, to be exact 45,7% in SB-2017 and 44,7% in SB-2019, said yes to this question.

SB-2019-TABLE 72: Do you have any members of your nucleus/close family living in Syria?

	SB-2017		SB-2019	
	#	%	#	%
No	478	53,9	784	55,3
Yes	392	44,2	634	44,7
No response	17	1,9	-	-
Total	887	100,0	1.418	100,0

130 Syrians' economic situation back in Syria and working situation in Turkey is examined. It appears that the rate of self-employment and ownership of a workplace, which was 24,8% in Syria, increased in Turkey. Although these workplaces are most likely small establishments like grocery, barber or bakery shops, it can be suggested that entrepreneurship appears to be growing among Syrians.

SB-2019-TABLE 73: Who are the members of your family living in Syria?

(Multiple responses, results from 634 respondents who suggested that they have member of their nucleus/close family living in Syria)

		#	%
1	Siblings	212	33,4
2	Mother	196	30,9
3	Father	166	26,2
4	The whole family	120	18,9
5	Paternal uncle	62	9,8
6	Child	36	5,7
7	Maternal uncle	22	3,5
8	Spouse	14	2,2
9	Paternal aunt	14	2,2
10	Maternal aunt	12	1,9
11	Relatives	11	1,7
12	Cousins	10	1,6
13	Grandfather	9	1,4
14	Spouse's family	4	0,6

3. How do Syrians Make Their Living in Turkey?

How the Syrians in Turkey make their living is a controversial topic and has a significant influence on social cohesion.

SB-2019-TABLE 74: Have you received assistance from any institution or individual in the last 12 months to make your family's living?

	SB-2017		SB-2019	
	#	%	#	%
Yes	195	22,0	515	36,3
No	684	77,1	896	63,2
No idea /No response	8	0,9	7	0,5
Total	887	100,0	1.418	100,0

The perception of the Turkish society concerning Syrians' sources of livelihood is quite different. As it was already mentioned, in SB-2017 86,2% and in SB-2019 84,5% of Turkish society suggested that they believed Syrians to make their living "through the support of Turkish state". Similarly, 65,1% of Turkish respondents in SB-2019 argued that Syrians make their living by begging. The same figure was 54,2% in SB-2017. The view that Syrians make their living by working could only come in third place in both years, with 49,8% in 2017 and 50,9% in 2019. This perception, naturally, plays an important role in seeing Syrians as a "burden". However, to the question "Have you received assistance from any institution or individual in the last 12 months to make your family's living?", the share of those who said yes was 22% in SB-2017 and 36,3% in SB-2019, a figure that

is almost identical to the official data concerning the current program. When those who said “yes” were further asked where this assistance is coming from, the main source appears to be the SUY support, which is also known as “Kızılay Kart”, as reported by 93,4% of the respondents. Back in 2017, the SUY supports were not yet as widespread, and the existing financial assistance to Syrians had been provided through AFAD and “Kızılay Kart” systems. SB-2017 has found that 22% of Syrians living outside of camps had received assistance in the previous 12 months.¹³¹ In 2019, the sources of the received assistance included Kızılay Kart-SUY (93,4%), municipalities (7%), NGOs (3,9%), relatives in Syria (2,1%), and international organizations (1,9%).

SB-2019-TABLE 75: Where have you received the assistance from? (Multiple response)

(Note: Results from 515 respondents who stated that they have received assistance in the last 12 months to make their family's living)

		#	%
1	Kızılay kart/SUY	481	93,4
2	Municipalities	36	7,0
3	Civil Society Organizations	20	3,9
4	Family/relatives in Syria	11	2,1
5	International organizations	10	1,9
6	Other	12	2,3

Among those Syrians who reported to be working, 25,5% (i.e. 197 out of 774) said they received assistance in the previous 12 months. 92,4% of these 197 individuals named the assistance they received to be Kızılay Kart/SUY. This finding, on the one hand, shows that a large part of those who receive SUY assistance are also actively working, and on the other hand, proves that the main assistance mechanism reaching to Syrians in Turkey is SUY.

SB-2019-TABLE 76: Relationship between Receiving Assistance and Working

Have you received assistance from any institution or individual in the last 12 months to make your family's living? (Working)			Where have you received the assistance? (Multiple response)		
	#	%		#	%
Yes	197	25,5	Kızılay kart/SUY	182	92,4

4. Working Status of Syrians and Sources of Livelihood

Rules and guidelines regarding the working of Syrians in Turkey are regulated by the 29th Article of the Temporary Protection Regulation which was adopted on 22 October 2014 in the framework of the LFIIP.¹³² Based on this regulation, the “Directive on Working Permits for Foreigners Under Temporary Protection” was adopted on 15 January 2016.¹³³ In a context where more than 98% of Syrians live outside of camps, there

131 Bkz: Türk Kızılayı-Kızılay Kart, <http://kizilaykart-suy.org/TR/index.html> (Erişim: 24.10.2017)

132 Regulation on Temporary Protection, <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/10/20141022-15-1.pdf> (Access: 10.05.2019)

133 Regulation on the Working Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection, Official Gazette (15.01.2016) (<http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/3.5.20168375.pdf>) (Access: 20.10.2019).

isn't any source of readily available regular income for Syrians, except for the SUY program which is funded by the EU and from which around 1.4 million Syrians benefit. It needs to be added that the SUY program involves a monthly payment of 120 TL per person, which is obviously insufficient to fully support the livelihood of a person living in an urban context. Therefore, it is a known fact that Syrians in Turkey have opened a space for themselves in the informal economy to work. However, exactly figuring out how many of them are working is impossible because of the very nature of the informal economy.

SB research tried to shed some light, albeit limited, on this issue in 2019, like it did in 2017, by including two important questions regarding the working status of Syrians. In SB-2019, among those aged 12 or above in households, 37,9% responded positively to the question "are you currently working in an income-generation job". As of October 2019, the number of those in the age group of 12 years of age or older is around 2,5 million. When the finding of this research is taken into consideration, it can be estimated that the number of Syrians that are actively working is between 900 thousand and 1 million. An ILO study on this topic, suggested that the number of Syrians of 15 years of age or older who were working was 930 thousand. Additionally, according to this study, 97% of these were working informally.¹³⁴

SB-2019-TABLE 77: SB-2019 Profile of working status among Syrians

Working Status of Interviewed Individuals (18 + year-olds)				Working Status of Individuals in the Households (12+ year-olds)			
		#	%			#	%
1	Working	774	54,6	1	Working	1.648	37,9
2	Housewife	426	30,0	2	Housewife	1.420	32,7
3	Unemployed	121	8,5	3	Student	635	14,6
4	Unable to work/ disabled or old	62	4,4	4	Unemployed	451	10,4
5	Student	32	2,3	5	Unable to work/ disabled or old	182	4,2
6	Retired	3	0,2	6	Retired	7	0,2
Total		1.418	100,0	Total		4.343	100,0

The number of Syrians in Turkey who are in the age group of 15 to 65, which are the active working ages, is around 2 million. According to TUIK statistics, as of July 2019, the labor force participation rate among Turkish citizens is 53,8%. The labor force participation rate is 73,2% among men and 34,9% among women.¹³⁵ It can be expected that this rate would be lower among Syrians, partly as a result of a lower level of participation among women. According to SB-2019 data, 32,7% of Syrian women are found to be "housewives". It is known that larger numbers of individuals need to work in Syrian households stemming from low wages. The information on this topic inevitably depends largely on projections and estimations due to lack of reliable data.

134 This statement is made in the context of 15 year-old or older individuals. See: ILO Syrians in The Turkish Labour Market, Data from TURKSTAT Household Labour Force Survey (HHLFS) 2017, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-ankara/documents/genericdocument/wcms_738618.pdf (Access: 18.03.2020)

135 TUIK: Labor Force Statistics, July 2019, <http://tuik.gov.tr/HbGetirHTML.do?id=30687> (Access: 10.10.2019)

SB-2019-TABLE 78: Distribution of household populations based on age, 12-17

	#	%
12-year-olds	5	3,9
13-year-olds	7	5,5
14-year-olds	12	9,4
15-year-olds	29	22,7
16-year-olds	32	25,0
17-year-olds	43	33,5
Total	128	100,0

According to the statistics released by the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services, as of 2018, 34.573 citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic were granted working permits in Turkey. There is no specific information regarding how many of these individuals were under temporary protection or had residence permits in Turkey. However, two separate UNHCR documents published in 2019 and 2020 declared the number of working permits issued to Syrians to be 80 thousand¹³⁶ and 132.497.¹³⁷ Even when the highest figure, 132.497, is considered, it is seen that the official statistics of work permits are very far away from the estimated number of 1 million working Syrians.

SB-2019-TABLE 79: Type of employment of those who work

Type of Employment of Interviewed Individual (18 + year-olds)				Type of Employment of Individuals in Households (12 + year-olds)			
		#	%			#	%
1	Regularly working employee	362	46,8	1	Regularly working employee	828	50,2
2	Casual (daily) worker	216	27,9	2	Casual (daily) worker	553	33,6
3	Self-employed/ Artisan	153	19,8	3	Self-employed/ Artisan	184	11,2
4	Employer (employing 1 or more individuals)	29	3,7	4	Employer (employing 1 or more individuals)	41	2,5
5	Seasonal worker	11	1,4	5	Seasonal worker	32	1,9
6	Unpaid family employee	3	0,4	6	Unpaid family employee	10	0,6
Total		774	100,0	Total		1648	100,0

Considering all these numbers, it can be suggested that working rights have not been sufficiently functional for the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey, where more than 95% of working Syrians appear to be employed in the informal economy. There are many known reasons for this. These include the issues that are not sufficiently “attractive” for the employers associated with current regulations on working rights of Syrians as well as the issues of the “language barrier” and difficulties arising from the different “working culture” of Syrians.

136 Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees (July-August 2019) <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70892>

137 UNHCR- 3RP Regional Strategic Overview (2020) <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/73116> (Access: 02.05.2020)

As widely known, one of the most important structural problems of Turkish economy is informality. The rate of those who are working in the informal economy, which has been in an increasing trend in the last few years, was as high as 36,1% among Turkish citizens according to the August 2019 data released by TUIK.¹³⁸ Since Syrians have various disadvantages in the labor market, including language and a “different working culture”, and they are not mostly highly-skilled individuals, they usually work as manual workers at small and medium sized Turkish enterprises. Taking all of this into consideration, our estimation on the basis of SB-2019 research is that there are around 1 million Syrians working in Turkey as of November 2019. This figure was 40,7% in 2017.

The findings related to the types of jobs that the 37,9% who suggested that they were working had are also quite interesting. Accordingly, it appears that more than half of working Syrians, 50,2% to be exact were now “regularly working employees”. In fact, this increase can be taken as a clear evidence that the process of economic integration of Syrians has already made significant progress in Turkey. The share of those who are employed as casual (daily) workers has decreased to 33,6% in SB-2019 from 43,1% in SB-2017. Similarly, there appears to be a significant decrease in the rate of those working as seasonal workers from 6,2% in 2017 to 1,6% in 2019. The employers, who employ at least one individual, constituted 2,5% of working Syrians while the rate of those who are self-employed or artisans was 11,2%. In other words, the combination of these two groups, those who work for themselves, made up of 13,7% of all working Syrians in 2019. This combined figure was 8,8% in 2017. According to some studies on the subject¹³⁹, the number of Syrians who established their own companies has exceeded 15 thousand and these companies are providing employment for around 100 thousand Syrians in Turkey. Although there is not sufficient information regarding the workplace sizes or number of employees, it appears to be clear that Syrian entrepreneurialism has achieved significant development.

The relationship between Syrians’ knowledge of Turkish language and their working status has been examined through cross-tabulations. Accordingly;

31,8% of the combined group of those who reported that Turkish was their mother tongue and those who suggested they have an advance level of Turkish knowledge reported that they were working. Similarly, 34,9% of the combined group of those with no knowledge of Turkish and those with beginner level of knowledge of Turkish suggested that they were working. 39,2% of the former group and 28,5% of the latter group reported that they were employed as regularly working employees. Among those who are unemployed, 17,3% were those whose mother tongue is Turkish or who have advanced level of knowledge of Turkish; while 55,4% were those with little or no knowledge of Turkish. These figures clearly confirm that a significant relationship exists between knowledge of Turkish language and employment.

138 “In July 2019, the rate of those who work without being registered to any social security institutions was 36%. Those who work informally in other sectors than agriculture was 23,2%.” See: TUIK Labor Force Statistics, July 2019: <http://tuik.gov.tr/HbGetirHTML.do?id=30692> (Access: 16.11.2019).

139 TESEV-Syrian Entrepreneurship and Refugee Start-ups in Turkey: Leveraging the Turkish Experience 2018 (https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1566830992-6.TEPAV_and_EBRD___Syrian_Entrepreneurship_and_Refugee_Start_ups_in_Turkey_Lever....pdf) (Access: 12.12.2019)

SB-2019-TABLE 80: Knowledge of Language and Working Status **At what level and which languages do you know?** (Turkish %)

	Mother Tongue	Advanced	Intermediate	Beginner	Don't know
Working	17,2	14,6	33,3	23,4	11,5
Housewife	9,2	8,5	20,9	21,4	40,0
Student	21,9	46,9	25,0	3,1	3,1
Unemployed	6,6	10,7	27,3	15,7	39,7
Unable to work/disabled or old	3,2	9,7	11,3	24,2	51,6
Retired	-	-	33,3	33,3	33,3

Note: Results from individuals of 18 years of age or older. 'Retired' shows results from 3 individuals.

Regularly working employee	22,1	17,1	32,3	18,2	10,3
Casual (daily) worker	16,2	8,8	36,6	22,2	16,2
Self-employed/ Artisan	8,5	19,6	32,7	32,7	6,5
Employer (employing at least 1 individual)	17,3	3,4	17,3	44,7	17,3
Seasonal worker	-	9,1	45,5	27,3	18,1
Unpaid family employee	-	-	66,7	33,3	-

Note: Results from individuals who work. 'Employer' presents results from 29, 'Seasonal worker' from 11, and 'Unpaid family employee' from 3 individuals.

5. Accommodation

More than 90% of Syrians in Turkey live in urban spaces. This has been causing some serious problems and tensions. A majority of Syrians are living in impoverished neighborhoods in their cities of residents in poor-quality houses, similar to Turkish residents living in same neighborhoods. However, Syrians usually have the additional issues such as having large households, further financial limitations, and exploitation or discrimination by landlords. SB surveys aimed to learn about the kind of housing in which Syrians lived as well as the issues that Syrians are facing in finding and affording them. In SB-2017, 64,4% of Syrian families reported living in apartment flats, while 23,7% lived in self-contained houses with another 10,7% were living in slums. In SB-2019, however, the housing conditions of Syrians appear to be improving through time towards better quality accommodation options. The rate of those who lived in apartment flats in SB-2019, for example, has increased to 80,3%, while that of those who lived in self-contained houses has decreased to 16,8%. Obviously, the type of accommodation, i.e. apartment flats or self-contained houses, does not explain much about the quality of housing conditions by itself. Even though information about structural integrity, infrastructure sufficiency, size, location, or rent of these housing options were not considered to be in the scope of this research; the collected information does appear to provide a general idea on the topic.

SB-2019-TABLE 81: Housing in which families live

	SB-2017		SB-2019	
	#	%	#	%
Apartment flat	571	64,4	1.139	80,3
Self-contained house	210	23,7	238	16,8
Slum	95	10,7	23	1,6
Depot	7	0,8	11	0,8
Store	3	0,3	7	0,5
Tent	1	0,1	-	-
Total	887	100,0	1.418	100,0

6. Problem Areas of Syrians

It is of utmost importance to listen to Syrians themselves about the problems they experience in Turkey for the prospects of a peaceful future together. In this context, the respondents were asked to reflect their experiences on 7 potential issue areas. The weight ranking of the responses given to the question “Please state to what extent do you experience problems regarding the following areas” has remained the same between SB-2017 and SB-2019. There appears to be, however, a reduction, albeit to a limited extent, in the reported problems by Syrians in 2019 compared to 2017. This, in turn, can be interpreted as a sign of Syrians’ increasing satisfaction with living in Turkey.

SB-2019-TABLE 82: SB-2017¹⁴⁰/SB-2019: Please state to what extent do you experience problems regarding the following areas (%)

Problem Areas		Experiencing a lot of problems	Experiencing problems	Combined problems	Sometimes experiencing, sometimes not experiencing problem	Not experiencing problems	Not experiencing problems at all	Combined no problems	No idea/ No response
Working conditions	2019	9,6	26,6	36,2	18,4	43,1	0,9	44,0	1,4
	2017	17,8	32,5	50,3	17,6	25,0	2,4	27,4	4,7
Communication/ Language	2019	11,3	21,9	33,2	17,7	44,3	4,1	48,4	0,7
	2017	16,7	23,7	40,4	23,8	26,9	7,0	33,9	1,9
Food	2019	5,6	21,1	26,7	19,0	49,7	1,0	50,7	3,6
	2017	5,7	15,3	21,0	28,2	44,2	5,9	50,1	0,7
Accommodation	2019	8,7	17,6	26,3	15,5	55,0	2,8	57,8	0,4
	2017	10,4	15,6	26,0	16,5	49,7	7,0	56,7	0,8
Discrimination	2019	9,0	12,1	21,1	14,4	59,8	2,0	61,8	2,7
	2017	8,5	16,6	25,1	18,5	45,0	7,7	52,7	3,7
Health	2019	5,3	11,7	17,0	14,6	65,4	2,3	67,7	0,7
	2017	5,0	15,9	20,9	15,0	55,8	7,8	63,6	0,5
Education	2019	3,0	4,4	7,4	10,1	61,9	3,5	65,4	17,1
	2017	6,9	11,4	18,3	13,4	40,5	10,1	50,6	17,7

140 In SB-2017, two different survey questionnaires were used, one for the Syrians living in camps and the other for those who lived outside of camps. Since the SB-2019 was only conducted outside of camps, SB-2017 figures in this table reflect only the “outside of camp” data.

The area in which Syrians experience the most problems is “working conditions”. Here, 36,2% of Syrians reported experiencing problems in this area, including 9,6% that reported that they were “experiencing a lot of problems” and 26,6% who suggested that they were “experiencing problems”. It is also highly noteworthy that the total rate of those who stated that they were either “not experiencing problems” or “not experiencing problems at all” was 44%. The decrease in the total rate of those who stated that they were experiencing problems in this field, which was 50,2% in SB-2017, and the increase in the total share of those who reported that they were not having problems, which was 27,4% in SB-2017, are both significant improvements in this context. In the same manner, although “working conditions” remains as the top problem area for Syrians, the number of those who report experiencing problems is decreasing. In terms of the total share of the respondents that report experiencing problems, the area of working conditions is followed by areas of communication/ language (33,2%), food (26,7%), accommodation (26,7), discrimination (21,1%), health (17%), and education (7,4%). It is noteworthy that no problem area exceeds 50%. Like it was in SB-2017, the area with which Syrians in Turkey are the most satisfied was also “health services” in SB-2019.

SB-2019-TABLE 83: Please state to what extent do you experience problems regarding the following areas. (Score)

		SB-2017	SB-2019
1	Working conditions	3,2	2,9
2	Communication/ language	3,1	2,9
3	Accommodation	2,7	2,7
4	Food	2,7	2,7
Average Score		2,7	2,6
5	Discrimination	2,6	2,6
6	Health	2,5	2,5
7	Education	2,1	1,9
TOTAL		21,6	20,8

■ 0-2,99 ■ 3,0-5,0

For a peaceful future of living together, perhaps the most sensitive issue area is “discrimination”. The finding that Syrians have ranked “discrimination” as the 5th out of 7 problem areas calls for optimism, given that almost all of them have been living together with Turkish societies for years now. In fact, in addition to its relative placement as a problem area, the weight given to it is also striking. While the total share of those who stated that they were experiencing discrimination was 21,1%, the total rate of those who reported that they were not experiencing discrimination was 61,8%. In addition, there appears to be a positive trend here as well, given that the rate of those suggested that they were experiencing discrimination, which was 25,1% in 2017, has decreased, and the rate of those who reported that they were not experiencing discrimination, which was 52,7% in 2017, has increased. This confirms that while concerns and complaints are growing among Turkish society regarding Syrians, actual reactions to them remained limited and social acceptance remained at a very high level. This is a very valuable finding for a possible future together in peace.

There appears to be a quite interesting relationship between those who reported having experienced discrimination and those who stated that “I could be friends with a Turk”. Accordingly, while 11,7% of the former group said that they couldn’t be friends with a Turk, 74,6% of them declared that they could be friends with a Turk. This shows that, even after personal experience of discrimination, the door for establishing friendships and communicating remains open.

SB-2019-TABLE 84: To what extent do you agree with the following statement? (those who reported having experienced problems in the area of discrimination)

	Disagree	Partially Agree	Agree	No idea/ No response
I could be friends with a Turk	11,7	11,4	74,6	2,3

FGD Findings: Problem Areas of Syrians

The extensive discussions in the FGDs by Syrian participants regarding the policy areas of Syrians in Turkey can be summarized under 5 main headings:

(i) Economic and financial problems: Confirming the survey findings, Syrian participants have most frequently mentioned the problems they experience in Turkey regarding high cost of life, difficulty of finding a job, low wages, and difficulty of the working conditions. In addition to these, it was argued that finding a decent house to live and affording its rent were very difficult for the Syrians in Turkey. Lastly, Syrian participants have often complained about perceived injustices and double-standards they are experiencing in the labor market. Accordingly, Syrian workers are paid much less for the same work than a Turkish worker is.

- "Wages are too low and working conditions are too harsh. Even those Syrians who opened their own workplaces cannot afford a comfortable life. Everything has become too expensive." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- **"The living conditions and working hours are very difficult here. Even if we work at the same place and do the same job, the Turks are being paid more than us."** Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- "The housing rents are too expensive and Syrians cannot find houses to live, especially in Ankara. Finding a job is very difficult. When you find a job, they usually make Syrians work for a few months and then fire them." Ankara-Women
- "Everything is too expensive, so much so that all of the family have to work. Working hours are too long and tiresome. Sometimes we work for 12 hours a day." Gaziantep-Women
- "Job opportunities are too limited. For Syrians who are 40 years old or older, job opportunities are even more limited." Gaziantep-Women

(ii) Problems arising from not knowing the language and the system in Turkey: It has been suggested that not knowing Turkish creates a lot of problems for Syrians in Turkey. These include, firstly, inability to express oneself and communicate with Turkish people. Accordingly, this inability has a significant limiting effect particularly in the public space and prevent Syrians from benefiting from public services, like health. Other participants suggested that they cannot find employment and are discriminated against because they cannot speak Turkish. What is more, they continued, they cannot protect their rights or interests for the very same reason. Lastly, participants stated that they are having significant problems due to not knowing the legal and institutional systems in Turkey.

- "Language barrier is a very big problem for Syrians. Many of our problems stem from this. Especially in hospitals, we find it very difficult to find a translator and communicate with doctors." Gaziantep-Women
- **"Language is our biggest problem. Because we can't speak Turkish, we cannot establish good relations with Turks and we cannot get along."** Ankara-Women
- "Our biggest problems are language and not being able to establish a good communication with Turkish people. Our kids are being discriminated against at schools and their psychologies are being disturbed. Another very big problem of ours is that in Turkey decisions and laws are changing all the time. The state doesn't inform us about the new decisions." Ankara-Women
- "I think, our biggest problem is language and this a mistake that Turkish state has done. I wish they had made language education mandatory like in the EU countries." Hatay-Naturalized Citizens

(iii) Insecurity of their legal status and uncertainty of future: Many participants have argued that one of their biggest problems in Turkey relates to the insecurity of their legal status and the associated uncertainty about their future in the country. They went on to suggest that they were concerned about the limits of “temporary” protection and wondering whether or not they will have a future in Turkey. Besides these anxieties about future, some participants stated that the current status of temporary protection was too restrictive in terms of their travelling and working rights, although they did not really know much about their rights and obligations associated to this legal status.

- *“Syrians are fearful about their future in Turkey. Laws are changing all the time and the government is just making new decisions about us every day.”
Ankara-Artisans/Employees”*
- *“Travel restrictions, language barrier, discrimination, and difficulties in obtaining official documents are the biggest problems of Syrians. We feel like we are tied up here.” Gaziantep-NGO Workers*
- *“Since Syrians don’t know about the laws and rules, other Syrians are swindling them. There are many new consultancy companies now supposedly to help Syrians with obtaining residence or identification documents. They are cheating. Also, the word “temporary” is holding us down. We cannot live comfortably here because we know that we are temporary. Temporary protection didn’t give us refugee rights and it is a major moral discomfort for us.” Gaziantep-NGO Workers*
- *“I think, our biggest problem is that we don’t have anybody representing us. I think it is the duty of the Turkish state to arrange this. These representatives can be a bridge to prevent segregation and ghettoization. This way Syrians could receive right information from the right people.” Istanbul-Women*

(iv) Discrimination and Hatred: It has been suggested that this problem is an increasingly growing one particularly in the recent years. Participants explained that discrimination has many faces and exists in many different contexts. Accordingly, it definitely reigns on social media and increasingly makes its way into other facets of life in the streets, busses, schools, and so on.

- ***“Turkish people don’t accept Syrians in Turkey. Even when they don’t say anything, we can understand from their gazes that they don’t like us and our children are being affected by this discrimination.”
Hatay-Naturalized Citizens***
- *“Syrians are being discriminated against recently on social media, on the streets, on the busses... Students and those who speak Turkish are not having that much problem.” Ankara-Women*
- *“Our biggest problem is discrimination. But, I think, it is not only Turkish people’s guilt. Many Syrians also act in a wrong way causing this.” Istanbul-Women*
- *“Since I work at a Turkish school, I am seeing Syrian children suffering from discrimination. I think, MoNE needs to define strict rules to prevent this.”
Istanbul-Women*

(v) Other problems: Besides the above-mentioned wider problems, some participants also mentioned some more specific problems experienced by Syrians.

- *“Syrians’ passports are a major problem. If we go to another country for education, we are forbidden to return to Turkey. I think, it is necessary to give them this permission so that they can better themselves and be of better use for Turkey.”
Gaziantep-NGO Workers*

- *"Nowadays, there are many NGOs offering language courses but to be able to enroll a Syrian must be under the age of 48. I think there shouldn't be such an age limitation, especially for education. We don't want to only learn arts and crafts, we also want to have education. And the travel limitation is a major problem for us. We cannot go and visit our family members when we want." Istanbul-Women*

7. Cultural Closeness between Syrians and Turks

There appears to be an assumed relationship between cultural closeness and integration in many integration discussions, which seem to suggest that cultural closeness would facilitate easier and quicker integration. However, this assumed relationship between cultural closeness and integration is also being questioned. Initially, it can certainly be expected that cultural closeness and senses of "brotherhood", "consanguinity", and "religious affinity" to help support solidarity. However, it would appear, through time, the role of these moral and emotional factors would fade away and those more objective, material, and practical matters become increasingly more important. In addition, very interestingly, the approaches to and perceptions of cultural closeness might be different among the newcomers and the host society. Syrians in Turkey, whose number in the country reached to millions in a fairly short amount of time and whose propensity to return appears to diminish by the day, provides a good opportunity for pondering on the relationship between cultural closeness and integration.

The cultural, historical, and geographical closeness between the Turkish and Syrian societies cannot be denied. However, when extraordinary and unexpected conditions forced a cohabitation, there could be significant problems even despite this cultural closeness. The emotional background of the relations between Syrians and the Turkish society is particularly important in terms of social perceptions. This is also an important starting point regarding future integration policies. As expected, cultural closeness between Syrians and Turkish society appears to have positively influenced the process in the initial years by contributing in the development of a high level of social acceptance and solidarity. However, as time passed and prospects of Syrians' permanent stay in the country became more pronounced, it seems that the positive influence of this cultural affinity have waned. In other words, a society may assign much importance to cultural closeness in the short run when certain communities arrive at its doors, escaping war and persecution; but when what is at stake is establishing a future together in the long run, the links of ethnicity, religion, and culture lose their significance. This is especially the case if it experiences loss of jobs, deterioration of public services, growing criminality, and an anxiety of losing its identity. What become more important than cultural closeness in such a context are the perception of permanence and the numerical size of the immigrant community. Immigrant communities, no matter how different or distant their cultural background may be from the host society, will not be perceived as a threat or cause concerns in the host society as long as their number is small. In the case of Syrians in Turkey, however, the substantial scope of the mass mobility and the very large number of refugees that arrived in the country have created certain anxieties among Turkish society.

Turkish society has been denying cultural closeness or similarity with Syrians from the very beginning of the process. In all three SB studies, Turkish society has very clearly declared that it doesn't see Syrians to be culturally close to itself. In particular, the rate of those who stated that "Turkish society is not culturally similar to Syrians" was 70,6% in 2014, 80,2% in 2017, and 81,9% in 2019. The same clear message is visible in the questions related to social distance, that were described and analyzed earlier. Very interestingly, however, Syrians seem to believe that they are very culturally similar to the Turkish society. The share of those who voiced this opinion in SB-2017 and SB-2019 were 56,8% and 57,1%, respectively. In the same way, it is observed that the rate of those who claim that Turkish society is not culturally similar to Syrians is in a tendency of decrease, falling from 23,9% in 2017 to 21,9% in 2019.

Data on ethnic-religious characteristics of Syrians in Turkey is quite scarce. It is estimated, however, that around 80% of the Syrian population in Turkey is constituted by Sunni Arabs. The vast majority of the remaining population are most likely to be Syrian Kurds and Syrian Turkomans, each of whom is predicted to constitute around 10 to 15% of the Syrian population. These predictions appear to be supported by the findings of the SB-2019 question on "mother tongue". There is, however, a significant social distance between the Turkish society and these three ethnic groups. It can further be suggested that Turkish society appears to be imposing a distance between itself and Syrians concerning their cultural affinity, as well. In SB-2017, in response to the question "How culturally similar are Syrians to Turkish society?", the combined share of those who replied that "not similar at all" and "not similar" was a massive 80,2%, while that of those who said "similar" and "very similar" was only 7,8%.¹⁴¹ In SB-2019, it is observed that this clear attitude of Turkish society continues in

SB-2019-TABLE 85: To what extent do you think Syrians are culturally similar to Turks?

	SB-2017		SB-2019	
	#	%	#	%
Not similar at all	71	8,0	51	3,6
Not similar	141	15,9	259	18,3
Neither similar, nor not similar	140	15,8	281	19,8
Similar	417	47,0	669	47,2
Very similar	87	9,8	141	9,9
No idea/ No response	31	3,5	17	1,2
Total	887	100,0	1.418	100,0

a slightly stronger way, where the total rate of those who reported that Syrians are not culturally similar to Turkish society increased to 81,9% while the combined share of those who claimed otherwise decreased to 7%. It appears that Turkish society is deliberately imposing a distance here. When the same question is asked to Syrians, however, a completely different picture emerges. This was the case in SB-2017, for instance, where the combined share of those who believed Syrians were culturally similar to Turkish society (i.e. "similar" + "very similar") was 56,9%, while the total rate of those who stated that Syrians were not culturally similar (i.e. "not similar" + "not similar at all") was only 22%. This was definitely the case again in SB-2019, where the total share of those who declared cultural similarity between Syrians and Turkish society increased to 57,2%, and the share of those who argued otherwise decreased slightly to 21,9%. This striking difference in the respective perspectives of Syrians and the Turkish society needs to be taken into consideration when designing the integration policies of the future.

Among Syrians, those who disproportionately strongly supporting the cultural similarity thesis between Syrians and Turkish society are the men, university students and graduates, and those living in the non-metropolitan cities. Perhaps the most interesting finding here is that both the perception/view among Turkish society regarding cultural dissimilarity and that among Syrians regarding cultural similarity are simultaneously getting stronger. This striking difference on the matter of cultural similarity between the Turkish society and Syrians is obviously much more a matter of perception, than a matter of fact. In any case, however, it needs to be taken serious consideration in terms of integration policies.

141 In the 2014 study, "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration", the rate of those who "completely disagreed" with the statement "I believe we are culturally similar with Syrians" was 45,3%, while 25,3% "disagreed" with this statement (in total 70,6%). The total share of those who "agreed" and "completely agreed" with the statement was 17,2%. By region, those who disagreed was 75,6% at the border cities and 69,6% at the other cities. See: p.139.

SB-2019-TABLE 86: Demography - To what extent do you think Syrians are culturally similar to Turks?

	Not similar at all	Not similar	Combined Not similar	Neither similar, nor not similar	Similar	Very similar	Combined similar	No idea/no response
Sex								
Female	3,1	27,0	30,1	19,6	41,7	6,3	48,0	2,3
Male	3,9	12,9	16,8	19,9	50,6	12,2	62,8	0,5
Age Group								
18-24	3,3	23,7	27,0	22,9	42,0	6,1	48,1	2,0
25-34	4,6	18,4	23,1	20,2	45,9	10,0	55,9	0,9
35-44	3,7	17,1	20,8	19,5	47,2	11,5	58,7	1,0
45-54	3,4	16,3	19,7	15,2	52,8	11,8	64,6	0,5
55-64	-	13,1	13,1	19,0	56,0	9,5	65,5	2,4
65 +	-	14,3	14,3	22,9	51,4	11,4	62,8	-
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate	2,3	33,3	35,5	19,6	39,1	5,7	44,8	-
Literate but not graduate of any school	2,7	39,7	42,4	26,0	24,7	5,5	30,2	1,4
Primary school	3,2	21,5	24,7	20,2	46,7	7,4	54,1	1,0
Middle school	2,6	17,8	20,4	21,3	47,8	9,2	57,0	1,3
High-school or equivalent	5,9	13,2	19,1	19,6	48,9	10,5	59,4	1,9
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	1,8	10,5	12,3	14,0	57,9	12,3	70,2	3,5
University degree	5,1	5,6	10,7	15,8	54,1	18,9	73,0	0,5
Region								
Border cities	1,9	15,6	17,5	22,8	47,6	11,3	58,9	0,8
Other cities	6,3	22,4	28,7	15,1	46,5	7,9	54,4	1,8
<i>Metropolitan cities</i>	5,4	25,5	30,9	16,6	44,0	6,0	50,0	2,5
<i>Non-metropolitan cities</i>	7,9	16,4	24,3	12,2	51,3	11,6	62,9	0,6
General	3,6	18,3	21,9	19,8	47,2	9,9	57,1	1,2

FGD Findings: Cultural Similarity

In line with the survey findings, a majority of Syrian participants suggested that they believed that there is a significant degree of cultural similarity between the Turkish society and Syrians in Turkey. A brief summary of the discussions on this matter is presented below.

Turkish society and Syrians are culturally similar: Those participants who are placed under this heading justified their arguments by mostly referring to the common religion of Islam and the food culture.

- *"I think, we are very much like one another. But they don't see this similarity. We believe in the same religion, many of our traditions are the same and we have a very close food culture."* Ankara-Women
- **"I think they (members Turkish society) are very similar to us but they deny this because they rather want to see themselves as similar to the Europeans. Our social relations, food cultures, languages, and traditions are all very similar."** Ankara-Women
- **"To me, we are similar in everything. Only our opinions and views are different."** Gaziantep-Women
- *"We are very similar. Our cultures are almost identical"* Istanbul-Students

Turkish society and Syrians are not culturally similar: There were also participants who, while not denying the similarities of religion or food culture, claimed that there was no real cultural similarity between the Turkish society and Syrians. Accordingly, even on the point of common religion of Islam, there were very significant differences between two communities in terms of interpretation and practice.

- *"I don't think we are similar. Although we have the same religion, they understand the religion differently."* Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- *"The customs and traditions are different. For example, our weddings are very different from each other. In our weddings, men and women celebrate the wedding in separate halls."* Gaziantep-Women
- *"We are not very similar. Our lifestyle and culture are very different from theirs. We work less than them. There are many different practices in religion, too."* Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- **"I don't believe that we are similar. For example, they raise their children differently. They don't hit children. If I child smokes cigarette as soon as he is 18, nobody says anything to him. Religion is the same but they practice it differently."** Gaziantep-Women
- *"We are very different. Not everything works around bribes and favors here. People are more hard-working here and they respect laws."* Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- *"I think we are very different. We give great importance to learning a foreign language. Besides we don't have such big egos and we are not that nationalist."* Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- *"I think they started to become different. Turkish people want more to make themselves similar to Europeans recently."* Istanbul-Student

There are similarities and differences between Turkish society and Syrians: Some participants have placed themselves in the middle of two positions, somewhat playing the role of mediators. According to these participants, both groups are partly right. In other words, while there are undeniable cultural similarities between two communities, there are also significant

differences including different interpretations and practices in many common/similar elements.

- ▶ ***“We are similar on many subjects but we also have very different traditions. Even though they are Muslim, they drink alcohol and their women are very free. Both men and women work. In our culture, usually only men work.” Ankara-Artisans/Employees***
- ▶ ***“We are alike from many angles. Our religion and our food culture are very similar. But our way of dressing is very different from them. Even though they are also Muslim, Turkish women don’t wear headscarves like we do. Our customs are also different. They go to bed and get up early. We sleep late.” Gaziantep-Women***
- ▶ *“Food culture, religion and social behaviors are very similar. But we don’t have a system. Turks work from 9 am to 5-6 pm. They don’t wake up late even in weekends. We are very different that way.” Istanbul-Women*

8. Social Distance of Syrians from Turkish Society

Identifying the mutual social distance between the Turkish society and Syrians in Turkey would provide a significant contribution in reducing or eliminating social problems that may arise in a potential common future. The findings from SB-2017 and SB-2019 both suggest that Turkish society is inclined to reject any argument for cultural closeness between themselves and Syrians as well as that Turkish society tends to impose a significant social distance between the two communities. It is clear that the Turkish society places a much more than normal “social distance” against Syrians as well as that this distance is growing over time. Social distance takes a value between +1 (closest) and -1 (most distant). In SB-2017, the social distance between the Turkish society and Syrians was measured to be “-0,36”, which denotes a very large distance, from the perspective of Turkish society. In SB-2019, the distance was found to have grown to become “-0,51”.

SB-2019-TABLE 87: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning your feelings about Turkish people? (%)

		Disagree	Partially agree	Agree	No idea/ No response
1	It wouldn't disturb me to live in the same building as a Turk	1,2	3,4	94,1	1,3
2	It wouldn't disturb me if Turkish children go to the same school as my children	1,2	3,1	94,0	1,7
3	It wouldn't disturb me to work in the same workplace as a Turk	1,2	3,4	93,9	1,5
4	It wouldn't disturb me to move to a neighborhood where predominantly Turks live	1,3	3,6	93,5	1,6
5	It wouldn't disturb me if some Turkish families were to move in my neighborhood	1,8	3,7	93,0	1,5
6	I can be friends with a Turk	4,9	6,0	87,6	1,5
7	I can be business partners with a Turk	6,7	5,5	83,8	4,0
8	I would allow my child to marry a Turk	21,5	7,8	65,2	5,5
9	It wouldn't disturb me if my sibling were to marry a Turk	22,8	8,3	62,6	6,3
10	I can get married with a Turk	28,6	10,4	55,5	5,5

In contrast to the attitude of Turkish society, Syrians in Turkey display a very different attitude in terms of their social distance. While the overall measurement yields a score of +0,74, which denotes a high level of closeness, the share of those who supported the category “very close” was 62,5% and that of those who said “very distant” was only 0,9%. In SB-2017, the combined rate of “close” + “very close” was 73,5%, which increased to 85,7% in SB-2019. The findings show not only that Syrians consider themselves very close to Turkish society, they are also getting closer. This quite positive approach is all the more noteworthy considering the contrasting negative and rigid approach displayed by the Turkish society. In this context, it is essential to develop policies that will change the negative attitudes of the Turkish society as well as to ensure the continuation of the positive ones among Syrians in Turkey for a peaceful and harmonious common life. The findings also show that Syrians in Turkey don't seem to be affected in a significant way from society's negative attitudes and anxieties concerning them. This can be seen as a reflection of the “high level of social acceptance”.

SB-2019-TABLE 88: Social Distance Groups (Syrians)

	SB-2017			SB-2019		
	#	%	Social Distance Score	#	%	Social Distance Score
Very distant	13	1,5	-0,87	13	0,9	-0,85
Distant	35	4,0	-0,21	32	2,3	-0,29
Neither close, nor distant	186	21,0	0,16	156	11,1	0,18
Close	359	40,6	0,53	328	23,2	0,53
Very close	291	32,9	0,91	882	62,5	0,97
General	884	100,0	0,53	1411	100,0	0,74

SB-2019-TABLE 89: Social Distance Groups (Demography) (%)

	Very distant	Distant	Neither close, nor distant	Close	Very close
Sex					
Female	1,1	3,3	15,2	31,4	49,0
Male	0,8	1,6	8,5	18,2	70,9
Age Group					
18-24	0,4	2,5	10,7	23,5	62,9
25-34	0,8	2,4	10,2	21,3	65,3
35-44	1,1	2,4	10,1	24,8	61,6
45-54	1,7	1,1	14,2	27,3	55,7
55-64	1,2	1,2	14,3	21,4	61,9
65 +	-	5,7	11,4	17,1	65,8
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	1,2	5,8	30,2	30,2	32,6
Literate but not graduate of any school	2,7	2,7	28,8	34,2	31,6
Primary school	0,2	2,7	8,2	25,6	63,3
Middle school	0,5	1,6	8,5	20,9	68,5
High-school or equivalent	0,9	2,7	14,2	23,3	58,9
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	1,8	-	-	19,3	78,9
University/ Graduate degree/PhD	2,1	1,0	6,7	16,9	73,3
Region					
Border cities	1,0	2,1	6,6	20,7	69,6
Other cities	0,7	2,5	17,9	27,2	51,7
Metropolitan cities	0,8	2,8	23,4	30,0	43,0
Non-metropolitan cities	0,5	2,1	7,4	21,7	68,3
General	0,9	2,3	11,1	23,2	62,5

In terms of specific demographic groups among the respondents, a higher perception of social closeness can be seen among men, those in the 25-34 age group, those with a 2-year associate degree or vocational school of higher education degree, and those who live in the metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

In addition, there appears to be a direct relationship between knowledge of Turkish language and social distance. The cross-analysis of social distance and Turkish language knowledge reveals a very interesting, albeit on a minimal level, finding. In this context, those whose mother tongue was Turkish produced a social distance score of 0,71, which is below the general average of 0,79. Those who reported "advanced" or "intermediate" levels of knowledge in Turkish language, however, appeared to have social distance scores of 0,78 and 0,79, which are right on the average. This finding shows that having Turkish as one's mother tongue, or even obtaining citizenship, doesn't automatically mean it will be easy to establish a close relationship with the society.

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142 In a study conducted by M.M.Erdoğan et al. on Syrian university students in Turkey, the social distance of those students who obtained citizenship was found to be greater than those students who did not. See: Erdoğan, M.M, Erdoğan, A, Yavcan, B., Mohamad, T.H. (2019) *Elite Dialogue-II: Dialogue with Syrian Asylum-Seekers in Turkey through Syrian Academics and Graduate Students*, Unpublished research, TAGU&HOPES.

SB-2019-TABLE 90: Social Distance Groups (X Turkish Speakers)

	Mother Tongue			Advanced			Intermediate			General*		
	#	%	Social Distance Score	#	%	Social Distance Score	#	%	Social Distance Score	#	%	Social Distance Score
Very distant	-	-		1	0,6	-1,00	4	1,0	-0,90	5	0,7	-0,92
Distant	3	1,6	-0,37	2	1,1	-0,45	9	2,3	-0,24	14	1,8	-0,30
Neither Close Nor Distant	30	15,9	0,17	14	7,7	0,17	33	8,4	0,18	77	10,0	0,17
Close	41	21,7	0,50	41	22,5	0,57	74	18,7	0,54	156	20,4	0,54
Very Close	115	60,8	0,96	124	68,1	0,97	275	69,6	0,98	514	67,1	0,97
General	189	100,0	0,71	182	100,0	0,79	395	100,0	0,78	766	100,0	0,77

Note: As 7 individuals did not respond to the question on social distance, they were not included in the grouping.

* Results taken from "Mother Tongue", "Advanced" and "Intermediate" Turkish speakers

SB-2019-TABLE 91: Social Distance Groups x S1 (Turkish speakers) x Demography

	Very distant	Distant	Neither close, nor distant	Close	Very close
Sex					
Female	0,9	2,3	15,8	29,9	51,1
Male	0,6	1,7	7,7	16,5	73,5
Age Group					
18-24	-	1,3	11,5	21,6	65,6
25-34	0,7	1,7	9,2	20,4	68,0
35-44	0,5	3,1	9,9	20,3	66,
45-54	2,2	1,1	12,2	22,2	62,
55-64*	-	-	4,0	12,0	84,0
65 +*	-	-	12,5	-	87,5
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	-	2,3	40,9	22,7	34,1
Literate but not graduate of any school	2,9	2,9	37,1	34,3	22,8
Primary school	-	2,6	6,3	21,2	69,9
Middle school	-	0,5	5,8	18,8	74,9
High-school or equivalent	0,7	3,0	11,2	20,9	64,2
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education**	-	-	-	12,5	87,5
University/ Graduate degree/PhD	2,0	1,3	5,4	18,1	73,2
Region					
Border cities	0,9	0,9	5,2	16,8	76,2
Other cities	0,3	3,1	16,6	25,2	54,8
Metropolitan cities	0,5	3,9	22,9	28,8	43,9
Non-metropolitan cities	-	1,7	5,8	19,2	73,3
General	0,7	1,8	10,0	20,4	67,1

* Results presented in Age Group "55-64" are from 25 and Age Group "65+" are from 8 individuals

** Results presented in Educational Attainment Group "2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education" are from 24 individuals.

The research clearly demonstrates that the perceived social distance between Turkish society and Syrians are very different in each's perspective. This is easily observable when the two SB-2019 surveys, i.e. the one conducted with Syrians and the one conducted with Turkish respondents, are brought together for comparison.


SB-2019-TABLE 92: Comparison: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning your feelings about Syrians/Turkish people? (%)

		Disagree	Partially agree	Agree	No idea/ No response
1	It wouldn't disturb me to live in the same building as a Turk	1,2	3,4	94,1	1,3
	It wouldn't disturb me to live in the same building with a Syrian	60,4	14,8	23,3	1,5
2	It wouldn't disturb me if Turkish children go to the same school as my children	1,2	3,1	94,0	1,7
	It wouldn't disturb me if Syrian children go to the same school as my children	52,0	13,2	32,3	2,5
3	It wouldn't disturb me to work in the same workplace as a Turk	1,2	3,4	93,9	1,5
	It wouldn't disturb me to work in the same workplace with a Syrian	56,3	12,6	28,2	2,9
4	It wouldn't disturb me to move to a neighborhood where predominantly Turks live	1,3	3,6	93,5	1,6
	It wouldn't disturb me to move to a neighborhood where predominantly Syrians live	70,5	11,3	16,7	1,5
5	It wouldn't disturb me if some Turkish families were to move in my neighborhood	1,8	3,7	93,0	1,5
	It wouldn't disturb me if some Syrian families were to move in my neighborhood	59,4	14,2	24,7	1,7
6	I can be friends with a Turk	4,9	6,0	87,6	1,5
	I can be friends with a Syrian	61,1	15,4	21,8	1,7
7	I can be business partners with a Turk	6,7	5,5	83,8	4,0
	I can be business partners with a Syrian	61,1	15,4	21,8	1,7
8	I would allow my child to marry a Turk	21,5	7,8	65,2	5,5
	I would allow my child to marry a Syrian	81,5	8,5	7,6	2,4
9	It wouldn't disturb me if my sibling were to marry a Turk	22,8	8,3	62,6	6,3
	It wouldn't disturb me if my sibling were to marry a Syrian	81,3	8,5	8,2	2,0
10	I can get married with a Turk	28,6	10,4	55,5	5,5
	I can get married with a Syrian	86,9	6,6	5,0	1,5

The significant differences between the attitudes of the Turkish society and Syrians are clearly visible in the table. A more vivid visualization of this situation is attempted in the following, presenting Turkish society's "distant" (-0,51) social distance against Syrians and Syrians' "very close" (+0,74) social distance against Turkish society.

To create the scoring and measurement of social distance, 10 statements were presented to respondents with which their extent of agreement was asked. The highest rate of disagreement came to the statement "I can get married with a Turk" with 28,6%, which is understandable given the level of privacy and intimacy involved in the statement. Strikingly, as stated above, the social distance of Syrians has decreased over the last 2 years since the last SB study. The rate of those who disagreed with the "marrying a Turk" statement was 62,2% in SB-2017. Similarly, the rates of those who disagreed with the statements "wouldn't disturb me if my sibling were to marry a Turk" (35,1%) and "I would allow my child to marry a Turk" (36,4%) both decreased in SB-2019 to respectively 22,8% and 21,5%. Looking from the opposite end, while only 24% of the Syrian respondents agreed with this most provocative statement of "I can get married with a Turk" in SB-2017, this figure increased to 55,5% in SB-2019. Among the other 9 statements, in 5 there is an over 90% and in 2 over 80% support for harmonious coexistence. A case of increased closeness concerns the statement on "being business partners". While in SB-2017, 70,7% of Syrian respondents agreed with the statement "I can be business partners with a Turk", this rate has increased to 83,8% in SB-2019. In other words, the tendency to come closer and demonstrate a will for a common life can be seen in all areas of social life.

SB-2019-TABLE 93: Social Distance Measurements in Comparison



FGD Findings: Social Distance and Types of Relations

In FGDs with Syrians, instead of having a discussion on the questions of whether the participants would engage in various types of social relationships with Turkish individuals, a frequency table was formed by their "Yes" and "No" answers.

SB-2019-TABLE 94: Approaches of Syrian FGD Participants to Engaging in Various Types of Social Relationships with Turkish Individuals

	Being neighbors	Being friends	Having Turkish children in the same class as their children	Doing business together	Getting married
I would like it	46	46	46	36	22
I wouldn't like it	-	-	-	9	24
I don't know	-	-	-	1	1
Total	46	46	46	46	46

As it can be seen in the table, there was a consensus of opinions among Syrian FGD participants for the first three questions. In other words, they all said that they would like to “be neighbors” and “be friends” with Turkish individuals as well as that they would have no problem with their children and Turkish children having education in the same classrooms. The fourth category of relations concerned doing business together and here again a large majority of participants suggested that they would like to do business with Turkish partners. The smaller, yet not insignificant, number of participants stated that they would not like to have Turkish business partners. These participants mentioned the different mentality of doing business, problems in communication, and difficulty of building trust as the justification for their attitude. The one category, however, in which a majority of FGD participants responded negatively was “getting married”. Accordingly, slightly more than half of the participants stated that they wouldn’t like to get married with a Turkish citizen. Although the reasons were not discussed in detail, the main issues that were touched upon were the cultural differences, the potential reaction of the family of the would-be groom or bride, and again, the difficulty of communication due to language problems.

9. Level of Social Relations of Syrians

Syrians have lived in Turkey on average 4,5-5 years. To better evaluate their level of social interaction with the Turkish society, the question “Have you ever engaged in any of the following social relations (e.g. having a conversation/shopping/fighting/...) with a Turkish citizen?” was included in both SB-2017 and SB-2019. The list included a number of social relations from low-intensity ones like “having a conversation” to very intimate ones like “getting married”. As might be expected, the most frequently engaged one was “having a conversation” which was reported by 75,5% and 81,7% of the respondents in SB-2017 and SB-2019, respectively. It was followed by “shopping” (72,9% in SB-2017 and 74,8% in SB-2019), “being friends” (which significantly increased from 56,9% in SB-2017 to 73,8% in SB-2019), and “business relations” (which increased from 62,5% in SB-2017 to 68,1% in SB-2019). Obviously, the definition of friendship might be different from one person to another. Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate the figures on this category of relationship. However, there is an observed regression in some of the more intimate types of relations such as “flirting” and “marriage”. Another interesting finding concerns some of the negative social relation types, namely “having problems” and “fighting”. While there was decrease in the rate of those who reported “having problems” with Turkish individuals, which was 10,6% in 2017 and 6,7% in 2019; there was an exceptional, yet very slight, increase in the share of those who reported that they have “had a fight” with a Turkish individual from 6,5% in 2017 to 6,8% in SB-2019. In any case, both from the findings concerning social distance and those concerning level of social relations, it can be observed that Syrians are significantly getting closer to the Turkish society and they appear to make an effort for this over the past 2 years.

SB-2019-TABLE 95: Have you ever engaged in any of the following social relations with a Turkish citizen? (%)

		SB-2017			SB-2019		
		Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response
1	Having a conversation	75,5	24,1	0,4	81,7	18,1	0,2
2	Shopping	72,9	26,6	0,5	74,8	24,6	0,6
3	Being friends	56,9	41,7	1,4	73,8	25,4	0,8
4	Forming a business relationship	65,6	33,9	0,5	68,1	31,2	0,7
5	Fighting	6,5	92,4	1,1	6,8	91,0	2,2
6	Having a problem	10,6	87,7	1,7	6,7	91,0	2,3
7	Flirting	5,2	93,2	1,6	3,1	95,7	1,2
8	Marriage	3,4	94,3	2,3	2,8	96,3	0,9

10. Syrians' Feelings towards Turkish Society

It is seen that Syrians' social distance to Turkish society is quite "close" and that there is a positive trend in almost all types of their social relations with Turkish individuals. In this context, a set of questions were included to learn about how Syrians see Turkish society from themselves. The positive and negative statements included here aimed to understand how Syrians look at their own community as well as the Turkish society.

According to Syrian respondents, the Syrian community in Turkey is making a significant effort to integrate into Turkish society. Among all the statements, this one was the one that received highest level of support with 47,6% of the respondents mentioning it. In addition to this, 41,8% of respondents thought that Syrians "feel grateful to the Turkish society", 41,6% believed that "Syrians love Turkish society", and 35,9% stated that they "behave respectfully". There was a strikingly low level of support to the negative statements, i.e. "Syrians don't like the Turkish society at all" and "Syrians are exploiting the Turkish society" received support from respectively 1,1% and 0,8% of the respondents.

SB-2019-TABLE 96: What do Syrians feel about the Turkish society? (Multiple responses)

	#	%
Syrians are making an effort to integrate into the Turkish society	675	47,6
Syrians are grateful to the Turkish society	593	41,8
Syrians love Turkish society	590	41,6
Syrians are treating Turkish society very respectfully	509	35,9
Syrians don't like the Turkish society at all	16	1,1
Syrians are exploiting the Turkish society	11	0,8
No idea/ No response	79	5,6

There doesn't seem to be much differentiation in the responses of respondents based on their demographic characteristics.

SB-2019-TABLE 97: What do Syrians feel about the Turkish people? (%) (Multiple responses)

	Syrians are making an effort to integrate into the Turkish society	Syrians are grateful to the Turkish society	Syrians love Turkish society	Syrians are treating Turkish society very respectfully	Syrians don't like the Turkish society at all	Syrians are exploiting the Turkish society	No idea/ no response
Sex							
Female	58,0	42,8	30,4	32,2	0,6	0,6	7,2
Male	41,2	41,2	48,5	38,2	1,5	0,9	4,6
Age Group							
18-24	46,1	41,2	35,9	33,5	2,4	-	8,6
25-34	47,7	36,5	43,5	32,3	1,0	0,8	4,4
35-44	50,4	44,5	40,8	42,1	1,3	1,3	5,1
45-54	49,4	48,9	45,5	35,4	-	0,6	5,1
55-64	41,7	48,8	41,7	33,3	-	1,2	7,1
65 +	31,4	40,0	42,9	45,7	-	-	5,7
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate	63,2	33,3	21,8	31,0	2,3	-	5,7
Literate but not graduate of any school	64,4	32,9	27,4	23,3	1,4	-	4,1
Primary school	37,0	36,8	52,1	34,3	1,0	1,0	7,2
Middle school	53,0	46,2	38,6	35,2	1,0	0,8	5,0
High-school or equivalent	48,4	41,1	42,5	37,0	0,9	0,5	4,6
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	52,6	56,1	22,8	45,6	3,5	-	5,3
University/Graduate degree/PhD	43,4	47,4	44,4	43,4	0,5	1,5	5,1
Region							
Border cities	42,9	41,6	41,3	33,0	0,8	0,3	6,2
Other cities	54,9	42,2	42,0	40,4	1,6	1,4	4,7
Metropolitan cities	57,1	41,6	45,9	41,0	1,4	2,2	5,7
Non-metropolitan cities	50,8	43,4	34,4	39,2	2,1	-	2,6
General	47,6	41,8	41,6	35,9	1,1	0,8	5,6

11. Perceptions of Syrians Regarding Life in Turkey, the Syrian Community, and the Turkish Society

There were 10 statements in this part, 5 “positive” and 5 “negative”, trying to learn about the issues that positively or negatively affecting the lives of Syrians in Turkey. A look at the findings here and their comparison with the 2017 findings are quite instructive. In the next sections, findings concerning some of these statements are examined separately and in detail. In the below table, however, all of them are presented in the order of support they received from the respondents. Accordingly, respondents gave the strongest support on the issue of “obtaining citizenship”, which was followed by “being grateful to Turkish society”, “wanting to stay in Turkey” and “being happy in Turkey”. The least amount of support is given to the negative statements.

SB-2019-TABLE 98: To what extent would you agree with the following statements regarding the situation of Syrians in Turkey?

	Completely Agree	Agree	Combined Agree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Disagree	Completely Disagree	Combined Disagree	No idea/ No response
Syrians want to obtain citizenship	9,8	53,6	63,4	21,6	3,4	2,3	5,7	9,3
Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	2,8	52,1	54,9	29,1	7,1	1,3	8,4	7,6
Syrians want to stay in Turkey	5,9	48,1	54,0	26,9	4,6	3,4	8,0	11,1
Syrians are happy in Turkey	3,9	44,2	48,1	25,9	12,9	3,5	16,4	9,6
Syrians want to go to another country	12,4	28,0	40,4	22,5	11,0	13,1	24,1	13,0
Syrians are getting what their labor deserves	0,5	28,6	29,1	23,4	28,7	14,7	43,4	4,1
Syrians can get work easily	1,1	25,2	26,3	23,0	34,8	11,5	46,3	4,4
Turks are exploiting Syrians	6,0	14,0	20,0	26,3	23,5	19,5	43,0	10,7
Syrians are excluded in Turkey	1,0	18,2	19,2	27,9	27,5	17,0	44,5	8,4
Syrians don't like Turks	0,6	10,6	11,2	22,1	33,1	24,3	57,4	9,3

When the responses are scored and analyzed comparatively with the SB-2017 findings, a more meaningful picture emerges. Here, again, it is striking to observe that while the support to positive statements has grown in the past 2 years between 2017 and 2019, the level of support to negative statements has decreased.

SB-2019-TABLE 99: To what extent would you agree with the following statements regarding the situation of Syrians in Turkey? (Score)

	SB-2017	SB-2019
Syrians want to obtain citizenship	3,5	3,4
Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	3,0	3,2
Syrians want to stay in Turkey	2,7	3,1
Syrians are happy in Turkey	2,7	3,0
Syrians want to go to another country	2,6	2,8
Syrians are getting what their labor deserves	2,2	2,6
Syrians can get work easily	2,2	2,6
Turks are exploiting Syrians	2,8	2,3
Syrians are excluded in Turkey	2,5	2,3
Syrians don't like Turks	2,3	2,0

0-2,99
 3,0-5,0

11.a- The Future Perspective of Syrians

SB-2019 has tried to understand Syrians' attitudes and tendencies regarding their perspective on future and their prospects of permanent stay in Turkey. In this context, the respondents were posed several statements to which their level of agreement was asked on a 5-point Likert scale. The responses to the statement "Syrians want to stay in Turkey", for instance, appear to suggest a significantly increasing tendency of Syrians to stay in Turkey. In fact, the combined rate of those who agreed with this statement ("completely agree" + "agree") was 54%, while the combined share of those who disagreed was only 8%. There was also a significant group of 26,9% of the respondents who stated that they "neither agreed, nor disagreed" with this statement. When these percentages are converted into scores, this statement receives a high score of 3,1. The specific demographic

groups within the Syrian respondents who supported this statement more strongly than the others included men, 65-year-old or older respondents, university graduates and graduate degree holders, and those who live in the border cities. Another relevant statement in this context was “Syrians want to obtain citizenship”, which received the highest level of support in all statements. While the combined rate of those who agreed with this statement was over 63%, only 5,7% of the respondents reported their disagreement. This finding is extremely important in itself in understanding the future perspective among Syrians.

11.b- Relations with and Feelings about the Turkish Society

The responses to the statements related to Syrians’ relations with and feeling about the Turkish society reflect very clearly a positive perception. These statements include “Syrians are grateful to Turkish society”, “Syrians don’t like Turkish society at all”, and “Syrians are excluded in Turkey”. While the first statement received a strong support with 41,8% agreement, the statement “Syrians don’t like Turkish society at all”, in turn, was the one that is most strongly rejected with 57,4% disagreement and only 11,2% agreement. Those who gave above average support for the “Syrians are grateful to Turkish society” statement were men, 65-year-old or older respondents, university graduates, and those who live in the border cities. Here, a very interesting finding was that the level of support from women and those respondents without a diploma was significantly below the average.

A very important statement concerning the level of social acceptance was the one on “exclusion”. While 44,5% of the Syrian respondents disagreed with the statement that “Syrians are excluded in Turkey”, those who agreed with it constituted 19,2% of the respondents. This finding that Syrians don’t feel excluded in Turkey is very valuable. The perception of being excluded is relatively slightly higher among women, and those in the 18-24 and 35-44 age groups.

FGD Findings: Perspective on the Turkish Society

FGD participants were asked about the experiences and attitudes, both of themselves individually and that of Syrians generally, concerning the Turkish society. As usual, there were a variety of opinions, experiences, and arguments discussed in the context of the FGDs.

Turkish society treats Syrians badly: A significant group among the Syrian participants suggested that they were not happy with the way that Turkish society was treating Syrians. While almost all of them acknowledge the fact that there are people within Turkish society that treat them well and that treat them poorly, they argued that a majority of Turkish people do not like and accept Syrians. When asked why this was, the participants claimed that this negative attitude was the result of Syrians arriving in Turkey in such a short amount of time, while some of them said that it was because of the existence of negative historical experiences between the people.

- “There are good ones and there are bad ones but in general they [Turkish people] don’t treat Syrians well. They look down on us.” Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- “They treat us very badly. The negative behaviors and prejudices of the adults are picked up by their children, who as a result treat Syrian children at the schools badly.” Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- “They don’t accept us. They don’t even want those Syrians who pass to Turkish citizenship.” Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- **“They don’t like Syrians and they make a lot of generalizations. Sometimes they don’t even communicate with us because we are Syrian.” Istanbul-Students**
- “I don’t think it is about the Syrians, Turkish people don’t like any Arabs. It may be related to history.” Istanbul-Students
- “70% of them look down on us, as if they are so much better than us. If they see

a bag of fruits in our hands, they say 'You escaped from war, why are you eating fruit?'.*" Hatay-Women*

- *"It depends on the person and on the place. They don't treat Syrians well. They welcome the Russians in Antalya or those who came from Gulf countries in the Black Sea region. But they don't do the same with us. It depends on the neighborhood. If you live in a good neighborhood, everyone treats you well."
Gaziantep-NGO Workers*

Turkish society exploits Syrians: Some participants suggested that the Turkish society was taking advantage of their difficult and vulnerable situation to exploit Syrians. The two most obvious examples of this exploitation, accordingly, were the way Syrians were abused as cheap labor by Turkish employers and the astronomical rents demanded from them for very bad houses.

- *"Turks are exploiting us at the workplaces. They think that Syrians came here to take a walk around. I think they behave very selfishly and they don't show any respect to us."
Ankara-Women*
- *"They don't want us and they don't accept us. They look down on us. They demand extra high rents from us just because we are Syrians."
Gaziantep-Women*

Turkish society treats Syrians well: Those participants who thought that Turkish people treats Syrians well usually gave examples from their personal experiences.

- *"I have been living here for 8 years and never experienced a trouble. I think the Turkish people treat us very well. I used to live in Raqqa back in Syria. Landlords were trying to squeeze money off from renters even though they were also Syrian. If we do this to ourselves, we can say anything to foreigners."
Gaziantep-Women*
- ***"Turks do not take the first step, they wait for us to do that. They usually remain distant at first and I can understand that. After we have taken the first step, though, they become very close friends."
Hatay-Naturalized Turkish Citizens***
- *"Some Turks are really good people and they are very charitable. Our Turkish friends have become like family for us."
Istanbul-Women*

Some Turkish people treat Syrians well, some don't: Another big part of participants suggested that it was not possible to give one valid response for every Turkish individual. Accordingly, like any other society or community, there are good and bad people, those who are tolerant and intolerant, and those who are understanding and discriminative among the Turkish society, too.

- *"There are good ones and bad ones, like there are in any country or city. But recently, in general they are treating us poorly."
Ankara-Women*
- *"Some of them treat us well, extremely well. Others are treating us poorly and discriminating against us. It is hard to generalize. But these things can and do happen in every country."
Hatay-Naturalized Turkish Citizens*
- ***"Some of them are treating us well, some of them aren't. But in any case, I prefer to be neighbors with Turks. I don't prefer to live in a neighborhood that is inhabited mostly by Syrians because there are a lot of men living in those places, and I don't feel comfortable because I live with my family."
Istanbul-Students***

Syrians are the ones who determine how the Turks will treat them: According to some participants, what determines how the Turkish society will treat Syrians is not only their personality characteristics, but the profile and behaviors of the Syrians with whom come into contact. They went on to suggest that if Syrians can speak Turkish, are willing to communicate, and take initiative for the first step, then Turks will certainly treat them well.

- "I think they treat as badly because we don't communicate with them."
Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- "They treat Syrians that speak Turkish very well and become friends with them."
Ankara-Women
- "They treat you well and help you if you can explain and express yourself in Turkish. Even though I wear a headscarf, everyone talks to me and they like me. But I don't think they treat all Syrians well." Ankara-Women
- "They get along better with Syrians that are educated. But since the number of uneducated Syrians are in majority in Turkey, Turks are getting uncomfortable with them." Istanbul-Students

11.c-Working Life

It is obvious that the most problematic area for Syrians in Turkey is the working life. This finding was confirmed over and over again by many different questions. In the context of this question, there were three relevant statements: "Syrians are getting what their labor deserves", "Syrians can get work easily", and "Turks are exploiting Syrians". Among these, the strongest rejection came to the statement "Syrians are getting what their labor deserves" with 43,4% of the respondents disagreeing. The rate of those who agreed with this statement was 29,1%. In fact, despite the obvious frustration, given that more than 90% of Syrians in Turkey are working informally, this finding that almost one-third of them think that Syrians are getting what their labor deserves might even be found encouraging. As might be expected, those Syrians who more strongly opposed this statement included women, those without a diploma probably working as unskilled labor, and those who live in metropolitan cities. Even though with a slight difference, those with a 2-year associate degree or higher educational attainment can be said to be less dissatisfied.

SB-2019-TABLE 100: To what extent would you agree with the following statements regarding the situation of Syrians in Turkey? (Score) X Demography

	Syrians want to acquire citizenship	Syrians are grateful to the Turkish people	Syrians want to stay in Turkey	Syrians are happy in Turkey	Syrians want to go to another country	Syrians are paid as rightfully deserved	Syrians can work easily	Syrians are excluded in Turkey	Turks are exploiting Syrians	Syrians don't like Turks	Average Score
Sex											
Female	3,1	2,9	2,9	2,9	3,0	2,3	2,4	2,4	2,5	2,2	2,7
Male	3,5	3,4	3,2	3,1	2,6	2,7	2,6	2,3	2,2	1,9	2,8
Age Group											
18-24	3,3	3,3	3,1	3,1	2,7	2,7	2,6	2,4	2,2	2,0	2,7
25-34	3,4	3,1	3,1	3,0	2,8	2,6	2,5	2,3	2,3	2,0	2,7
35-44	3,4	3,3	3,1	3,0	2,9	2,5	2,5	2,4	2,4	2,0	2,8
45-54	3,4	3,3	3,2	2,9	2,6	2,5	2,6	2,3	2,3	2,1	2,7
55-64	3,5	3,4	3,3	3,1	2,8	2,7	2,6	2,2	2,3	2,2	2,8
65 +	3,2	3,5	3,5	3,2	2,7	2,4	2,7	2,1	2,4	1,8	2,8
Educational Attainment											
Illiterate	3,3	3,1	3,0	2,8	2,8	2,3	2,3	2,7	2,6	2,2	2,7
Literate but not graduate of any school	3,2	2,9	3,0	2,9	2,8	2,3	2,4	2,8	2,4	2,2	2,7
Primary school	3,3	3,3	3,1	3,0	2,8	2,6	2,5	2,3	2,2	1,9	2,7
Middle school	3,3	3,2	3,1	3,0	2,8	2,5	2,6	2,4	2,4	2,1	2,8
High-school or equivalent	3,4	3,3	3,1	2,9	2,8	2,7	2,5	2,3	2,2	2,0	2,7
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	3,5	3,5	3,3	3,3	3,3	2,7	2,8	2,6	2,7	2,4	3,0
University/Graduate degree/PhD	3,8	3,4	3,5	3,3	2,5	2,8	2,8	2,1	2,2	1,8	2,8
Region											
Border cities	3,4	3,3	3,3	3,3	2,6	2,8	2,6	2,4	2,3	2,2	2,8
Other cities	3,3	3,2	2,8	2,6	3,1	2,3	2,4	2,3	2,4	1,8	2,6
Metropolitan cities	3,3	3,1	2,8	2,5	3,2	2,1	2,3	2,4	2,5	1,9	2,6
Non-metropolitan cities	3,5	3,4	3,0	2,7	2,7	2,6	2,6	2,0	2,2	1,8	2,7
General	3,4	3,2	3,1	3,0	2,8	2,6	2,6	2,3	2,3	2,0	2,7

The level of support to the provocative statement of "Turks are exploiting Syrians" also remained quite low. 43% of Syrians disagreed with this statement, while only 20% of them agreed with it. The specific groups that more strongly supported this statement included men, those in the 18-24 age group, primary school and higher education graduates, and those living in non-metropolitan cities.

All these findings actually show a relatively positive picture, especially given the fact that working life is quite problematic for Syrians for whom formal employment is almost an exception. Even more importantly, there appears to be a trend of improvement through time.

11.d- Perception of Happiness

The level of happiness of Syrians in Turkey is one of the issues in which SB research takes special interest. Perhaps a more important variable is the change in this over time. While the total rate of those who either "agreed" or "completely agreed" with the statement "Syrians are happy in Turkey" was 33,7% in SB-2017, this figure has increased to 48,1% in SB-2019. In the opposite end, the total share of those who "disagreed" and "completely disagreed" decreased from 21,9% in 2017 to 16,4% in 2019. Both changes show that Syrian

respondents tended to believe in 2019 that Syrians in Turkey are happier than they were in 2017. Despite the complexity of the social context in Turkey and that of the concept of happiness itself, this finding appears to be largely confirmed by the FGDs, as well.

FGD Findings: Perception of Happiness of Syrians in Turkey

The discussions concerning the happiness of Syrians in Turkey have yielded three major headlines, which are briefly summarized below.

Syrians in Turkey are happy: According to a large part of FGD participants, most Syrians in Turkey were happy and content with their lives in Turkey. According to these participants, there were two main reasons for this. Firstly, according to a large majority, Turkey welcomed Syrians in a time of extreme hardship and it still provides them an environment in which they can live in peace, security, and comfort. And secondly, according to a smaller group of participants, Syrians are happy in Turkey because the Turkish society has embraced them with love and compassion. Many participants suggested that it is possible to understand that Syrians are happy in Turkey from the fact that they still live in Turkey. Accordingly, if Syrians were not happy, they would have moved on to Europe or an Arab country by now.

- **“Syrians are happy in Turkey because they escaped the war and they are now safe here. Syrians have found jobs here, they have found peace and they are now living in a more open society. Why shouldn’t they be happy? But, still, sometimes the word of refugee makes them unhappy.”**
Istanbul-Women
- “We live in security in Turkey and some Syrians ended up having very good jobs here. They are doing increasingly well financially. I think they are happy. Even if things become 100% fine in Syria, a lot of Syrians would remain in Turkey because they are happy here and they established a life here.” Gaziantep-Women
- They are very happy. But, I think, they would be happier if they are granted Turkish citizenship.” Istanbul-Women
- “Syrians are happy in Turkey. Our Turkish neighbors love us and they are helping us.” Gaziantep-Women
- “Even though I am having so many problems, I still want to stay in Turkey. Generally speaking, Turkey is better than many Arab countries. That’s why I think Syrians are happy here.
- “Those Syrians who wanted to live in Europe already left. The Syrians that still live here stayed because they are happy. Otherwise, they wouldn’t have stayed.”
Gaziantep-NGO Workers

Some of the Syrians in Turkey are happy and some are not: A majority of the participants suggested that there is a wide scale of Syrians in Turkey including those who are very happy and those who are unhappy. The more interesting part of these arguments were the factors that the participants thought were necessary for happiness in Turkey. The most frequently mentioned ones were, once again, the economic factors including a regular and high income. Another factor that was suggested to make Syrians happy, or at least contribute in making them happy, was the Turkish language fluency. Accordingly, those who speak Turkish could both take care of themselves and communicate with the Turkish society, protecting them from social isolation and helping them achieve economic self-sufficiency.

- “Those with a regular paycheck and good economic conditions in Turkey are happy. The others are not happy.” Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- “Those who can speak Turkish, those who are students, those who have a good income are all happy in Turkey. Because these can defend themselves and the Turks see these groups as good examples.” Ankara-Women

- **"50% are happy. And it is not possible for everyone to be happy here because Turkey isn't our homeland"- Gaziantep-Women**

Syrians in Turkey are not happy: A similar number of participants stated that Syrians in Turkey were not happy. There were 3 main reasons voiced by these participants to support their argument: (i) economic problems and living expenses; (ii) the growing discrimination against and hatred towards Syrians, and (iii) unhappiness because of the experience of having left the homeland.

- "10% of Syrians are happy and the rest are not because they don't speak Turkish and they don't have good jobs." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- **"We need a good source of livelihood and stability in order to be happy here. A lot of Syrians are not happy because they don't have these." Ankara-Artisans/Employees**
- "Of course we are not happy. Happiness requires money, stability and peace of mind. Syrians work day and night and are still unable to make ends meet." Ankara-Women
- "Syrians are not happy in Turkey because life is very expensive here. Even with a few members of the family working, we can barely make a living. Our children have to work, too, and their education had to stop." Gaziantep-Women

Syrians in Turkey are safe and sound, but not happy: A last group of participants contended that while Turkey provided Syrians a safe and secure environment with the minimum requirements of a regular life, it could not give Syrians the opportunities that they need to be happy. Accordingly, one cannot deny the security and relative comfort in Turkey when comparing it to the conditions of civil war or the life in a war-struck Syria, but saying that Syrians are happy here would be a stretch.

- **"Maybe we are not happy here but we live comfortably. Even widowed, divorced or separated women can live comfortably here and take care of their children." Hatay-Women**
- "When we compare ourselves with the Syrians living in Syria, we are doing very well here. But not everyone is happy. A lot of Syrians want to return to Syria. There is a lot of discrimination here against us and we cannot defend our rights." Gaziantep-Women

12. Integration

For a peaceful cohabitation, the mutual feelings and attitudes of communities are very important. SB research has aimed to obtain hints of these from "within" both Syrians and Turkish society. To understand how Syrian respondents see the feelings and attitudes of Syrians in Turkey regarding Turkish society, 6 statements were posed to them with the chance of providing multiple responses. Among the 6 statements included in the below table, the one that received the strongest support was "Syrians are making an effort to integrate into Turkish society" with the agreement of 47,6% of the respondents. It was followed by the statements "Syrians are grateful to Turkish society" (41,8%) and "Syrians love the Turkish society" (41,6%). Syrians also largely believe that Syrians in Turkey treat Turkish society with respect (35,9%). Also noteworthy are the extremely low levels of support to the two "negative" statements. The share of those who agreed with the statements "Syrians don't like the Turkish society at all" and "Syrians are exploiting Turkish society" were respectively 1,1% and 0,8%. All these findings obviously call for optimism.

The groups that gave the strongest level of support to the statement "Syrians are making an effort to integrate into Turkish society" include women and middle-aged respondents. The same can be said for those aged 45-64, those with 2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education, and those living in

metropolitan cities concerning the statement “Syrians are grateful to Turkish society”. Lastly, the ones that gave disproportionately high level of support for the statement “Syrians are treating Turkish society with respect” include men, over 65-year-olds, those with higher educational attainment, and those who live in metropolitan cities.

The issue of “integration” is very complicated, starting from the fact that there is no agreed-upon meaning of the concept. The “hierarchical” and “biased” implications of the concept lead one to ask “integration into what?” It can be suggested that the decisive determinant of integration is the “level of social acceptance”¹⁴³ in the host society, which can be discerned in its attitudes and approach towards the newcomers. The other main factors in the process include the capacity of the host society, existing vulnerabilities, the issues concerning public services caused by the newcomers as well as their number.

The great controversies surrounding the concept of “integration” are well known. The position that rejects “assimilation” also frequently criticizes “integration” as well, finding it hierarchical and blaming it to have hidden assimilationist agenda. The formal concepts used in Turkey are “adaptation” and “harmonization” (“uyum”), instead of integration. Irrespective of the concept being used, the relationships between the host society and the newcomers are the main focus in these discussions. The ideal end result is a “culture of living together in peace and serenity” and there are two essential actors here: the state and the society. Therefore, it is important to be aware of which actors are being spoken about as well as the answer that will be given to the question “integration into what”. The other important question concerning integration here is “integration of whom”. In this complexity, it is possible for different individuals living in the same region and sharing the same daily life to go through very different integration processes and paths. In all this, however, it is obvious that “social acceptance” is an issue that has very high priority.

SB-2019-TABLE 101: To what extent have the Syrians integrated into Turkey/Turkish society?

	#	%
Completely	119	8,4
To a great extent	613	43,2
Partially	523	36,9
To a very little extent	95	6,7
Not at all	25	1,8
No idea/ No response	43	3,0
Total	1418	100,0

How Syrians perceive their level of integration is also an important issue. The question “Have Syrians integrated into Turkey or will they integrate?” concerns the 3,6 million Syrians accounting for around 5% of Turkey’s population as much as it does Turkish society. This very question, therefore, was asked to Syrians. In stark contrast with the dominant opinion among Turkish society, Syrians appear to believe that they have integrated into Turkey. In fact, the combined share of those who stated either that Syrians have “completely” or “to a great extent” integrated was 51,6%. Another 36,9% suggested that they have “partially” integrated. Total rate of those who believed that Syrians have integrated “to a very little extent” or “have not integrated at all” was only 8,5%. These findings also display a significant internal diversity regarding how the issue of integration of Syrians is perceived by Syrians themselves. What is seen here is two quite clear beliefs in both sides, the Turkish society and the Syrians in Turkey. While one side is convinced that Syrians haven’t integrated and they will likely never integrate; the other side appears to be quite satisfied with the integration performance of itself. This striking difference in the perceptions is a likely candidate for trouble.

143 See. M. Murat Erdoğan (2018) (Expanded 2nd Edition) *Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration*, Bilgi University Press, Istanbul.

Men, those in 55-64 age group, those with higher education, and those who live in non-metropolitan cities appear to more than averagely believed that Syrians have “completely integrated”. On the other side, those who live in the metropolitan cities, illiterates, and women supported the opinion that integration hasn’t happened more strongly than the others.

Overall, the general picture drawn by the Syrians regarding integration is much more positive than the one produced by Turkish respondents. This can influence the integration processes in 2 ways: 1. Syrians might feel that, since they have already integrated, any remaining problems are the responsibility of Turkish society; or, 2. This positive attitude might strengthen the sense of belonging among Syrians, who can further see themselves as parts of the Turkish society, and thereby it can contribute positively in the integration processes.

SB-2019-TABLE 102: To what extent have the Syrians integrated into Turkey/Turkish society? (%) X Demography

	Completely	To a great extent	Partially	To a very little extent	Not at all	No idea/ No response
Sex						
Female	4,6	39,3	39,4	9,4	2,0	5,3
Male	10,7	45,7	35,3	5,0	1,6	1,7
Age Group						
18-24	9,8	38,4	39,2	6,1	2,9	3,6
25-34	8,2	47,1	34,9	6,0	1,6	2,2
35-44	8,3	41,9	38,4	7,5	1,3	2,6
45-54	7,9	38,8	36,0	10,1	2,8	4,4
55-64	10,7	42,9	39,3	3,6	-	3,5
65 +	-	60,0	31,4	2,9	-	5,7
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	1,1	29,9	46,0	14,9	2,3	5,8
Literate but not graduate of any school	-	27,4	54,8	15,1	-	2,7
Primary school	10,6	40,5	35,1	6,7	2,7	4,4
Middle school	8,9	46,5	35,4	4,2	2,1	2,9
High-school or equivalent	8,2	40,6	40,6	6,5	1,8	2,3
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	1,8	45,6	47,3	5,3	-	-
University/Graduate degree/PhD	11,2	56,6	25,5	5,6	-	1,1
Region						
Border cities	8,2	45,4	37,7	5,1	0,4	3,2
Other cities	8,6	39,9	35,5	9,2	3,9	2,9
Metropolitan cities	4,6	38,3	39,4	11,7	2,7	3,3
Non-metropolitan cities	16,4	42,9	28,0	4,2	6,3	2,2
General	8,4	43,2	36,9	6,7	1,8	3,0

The views of Syrians on integration can be described with the term of “self integration”. It refers to a spontaneous integration process regardless of the host society’s reactions and anxieties. This is also supported by the study’s findings about Syrians living in Turkey.

FGD Findings: The evaluation of Syrians' integration process by themselves

In previous parts, the Turkish citizen participants of the FGDs were asked whether Syrians integrated to Turkey, with the results suggesting that mostly they have not integrated. In this part, the same questions were also asked to the Syrian participants of the FGDs. First, the participants discussed "to what extent the Syrians have integrated to Turkey", and they were also asked if the integration trend is in a positive or negative direction.

Syrians have integrated into Turkey: Most Syrian participants have optimistic views on Syrians' integration to Turkey. For them, all Syrians to some degree have integrated. These participants also argued that most Syrians have integrated to Turkey to a very large extent.

- "I think all Syrians have integrated to Turkey. My three children are studying at Turkish universities. Their friends at the university are Turkish and they get along very well. I think we integrate better because some Turkish people help us and treat us well." Istanbul-Women
- "Most Syrians have integrated. Some Turkish people have really treated the Syrians very well and supported us." Istanbul-Women

Some participants said some demographic groups of Syrians can better, faster, and further integrate to Turkey compared to the others. Particularly the children and the youth, and those Syrians who study in Turkey have much more integrated to the country.

- "Mostly our children have integrated. Old people are unable to integrate because it's hard for them to learn Turkish. Our children now speak in Turkish among themselves." Gaziantep-Women
- "Mostly our children have integrated because they can speak Turkish with the Turkish people and they go to the same schools. Maybe we have not completely integrated to Turkey, but got used to the situation and life here." Gaziantep-Women

These participants said the Syrians did not have difficulty in their integration to Turkey thank to the cultural similarities between the two countries.

- "We have very similar traditions with the Turkish people, and the Syrians have integrated to Turkey to a large extent because of this. Especially the Syrian men integrate more compared to the Syrian women as the men go to work and further communicate with the society. But Syrian teachers and Turkish teachers still have not integrated. They do not even greet each other at the school." Hatay-Naturalized Turkish citizens
- "We adapted because the two cultures are similar. We did not integrate that much during the migration wave because everyone was dreaming of Europe. In general, to integrate to Turkey we both need to learn the Turkish history and become nationalist." Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- "It is not possible to completely integrate because we are under temporary protection." Gaziantep-NGO Workers

Some participants said the Syrians had to leave their country due to the war and wherever they go they do not have any other chance but to integrate to the country and the society they live in. So the Syrians, who came to Turkey, have inevitably and naturally integrated to Turkey, and they will do so even further in time.

- **"They should integrate because they fled the war. I think they integrated even in the first years. They are both working and studying here. There is no barrier between the Syrians and the Turkish people. But some Syrians have now started to create ghettos."** Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- "The Syrians have integrated not only in Turkey but everywhere." Hatay-Women

Only some Syrians have integrated: Some participants think that Syrians have started to integrate but for them, it is early to argue that most Syrians have integrated. These participants think that only some Syrians have integrated to Turkey, and that integration is a long

process with serious barriers in front of it.

- "40% have integrated. Mostly the Turkmens and those who learn the Turkish language are able to integrate." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- "Mostly our children and women have integrated. The children started to go to school and they are learning Turkish. The women can integrate because they talk with their neighbors. Some have started to learn about the Turkish cuisine." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- "They have integrated very little. A few years ago, we could not integrate at all but when the Temporary Education Centers were closed our children started to make good relations with the Turkish children and teachers. Even with the help of children, the Syrians started to have better communication and friendship with their Turkish neighbors." Ankara-Women
- **"Many Syrians are now behaving like Turkish people and very well integrated. I think 60% have integrated. After some time everyone will respect us because we are improving ourselves."** Ankara-Women
- **"Because our children are getting education here and learning Turkish, they have integrated face to face. The first generation will never integrate to Turkey, because we grew up in Syria and took our education there, so it is not possible to integrate to a new culture."** Hatay-Naturalized Turkish citizens
- **"I think only some could integrate. We like the Turkish people but I think they do not want to integrate with us. I visit a UN office in Esenler. They have meetings and activities about integration. The first day we came together with the Turkish people, they didn't like us and they looked very unhappy. Then the moment we started to talk their facial expressions started to change and in the last meeting we were like a family."** Istanbul-Women

Syrians could not integrate into Turkey: According to the participants with this view, the Syrians have not integrated to Turkey, and a significant part of the participants think that integration will never be possible. As a reason of this pessimistic picture, they said the Turkish society seems to be determined in not accepting the Syrians. Moreover, those participants argued that one of the main conditions of integration, learning the Turkish language is an area that Syrians over a specific age do not have much chance.

- **"Syrians in Turkey are not able to integrate because they are scared. Everyone is scared of being deported and they can not live a stable life. We are only trying to adapt."** Hatay-Women
- "They did not integrate much. Especially those who do not financially in a good condition are just working and they do not have any relations with the Turkish people. We have only adapted to working long hours with low salaries." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- "I think only 20% have integrated. Turkish people do not accept us and it's not possible to integrate because we do not speak Turkish. The Syrians are used to the Turkish people and trying to adapt." Ankara-Women
- "Most have not integrated because the Turkish people do not accept us and they exclude us. Maybe in other cities, the Syrians are able to integrate better but those in Istanbul could not integrate." Istanbul-Students

The participants were asked how they evaluated the Syrians' integration trend. Compared to the question on the current situation of integration, it can be said that in this question more participants have put an optimistic picture. Because a significant part of the participants said they saw the Syrians' integration trend in the positive direction and that they believed the Syrians will integrate to Turkey much more than they do today.

There is a Positive Trend in Syrians' Integration to Turkey: The participants with this view said that they construct their trust in future on three main factors: (i) The most important of these is the expectation that the state's positive steps on integration will continue

and that it will guide the process with a good integration vision. (ii) Secondly, according to the participants, in time the Syrians will better get used to their lives in Turkey, improve themselves and do what they need to do to integrate. (iii) Lastly, the participants said they believe that the interaction and communication between the Syrian and Turkish communities will improve in time, which will make the members of both communities to get closer.

- "I think it's getting better. The state has now asked the employers to provide compulsory insurance for the Syrian employees. If this continues, and the state monitors such practices, the situation will get better and we will integrate further." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- "I think it's getting better. It'll get better if the Turkish government makes the right regulations." Ankara-Women
- "It'll get better in time. Because our business in Turkey and communication with the Turkish people increase and get better. To make it better, the state should provide compulsory Turkish language trainings." Gaziantep-Women
- "We should also spend more effort and set good example to our children. The state does whatever it can to support us and our children now go to school just like the Turkish children." Gaziantep-Women
- **"I think everyone should do something. The state should do some integration regulations. The Syrians should also spend more effort and everything will get better when the Turkish society accepts us in Turkey." Hatay- Naturalized Turkish citizens**
- "I think in 4-5 years, all our children will go to Turkish schools, and so everything will get better, it should. But the Turkish government should spend more effort and help us." Hatay-Naturalized Turkish citizens
- **"In time, the Turkish people will get used to us and we will integrate more. But for it to get better, the government should produce projects that support the integration. Maybe everything will be better and the Turkish society may start to accept us if Turkish politicians talk positively of Syrians. The Syrians should also explain themselves to the other side. They should defend themselves in a good and respectful way." Istanbul-Students**

There is a Negative Trend in Syrians' Integration to Turkey: In contrast to the opinions above, some participants described much more pessimistic and negative future expectations. For them, the recently rising hatred discourse in Turkey along with the signs from the state that it will toughen the practices about Syrians, have made the issue of integration even harder.

- "The working conditions should be better for it to get better and the hatred of the Turkish people should decrease. If things continue like this, I think it will not get better at all, on the contrary, it will get worse." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- **"I think it's getting worse. Both sides do behave in a wrong way. For it to get better firstly the Syrians should know that it's not their own country and so they should be respectful. The Turkish people should know that they are not just refugees but also humans." Istanbul-Women**

13. Turkish state's support provided for Syrians

For the sake of managing this process, it is significant to measure the perceptions and views of Syrians -- living in Turkey approximately for the last 4,5 years -- on the services the Turkish state provides, and to understand to what extent the Syrians could access to the services they require in their daily lives, as well as the level of their satisfaction.

Syrians living in Turkey were asked the question of "To what extent do you find the support and aids the state provides for the Syrians in Turkey in the following areas sufficient?" referring to the five main areas (health, education, housing, food, and Money/financial aid) for which the Turkish state provides support.

While in SB-2017, the total rate of those who responded "sufficient" and "very sufficient" to this question on average (outside the camps) 28.62%, this rate has risen to 34.96% in SB-2019. It corresponds to a rise from 2.2 to 2.5 based on the 5-point scale. It is observed that the highest level of satisfaction was in the "health" area, with 72% in SB-2017 and 71.8% in SB-2019. The actual positive development is observed in the education services. The satisfaction in this area rose to 64.6% in SB-2019 from 58% in SB-2017.

SB-2019-TABLE 103: To what extent do you find it sufficient the support and aids the state provides for the Syrians in Turkey in the following areas? (%)

No.		Very Insufficient	Insufficient	Combined Insufficient	Neither sufficient, nor insufficient	Sufficient	Very sufficient	Combined Sufficient	No idea/ No response
1	Health support	2,8	7,3	10,1	15,2	59,0	12,8	71,8	2,9
2	Education support	2,7	6,5	9,2	13,0	52,3	12,3	64,6	13,2
3	Housing support	30,3	33,7	64,0	9,2	13,4	0,9	14,3	12,5
4	Food aid	29,2	32,4	61,6	10,3	13,1	0,8	13,9	14,2
5	Financial aid	27,9	34,6	62,5	13,6	9,2	1,0	10,2	13,7
	ALL SERVICES	18,58	22,09	41,48	12,26	29,4	5,56	34,96	11,3

SB-2019-TABLE 104: To what extent do you find the support and aids the state provides for the Syrians in Turkey sufficient? (Score)

No.		SB-2017	SB-2019
1	Health support	3,6	3,6
2	Education support	2,9	3,3
Average Score		2,2	2,5
3	Housing support	1,5	1,8
4	Food aid	1,6	1,8
5	Financial aid	1,4	1,8

■ 0-2,99 ■ 3,0-5,0

The study finds that the satisfaction of Syrians in all five areas for which the Turkish state provided support. It is very valuable that the services provided by the Turkish state considered "sufficient" by the Syrians at an increasing tendency, despite the limited resources of the country, little support from abroad, complexity and dynamism of refugee policies.

FGD Findings: Support Provided for Syrians and Their Level of Satisfaction

The Syrian participants of FGDs were asked how they see the policies and practices developed for the Syrians since the beginning of the crisis.

Policies and Practices about Syrians are Successful: Some participants responded to this question very generally and vaguely, and just said that the policies and practices are "good". Others provided more detailed explanations with examples of policies and practices they find successful. Education is among those successful areas, as also the survey study suggested. **Education** here in general covers the Syrian children included in the elementary and secondary education.

- "I find Turkey successful in the issue of education. Our children should definitely go to school together with the Turkish children. The health system is generally good, however people who are implementing this are not helpful." Hatay- Naturalized Turkish citizens
- **"All our problems in Turkey result from the individual opinions and behaviors of some Turkish people."** Hatay- Naturalized Turkish citizens

Besides education, another policy area that Syrians find successful in Turkey is the opportunity of **"social mobility"** within the society provided for the Syrians. This suggests that it is possible for Syrians to accomplish whatever they want as long as they improve themselves:

- **"Many Syrians studying in Turkey and improving themselves can accomplish whatever they want, but this doesn't happen in other countries.** I find the policies very positive. But the state should have a specific and clear integration policy. I think the decisions and laws for the Syrians should be the same. They sometimes ask for a document in Gaziantep but not in Istanbul. The decisions should be the same for everyone and everywhere." Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- **"For us, Turkey is much better than many European countries. For this reason, I think in time the situation will get better and the Syrians will completely integrate with the Turkish society."** Gaziantep-NGO Workers

On the other hand, although they like Turkey's policies and practices, some participants argue that Turkey should further improve itself to help hardworking Syrians reach the points they desire:

- **"For the Syrians not to be a burden on Turkey, the state should provide them for opportunities to improve themselves and the Syrians shouldn't have travel bans within Turkey."** Gaziantep-NGO Workers

Besides these, there are also policies and practices that the participants find right and successful.

- **"When the migration wave to the Europe started, the Turkish state and Turkish police worked hard for us and saved us from the sea and the death. The practices were fairly determined for the refugees"** Gaziantep-Women
- "I think they are much better compared to the ones in many other countries. But such policies should also be provided for us in Arabic." Hatay-Women
- "It's very hard to live in instability and fear. If a Syrian has wrong behaviors and does not comply with the law, I do not want them in Turkey and I would accept that as a Syrian if they would be deported. The Syrians in general do not know their rights and duties. I started to have a training on rights and I am learning about my rights in Turkey." Istanbul-Women

Criticisms on Policies and Practices about Syrians: There are also policies and practices that the Syrian participants consider insufficient or wrong, find unsuccessful or ineffective, or criticize as being open to improvement.

Within this context, the criticized policies and practices can be categorized under 5 main titles:

- (i) The participants complained about the **insecurity of their status and uncertainty regarding their future in Turkey**

- *"The concept of "temporary protection" is a very broad term, and we still don't know what it means exactly. We are neither refugees, nor guests. The temporary protection made us to lose our rights." Hatay-Women*

(ii) *The participants told about the failure of Turkey in informing Syrians of the state's policies, practices, legal regulations, and of their rights.*

- ***"We don't think there is a policy. Syrians do not know about any policies or practices. The state should better communicate with us and there should be SYrians representing us." Ankara-Artisans/Employees***
- *"I think Syrians should be informed of these types of practices. We don't know about our rights and duties here and we are unable to predict anything about our future in Turkey. The state should better communicate with us on this issue." Gaziantep-NGO Workers*
- *"The practices and laws might be good, but Syrians do not know them." Hatay-Naturalized Turkish citizens*

(iii) *The participants said Turkey has not informed its own citizen about the Syrians, and that this has created a gap for provocative and false news.*

- ***"Because the Turkish government talks about Syrians in a covert way, the Turkish people are scared of us and stay distant to us. They think that Turkey provides support to us but we are getting the support from Europe. I think both Syrians and the Turkish state should explain this to the Turkish people." Ankara-Artisans/Employees***
- ***"Turks are very much affected by the politics, false information and news. There is too much false and lack of information about Syrians living in Turkey. I think the state and the media should provide them with the right information. The Syrians have also made a lot of mistakes on this issue, and did not approach the Turkish people. I think the state, Syrians, and the local community should spend more efforts on the issue." Ankara-Women***

(iv) *The participants criticized the limited policies in implementing the temporary protection status, particularly the limitations on Syrians' domestic and international travel.*


- *"The practices, particularly the travel permit and residence permit, block us. To help with the documents and permits, the state should warn the authorities and the immigration office employees." Ankara-Women*
- ***"The travel permit should be removed, there should be no barriers blocking us from travelling freely. Syrians have come to Turkey to live a more peaceful and secure life, we shouldn't be treated as terrorists."***
Gaziantep-Women
- ***"I wish we were provided with the refugee status, as the other countries did."***
Istanbul-Women
- *"I think the travel permit should be removed. Turkey is not like other European countries, and does not give salaries and jobs to the Syrians like the EU does. For this reason, the practice of travel permit should be removed, so that the job opportunities can increase." Istanbul-Students*

(v) *Within the framework of education policies about Syrians, although the participants praised the practice of closing TECs and enrolling the Syrian children in the Turkish schools for its contribution to the social integration, they also criticized it with regard to the concerns for the Syrian children in losing their mother tongue.*

- ***"Closing of TECs was a right decision for our integration to Turkey but our children are losing their language (Arabic). Sometimes unfair laws and decisions are implemented. Because we fled the war, softer and refugee-friendly decisions should be made, particularly regarding the employment."***
Ankara-Women

Evaluation of Specific Policy Areas about Syrians: In this part, the Syrian participants evaluated to what extent the policies and practices about Syrians in four areas have been successful. These areas are (i) political-legal rights; (ii) working-economy (iii) education; and (iv) health. The participants evaluated the policies in these areas based on a 5-point scale (1-very bad, 2-bad, 3-neither good nor bad, 4-good, 5-very good). According to the evaluations of 47 participants, the average scores of each policy area have been calculated as follows:

SB-2019-FIGURE 23: Evaluation of Policies and Practices About Syrians in 4 Areas / Average score



As observed in the graphic, in line with the survey findings, according to the Syrian participants of the FGDs, the most successful policy area about Syrians is the health (4.1). On the other hand, among the policies and practices, the working-economy areas are considered the most unsuccessful. These policies have received a score of 1.1 from the participants and considered "very bad". In other two areas, the policies have received points closer to the average. The education with an average score of 3.5 is categorized as "good", while political-legal rights remained under the average with the score of 2.7, although considered "neither good, nor bad"

14. According to Syrians, who is providing how much support to Syrians in Turkey?

Assessments of Syrians living in Turkey about the aids provided for them, particularly how they see the sources of these aids is among the issues the SB study has questioned. This issue is actually very important with regard to the perceptions and approaches of the Turkish society. It is very difficult to present a sufficiently clear picture of the source and amount of the financial aid provided to Turkey from abroad.

In the SB study, the question of "which countries or international organizations and to what extent support the Syrian refugees in Turkey" was asked to the Syrians in Turkey, with the multiple responses of "Republic of Turkey", "European countries and EU", "UN", and "Islamic countries" to choose from. While in SB-2017 Syrians said the highest level of support ("sufficient-very sufficient") was provided by Turkey at a rate of 26.9%, this rate has risen to 39.6% in SB-2019. In SB-2017, the response rate (12.4%) of "sufficient-very sufficient" to the support of "European countries and EU" has dropped to 11.6% in SB-2019. For the UN's support this rate was 9.3% in SB-2017, and 7.6% in SB-2019, while for Islamic countries it was 4.7% in SB-2017, falling to 2.6% in SB-2019. In other words, there is a perception that Turkey's support for Syrians has risen, while that of the others has dropped.

SB-2019-TABLE 105: To what extent do you find the support provided by the following countries or international organizations for the Syrians sufficient? SB-2017¹⁴⁴/ SB-2019 (%)

		Very Insufficient	Insufficient	Combined Insufficient	Neither sufficient, nor insufficient	Sufficient	Very sufficient	Combined Sufficient	No idea/ no response
Turkey	SB-2019	11,6	28,1	39,7	9,4	35,7	3,9	39,6	11,3
	SB-2017	25,5	28,1	53,6	15,6	16,3	1,9	18,2	12,3
European countries and EU	SB-2019	27,1	32,6	59,7	10,5	11,0	0,6	11,6	18,2
	SB-2017	34,3	22,8	57,1	8,8	13,1	1,0	14,1	20,0
United Nations	SB-2019	28,4	35,7	64,1	8,9	7,0	0,6	7,6	19,4
	SB-2017	39,8	22,2	62,0	5,3	8,5	0,3	8,8	18,2
Islamic countries	SB-2019	33,6	38,6	72,2	4,2	2,5	0,1	2,6	21,0
	SB-2017	49,4	23,3	72,7	11,0	3,2	0,5	3,7	18,3

15. Status Syrians would prefer in Turkey

The “temporary protection” status as well as the future of Syrians, who have had around five years of experience in Turkey, are among the issues discussed frequently. How Syrians themselves consider this issue and their demands are regarded as one of the significant areas of the SB study.

Among the responses to the question of what status Syrians want to have, “citizenship” strikingly takes the lead. 57.7% of Syrians in Turkey want to have both Syrian and Turkish citizenship, while 22.6% want to have only Turkish citizenship. In other words, the total rate of Syrians demanding Turkish citizenship is 78.3%, while this rate was 70.2% in SB-2017.

SB-2019-TABLE 106: Which status would you want to have in Turkey?

		SB-2017*		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	Dual citizenship-both Syrian and Turkish	376	61,8	818	57,7
2	Only Turkish citizenship	51	8,4	320	22,6
3	Refugee status/under temporary protection status	95	15,6	140	9,9
4	Same as my current status	35	5,8	45	3,2
5	Long term/unlimited residence permit	21	3,5	9	0,6
6	Work permit	13	2,1	-	-
	No response	17	2,8	86	6,0
Total		608	100,0	1418	100,0

These data very clearly show Syrian's high-level demand for citizenship. Without doubt, demand for citizenship cannot be considered as a reflection of a statement for "permanency". Some Syrians even said "we would feel safe if we got the citizenship and would consider returning". However, in any case, demand for citizenship, independent from the state's decision-making process, sheds light on the future perspective.

It is remarkable that among those who prefer to become Turkish citizens, 87.2% of the participants were men, much higher than the rate of 78.3% in SB-2017. It is observed that the dual citizenship preference rises as the age increases, and those with high education and university degrees compared to other educational attainment groups have a much higher preference for dual citizenship.

The study finds that those who only want Turkish citizenship are mostly among men, from high school degree group and from among those in non-metropolitan cities.

SB-2019-TABLE 107: What status would you want to have in Turkey? (%) X Demography

	Have dual citizenship (Turkish and Syrian citizenships)	Have Turkish citizenship only	Have refugee/ temporary protection status	Preserve my current status	Obtain long term/indefinite residence permit	No answer
Sex						
Female	50,0	18,9	16,9	4,4	0,7	9,1
Male	62,4	24,8	5,6	2,4	0,6	4,2
Age Group						
18-24	59,6	18,4	11,4	2,4	0,8	7,4
25-34	56,1	23,6	10,0	2,8	1,2	6,3
35-44	56,3	22,7	10,1	4,0	0,3	6,6
45-54	59,0	25,8	9,0	2,8	-	3,4
55-64	58,3	27,4	6,0	3,6	-	4,7
65 +	74,3	8,6	8,6	5,7	-	2,8
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	49,4	21,8	16,1	10,3	-	2,4
Literate but not graduate of any school	65,8	9,6	19,2	4,1	-	1,3
Primary school	55,6	21,2	10,4	2,7	0,2	9,9
Middle school	54,6	23,4	11,8	3,4	0,3	6,5
High-school or equivalent	55,3	28,8	6,8	1,8	1,4	5,9
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	71,9	10,5	10,5	3,5	-	3,6
University/Graduate degree/PhD	67,3	25,5	2,0	1,5	2,0	1,7
Region						
Border cities	69,2	14,6	11,1	2,1	0,2	2,8
Other cities	39,9	34,8	7,9	4,8	1,3	11,3
Metropolitan cities	40,5	30,2	8,7	4,3	1,4	14,9
Non-metropolitan cities	38,6	43,9	6,3	5,8	1,1	4,3
General	57,7	22,6	9,9	3,2	0,6	6,0

When Syrians were asked which status they wanted to have, after dual citizenship and Turkish citizenship, "Refugee/Temporary Protection" status takes the second place. However, between 2017-19, a fall is observed in this demand (from 15.6% to 9.9%). The response of "same as today" in SB-2019 drops to 3.2% from 5.8% in SB-2017. The rate of those who want a "long term residence permit" as status also dropped to 0.6% from 3.5%. The interest in citizenship especially the dual citizenship actually shows also the future perspective, in other words the permanency tendency.

16. Returning to Syria?

The issue of permanency of Syrians in Turkey should be considered in two dimensions. The first is the desire or condition of staying in Turkey without any reason, while the second is the desire or condition of not returning to Syria. For this reason, the SB study, specifically conducted on social integration, considers Syrians' opinions on return as one of the most significant areas. In a process of extraordinary uncertainties, it is obvious that the Syrians' views on return would be very relative. Because the developments in Syria, and the host country Turkey's attitude would also play significant roles as much as the desire of Syrians. For this reason, besides asking direct questions to Syrians, such as "are you planning to return?", other indirect findings also need to be considered. For this sensitive issue, it is helpful to restate an important issue to remember: As frequently mentioned in the study, although it is a study with a high confidence level, the findings of the SB reflect the views of those who participated in this study rather than all Syrians in Turkey.

16-a. Opinions of Syrians in Turkey about returning to Syria

In the SB study, the basic question of "In general, which of the following statements better explains your attitude in returning to Syria?" was asked to get some clues on return tendencies. The most striking finding here is that the rate of those who responded to this question in SB-2019 by saying "I don't plan to return to Syria under any circumstances" has risen to 51.8% from 16.7%. This incredible rise in the rate of those who said they would not return no matter what the conditions were, needs to be seriously considered with regard to the future of Syrians in Turkey and their integration processes. This finding shows that the future conditions in Syria have radically lost their attraction and influencing power on decisions. In other words, the change in these two years, when considered along with the other findings, can be seen as the most significant indicator that the permanency tendency of Syrians has become stronger.

SB-2019-TABLE 108: In general, which one of the following statements better explains your attitude on returning to Syria?¹⁴⁵

	SB-2017		SB-2019	
	#	%	#	%
I do not plan to return to Syria under any circumstances	148	16,7	735	51,8
I would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed	529	59,6	429	30,3
I would return if the war ends in Syria, even if an administration we want is not formed	114	12,9	78	5,5
I would return if a safe zone is created in Syria	-	-	83	5,9
I would return even if the war continues in Syria	19	2,1	3	0,2
No idea/ I don't know	46	5,2	64	4,5
No response	31	3,5	26	1,8
Total	887	100,0	1418	100,0

¹⁴⁵ The present statement "I would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed" was "I would return if the war ends and if a good administration is formed" in SB-2017. Similarly, the statement "I would return if the war ends in Syria, even if an administration we want is not formed" was "I would return if the war ends, even if a good administration was not formed" in SB-2017.

In SB-2019, the rate of those who said “I would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed” has dropped to 30.3% from 59.6% in SB-2017. The rate of those who said “I would return if the war ends in Syria, even if an administration we want is not formed” in SB-2019 has dropped to 5.5% from 12.9% in SB-2017. The rate of another response that is added to SB-2019, “I would return if a safe zone is created in Syria”, remained at 5.9%. All these data, actually show that the will/tendency of Syrians to return has dramatically dropped for the last two years.

SB-2019-TABLE 109: In general, which one of the following statements better explains your attitude on returning to Syria?

	I do not plan to return to Syria under any circumstances any condition	I would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed	I would return if a safe zone is created in Syria	I would return if the war ends in Syria, even if an administration we want is not formed	I would return even if the war continues in Syria	No idea/ don't know	No response
Sex							
Female	46,1	36,9	6,1	3,9	0,2	5,6	1,2
Male	55,4	26,2	5,7	6,5	0,2	3,9	2,1
Age Group							
18-24	49,0	31,8	6,5	6,1	0,8	4,5	1,3
25-34	55,1	28,9	6,8	3,0	-	4,8	1,4
35-44	49,9	30,1	6,7	6,1	0,3	4,3	2,6
45-54	52,8	29,2	3,4	7,3	-	5,1	2,2
55-64	51,2	33,3	1,2	8,3	-	3,6	2,4
65 +	42,9	37,1	2,9	14,3	-	2,8	-
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate	27,6	64,4	4,6	2,3	-	1,1	-
Literate but not graduate of any school	27,4	67,0	1,4	1,4	-	1,4	1,4
Primary school	56,3	22,0	6,9	6,4	0,5	5,7	2,2
Middle school	48,0	31,5	6,0	5,2	-	7,1	2,2
High-school or equivalent	60,7	21,0	7,8	5,0	0,5	2,7	2,3
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	45,6	36,8	3,5	12,3	-	-	1,8
University/Graduate degree/PhD	61,8	24,5	4,1	5,6	-	3,1	1,0
Region							
Border cities	49,4	34,5	5,8	6,5	0,1	3,3	0,4
Other cities	55,7	23,7	5,9	3,9	0,4	6,5	3,9
Metropolitan cities	52,7	27,7	6,5	1,6	0,3	7,3	3,9
Non-metropolitan cities	61,4	15,9	4,8	8,5	0,5	4,8	4,1
Genel	51,8	30,3	5,9	5,5	0,2	4,5	1,8

16-b. Is there a return plan within the next 12 months?

To get some clues on return tendencies, the Syrians in Turkey were asked the question of “What are your plans for return within the next 12 months?”. As a response, those who said “I don't plan to return” had a rate of 56.1%. This rate is over the response rate of “I don't plan to return under any circumstances” (51.8%) to the question in the previous section. In other words, the resistance of Syrians to the issue of returning in the short term is much higher.

SB-2019-TABLE 110: What are your plans for return within the next 12 months?

	#	%
I do not plan to return	795	56,1
Undecided	266	18,8
I plan to return	96	6,8
No idea/I don't know	129	9,1
No response	132	9,2
Total	1418	100,0

Through a multiple response system, the reasons why Syrians prefer to return to certain locations were tried to be understood. Those who said "I was living there when I was in Syria" were at a 91.7%, while the ones who said "Because it's where my family lives" were at 40.6%. Other responses remained under 10%. In other words, the main motivation is the location where the participants or their families lived.

SB-2019-TABLE 111: Why do you prefer this place to return? (Multiple responses)

Sıra No.		#	%
1	I was living there when I was in Syria	88	91,7
2	Because it's where my family lives	39	40,6
3	Because it is a safe place	9	9,4
4	Because it is a place with opportunity to find work	4	4,2
5	It would be easier to live there	1	1,0

Note: Results are based on 96 participants who do not plan to return to Syria in the next 12 months.

16.c. Reasons for Not Returning¹⁴⁶

It is very explanatory to see the reasons why the Syrians in Turkey do not plan their return. When participants were asked the question of "Provide the most important 3 reasons why you are not planning to return to Syria", through a multiple response system, the first response with the highest rate is "because it's not a safe place" (42.9%). The second most response was, very similarly, "because the war continues" with a rate of 31.2%. In other words, the strongest reason of no return, by far, is the issue of safety. Other factors believed to be making the Syrians' return harder include "There is nothing left in Syria for us" (14.6%), "Because I am happy here" (10.3%), "Because education in Turkey is better" (8.4%), "I don't want to return" (4.9%), and "Because I'm being chased after by the regime" (2.6%).

Those who do not make/do not want to make any plans to return within the next year, mostly have the following reasons that can be regarded as "attractive": "Because I'm working in Turkey" (20.6%) and "Because I'm happy here" (10.3%). The other responses are as follows: "Because education in Turkey is better" (8.4%), "To provide a better future for my children" (4.2%), "Because I want to stay in Turkey" (2.5%), "Because I like Turkey" (1.8%), "Because my family lives in Turkey" (1.4%), and "Because Turkey is a Muslim country" (1.4%).

¹⁴⁶ It is very explanatory to see the reasons why the Syrians in Turkey do not plan their return. When participants were asked the question of "Provide the most important 3 reasons why you are not planning to return to Syria", through a multiple response system, the first response with the highest rate is "because it's not a safe place" (42.9%). The second most response was, very similarly, "because the war continues" with a rate of 31.2%. In other words, the strongest reason of no return, by far, is the issue of safety. Other factors believed to be making the Syrians' return harder include "There is nothing left in Syria for us" (14.6%), "Because I am happy here" (10.3%), "Because education in Turkey is better" (8.4%), "I don't want to return" (4.9%), and "Because I'm being chased after by the regime" (2.6%).

SB-2019-TABLE 112: Provide the most important 3 reasons why you are not planning to return to Syria (Multiple responses)

Sira No.		#	%
1	Because it's not a safe place	341	42,9
2	Because the war still continues	248	31,2
3	Because I am working in Turkey	164	20,6
4	There is nothing left in Syria for us	116	14,6
5	Because I am happy here	82	10,3
6	Because education in Turkey is better	67	8,4
7	I do not want to return	39	4,9
8	To provide a better future for my children	33	4,2
9	I'm being chased after by the regime	21	2,6
10	Because I want to stay in Turkey	20	2,5

Note: Results are based on 795 participants who do not plan to return to Syria in the next 12 months.

SB-2019-TABLE 113: Provide the most important 3 reasons why you are not planning to return to Syria (Multiple responses)

Sira No.		Female	Male	General
1	Because it's not a safe place	40,1	44,6	42,9
2	Because the war still continues	35,9	28,3	31,2
3	Because I am working in Turkey	19,4	21,4	20,6
4	There is nothing left in Syria for us	23,4	9,2	14,6
5	Because I am happy here	7,6	12,0	10,3
6	Because education in Turkey is better	9,5	7,7	8,4
7	I do not want to return	5,3	4,7	4,9
8	To provide a better future for my children	2,6	5,1	4,2
9	I'm being chased after by the regime	2,0	3,1	2,6
10	Because I want to stay in Turkey	2,6	2,4	2,5

Note: Results are based on 795 participants who do not plan to return to Syria in the next 12 months.

Among those who do not plan to return because Syria is not a secure place, the majority of them are from the following groups: those who are younger, above 65 years old, have high school and vocational school degrees or above, and those who live in border cities.

SB-2019-TABLE 114: Provide the most important 3 reasons why you are not planning to return to Syria (Multiple responses)

		18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 +	General
1	Because it's not a safe place	44,0	42,2	42,6	43,3	42,9	47,1	42,9
2	Because the war still continues	32,6	31,2	33,0	30,9	22,4	23,5	31,2
3	Because I am working in Turkey	20,6	21,3	21,1	19,6	20,4	11,8	20,6
4	There is nothing left in Syria for us	15,6	12,8	15,8	15,5	14,3	17,6	14,6
5	Because I am happy here	13,5	11,0	5,7	11,3	14,3	11,8	10,3
6	Because education in Turkey is better	8,5	6,4	10,5	10,3	6,1	11,8	8,4
7	I do not want to return	4,3	3,9	6,7	6,2	4,1	-	4,9
8	To provide a better future for my children	0,7	3,5	7,2	3,1	8,2	-	4,2
9	I'm being chased after by the regime	1,4	3,9	2,4	1,0	-	11,8	2,6
10	Because I want to stay in Turkey	2,1	2,8	1,9	2,1	6,1	-	2,5

Note: Results are based on 795 participants who do not plan to return to Syria in the next 12 months. * Results for the age group 65+ are based on 17 participants.

SB-2019-TABLE 115: Provide the most important 3 reasons why you are not planning to return to Syria (%)
X Educational Attainment (Multiple responses)

		Illiterate	Literate but not graduate of any school	Primary school	Middle school	High-school or equivalent	2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education*	University / Graduate degree / PhD	General
1	Because it's not a safe place	23,1	38,2	45,5	35,6	50,4	42,1	50,0	42,9
2	Because the war continues	59,0	58,8	23,7	39,4	24,1	36,8	21,4	31,2
3	Because I work in Turkey	30,8	55,9	17,9	18,1	19,7	10,5	19,8	20,6
4	There is nothing left for us in Syria	25,6	17,6	13,4	16,7	13,9	15,8	9,5	14,6
5	Because I am happy here	5,1	20,6	11,6	6,9	10,9	-	13,5	10,3
6	Because the education in Turkey is better	7,7	11,8	6,3	9,3	6,6	15,8	11,1	8,4
7	I don't want to go back	5,1	-	5,8	7,4	4,4	-	1,6	4,9
8	To ensure a better future to my children	-	-	5,8	7,4	4,4	-	1,6	4,9
9	Because I am wanted by the regime	-	-	4,0	-	3,6	-	5,6	2,6
10	Because I want to stay in Turkey	-	5,9	1,3	2,3	0,7	10,5	5,6	2,5

Note: Results are based on 795 participants who do not plan to return to Syria in the next 12 months. * Results from 19 participants.

SB-2019-TABLE 116: Provide the most important 3 reasons why you are not planning to return to Syria (%)
X Educational Attainment (Multiple responses)

		Border cities	Other cities			General
			Metropolitan cities	Non-metropolitan cities	Other cities General	
1	Because it's not a safe place	49,0	31,3	38,0	33,0	42,9
2	Because the war continues	19,9	53,1	39,2	49,5	31,2
3	Because I work in Turkey	22,6	14,7	25,3	17,5	20,6
4	There is nothing left for us in Syria	10,6	24,1	12,7	21,1	14,6
5	Because I am happy here	13,6	4,9	5,1	5,0	10,3
6	Because the education in Turkey is better	8,9	5,8	12,7	7,6	8,4
7	I don't want to go back	0,8	14,7	2,5	11,6	4,9
8	To ensure a better future to my children	5,5	0,4	6,3	2,0	4,2
9	Because I am wanted by the regime	1,6	2,7	8,9	4,3	2,6
10	Because I want to stay in Turkey	2,6	2,7	1,3	2,3	2,5

Note: Results are based on 795 participants who do not plan to return to Syria in the next 12 months. * Results from 19 participants.

16-d. Under which conditions would the return be possible?

Responses of 1,322 participants to the question of "In the next 12 months, what are your plans of return?" were as follows: "I don't plan to return", "undecided", "no idea/I don't know", "no response". To understand the return tendency of Syrians and the measures to make their return possible, these participants were also asked the following question: "Under which conditions, would you consider returning?" The participants were provided with the opportunity to give multiple responses, and the first response was "if the war ends" with a rate of 31.6%. The other responses include "When Syria becomes a secure country" (21.3%), "If there is a secure zone"

(10.2%), "If I find a job there" (8.4%), "If current administration is replaced/regime changes/stability" (7,5%), "If I have a home" (4,5%). Meanwhile, the response of "I would not return under any circumstances" was supported at a rate of 27.2%, without considering the question itself.¹⁴⁷

SB-2019-TABLE 117: Under which conditions would you consider returning? (Multiple responses)

		#	%
1	If the war ends	418	31,6
2	I do not want to return under any circumstance	360	27,2
3	When Syria becomes a safe country	281	21,3
4	If there is a safe zone	135	10,2
5	If I find a job there	111	8,4
6	If current administration is replaced/regime changes/stability is secured	99	7,5
7	If I have a home there	60	4,5
8	Education	40	3,0
9	If my family wants	3	0,2
	No idea/no response	34	2,6

Note: Results from 1322 individuals who replied the question "What are your plans for return within the next 12 months?" with "I don't plan to return", "undecided", "No idea/ I don't know", and "No response".

SB-2019-TABLE 118: Under which conditions would you consider returning? (%) X Sex (Multiple responses)

		Female	Male	General
1	If the war ends	36,4	28,7	31,6
2	I do not want to return in any circumstance	21,5	30,8	27,2
3	When Syria becomes a safe country	25,7	18,5	21,3
4	If there is a safe zone	6,9	12,3	10,2
5	If I find a job there	11,5	6,5	8,4
6	If current administration is replaced/regime changes/stability is secured	4,3	9,4	7,5
7	If I have a home there	9,3	1,6	4,5
8	Education	3,6	2,7	3,0
9	If my family wants	0,6	-	0,2
	No idea/no response	2,2	2,8	2,6

Note: Results from 1322 individuals who replied the question "What are your plans for return within the next 12 months?" with "I don't plan to return", "undecided", "No idea/ I don't know", and "No response".

* Results from 17 individuals.

147 Syrian participants of this study, particularly at the FGDs, have mentioned "Assad" and "the regime". However, this study has preferred to use the concepts of "current administration" and "Syrian government".

SB-2019-TABLE 119: Under which conditions would you consider returning? (%) X Age Group (Multiple responses)

		18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 +	General
1	If the war ends	29,8	31,4	32,0	34,5	28,2	36,4	31,6
2	I do not want to return in any circumstance	23,7	29,9	27,7	23,2	28,2	27,3	27,2
3	When Syria becomes a safe country	23,7	23,9	17,9	17,3	21,8	21,2	21,3
4	If there is a safe zone	9,2	9,2	11,2	10,7	12,8	12,1	10,2
5	If I find a job there	7,5	8,3	8,4	9,5	11,5	3,0	8,4
6	If current administration is replaced/regime changes/stability is secured	6,6	6,4	10,1	7,1	7,7	3,0	7,5
7	If I have a home there	7,0	3,0	5,5	6,0	1,3	-	4,5
8	Education	3,1	1,9	4,3	3,6	1,3	6,1	3,0
9	If my family wants	0,4	-	0,3	-	-	3,0	0,2
	No idea/no response	3,5	2,4	2,0	3,6	-	6,1	2,6

Note: Results from 1322 individuals who replied the question "What are your plans for return within the next 12 months?" with "I don't plan to return", "undecided", "No idea/ I don't know", and "No response".

* Results from 17 individuals.

SB-2019-TABLE 120: Under which conditions would you consider returning? (%) X Region (Multiple responses)

		Border cities	Other cities			General
			Metropolitan cities	Non-metropolitan cities	Other cities General	
1	If the war ends	36,0	23,9	25,0	24,3	31,6
2	I do not want to return in any circumstance	24,5	34,2	27,3	31,7	27,2
3	When Syria becomes a safe country	16,7	31,7	23,3	28,7	21,3
4	If there is a safe zone	12,1	3,1	14,2	7,0	10,2
5	If I find a job there	11,2	3,7	4,0	3,8	8,4
6	If current administration is replaced/regime changes/stability is secured	7,8	5,9	9,1	7,0	7,5
7	If I have a home there	6,2	1,9	1,7	1,8	4,5
8	Education	2,5	4,0	3,4	3,8	3,0
9	If my family wants	0,2	-	0,6	0,2	0,2
	No idea/no response	1,3	4,7	4,5	4,6	2,6

Note: Results from 1322 individuals who replied the question "What are your plans for return within the next 12 months?" with "I don't plan to return", "undecided", "No idea/ I don't know", and "No response".

* Results from 17 individuals.

FGD Findings: Return

Syrian participants of FGDs were asked whether they would return to their country.

Most Syrians will return to their country after the war ends: Some participants said they believed the Syrians would prefer to return to their country if the war – the reason why they in the first place left their country – ends and if the current administration is replaced.

- ▶ "If the current administration is replaced and if there is a good administration in Syria everyone would return. Nothing would change if a similar administration replaces the current one." Ankara- Artisans/Employees
- ▶ **"If the war ends and if the administration is replaced everyone will of course return." Ankara-Artisans/Employees**
- ▶ "If Syria becomes a secure place, 70% of Syrians would return. Those Syrians who established business here and those who have good jobs here would stay in Turkey." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- ▶ "If I had the chance and the conditions get better I would immediately take a flight and go to Syria. I think if conditions get better in Syria, the Syrians would return." Istanbul-Women
- ▶ **"Turkey is surely a station for us, but one day we will return. But our children and youth do not want to return, because in Syria, they only experienced war and fear." Hatay-Women**
- ▶ "If the war ends, yes, 90% would return. Most people would return if the administration is replaced. We need to return and reconstruct. As I am a teacher, all families tell me that they will return." Istanbul-Women

Most Syrians would not be able to return to their country even if the war ends: Another part of the participants said it is necessary to approach this question in a more realistic way. Although most Syrians long for their country and dream of returning, these participants believe that in practice return after years of war does not look feasible. Also, they say that each day the war in Syria and life in Turkey continues makes the return more impossible. According to this view, Syria now is no longer the same Syria that the Syrians left behind. The cities are destroyed, the families have fallen apart, the people's properties are lost. Even if the war ends today, it wouldn't be possible for the Syrians to re-establish their old lives. Moreover, as also mentioned before, an important part of Syrians have now established a new life for themselves.

- ▶ **"I think 70% would stay in Turkey. We are now hopeful about Syria. Our relatives and families have fallen apart, we no longer have anything left there." Ankara-Women**
- ▶ "We do not want to return. Whatever happens, I do not want to return. My mother, grandmother and two brothers died there, and for that reason I hate Syria. My children were used to hear the sounds of rockets and see the bodies, and so I never want to return." Gaziantep-Women
- ▶ "Our country is totally destroyed, we don't want to return." Gaziantep-Women
- ▶ "Many Syrians say they will return with the war in Syria is continuing. In my opinion, no one would that easily return to Syria. Even if the conditions get better in Syria they will not return." Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- ▶ "I wouldn't return to Syria. I don't think the Syrians would return. **If Syria becomes better than Turkey, then we would return.**" Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- ▶ "Absolutely no, they would not return. My mother, and my family are there, but I do not want to return under any circumstances. **If they forcibly send us we would go, but we will not go with our own will.** When they were in Syria, the Syrians were living in a very conservative space. We were unaware of psychological support and we weren't welcoming the working of women. **Now we are here and have learned many good and new things, but what will we do if we return to Syria, in that conservative country?"** Istanbul-Women
- ▶ **"If the old Syria comes back then I may return. But old Syria would never come back. I think most of them will stay in Turkey." Istanbul-Students**

16-e. Moving to a country other than Turkey and Syria

Tendency of Syrians living in Turkey to go to a third country was tried to be understood with the question of "Would you want to go to a country other than Turkey and Syria?" Among the replies to this question, through the opportunity of multiple responses, 58.6% of them at a strong rate suggested "I would never consider going under any circumstances". The support given to this response in SB-2017 was 65.8%. In other words, the idea of going on a conditional basis in the other responses has become prevalent. Following the same trend, rate of those who said "I would go if I had the opportunity" has risen from 23% to 34.1%. All responses show that the rate of those who want to go if given the opportunity has risen.

Among those who said "I would never consider going under any circumstances", 64.9% are remarkably men. The rate of women for this response is 48.3%. Among those who do not consider going are mostly the ones in the age group of 55 and above, the ones with college and graduate degrees and the ones living in border cities. It is obvious that the tendency of those living in border cities to return to their countries are relatively stronger, as also seen in responses to some other questions.

SB-2019-TABLE 121: Would you want to move to a country other than Turkey and Syria? (Multiple responses)

		SB-2017*		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	I would never consider going	584	65,8	831	58,6
2	I would go if I had the opportunity	204	23,0	483	34,1
3	I would go if I am provided a job opportunity	36	4,1	202	14,2
4	I would go if I have a relative/ acquaintance to help me there	3	0,3	196	13,8
5	I would go if I cannot become a Turkish citizen	-	-	71	5,0
6	I would go if I cannot find a job in Turkey	24	2,7	64	4,5
7	I would move abroad after I become a Turkish citizen	-	-	43	3,0
8	I would go if I cannot get education in Turkey	4	0,5	23	1,6
9	I would go if I cannot earn the money worth my efforts in Turkey	8	0,9	19	1,3
	No response	24	2,7	23	1,6

SB-2019-TABLE 122: Would you want to move to a country other than Turkey and Syria? (%)
Demography (Multiple responses)

	I would never consider going	I would go if I had the opportunity	I would go if I am provided a job opportunity	I would go if I have a relative/acquaintance to help me there	I would go if I can't become a Turkish citizen	I would go if I can't find a job in Turkey	I would move abroad after I become a Turkish citizen	I would go if I cannot get education in Turkey	I would go if I cannot earn the money worth my efforts in Turkey	No response
Sex										
Female	48,3	45,9	18,1	20,6	4,8	4,8	2,6	1,3	1,3	1,3
Male	64,9	26,8	11,8	9,7	5,1	4,3	3,3	1,8	1,4	1,8
Age Group										
18-24	57,6	33,9	13,5	14,3	4,9	4,5	4,1	2,0	1,6	1,2
25-34	59,3	31,9	13,8	12,4	4,2	4,6	2,8	1,6	1,6	2,2
35-44	54,7	40,0	17,3	17,6	5,6	5,1	2,7	1,9	0,8	1,1
45-54	61,8	31,5	12,9	11,8	5,1	6,2	2,8	1,7	1,1	1,7
55-64	65,5	26,2	10,7	8,3	7,1	-	2,4	-	2,4	2,4
65 +	65,7	34,3	8,6	14,3	5,7	-	5,7	-	-	-
Educational Attainment										
Illiterate	58,6	35,6	18,4	17,2	-	1,1	6,9	-	-	-
Literate but not graduate of any school	54,8	43,8	20,5	16,4	-	1,4	5,5	-	-	-
Primary school	57,8	35,3	11,6	11,1	4,2	4,0	2,0	1,7	1,5	2,7
Middle school	56,7	36,0	15,5	16,5	6,8	5,0	2,4	1,0	1,0	1,3
High-school or equivalent	58,9	32,4	12,8	14,3	6,8	4,1	1,4	-	1,8	2,7
2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	56,1	38,6	19,3	19,3	-	7,0	8,8	7,0	1,8	-
University/Graduate degree/PhD	65,8	24,0	13,3	9,7	6,6	7,1	4,1	4,1	2,0	0,5
Region										
Border cities	68,1	26,6	17,8	15,8	3,1	5,0	3,5	1,4	0,6	0,5
Other cities	44,0	45,6	8,8	10,8	7,9	3,8	2,3	2,0	2,5	3,4
Metropolitan cities	37,2	53,8	8,2	11,7	9,5	3,5	2,4	1,6	3,0	2,2
Non-metropolitan cities	57,1	29,6	10,1	9,0	4,8	4,2	2,1	2,6	1,6	5,8
General	58,6	34,1	14,2	13,8	5,0	4,5	3,0	1,6	1,3	1,6

In the study of SB-2019, it was thought that it would be meaningful to look at the tendency of going to a third country, except Turkey and Syria, and the tendency of returning to Syria on a single table. The most striking finding here is that over 30% of those who are talking about returning are also inclined to go to a third country.

SB-2019-TABLE 123: Would you want to move to a country other than Turkey and Syria? X In general, which of the following statements better explains your attitude in returning to Syria? (Multiple responses)

In general, which of the following statements better explains your attitude in returning to Syria? (%)	I would never consider going	I would go if I have an opportunity	I would go if I am provided a job opportunity	I would go if I have someone close there to help me	I would go if I cannot become a Turkish citizen	I would go if I cannot find a job in Turkey	I would move abroad after I become a Turkish citizen	I would go if I cannot get education in Turkey	I would go if I cannot earn the money worth my efforts in Turkey	No response
I do not want to return to Syria under any circumstances	62,0	32,4	10,6	11,2	6,1	3,7	2,4	1,5	1,6	0,7
I would return if the war ends in Syria and if an administration we want is formed	54,5	36,6	20,7	17,7	4,0	6,3	4,9	1,4	1,2	0,5
I would return if a secure zone is formed in Syria	61,4	33,7	14,5	13,3	1,2	2,4	-	2,4	-	2,4
If the war ends in Syria I would return even if there is no administration as we wish	66,7	30,8	16,7	12,8	1,3	3,8	3,8	2,6	1,3	1,3
I would return even if the war continues in Syria	100,0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
No idea/I don't know	42,2	37,5	12,5	18,8	6,3	6,3	-	-	-	12,5
No response	30,8	46,2	7,7	19,2	11,5	3,8	3,8	7,7	3,8	19,2

17. Future Expectations of Syrians in Turkey

Whether Syrians see a future for themselves in Turkey gives important clues both on their permanency trends and integration processes. Within this framework, the Syrians were asked the following question based on three actors: "Do you believe that there is a future for yourself, for your family, and for other Syrians?" The result picture shows that Syrians very strongly, at a rate of over 60%, believe that they believe in a future for themselves and for their families. Although this rate drops to 47.2% "for Syrians", the high rate of 31.1% who chose the response of "no idea/no response" should be taken into consideration. In other words, although the Syrians for themselves (62.5%) and for their families (63.7%) believe in a future, they refrained from commenting on other Syrians.¹⁴⁸

Among those Syrians who see a future for themselves and for their families, those who most strongly believe/stress this are the ones living in border cities. It is remarkable that these rates are the lowest for the metropolitan cities.

SB-2019-TABLE 124: Do you believe that there is a future in Turkey for yourself, your family, and other Syrians? (%)

	Yes	No	No idea/ No response
For yourself	62,5	30,1	7,4
For your family	63,7	28,9	7,4
For Syrians	47,2	21,7	31,1

148 This question was asked differently in SB-2017. It was posed as "Do you believe that there is a future for you and your family in Turkey?" with the possible responses of "Yes", "No", and "I don't want a future in Turkey". The rate of those who said "yes" to this question was 49,7% among Syrians living outside of the camps. However, since it is not possible to differentiate that answer for the person, their family, and Syrians, comparison was not possible. Still, however, the apparent change in the last 2 years is very interesting.

SB-2019-TABLE 125: Do you believe that there is a future in Turkey for yourself, your family, and other Syrians? (%)

		Yes	No	No idea/ No response
Border cities	For yourself	74,0	19,6	6,4
	For your family	75,0	18,7	6,3
	For Syrians	57,6	17,5	24,9
Other cities (Metropolitan cities + Non-metropolitan cities)	For yourself	44,7	46,3	9,0
	For your family	46,1	44,7	9,2
	For Syrians	31,2	28,2	40,6
Metropolitan cities	For yourself	35,9	55,7	8,4
	For your family	36,7	54,3	9,0
	For Syrians	23,9	32,3	43,8
Non-metropolitan cities	For yourself	61,9	28,0	10,1
	For your family	64,6	25,9	9,5
	For Syrians	45,5	20,1	34,4
General	For yourself	62,5	30,1	7,4
	For your family	63,7	28,9	7,4
	For Syrians	47,2	21,7	31,1

FGD Findings: A Future in Turkey

The issue of Syrians' future expectations in Turkey also gives clues on their return trends. In this part, SB-2019 FGD participants were asked how they assess their own and other Syrians' future in Turkey:

Syrians believe they have a future in Turkey: An important part of the participants said most Syrians in Turkey see their future in this country. The basis of their view rests on the fact that most Syrians have now established a life in Turkey. According to these participants, Syrians have established business in Turkey, the youth have got their education here, and for most Syrians, Turkey has become their homeland. Some participants said Turkey has offered them opportunities which would not be possible anywhere else, including their own country, and that they could not imagine a future in another country.

- (Do Syrians believe Syrians have a future in Turkey?)
"Yes, they believe. We have established business here, and our children go to school here, and they have learned Turkish." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- "They believe that they will have a future here because they have nothing left in Syria." Ankara-Women
- "Syrian youth who study here believe they will have a future. Many Syrians have started to be like Turkish people and they have very well integrated. I think 60% of Syrians believe this." Ankara-Women
- "Of course. Our children go to school here and they become successful. I think for this reason many Syrian families believe they have a future in Turkey." Gaziantep-Women
- "Yes because our children go to school here." Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- "Yes I think they definitely believe. Turkey has become our homeland." Hatay-Women

- "My children like Turkey very much because they study at the university here. They like their friends very much. They do not even want to go abroad. Their father wants to send them abroad for masters and doctoral studies but they do not accept and they say that they want to have a future in Turkey." Istanbul-Women
- **"- Yes, if they become Turkish citizens. - And yes, even if they do not become Turkish citizens." Gaziantep-NGO Workers**

Syrians do not believe they have a future in Turkey: Some participants said they do not believe they have a future in Turkey. This view suggests that Syrians especially due to the recent discriminatory and hate discourse towards them feel that they are not accepted in Turkey, and they do not have future expectation. These participants said particularly the state policies do not provide them with a safeguard for future, and that the emphasis on "temporariness" on their status, along with their uncertain position in Turkey all prevent them from having such a future expectation.

- (Do Syrians believe they have a future in Turkey?)
"No, because the decisions keep changing and we do not know when they will send us back." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- "I do not believe that I do. We do not have a future anywhere, not only in Turkey." Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- "No, it's very hard to live with fear. Syrians would leave Turkey if they have an opportunity to go abroad." Istanbul-Women

Some Syrians believe they have a future in Turkey: Some participants think having future expectations is only possible for only some Syrians; and while they believe they have a future in Turkey, they said some other groups do not have such a belief (expectation). According to this view, only those who could establish good and robust businesses in Turkey, who could speak Turkish, who could have education in Turkey, and those with high education level and socio-economic status believe they have a future in Turkey.

- "Syrians who have good jobs do believe (in a future), but people like us do not have any hopes for future." Ankara -Artisans/Employees
- "We do not see a future for ourselves but of course our children have a future in Turkey." Gaziantep-Women
- "Syrians who have good work conditions believe they have a future. We are struggling to have a good future in Turkey. Even at this age I started learning Turkish." Gaziantep-Woman
- "I do not think the adults are planning a future, but our children believe they have a future here." Hatay-Women

Future Considerations of Syrians in Turkey and Their Future Expectations: Syrians who have future expectations in Turkey were asked **"what type of future" they are dreaming of in this country.** Most participants surely said they are dreaming of a future where they can live safely and comfortably. However, according to most of these participants, it's not in their hands to construct such a future. This suggests that for his future to become real depends on the state to show such an intention and take required measures and implement the necessary regulations. Within this context, expectations of Syrians from the Turkish state and society include their acceptance as part of this society and to be recognized as individuals who have equal rights and duties with the other components of the society.

- **"We're dreaming of living with the Turkish people in the same environment in peace, to have good work conditions, and to live fearlessly in Turkey." Ankara-Women**
- **"To live together peacefully. To work and study under fair and equitable conditions." Ankara-Women**
- "If we obtain Turkish citizenship and become equal with the Turkish people a very good future in Turkey is awaiting us. We are dreaming of becoming equal with the Turkish people and to go abroad, to the world freely and easily." Ankara-Women

- **"If Syrians continue to be active individuals, some of them will have very good lives in Turkey."** Gaziantep-Women
- **"We are dreaming of a future and life where no one will tell us 'you're Syrian'."** Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- **"They want to be equal with the Turkish people and to have the same rights."** Hatay-Women
- **"We are imagining a very good future. We've had a new experience and learned a new language here. Everyone has gained something new and improved themselves. Syrians are dreaming for better experiences and working at better jobs"** Hatay-Women
- **"I think Syrians will live with the Turkish society in full integration. Now that Turkey has put our children together with Turkish children, in schools, the new generation has become Turkish and they will be."** Istanbul-Women

18. Concerns/Anxieties of the Turkish Society

Since 2011, the Syrians, with a population counted in millions, have been living in Turkey approximately for the last 4,5 years.

This "common life", lasting unexpectedly long, as you see in the SB study, does not reduce the anxieties of the Turkish society, but on the contrary increases them. So the questions of how much these anxieties reflect on the Syrians and "to what extent they can have empathy with the Turkish society" have significance. For this reason, the question of "In your opinion, to what extent does the Turkish society have the following anxieties about Syrians?" has been developed to understand how Syrians assess the six basic anxieties that emerge in local communities in all mass humanitarian movements. The responses to this question suggest that Syrians do not assess almost any of these anxieties high enough. However, these anxieties overlap with the order of the Turkish society's responses. Syrians have most strongly -- with a rate of 39,8-36,8% -- stressed the Turkish society's anxiety of "losing jobs because of Syrians". Other anxieties assessed less strongly by Syrians include security, challenges faced/will be faced in benefiting from public services, political rights, deciding on Turkey's future through citizenship and destroying the identity of the Turkish society.

SB-2019-TABLE 126: To what extent does Turkish society have the following concerns because of Syrians? (%)

#		Not worried at all	Not worried	Com-bined Not worried	Neither worried, nor not worried	Worried	Very worried	Com-bined Worried	No idea/ no response
1	Losing their jobs because of Syrians	16,0	20,8	36,8	11,8	33,6	6,2	39,8	11,6
2	Security problems Syrians would cause	18,5	26,8	45,3	10,9	26,6	5,1	31,7	12,1
3	Reduction in public services because of Syrians	18,4	25,9	44,3	14,5	21,3	5,2	26,5	14,7
4	Concerns on Syrians' political participation (elections)	17,3	21,9	39,2	13,1	20,0	3,1	23,1	24,6
5	Concerns that Syrians will obtain Turkish citizenship and have a say in Turkey's future/fate	19,0	23,3	42,3	13,0	15,8	2,2	18,0	26,7
6	Concerns that Syrians would damage the identity Turkish society	20,2	28,6	48,8	12,3	14,9	1,8	16,7	22,2

SB-2019-TABLE 127: To what extent does Turkish society have the following concerns because of Syrians? (Score)

		SB-2017
1	Losing their jobs because of Syrians	2,6
2	Security problems Syrians would cause	2,4
3	Reduction in public services because of Syrians	2,3
Average Score		2,1
4	Concerns on Syrians' political participation (elections)	2,0
5	Concerns that Syrians would damage the identity Turkish society	1,8
6	Concerns that Syrians will obtain Turkish citizenship and have a say in Turkey's future/fate	1,8

0-2,99 3,0-5,0

SB-2019-TABLE 128: To what extent does Turkish society have the following concerns because of Syrians? (Score)

	Losing their jobs because of Syrians	Security problems Syrians would cause	Reduction in public services because of Syrians	Concerns on Syrians' political participation (elections)	Concerns that Syrians would damage the identity Turkish society	Concerns that Syrians will obtain Turkish citizenship and have a say in Turkey's future/fate	Average Score
Sex							
Female	2,9	2,6	2,6	2,0	1,8	1,7	2,3
Male	2,4	2,2	2,0	2,0	1,8	1,8	2,0
Age Group							
18-24	2,5	2,4	2,2	1,9	1,8	1,8	2,1
25-34	2,6	2,3	2,3	2,0	1,9	1,9	2,2
35-44	2,8	2,5	2,3	2,0	1,8	1,8	2,2
45-54	2,6	2,4	2,0	1,9	1,8	1,7	2,1
55-64	2,3	2,2	2,1	1,8	1,8	1,6	2,0
65 +	2,3	2,3	2,4	1,8	1,6	1,5	2,0
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate	2,6	2,3	2,2	1,7	1,7	1,5	2,0
Literate but not graduate of any school	2,8	2,5	2,4	2,5	2,0	2,2	2,4
Primary school	2,6	2,3	2,2	1,8	1,7	1,7	2,0
Middle school	2,8	2,5	2,3	2,0	1,9	1,9	2,2
High-school or equivalent	2,6	2,5	2,3	2,0	1,9	1,9	2,2
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	2,8	2,7	2,5	2,3	1,9	2,0	2,4
University/Graduate degree/PhD	2,2	2,0	2,0	2,0	1,9	1,9	2,0
Region							
Border cities	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,0	2,0	1,9	2,2
Other cities	2,7	2,2	2,3	1,9	1,6	1,6	2,1
Metropolitan cities	2,8	2,3	2,4	1,9	1,5	1,5	2,1
Non-metropolitan cities	2,4	2,0	2,1	1,9	1,8	1,9	2,0
Genel	2,6	2,4	2,3	2,0	1,8	1,8	2,1

0-2,99 3,0-5,0

FGD Findings: Understanding Turkish Society's Concerns

All Syrian participants in FGDs mentioned that they know the Turkish society has specific anxieties and concerns about millions of Syrians who came to Turkey. Although the participants find these concerns fair, or to put it more correctly, they understand why Turkish people have such concerns; they said they do not find it fair when Turkish citizens, because of these concerns, treat all Syrians in a negative way. For Syrians, there are some factors affecting the formation and spread of such anxieties and concerns. According to the participants, the most important ones are as follows: (i) lack of communication between the members of the two communities and generalizing negative acts of some community members to the whole group; (ii) lack of information provided by media and state to the Turkish society, and filling of this gap by disinformation or by those with the aim of provocation (iii) with the recently intensified economic crisis period, increased competition between Turkish citizens and Syrians, and lastly, (iv) societal and cultural reasons.

(i) For most of the participants, the most important reason why Turkish society has a negative perception of Syrians and consequently develops anxieties is that the **two communities do not sufficiently know each other and that they do not interact enough**. According to this view, if Syrians could communicate with the Turkish people and explained themselves, then it could not be expected from the Turkish citizens to develop these anxieties. Also, the participants from time to time assess that Turkish people's consideration of some outburst acts of Syrian youth or individuals -- which they also do not approve -- as if they represent all Syrians is a misfortune.

(ii) Another main reason of increasing anxieties and concerns of Turkish citizens is, according to the participants, is that the **media and the government since the beginning of the crisis could not sufficiently explain to the Turkish society the process about the Syrians**. This view suggests that while the media in Turkey could not sufficiently inform the public about the Syrians, it also remained silent to the untrue and defamatory news on Syrians and to the process during which the Turkish public was gradually antagonized with the Syrians due to the provocative and disinformative news.

(iii) Another mentioned reason the Turkish society has increasing concerns about Syrians is the Turkey's **economic challenges and the crisis environment**. According to this view, the increasing inflation and unemployment due to Turkey's economic conditions are blamed on the Syrians and are shown as such. For many Turkish citizens, this makes the Syrians the scapegoat of all these conditions. The participants rejected the blaming of Syrians for the economic crisis, and said the Syrians in Turkey contribute to the economy and that the Syrians are more adversely affected by the effects of the crisis compared to the Turkish people.

(iv) Lastly, according to the participants, another factor making the Turkish citizens concerned is **the anxiety that the Syrians would create changes in their societal and cultural lives and as well as identities**. As mentioned in the above sections, most Turkish citizens see Syrians culturally very distant and very different. Similarly, most Syrians think that they have significant cultural differences with the Turkish people.

19. Turkish Society's Behavior towards Syrians

In the culture of peaceful coexistence, grounds of emotional relations might be as important as physical infrastructure. When they arrived in Turkey, Syrians were welcome with extraordinary support and solidarity. Although the number of Syrians has exceeded 3.6 million, the Turkish society -- despite their concerns -- still provides this solidarity, "the societal acceptance". This is extremely important. However, how Syrians assess the way Turkish society treats them is also a significant issue. This issue without any doubt an area of perception. So, the assessments would remain speculative.

The Syrians were asked the question "In your opinion, how does the Turkish society treat Syrians" with a "multiple answer" system, and the answers in general point out to a positive condition. According to the 63.3% of Syrians, "Turkish society embraced the Syrians". This is followed by the answer "Turkish society does everything it can" with a 42.7% of the respondents. The rest of the 3 answers includes negative correspondence. While the percentage of those who support the view "Turkish society exploit the Syrians as cheap labor" are 35.3, those who think "Turkish society treats the Syrians badly" make 8.3% of the respondents, with number of those who believe "Turkish society looks down on Syrian" correspond to a percentage of 3.8% The picture in general can be considered "positive".

SB-2019-TABLE 129: How do you think the Turkish society treats Syrians? (%) (Multiple Choice)

	#	%
Turkish society embraced Syrians	898	63,3
Turkish society does everything it can for Syrians	605	42,7
Turkish society exploits Syrians as cheap labor	500	35,3
Turkish society treats Syrians badly	117	8,3
Turkish society looks down on Syrians	54	3,8
No idea/no response	110	7,8

According to 63,3% of Syrians, “Turkish society embraced Syrians” and 42,7% of them think “Turkish society does everything it can for Syrians”. These two “positive” statements are more strongly supported more by men rather than by women, and more in metropolitan cities compared to other regions.

Whereas support to negative statements come from Syrians with lower level of education and those living in metropolitan cities.

SB-2019-TABLE 130: How do you think the Turkish society treats Syrians? (%) (Multiple Choice)

	Turkish society embraced Syrians	Turkish society does everything it can for Syrians	Turkish society exploits Syrians as cheap labor	Turkish society treats Syrians badly	The Turkish people humiliate Syrians	No idea/no response
Sex						
Female	55,7	39,4	44,6	11,3	6,1	7,8
Male	68,0	44,6	29,5	6,4	2,4	7,7
Age Group						
18-2	60,4	42,0	32,7	10,6	4,1	9,0
25-34	63,7	37,1	34,9	8,6	4,0	7,2
35-44	64,5	49,1	38,7	6,7	3,2	6,4
45-54	62,9	42,7	39,9	9,0	5,1	9,6
55-64	64,3	46,4	23,8	3,6	1,2	11,9
65 +	65,7	48,6	25,7	11,4	5,7	2,9
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	39,1	34,5	51,7	9,2	1,1	8,0
Literate but not graduate of any school	38,4	32,9	54,8	9,6	4,1	5,5
Primary school	65,7	37,3	33,8	6,4	4,7	12,3
Middle school	68,0	46,2	35,4	10,8	4,5	5,0
High-school or equivalent	67,1	42,0	35,2	11,4	3,2	7,8
2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	56,1	70,2	31,6	1,8	3,5	5,3
University/Graduate degree/PhD	67,3	46,9	24,5	4,6	2,6	5,1
Region						
Border cities	60,6	49,2	22,1	6,0	0,9	10,6
Other cities	67,5	32,5	55,7	11,7	8,3	3,4
Metropolitan cities	68,2	29,1	56,0	12,0	10,1	4,1
Non-metropolitan cities	66,1	39,2	55,0	11,1	4,8	2,1
General	63,3	42,7	35,3	8,3	3,8	7,8

FGD Findings: Behavior of Turkish society towards Syrians

Responses of Syrians in FGDs of SB-2019 on this issue puts a more critical attitude compared to the survey responses:

Turkish society treats Syrians badly: Most participants mentioned that they were not happy about the way they are treated by the Turkish society. Almost all of these participants, although saying that there are people in the Turkish society treating them both well and badly, think that most Turkish citizens do not like or accept Syrians. According to the same participants, this unacceptance and dislike might be due to the fact that Syrians came to Turkey in a very short period of time or due to a reflection of the attitude to the Arabs based on historical reasons.

Turkish Society Exploits Syrians: Some participants created a sub-title of bad behaviors of Turkish citizens towards Syrians, claiming that the Turkish citizens exploit the sensitive and fragile conditions that Syrians are in. Providing different examples, the participants said such exploitation is mostly and more frequently observed in the jobs that Syrians are made to work as cheap labor and higher-than-normal rent amounts they are asked for the homes they live in.

Turkish society treats Syrians well: Participants who think Turkish society treats Syrians well usually give examples based on their own experience and relations that the Turkish society treats them in a friendly manner, helping Syrians, embracing them as one of their own people

Some Turkish people treat Syrians well, while some treat them badly: For some participants, it is not possible to provide a specific answer to this question. In other words, for them, it is not possible to generalize how Turkish citizens treat Syrians, and as in every country and society, in Turkey and among the Turkish people there are both good and bad people, tolerant and intolerant ones, as well as those who discriminate others.

Syrians determine how Turkish citizens treat them: According to another opinion, the actual factor determining how Turkish citizens behave/will behave is not the character of the Turkish people, but the profile of Syrians and how Syrians approach the Turkish citizens. For these participants, if Syrians can speak Turkish and are willing to communicate with the Turkish people and take the first initiative, the Turkish people will definitely treat them well.

20. General Findings of FGDs: Experience of Syrians in Turkey

Under the FGD section of SB-2019, the Syrian participants' perceptions of the Turkish society were analyzed under different titles. In this section, some general opinions and perceptions out of more specific experiences discussed in FGDs are analyzed. Categorizing these experiences, particularly within the context of cities, women and students, provides important clues.

Approaches of residents in cities to the Syrians

This question is asked for hearing about approaches of residents of different cities to Syrians. Different answers are detailed below, some of the common answers can be underlined as follows: (i) First of all, the participants stressed that they had a variety of experience. As in all cities, they said there are both "good" and "bad" people in the cities they lived, and so there are both types of people treating them well or badly. (ii) Most participants mentioned that city residents at the beginning of the crisis had more positive approaches, while in time their approaches turned out to be negative. (iii) Consistent with prior discussions, a significant part of the participants said the discriminatory and hate speech cases that they've been subject to have risen recently.

Approach of Ankara residents to the Syrians according to the Syrians in Ankara

- "Initially everyone embraced us, they liked us very much, and helped us. But now they changed and in time they started to become distant." Ankara-Women

- *"Like everywhere. Some are very good, some are distant, and some do not like us at all. We would want to be friends and in contact with them but we do not talk as we do not know Turkish."* Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- *"Not everyone behaves the same, but now tensions and unacceptance are more common. Ankara-Women*

Approach of Gaziantep residents to the Syrians according to the Syrians in Gaziantep

- *"In the beginning they helped us a lot and opened their homes to us."* Gaziantep-Women
- ***"In the past, it was better, now they are bored from us and they discriminate against us a lot."*** Gaziantep-Women
- *"I love the people of Gaziantep. They opened their homes to us when the war started. Even those in unavailable conditions supported the Syrians. I will never forget this. Now maybe some people hate us but I am grateful that they had helped us."* Gaziantep-Women
- *"It is the same everywhere, except Gaziantep, some are good, some are bad. We could adapt to them as it is the border region and they are like us."* Gaziantep-Women
- ***"They always ask us why we do not fight in Syria, and when we reply they do ot like our response, and think that we are cowards."*** Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- ***"I took a taxi yesterday and the driver asked me if I was with the PKK, al-Nusra or Free Syrian Army. We did not flee because we are cowards, we could have weapons if we wanted but we would shoot other Syrians with them. They still do not get this, or they do not want to understand."*** Gaziantep-NGO Workers

Approach of Istanbul residents to the Syrians according to the Syrians in Istanbul

- *"Some of them are very good, some bad. Some supported us a lot, while some extremely hate us. As I am a Syrian, I remain silent to many wrong behaviors, but I would not have remained silent like this if I had not been a Syrian."* Istanbul-Women
- ***"Some got bored from us as our residency has extended. I think Turkish people respect foreigners, as long as they are not Syrians."*** Istanbul-Women
- ***"They usually do not accept the Syrians and they do not like them. But there is not such a thing among the students, I really get along well with my Turkish friends at the university."*** Istanbul-Students
- *"Turkish people do not like us much as the number of Syrians in Istanbul is high. And also Syrians do not have good relations among themselves, how would they have good relations with the Turkish people?"* Istanbul-Students

Approach of Hatay residents to the Syrians according to the Syrians in Hatay

- *"Some of them helped us a lot, some remained impartial, but now discrimination and intolerance have started to rise. Our relations with neighbors are very good, in general we still do not have big problems with the people of Hatay."* Hatay-Women
- *"Some Syrians have wrong behaviors and for that reason I think people in Hatay are distant to us. I think Turkey's politicians play a big role in this."* Hatay-Women

Living Experience in this City as a Syrian

When the respondents were asked of their living experience in respective cities they were living, they responded as in the following:

Living in Ankara as a Syrian

- *"I would earn more if I work in Gaziantep, because more Syrians live there and the*

- Turkish people do not prefer us." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
- "I would have less job opportunities if I lived in Gaziantep or in cities with high number of Syrians. When I first arrived, I stayed in Kilis. It is harder to find a job there for a Syrian. Ankara may not be a relevant city for artisans but much better for workers like us." Ankara-Artisans/Employees
 - "It is better for us to live in Ankara than in other cities, because the number of Syrians is lower and there are more job opportunities." Ankara- Women
 - "Ankara is better for us compared to other cities. They treat us very well and in a careful manner maybe because it's the capital. There have been more tensions and fights in other cities. If I stay in Turkey I want to continue living in Ankara." Ankara-Women
 - "I live very comfortably here. I would not want to live in Istanbul. I think there are real Turkish people here. Istanbul is too crowded and full of foreigners." Ankara-Women

Living in Gaziantep as a Syrian

- "In the past it was better but now it started to be like Syria and we have started to be scared. My son sometimes comes home late as he is a hairdresser, and a few times he was verbally harassed by Turkish people. We are now afraid of walking in the Street, especially at nights." Gaziantep-Women
- "Both the advantage and disadvantage of living here is related to high number of Syrians living here. **Turkish people discriminate against us as our number is high, and as some Syrians have wrong behaviors, the Turkish people make generalizations.**" Gaziantep-Women
- "**There are too many Syrians here, and for that I am planning to change the city I live in.** I want to live in a city like Ankara or Istanbul. The residents there are much better and more intellectual." Gaziantep-NGO Workers
- "**In Gaziantep, those from Aleppo live the most. As I am from Deiru Zor, I am having hard time adopting to them and not getting along well.** So, if I live in another city, I'll be happier and also have more job opportunities." Gaziantep-NGO Workers

Living in Hatay as a Syrian

- "Police in Hatay treat us badly. We feel like criminals here, we particularly feel very bad when they take our photos with our IDs." Hatay-Woman
- "Even if we are close, some people in Hatay do not even greet us." Hatay-Women
- "The positive aspect of living in Hatay is that we speak Arabic freely everywhere, but some are uncomfortable because of our headscarves, and discriminate against us." Hatay-Women
- "Because we are living in the border region, police always stop us. Sometimes the ID checks take longer than an hour. Syrians living in Istanbul and Gaziantep do not have this much trouble." Hatay-Artisans/Employees
- "Hatay is very much like Syria, the lifestyles are the same and we can talk Arabic with the Turkish people, so for us, it's easier to live in Hatay." Hatay-Women

Living in Istanbul as a Syrian

- "I initially lived in Mersin. Mersin is very different than Istanbul. There are more job opportunities in Istanbul. If I lived in a city different than Istanbul, maybe I wouldn't think so differently. Here, life is both more difficult and better for me." Istanbul-Women
- "There are more services in Istanbul. My daughter lives in Bursa, and cannot benefit from many services (NGO, trainings, municipality activities, etc.) There are more scholarship opportunities here. We feel like we are in Europe here." Istanbul-Women

- *"There are more job opportunities, universities and services in Istanbul. I think Istanbul is better than Ankara for us in these respects. Also, there are more job opportunities for workers, and the salaries are higher here. The health services in Istanbul are also better compared to many other cities." Istanbul-Women*
- *"It's very difficult to live in Istanbul. It's both expensive and it's hard to get used to it. But it's better for our kids and husbands." Istanbul-Women*

Experience and Problems Specific to Women and Students in Participant Groups

Syrian Women and Their Problems

In Syrian women FGDs conducted in all four cities, the participants were first asked the problems they experience as Syrian women.

- ***"Like other Syrians, our biggest problem is discrimination. Our clothing style and headscarves give away that we are Syrians, and we are subject to more discrimination than men in the streets." Ankara-Women***
- ***"We are the ones having the most difficulty in integrating, because we do not go out too often, and do not communicate with Turkish people." Ankara-Women***
- *"Syrian women living in Turkey have no rights. We always stay behind our husbands." Gaziantep-Women*
- *"In Turkey, especially for refugees, men are always superior. Syrian women who are divorced or lost their husbands cannot even have ID cards for their children here (Only men can do that). If Syrian women want to get divorced, nobody provides support to them. Syrian women in Turkey know nothing about their rights." Gaziantep-Women*
- ***"Syrian women living in Turkey are subject to many harassments." Hatay-Women***
- *"On the streets, in transportation, and in bazaars, because of our clothing style and headscarf they harass us too much." Hatay-Women*
- ***"Turkish women do not communicate with us, because they are jealous. They fear that Syrian women would get their men." Hatay-Women***

Are there differences between the experience of women and men?

- *"In Syria, women generally did not work. Syrian women have started to work in Turkey. Now 60% of them work in Turkey, and therefore they have the same experience as men do, there is no difference." Ankara-Women*
- *"Syrian women have become more free here. They can more comfortably go around, get education and work. Not everyone would do that in Syria. They respect to women who study in Turkey or the Syrian women and they encourage them to get education." Ankara-Women*
- *"The children and men have integrated the most, they know Turkish and they also communicate with the Turkish people every day." Gaziantep-Women*
- *"It is definitely forbidden for our girls and women to work. We would want to work but our husbands do not accept this. So, we are not able to integrate much as men do". Gaziantep-Women*
- *"Syrian women in Turkey are now aware that they should also work like Syrian men. In Syria, the society would not accept this." Istanbul-Women*

Policy Recommendations aimed at Syrian Women

- ***"There is no policy specific to Syrian women. The state should help the Syrian women work and study." Ankara-Women***
- *"I think there should be laws and regulations specific to Syrian women. Our women are very intelligent and smart, and so they should continue their education, and work for the business world." Ankara-Women*
- *"More rights should be given to Syrian women, particularly to mothers and divorced*

women. Some Syrian men can easily take the children away from their mothers when they get divorced." Hatay-Women

- "Many NGOs provide trainings on rights of refugee women, but **Syrian women are victims in many issues, because they do not know their rights.**" Hatay-Women

Syrian students: Experience of Being a Syrian Student in Turkey

- "There is no extra negative aspect of being a Syrian student. We only have the same problems as other foreign students." Istanbul-Students
- "Some professors do not talk to us as they talk to other students, because we are Syrian, and they do not respond our questions." Istanbul-Students
- "I feel like other students at the university, and I do not see a difference." Istanbul-Students
- "As I studied in Jordan, I think, as a Syrian, it is better to study in Turkey and it has many advantages. Here, foreign students are treated the same and everyone is equal. Turkish people respect us more as we are students." Istanbul-Students
- "Good, but we do not study the majors we want, and the equivalency process is harder in Turkey compared to other countries." Istanbul-Students

What do the Syrian students plan after their education?

- "I want to stay in Turkey and work here." Istanbul-Students
- "I also want to work in Turkey. We have more work opportunities and advantages here as we also have our education here" Istanbul-Students



Photo: Ivor Prickett

Main Research Findings

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

7

V. SYRIAN BAROMETER-2019 (SB-2019): MAIN FINDINGS

The number of Syrians who sought asylum in Turkey since 29 April 2011 having escaped the crisis, chaos and war in their country has exceeded 3 million 576 thousand as of 31.12.2019. A completely unprecedented sociological context has emerged that has gone beyond all the expectations that existed in the beginning. The tendency as well as the possibility for return of Syrians, whose number corresponds to 4.36% of Turkey's current population of 82 million, has been decreasing by the day due to the continuing crisis in Syria. Even though Turkey has never been a stranger to significant international human movements throughout its history, a movement of this great magnitude is a first for the country and the 'social shock' that it has created is generating serious anxieties within the Turkish society. Today, almost all of the Syrians are living outside of the camps and alongside the Turkish society all across the country. Despite the challenges brought by this huge volume and the unexpected nature of this whole process, the almost 9 years of "compulsory cohabitation" has passed in a context of extraordinary solidarity and lack of conflict. The greatest credit for this belongs, undoubtedly, to the Turkish society. However, it needs to be noted that there has been a serious erosion in the extraordinarily high levels of social acceptance of the Turkish society over the years and the anxieties are on the rise. Concerning the Syrians, it can be said that their lives in Turkey are becoming more naturalized every day, through an unnamed and multifaceted "self-integration" process that is underway. In a context where Syrians' average duration of stay in Turkey has exceeded 4.5 years; more than 520 thousand Syrian babies were born in the country between 2011 and 2019; around 670 thousand Syrian children have been integrated into Turkish education system and schooled in Turkey; tens of thousands of Syrian university students have enrolled to Turkish universities; over 1 million Syrians are actively involved in the working life; and the "pull" factors in Turkey as well as the "push" factors in Syria continue to be strengthened over the years, it can be observed that Syrians in Turkey are increasingly planning their lives on the presumption of a more permanent stay. In fact, one of the most interesting findings of this research is the growing mutual foresight, in both Turkish and Syrian communities, of permanent stay of Syrians in Turkey. Undoubtedly, this common "foresight" does not mean that the expectations and preferences are overlapping.

The Syrian Barometer is an academic study that aims to identify the relationship between the Syrians in Turkey and the Turkish society through comprehensive surveys and focus group discussions conducted with both of these social groups and to provide policy recommendations based on its findings. The main objective of this research is to shed light on the actual experiences in the social field and, if cohabitation is inevitable, to establish a "framework for harmonious cohabitation" based on its empirical findings. This study aims to obtain as much data as possible through comprehensive fieldwork and interpret this data using an academic perspective and vigorous methods. The main focus of the research is on the perceptions of both social groups. Therefore, the responses obtained from both social groups may, and in fact do, contain statements that do not correspond to actual facts. These different views, however, are very important to note in order to understand the social perceptions and this study made every effort possible to uncover the social realities through a sober analysis of all the findings. Focus group discussions were conducted in order to test the survey findings as well as to substantiate these findings for a deeper and more detailed understanding. For these reasons, even though the Syrian Barometer is a continuously conducted study which is the most comprehensive of its kind in Turkey that has been trying to shed light on a very dynamic process, it does not presume to present its findings as "absolute truth" in any way whatsoever. In addition, this study does not intend to play either an encouraging or negating role in terms of the permanence of Syrians in Turkey. The study aims to shed light on the realities of the social field, within its academic restrictions, and to produce fact-driven policy recommendations for peaceful cohabitation, if cohabitation becomes inevitable.

The first study in the series, which serves as the precursor of the Syrian Barometer, was conducted in 2014 under the title of "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration". The second comprehensive research, which has served as a direct reference for the present study, was "Syrian Barometer-2017: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey". The Syrian Barometer-2019 research has attempted to engage with the findings of these two previous comprehensive studies, which were based on similarly structured modellings, and to show the changes and developments in social perceptions. The research, which is planned to be repeated annually, aims to contribute in the processes of integration which is fundamentally defined as living peacefully together.

Syrian Barometer-2019 is based on a comprehensive survey and focus group interviews with Syrians, who are under temporary protection and have almost entirely become urban refugees in Turkey, which in turn has become the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world since 2014. In the framework of the research, a survey has been conducted face-to-face with 2.271 Turkish citizens in 26 cities and 1.418 households of Syrians under temporary protection (accessing the information of 6.527 individuals) in 15 cities. The confidence level of the study is 95% and the confidence interval is $\pm 2,6$. The focus group discussions of the research have been conducted in 4 selected cities (i.e. Ankara, İstanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay), with 12 meetings of Turkish citizens and 8 meetings of Syrians conducted in total. The part of the study that covers Syrians was conducted with Syrians who live outside of the camps and who are under temporary protection in terms of their legal status in Turkey. The survey was completed in April-May 2019, while the focus groups were held in July-August 2019. In order for the findings to be more meaningful and understood more clearly, the survey sample was selected in consideration of the diversity stemming from sex, age, place of residence (i.e. border cities/metropolitan cities¹⁴⁹/others), educational attainment, occupation, ethnic background and political orientation of the respondents. The findings were evaluated and analyzed accordingly, and responses from different groups are presented in this report through additional cross-tabulations where relevant.

The SB-2019 final report was then submitted to the attention and evaluations of the members of the Academic Advisory Board, which is composed of academic experts with valuable studies on various subjects in social sciences and public opinion research, and the report was then finalized taking their comments and recommendations into consideration.

The main findings of SB-2019, which were also evaluated in comparison to the findings of SB-2017 where possible and/or relevant, can be summarized as follows:

- Even though the extraordinary level of support and solidarity displayed by the Turkish society towards Syrians continue and it can still be said that there is a high level of - albeit increasingly fragile - social acceptance, **there appears to be a considerable decrease in the level of acceptance and solidarity, with an increase in society's anxieties.** In other words, the acceptance of Turkish society has largely turned into "toleration".
- Even though it is in a decreasing trend, SB-2019 came up with findings, like the previous two studies (2014-2017) did, that there is still a **very high level of social acceptance** in the Turkish society regarding Syrians. This claim of high level of social acceptance depends on the facts that: the past 9 years of living together were largely smooth and peaceful; politicization of the issue had been to a very limited extent; there were no significant reactions in practice against Syrians from the mainstream society; Syrians have managed to open up some space in every facet of life for themselves; and they appear to feel safer and more content with their lives in Turkey every passing day.
- The **hopes and determinations of Syrians in Turkey to return is diminishing** partly because of the fact that the war and instability is still going on in Syria. **Equally importantly,** the normalization of the lives they have established over the years in Turkey is **strengthening the tendency to stay permanently.**
- The Turkish society has amply demonstrated that it has **anxieties concerning the prospects of Syrians' permanent stay** in the country, which it doesn't want irrespective of the political, socio-economic and regional differences. There is almost a consensus among the Turkish society on the desirability of Syrians' return to Syria or moving on to a third country. It can be suggested that Turkish society's support towards Syrians, which remained strong for a long time, has significantly been eroded. **The growing anxieties** among society concerning Syrians are also causing **an increasing politicization of the process.**
- SB-2019 has implemented the social distance measurement scales developed by E. S. Bogardus. There appears to be a significant divergence in the way the Turkish society perceives Syrians and in the way Syrians perceive the Turkish society. While the Turkish society displays a remarkably high level of "social distance" towards Syrians which is measured at a score of **-0,51 ("distant")**, Syrians were found to take a much more positive position towards the Turkish society with a social distance score of **+0,74 ("very close")**. It is important to note that Turkish society's social distance towards Syrians has been growing in time despite the growing practice of living together through time and the fact that there were not significant social, economic, and security problems caused by Syrians. The opposite observation can be made concerning Syrians' social distance towards Turkish society, which appears to further shrink as time passes.
- The **importance of a sense of cultural closeness** or affinity becomes more pronounced during **times of crisis.** This has certainly been the case concerning Syrians in Turkey, the notion of "Ensar-Muhacir"¹⁵⁰ solidarity was invoked frequently with religious and cultural references. In other words, it may be suggested that the religious and cultural factors have had a significant place in the support that the Turkish society displayed towards Syrians. However, when the context moved past being an emergency through time, the numbers grew beyond being "manageable" and prospects of a permanent cohabitation became more prominent, these cultural referents appear to have started to lose their traction and even replaced by an attitude of otherization. **The Turkish society that enthusiastically showed solidarity with people who were in a difficult position, rejects a common future and permanent cohabitation by clearly stating that it is not ready for such an eventuality** through its anxieties and demands.

150 Both Arabic words, Ensar refers to the Muslims who helped Prophet Mohammed during his migration from Mecca to Medina; while Muhacir literally means migrant.

- It appears that in the medium and long terms, **more than cultural closeness, it is the numerical size and the existing capacity** that become the determinant factors in terms of living together and integration. While manageable numbers and short social interactions don't disturb the local society, the numbers and durations of stay that exceed the confines of "being a guest" bring along anxieties.
- The large and growing number of Syrians leaves different effects on the Turkish society and Syrians in Turkey. The Turkish society is increasingly concerned in the face of rising numbers in terms of security problems, expenses, disruption in public services, loss of identity, and "uncontrollability". From Syrians' perspective, however, even though there is considerable cultural, ethnic, and religious inner diversity; a growing Syrian community means a stronger Syrian identity in Turkey and growing solidarity networks. These networks provide Syrians with a secure space to establish and sustain their lives within "their own society". Regions that are settled by a large number of Syrians became attractive in this context for other Syrians, as explained by concepts such as "chain" migration in the literature. As long as they can satisfy most of their needs within their own communities, Syrians' need for the local society diminishes. For the 400 thousand Syrians in Sanliurfa, a city of 2 million; or for the 1 million Syrians in Istanbul; or for the 100 thousand Syrians in Kilis with a 125-thousand population, the comfort and security of being able to live within their own community degenerates the motivation, alongside with practical necessity, of Syrians interact with the local society or learn its language. It is exactly this point where the emerging social networks and solidarity enhance the emerging anxieties among the local society. It may therefore be suggested that reason for the divergent findings, i.e. increasing anxieties among the Turkish society and growing satisfaction, happiness, and confidence among Syrians, is the growing numbers and the ensuing networks.
- The perception of "**cultural closeness**" is very different among the Turkish society than it is among Syrians, just like it was the case with perception of social distance. Among the Turkish society, the rate of those who disagreed with the statement that there is cultural closeness between Syrians and the Turkish society has grown from 80,2% in SB-2017 to **81,9%** in SB-2019. The same figure was found to be 70,6% in 2014. This shows that there is a trend of increase in Turkish society's objection to the existence of a cultural closeness. Also interestingly, this objection is stronger in the border cities that have a more similar cultural fabric with that of Syrians. For Syrians, in contrast, there is a very clear cultural closeness between the Turkish society and Syrians. The share of those who believed that Syrians are culturally close to the Turkish society is **56,8%**.
- Despite the growing concerns mentioned by the Turkish society and the significant social distance, **Syrians declare that they feel themselves better in every sphere, especially safer, more at peace, and happier in Turkey.** As one of the most significant and precise findings of SB-2019 compared to the findings of SB-2017, this conclusion is reinforced by the answers of Syrians to many different questions.
- **The determination of Syrians to return to Syria is quickly running out.** While the percentage of Syrians who said "they do not plan to return to Syria under any circumstances" was 16,7% in SB-2017, the same percentage has risen to 51,8% in SB-2019. In the same way, the share of Syrians who said "I would return to Syria if the war ends and an administration as we desire is established" was %59,6 in SB-2017, while the same group only makes up 30,3% of the Syrian respondents in SB-2019. In other words, while the hopes of return are becoming weaker, the decision to become permanent in Turkey gets equally stronger.
- The initial expectations of the Syrians that were forced to leave their county were to see a change of administration and securing of stability in Syria. It is understood that a significant mental transformation has taken place among Syrians especially after 2014 when IS had become more active and the administration had secured its place. **Future plans of Syrians are increasingly becoming independent of the developments within Syria.** This appears to mean that, even if a solution is quickly reached in Syria, it will have a limited effect on Syrians' tendency to return.

- The SB study shows that a part of Turkish society's anxieties and complaints concerning the Syrians stems from **incomplete and incorrect information and partly perceptions**. While underlining the need for a reliable and regular communication strategy towards the Turkish society, this situation appears to constitute a significant handicap for social cohesion.
- The views of the Turkish society on how the Syrians make their living in Turkey exemplifies the problems with misinformation and managing the perceptions. Since December 2016, funded by the EU, SUY assistance (Kızılay Kart) of a monthly payment of 120 TL per person is provided for 1.5 million (40,5%) of over 3,5 million Syrians. There is no other financial support program regarding Syrians. According to the Turkish society, however, Syrians are making their livings **through the support of the Turkish state (84,5%) or "begging"**. However, despite minor exceptions and the 1.5 million beneficiaries of the 120 TL SUY assistance and in the absence of any continuous and regular income, Syrians earn their living in Turkey through working.
- Among 12 years old or older Syrians, **38,7% in SB-2017 and 37,9% in SB-2019 suggested that they were actively working under difficult conditions** to make a living. Also confirmed by the ILO study, SB findings suggest that there are around 1 million Syrians who are actively working in Turkey. Among these Syrians who mostly find themselves a space in the informal economy, the share of those who have **continuous and regular employment appears to be 50,2%**. While the share of those who work at **casual (day-to-day) work is 33,6%**, those who suggest that they are **self-employed or employers is 13,7%**. These findings, in fact, show that the economic integration process has significantly been underway.
- It is observed that the Turkish society identifies Syrians largely using **negative concepts**. While the Turkish society overwhelmingly identified Syrians as "victims who escaped war/persecution" in SB-2014 and SB-2017, this response was pushed down to the fourth place in SB-2019 and the most frequently stated identification became "dangerous people who will cause a lot of trouble for us in the future".
- A very high share of 34,1% of the Turkish society responded affirmatively to the question of "Have you ever provided assistance to Syrians in kind or cash?". This shows an extraordinary level of support. However, it is observed that **this support has been decreasing in recent periods**.
- There appears to be a very high level of **anxiety amongst the Turkish society that Syrians will harm** the national economy, morality and serenity in the society, quality of public services, and socio-cultural fabric of the society.
- A general societal anxiety usually experienced in response to mass human mobility is native society's **fear of losing jobs in the face of the incoming cheap labor power**. This point is also popularly discussed in the case of Syrians in Turkey. However, the SB research demonstrates that this anxiety is not considered to be among the top concerns for the Turkish society. The existing 9-year experience has shown that the loss of jobs remained quite limited.
- While the anxieties concerning that Syrians will remain permanently in Turkey and the desire for their return are getting stronger in the Turkish society, the belief that Syrians will return to Syria is remarkably becoming weaker. In the study conducted in 2014, when there were 1.6 million Syrians living in Turkey, the share of those who suggested that they believed all the Syrians would return was 45,1%. This share has decreased significantly to 15,7% in SB-2017 and 9,2% in SB-2019. In other words, even though they don't want it, Turkish respondents believe that Syrians will remain in Turkey permanently. The responses given to the following question, which includes the statement that "We can live with Syrians in harmony/peace", manifest the strength of the anxieties among the Turkish society concerning the future. The share of those who responded positively to this statement was 11,4% in SB-2017, while the same percentage has fallen to 8,6% in SB-2019.
- After more than eight years, almost 80% of the society is sure that at least half of the Syrians will

remain in Turkey. However, despite the common response of “they will be permanent here”, it can be said that **the will to live together is very weak, meaning that there is a “reluctant acceptance” among the Turkish society regarding Syrians**. Looking at the findings of SB-2019, it can be suggested that 81,8% in 2017 and 87,2% in 2019, of the Turkish society don’t look warmly to living together with the Syrians.

- There is a **significant divergence between the answers given by the Turkish society and the Syrians to the questions concerning “integration”**, which were framed similarly to allow for comparison. When asked “To what extent the Syrians have been integrated to the Turkish society/Turkey?”, only 13,2% of the Turkish respondents stated that Syrians were either “completely” or “to a great extent” integrated. In contrast, when the same question was directed at them, a total of **51,6% of the Syrian respondents suggested that integration has taken place either “completely” or “to a large extent”**. Another significant group of respondents, 36,9%, suggested that integration has taken place “partially”. Undoubtedly, these findings should be interpreted keeping in mind the ongoing fundamental discussions concerning “integration into what/whom”.
- In response to the question **“Among the top 10 most important problems of Turkey, where would you place the Syrians?”**, it appears that **more than 60% of the respondents consider the issue to be among the top 3 most important problems** of the country.
- It is obvious that **there is a strong resistance among the Turkish society against giving political rights to Syrians**. The share of those who suggested that “No political rights should be granted” has increased from 85,6% in SB-2017 to 87,1% in SB-2019. In the same framework, the question “How should the issue of granting citizenship to the Syrians be regulated?” was responded with 75,8% in SB-2017 and 76,5% in SB-2019 of the respondents suggesting “None of them should be granted citizenship”.
- As widely known, **one of the biggest structural problems of the Turkish economy is informality**. Informality amongst Turkish citizens, which displays a rising trend in recent years, has been reported at 36,1% by TÜİK in its August 2019 data. This means that at least 10 million Turkish citizens are currently working in the informal economy. **Even though Syrians were given the right to apply for work permits since January 2016, it appears that they mostly work in the informal economy**. To be clear, informality is not sustainable, recommendable - even for the short-term - or even an acceptable situation, either concerning the Turkish citizens or foreigners such as Syrians. In addition, it is structural problem against which the Turkish state has been fighting. However, it is a fact that **informality has been important in keeping a high level of social acceptance and played a crisis-preventing role in Turkey in the short-term through letting Syrians have access to paid work while limiting the level of job loss because of Syrians to a minimum**.
- The responses received for the question that asked Syrians to what extent they experience problems in the spheres of **working conditions, communication, accommodation, nutrition, discrimination, health, and education** show that there was an - albeit limited - decrease in the problems in SB-2019 compared to SB-2017. This suggests that **with their problems getting smaller, Syrians’ satisfaction in Turkey is growing**.
- **The area in which Syrians experience most problems is “working conditions” (36,2%)**. In terms of problem areas, it was followed by communication-language (33,2%), food (26,7%), accommodation (26,2%), discrimination (21,1%), health (17%), and education (7,4%). Similar to what has been found in SB-2017, the SB-2019 findings also suggest that the area with which Syrians in Turkey are most satisfied with is “health services”. It is interesting to note that, in all areas the number of those who suggest experiencing problems is smaller than the number of those who suggest otherwise. In addition, there appears to be an improvement in each problem area.

- Amongst the proposed problem areas, the most important one for the prospects of a peaceful cohabitation is perhaps “discrimination”. **The fact that Syrians placed “discrimination” at the 5th place out of the 7 proposed problem areas** and that the share of those who suggest that they consider “discrimination” as a problem is 21,1% (“we experience a lot of problems” 9 %, “we experience problems” 12,1%), while the percentage of those who don’t consider it as a problem is 61,8% (“we don’t experience problems” 59,8%, “we don’t experience any problems at all” 2%) **can be seen as a cause for optimism.**
- There appears to be **a perception of significant improvement among Syrians** from 2017 to 2019. This finding, which is an important indicator of the fact that reactions towards Syrians are extremely limited and that the level of “social acceptance” towards Syrians is still extraordinarily high despite all of the anxieties and complaints that exist within the Turkish society, is immensely valuable for the construction of a common and peaceful life of the future. These findings also indicate that the Syrians in Turkey - perhaps because they developed a life within their own community and are not informed about the Turkish society - do not strongly feel the negative perceptions and anxieties of the Turkish society concerning themselves.
- When the **“social proximity”** or the **“social distance”** between the Turkish society and the Syrians, whose average duration of stay in Turkey has exceeded 4.5 years, is measured in a comparative way between SB-2017 and SB-2019; there appears to **be an increase in “closeness” and decrease in “distance” in all types of social relationships** in the last two years. This can be seen as an important indicator in the context of how Syrians view living together.
- SB-2019 included several statements that were developed to give some indications concerning the **future prospects/permanency perspectives of Syrians** in Turkey. While the statement “The Syrians would like to stay in Turkey” brought 54% agreement (“I agree” 48,1%, “I completely agree” 5,9%), the combined share of “I disagree” and “I completely disagree” was only 8%. The statement that **“Syrians would like to obtain Turkish citizenship”** returned the most affirmative response from the Syrian respondents. The share of those who agreed with this statement was 63%, while only 5,7% of the respondents reported disagreement with the statement.
- Obviously, **the issue area in which Syrians in Turkey experience most problems is obviously the working life.** This can be seen very clearly from the findings of many different questions in the survey. The three statements that were included to control this finding are: “Syrians get what their labor deserves”, “It is easy for Syrians to work”, and “Turks are exploiting the Syrians”. The strongest response in this context was recorded for the statement “Syrians get what their labor deserves”, with which 43,4% of the respondents disagreed. The quite provocative statement that “Turks are exploiting Syrians” received only a limited level of agreement. 43% of the Syrian respondents suggested that they disagreed with this statement, while the share of those who agreed with it was 20%.
- All these findings indicate a more “positive” outlook than expected concerning the working lives of Syrians, considering the fact that this is the area from which the most serious problems are reported and where formal employment is almost an exception. It is observed that the share of respondents **who believe that Syrians get what their labor deserves, it is easy for them to work, and they are not being exploited is around 40%.** Even more importantly, the findings appear to be improving through time.
- One of the issues that SB research is especially interested in is the question of “how happy” the Syrians in Turkey are. What is more important than that is the changing trend in this feeling. In SB-2017, the percentage of those who “agreed” and “completely agreed” with the statement that **“Syrians are happy in Turkey”** was 33,7%. In SB-2019, this figure has increased to 48,1%. In the same way, while the total share of those who “disagreed” and “completely disagreed” with this statement was 21,9% in SB-2017, it has dropped to 16,4% in SB-2019. Both changes indicate that Syrians increasingly believe that their communities are happier in Turkey and there is a trend in

the positive direction.

- Learning about the opinions of Syrians concerning the **services provided by the Turkish state** and how they are perceived as well as understanding to what extent Syrians have access to various public services essential for their daily lives and measuring how satisfied they are about them are necessary for the effective management of the process. Concerning the support and services provided by the Turkish state in 5 essential fields (health, education, accommodation, nutrition, and financial), the share of those who find them “sufficient” and “very sufficient” was 28,6% in SB-2017, while it has increased to 34,9% in SB-2019. In both studies, the highest degree of satisfaction was mentioned in “health” services with 72% in SB-2017 and 71.8% in SB-2019. The more interesting positive development is observable in relation to “education” services. While in SB-2017 the share of those who found education services sufficient was 58%, it has grown to become 64,6% in SB-2019.
- It is an obvious finding of both SB-2017 and SB-2019 that there is a very high number of Syrians who have a positive perspective on obtaining citizenship in Turkey. When presented with the statement that “Syrians would like to obtain Turkish citizenship”, the percentage of respondents who “agreed” and “completely agreed” was 65,6% in 2017, and 63,4% in 2019. The share of those who disagreed with this statement has decreased from 12,4% in 2017 to 5,7% in 2019. 57,7% of Syrians in Turkey would like to be a double citizen, while 22,6% would like to have only Turkish citizenship. In combination, it can be suggested that **the percentage of Syrians who demand Turkish citizenship is 78,3%**.
- To reach clues concerning the tendency to return, Syrian respondents were asked “In general, which of the following statements best represents your **attitude towards returning to Syria?**”. The most striking finding here is the increase in the share of those who responded by saying “I definitely do not intend to return to Syria”, which was recorded at 16,7% in 2017 and soared up to 51,8% in SB-2019. In a similar vein, the percentage of those who said “I would return, if the war ends and an administration as we desire is established” has decreased, from 59,6% in SB-2017 to 30,3% in SB-2019. Those who suggested that they “[I] would return to Syria if the war ends, even if an administration as we desire is not established” made up of 12,9% in SB-2017, while this percentage has also dropped to 5,5% in SB-2019. All the data collected from the field indicate that the intentions and tendencies of Syrians to return have been dramatically reduced in the last two years.
- At a more concrete level, the Syrians in Turkey were asked the question of “What are your **plans for returning to Syria in the next 12 months?**”. Those who responded to this question by saying that they “do not plan to return to Syria” make up 56,1% of the respondents.
- It is important to look at **the reasons why Syrians do not plan to return**. The survey asked the question “What are the 3 most important reasons for you to not plan returning to Syria?” and respondents were given the chance of providing multiple responses. On the top spot was the response “because it is not a safe place” (42,9%). A related and similar answer was at the second place which was “because the war is still continuing” with a 31,2% frequency amongst all the answers. In other words, **the strongest reasons people have for not considering return are related to security**. It can be suggested that “preventing factors” appear to be dominant here.
- In response to the question “Under what circumstances would you consider to return?”, the most frequently provided answer was “if the war came to an end” with 31,6%. It was followed by “When Syria becomes a safe country” (21,3%), “If there is a safe zone” (10,2%), “If I find a job there” (5,3%), “If the current administration is replaced / the regime changes / stability is achieved” (7,5%), and “If I own a house” (4,5%).
- The tendency of Syrians to resettle in a third country was also inquired by the question “Would you like to move to and settle in a country other than Turkey and Syria?”. Also using multiple

answers, the **most frequently given response to this question with 58,6% was “I definitely would not”**. The frequency of this response was 65,8% in SB-2017. In other words, it can be said that the idea of conditional move suggested by other options has grown. To support this, the frequency of the answer “I would move if I had the opportunity” has increased from 23% to 34,1%. All in all, it appears the rate of those who would be willing to move if opportunities are established has increased.

- **Whether or not Syrians see a future in Turkey for themselves, for their families, or in general for the Syrians** is an important indicator both for assessing their tendencies for permanence and for the integration processes. In this framework, Syrians were asked the question “Do you believe that there is a future in Turkey for yourself, your family and other Syrians?”. The findings suggest that Syrians believe that there is future in Turkey for themselves and for their families with over 60% of the respondents answering affirmatively.
- **For a peaceful cohabitation culture, what is perhaps as important as the legal and physical infrastructure is the emotional background for relations and how the communities mutually understand each other.** When they first arrived in Turkey, the Syrians have witnessed an extraordinary support and solidarity of the Turkish society. Despite the prolonged duration of stay, the fact that their population has grown to 3,57 million, and the emergence of serious anxieties; the Turkish society appears to continue this solidarity or “social acceptance”. This doesn’t mean that the Turkish society is uncomfortable with the presence of Syrians. However, a minimum level of social acceptance is a must for being able to live together despite existing anxieties.
- How the Syrians perceive and evaluate the attitude of Turkish society towards them is also very important. Responded with “multiple answers”, the reactions to the question “In your opinion, how does the Turkish society treat Syrians?” indicate a generally positive context. According to the 63,3% of Syrians, “Turkish society has warmly welcomed Syrians”. This was followed by 42,7% who suggest that “Turkish society has been doing the best they can for Syrians” and 41,8% who stated that “Syrians are grateful to Turkish society”. These findings suggest that the reactions, anxieties, and even the rejection of the Turkish society regarding the Syrians “do not reach” them. In other words, even though it is uncomfortable and concerned, the Turkish society doesn’t significantly project these on the Syrians and still provides a space for a peaceful environment. In fact, this finding can be seen as a strong indicator that the Turkish society still retains a significant level of social acceptance towards over 3,5 million Syrians, who constitute nearly 5% of the national population. In addition to this, it can be suggested that the “lack of information” or “apathy” deriving from living within their own community networks and emerging “ghettoes” might have prevented Syrians being aware of the discomfort that the Turkish society discursively expresses.
- **Sustainability of social acceptance requires effort both from the social groups (Turkish society and Syrians) and from the public institutions.** It should not be forgotten that the mutual perceptions and positions can be quite fragile, and that the positive picture might instantaneously shatter under the influence of major social, economic, and political developments.

Policy Recommendations

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

8

V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Syrian Barometer study aims to take a scientific snapshot on Syrian refugees, who caused what can be termed “a social shock” for Turkey due to its development, volume and duration. Depending on this snapshot, it aims to provide policy recommendations. Its main objective in this sense is to prevent this “social shock” from turning into a trauma and chronic problem which would lead to social segregation and conflict, and to contribute into drawing a framework for a peaceful and honorable cohabitation. What is recommended here as “integration” is used not in a hierarchical and ideologically-biased way, but is meant to refer to “an honorable life together in peace and serenity” that would be established by a rights- and individual-oriented approach.

In this context, depending on the findings of SB-2019 research, the main policy recommendations for various policy fields could be presented as follows:

➤ **TO MOVE BEYOND THE “TEMPORARINESS-PERMANENCE” DUALITY AND TO FOCUS ON THE SOCIAL REALITY:**

What has started in April 2011 with the arrival of first Syrian groups to Turkey, and was seen to be “temporary” by all parties, has undergone a tremendous transformation through time. More than 3,57 million Syrians are now living all across the country, in mostly urban places, and their presence is felt in every facet of life in Turkey. **Turkey’s policy on Syrians**, which has been built since the beginning on the expected transformations within Syria, **has to be revisited considering the sociological realities of the past nearly 9 years and the fact that establishing a peaceful and stable environment within Syria appears to be a remote prospect for the short and medium terms**. When these 9 years are taken into consideration, it can be speculated that any prospective political changes in Syria will have a much more diminished influence on the Syrians in Turkey. If short-term policies are built on **“temporariness”** and with a **“problem-solving”** mentality, there is a very real risk that these may lead to serious social costs in the future, both for the Syrians and the Turkish society.

➤ **THE SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE, WHICH IS FRAGILE AND IN A TREND OF RUNNING OUT, NEEDS TO BE STRENGTHENED:**

Moving on from the facts that tendency of Syrians to become permanent is getting stronger every day and it is increasingly becoming independent of what will happen in Syria, **more policies need to be developed for a peaceful life together**, which should target and encompass not only the Syrians but also the Turkish society. In this context, it is necessary to intensify the efforts to strengthen the level of social acceptance in the Turkish society and make it sustainable.

➤ **“CULTURAL CLOSENESS” MAY PLAY A ROLE FOR SOLIDARITY IN THE BEGINNING BUT AS TIME PASSES NUMERICAL SIZE BECOMES THE DETERMINANT:**

Although it is a fact that religious and cultural affinity exists between the Turkish society and Syrians, society’s perception on this can change with increasing numbers. Therefore, Turkish society’s characterization of Syrians as “a group that is very culturally different from us” can be considered a deliberate reaction. What becomes the determinant factor here is the numerical size, which is seen to have exceeded the manageable levels. While bringing uneasiness among the host society in multiple ways, growing numbers usually increase the self-confidence of the newcomers in the meantime making it possible for them to live within their social networks without needing the host society. This, in turn, could further increase the distance and contribute in the emergence of “parallel societies”. For these reasons, building integration on cultural closeness may be unrealistic and such emotional statements based on the similarity and closeness of the communities may not be found to be satisfying for either of them. Integration policies concerning Syrians should be built on rights, norms, and the centrality of individual, while taking into consideration the capacity of the country and characteristics of the newcomers.

➤ **PREPARATORY WORK NEEDS TO BE UNDERTAKEN ON MULTIPLE OPTIONS AND INCENTIVE POLICIES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR VOLUNTARY RETURN:**

It is necessary **to work simultaneously on alternative scenarios for future concerning**

Syrians whose number has exceeded 3,57 million. Each of the main options, including the **return of Syrians to their home country, their resettlement in a third country and the stay of a large part of them in Turkey, should be developed into dynamic and multiple alternative models** without forgetting that desired policy outcomes can rarely be fully achieved in social reality. Road maps should be prepared for each of the models. Even though it appears that the likelihoods of voluntary return and resettlement in a third country have been significantly weakened, incentive policies encouraging voluntary return should be developed. To what extent such policies will become effective can only be understood following their implementation.

- **A COMMUNICATION STRATEGY BASED ON COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE DEVELOPED:**
 SB studies have shown that a large part of the negative opinions and attitudes concerning Syrians among the Turkish society are based on misleading or incomplete information. It is essential for the Turkish society and Syrians to be regularly informed about the process using accurate and reliable information. Preparation of an urgent and **comprehensive communication strategy** could ease the anxieties that exist in the Turkish society as well as encouraging Syrians' efforts to become a part of the society. **An effective communication strategy based on accurate data** would fight against misinformation and gossiping, which spread very quickly and often through the social media. Such a communication strategy would also be important in terms of bringing transparency to the subject.
- **A "DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH" SHOULD LEAD THE WAY:**
 Whether it is desired or not, the very likely prospects of cohabitation should be built upon a developmental approach that structures this cohabitation in a way that would contribute to every segment in society. A development-based migration-asylum policy could potentially open up a significant new space for the peaceful cohabitation. As it has been emphasized in the 11th Development Plan of the Turkish Republic, a very important starting point for such a policy would be the integration policies.
- **INTEGRATION POLICIES ARE RISKY, THEY ENCOURAGE PERMANENCY; BUT IF PROSPECTS OF PERMANENCY ARE ALREADY STRONG, POSTPONING INTEGRATION POLICIES ARE RISKY:**
 Adopting integration policies for temporary immigrants and especially refugees is not a popular choice for many countries because of the uncertainties surrounding the process and because it is believed that integration policies "encourage permanency". Both the fact that Germany only started developing integration policies concerning Turkish immigrants after 25 years and the fact that Lebanon categorically rejects integration policies towards Syrian refugees are based on this reason. However, the future projections in the minds of governments may not turn out to be accurate. The long-term stay of Syrians in Turkey, in the same way, has developed outside of the political expectations. There are currently more than 1.7 million Syrian children under the age of 18. Instead of border regions, Syrians are living as "urban refugees" in more developed parts of Turkey. Their likelihood of return is decreasing both because of the conditions in Syria and because of the lives that they have established in Turkey over the years. Thus, a common life and future, even though not preferred, appears to be increasingly inevitable. Therefore, integration policies are an essential requirement, not a preference, for the creation of an honorable and peaceful common life and for preventing many potential problems in social and political realms.
- **WHICH MODEL OF INTEGRATION, WHICH ACTORS?**
 The issue of integration is extremely complex and while there appears to be certain principles, there is no agreed upon model whose effectiveness is proven everywhere. One significant observation in this context is the fact that it is usually discussed in the context of immigrants, rather than refugees. In the context of refugees, the perception of temporariness, their traumatic experiences, and the risks associated with them produce a reluctance for developing integration policies. Considering the relationship between integration policies on the one hand, and the capacity and financial power of the implementing country, on the other; the fact that more than 85% of world's refugees are located in the undeveloped, poor countries may account for the lack of knowledge on as well as the rare implementation of integration policies concerning refugees. There are three known actors in terms

of integration: the state, the host-local society, and the “newcomers”. Each of these has its own way as well as obligations. The state’s role is mostly determining the statuses, making the strategic decisions, and managing the process in the public space. Even if the state determines the course and implements its strategy, integration essentially takes place between communities. Therefore, unless the host society is convinced and displays a certain level of social acceptance, integration cannot take place solely by the initiative of the state. The main role of the state is to determine principles, with a rights and individual-based approach, as well as to develop policies depending on the society’s expectations and needs. It shouldn’t be forgotten, however, that the actual process of integration will take place in society and at the local level.

➤ **LOCAL INTEGRATION PROCESSES NEED TO BE STRENGTHENED:**

Integration policies need to be society-based and local. This is even more important in the case of Syrians in Turkey because a **placement policy** regarding where the Syrians will live in Turkey has not been implemented. This situation has led to an unbalanced distribution amongst various cities, districts, and even neighborhoods. It has become almost impossible today to adopt a new placement/settlement policy concerning Syrians. Therefore, particularly the **local integration processes need to be encouraged through municipalities and civil society organizations**. This requires not only opening a legal space for the local governments, but also transferring financial and other resources to them depending on the foreigners that live within their boundaries.

➤ **SUY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM NEEDS TO BE RESTRUCTURED WITH “DEVELOPMENT” SET AS A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE:**

Funded by the EU, the SUY program has costed approximately €1 billion in the last two years and was benefitted by 1.7 million asylum-seekers in Turkey, 1.5 million of whom being Syrians. Even though this assistance involves a monthly payment of only 120 TL per person, it is still very significant for its beneficiaries. It is necessary for the funds that are used for the SUY program to be redirected to development investments through medium and long-term policies.

➤ **A FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAM (“BEL-SUY”) NEEDS TO BE DEVELOPED FOR MUNICIPALITIES (LOCAL AUTHORITIES):**

It is known that the local authorities, particularly the municipalities, do not have the resources to be used in their activities towards people under international protection in Turkey. In order to facilitate the local integration processes and to protect social peace, there needs to be an additional agreement between Turkey and the EU which should provide project-based funding through municipalities/local authorities to be benefitted not only by Syrians, but also others under international protection. The SUY model can be applied for this new program which could be named Municipality Social Integration Assistance (Belediye Sosyal Uyum Yardımı- BEL-SUY). Through such a program, municipalities could be provided with a monthly funding of €10 per refugee, the municipalities could be supported to design and implement projects dedicated to refugees. Such a program would annually cost around €450 million if it only targets Syrians, and if it covers other asylum-seekers in Turkey (4 million), then it would cost around €480 million annually. This kind of a program would be essential to eliminate the complaints from the local people who are aggrieved by the perceived use of all funds for the Syrians and to ease the pressure on the politicians because of this.

➤ **THE QUALITY OF THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE PREVENTED FROM DETERIORATION; PHYSICAL AND HUMAN CAPACITY SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED:**

Social reaction would be inevitable if citizens experience a significant deterioration of the quality of public services and a remarkable lowering of standards because of the newcomers compared to before their arrival. Therefore, the state needs to consider the necessary steps in ensuring a speedy increase in the capacity of such public services, especially including health, education, and municipal services, to contribute to the management of the process and social cohesion. Otherwise, the society will suffer and social acceptance will be negatively affected. Voicing objections and reactions to deteriorating public services is a natural situation that should be expected. Therefore, labeling the voiced concerns or reactions simply as “anti-Syrian discourse”, “racism”, or “hate speech” will make the social integration process more complicated.

➤ **PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS SHOULD COLLECT HEALTHY DATA AND PROVIDE THIS DATA TO THE USE OF ACADEMICS AND RESEARCHERS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE:**

The biggest problem facing the experts on the subject is the difficulty of accessing healthy official data. However, the first step of healthy migration management is reliable data. The second important part involves sharing this official data with academics and researchers. Without sharing this data, it would not be possible for the academics and researchers to carry out sound analysis and provide useful policy recommendations. Preparing plans and projections concerning millions of immigrants and asylum-seekers requires the contribution of the experts on this subject in addition to the efforts of bureaucrats and politicians.

➤ **SYRIANS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE POLICY-MAKING AND INTEGRATION PROCESSES:**

More effective involvement of Syrians in the policy-making processes should be ensured. Syrian academics, university students, NGO representatives that are living in Turkey can potentially play a very significant role in this regard.

➤ **SYRIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS SHOULD BE UTILIZED AS STRATEGIC ACTORS IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESSES:**

The special social group of **over 33 thousand university students and alumni of Turkish universities need to be identified as strategic solution partners.** They should be enabled to facilitate the communication and interactions between the Turkish society and Syrians. It should be ensured for the university students and alumni to **assume an active role in integration processes as social bridges and role models.**

➤ **THE MULTI-PURPOSE COMMUNITY CENTERS SHOULD BE IMPROVED:**

The number of the multi-purpose **community centers** should be increased and their qualities should be improved. These centers should be used both to inform and direct individuals concerning activities in education and employment; and to provide support regarding legal rights and social cohesion. These centers would also be important in creating opportunities for the local people and refugees to come together and interact with one another.

➤ **THE POLICY OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR SYRIANS SHOULD BE REFORMED:**

After 9 years of living in Turkey, the two most frequently voiced complaint of Syrians concerning their lives in the country are working conditions and travel restrictions. In line with the general practice worldwide, the place of residence of those who applied to or who are already under international protection is determined by the state and they are only allowed to travel outside of this place with a proper reason/excuse. However, the case of Syrians needs to be considered as a special case. As mentioned above, there was no advance planning in the beginning of the process concerning Syrians and they were told to remain in their cities of registration after the registrations were completed. This has created significant differences in terms of number of Syrian residents among cities, districts, and even neighborhoods. Moreover, due to the largeness of the number, mobility could not be prevented. 3.6 million Syrians have complex networks of relationships which may facilitate mobility, for instance, one can move to another city for work or for university education. The existing experience has shown both that applying such travel restrictions are difficult to implement and it is not clear why they are necessary. It is very clear that there is a need to reform travel restrictions of Syrians.

➤ **IT SHOULD BE ENSURED THAT SYRIAN WOMEN ARE EMPOWERED AND THAT THEY PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE PROCESSES:**

45% of the Syrian population in Turkey are women. Syrian women are the main actors not merely at an individual level, but also at the family level. Syrian women, however, appear to have a quite low level of educational attainment in comparison to Syrian men, who already have much lower levels of educational attainment compared to the Turkish averages. Therefore, empowerment of Syrian adult women through literacy, language, vocational, and entrepreneurial courses, among others, would not only lead to their self-improvement but also create a much wider influence in their respective communities.

➤ **AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY SECTORS CAN OFFER OPPORTUNITIES TO CREATE EMPLOYMENT FOR SYRIANS:**

A very large part of the Syrians in Turkey work in the service industry. However, the very large industries of agriculture and animal husbandry in Turkey, which are open to investment, can provide very good opportunities for the employment of the newcomers. The experience so far has shown that agriculture could be a particularly convenient industry for Syrians as it is one of the economic spaces where anxieties concerning Syrians remain relatively low. Developing projects in this area in close cooperation with the EU can bring along a policy the outcomes of which can be reached in a short while.

➤ **MORE EFFORT IS REQUIRED IN THE FIELD OF MANDATORY EDUCATION TO PREVENT SYRIAN CHILDREN FROM TURNING INTO "LOST GENERATIONS":**

Despite Turkey's extraordinary efforts and success, more than 35% of school-aged Syrians do not have access to formal education. Some of the main reasons for this are the differences in the formal education systems in Syria and Turkey, language barrier, perception/expectation of temporariness, the fact that boys over a certain age are expected to work, some families' preference of not sending girls to school, and capacity issues at schools. There is obviously a need for a new initiative and a leap concerning the schooling of Syrian school-aged children. However, to prevent this from aggrieving the native people, there is an urgent need to strengthen the capacity including the number of schools, classrooms, teachers and other educational equipment.

➤ **IT IS NECESSARY TO EMPOWER TURKISH TEACHERS AND INCREASE THEIR NUMBERS:**

It is plainly obvious that education of Syrians is crucial both for preventing Syrian children from turning into lost generations and for the serenity of the Turkish society and a harmonious cohabitation. It is also known that there is a serious capacity problem in this field. Over 650 thousand Syrian children have been placed into Turkish public schools over the past few years. The teachers, who are the bearers of the heaviest burden stemming from this policy of placement of Syrians, need to be supported and strengthened as they work extremely hard in firstly teaching a new language and its alphabet to foreign students, and then trying to give them education.

➤ **VOCATIONAL TRAINING:**

It is very valuable and necessary for the young and adult Syrians to be directed towards vocational training. However, the vocational training courses which do not correspond to the requirements of the economy and which do not lead to employment need to be eliminated. Those vocational training courses which do not cooperate with the chambers of industry, commerce, and artisanry do not achieve anything but producing a useless collection of certificates.

➤ **INFORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES SHOULD NOT ONLY BE SEEN AS A PROBLEM OF SYRIANS:**

While informal economic activities are neither sustainable nor ethically defensible, the prospects of developing a sufficient employment capacity for the Syrians in the short and medium term in Turkey do not seem realistic. Even though employment in the informal market seems to provide an opportunity for the Syrians to support themselves economically in the short term, this practice is also known to create risks and losses as well as leading to serious exploitation. New arrangements need to be made in this field considering the economic capacity and the needs of Turkey. However, it should not be forgotten that the informal economy constitutes more than 36% of the Turkish economy and, therefore, informal economic activities should not only be seen as a problem of Syrians.

➤ **IN ADDITION TO TEMPORARY PROTECTION OTHER ALTERNATIVE STATUSES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FOR SYRIANS WHO HAVE BEEN IN TURKEY FOR 9 YEARS:**

The **"Temporary Protection Status"** of Syrians needs to be re-evaluated as their average duration of stay in Turkey has exceeded 4.5 years. That is because this status has started to negatively influence the integration processes, primarily through enforcing travel restrictions, of Syrians whose tendency to remain in Turkey has been strengthened. The current practice of transition from temporary protection to "exceptional citizenship" creates a number of different concerns and complaints among the public. Allowing those Syrians who had stayed a certain amount of time in Turkey and who meet

certain criteria to move from having temporary protection to residence permits, and thus, creating new alternatives to granting citizenship, should be opened to discussion.

➤ **TRANSPARENCY IN CITIZENSHIP POLICY IS IMPORTANT FOR SOCIAL SUPPORT:**

There is a high degree of reaction and concern among the Turkish society over the issue of granting **citizenship** to Syrians. It is necessary **to manage the process more transparently**, to explain the facts more clearly and to share more information with the society.

➤ **ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE "GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES" AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS CONCEPTS WOULD BRING IMPORTANT BENEFITS:**

It would be very important for Turkey to re-evaluate its asylum policy on the basis of the Global Convention on Refugees, bringing its solidarity and burden-sharing elements into action. The world needs to be aware of the immense support that Turkey has been providing to over 4 million asylum-seekers using its limited resources and the risks that it has been taking. It may be possible for Turkey to assume a leadership role in this regard. This way, Turkey can become an example to other countries as well as utilizing the international capacity that had been accumulated within itself to develop effective policies.

➤ **SHARING EXTERNAL FUNDING COMING FROM EU AND OTHER SOURCES WITH THE SOCIETY WOULD HELP REDUCE THE PRESSURE OF SOCIAL REACTIONS:**

The external funds received by Turkey are very limited. Between 2011 and 2019, the total funds to enter Turkey was €5 billion, the largest bit being the €3.2 billion from the EU. Undoubtedly, this is very much below the actual needs and special effort need to be made to expand these resources. In addition, sharing more information regarding the contents/purposes and the amount of such funding with the public is important both for transparency and integration processes. Various claims and statements suggesting that no external resources are being received and that huge amounts of public funds are being spent on Syrians create social reactions among both the Turkish society and the asylum-seekers themselves. Explaining to the Turkish society the fact that this funding, albeit insufficient, is provided by external resources would help reduce social reactions in many fields.

➤ **HEALTHY AND REGULAR SHARING OF DATA IS ESSENTIAL FOR PROCESS MANAGEMENT AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT:**

The significant contributions of international organizations and institutions that became very effective actors in the process cannot be underestimated, particularly in relation to the issues of protection, capacity development, funding, and cooperation. However, eventually the "burden/cost sharing" will remain very limited, leaving the cost of this huge challenge almost entirely on the shoulders of the Turkish society. Therefore, **Turkey should develop its own strategy based on its priorities and capacity, and utilize these external resources in line with this strategy. This way, the chaos of disconnected "projects" would be avoided; instead, both more funding would be attracted and the resources would be used more efficiently by the coherent and complementary projects in the framework of this general strategy.**

➤ **PROJECTS FOR THE FIELD SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AS PART OF A STRATEGIC COHERENCE:**

One of the most significant problems concerning the Syrians in Turkey is that various projects, particularly those developed by international agencies and NGOs, are implemented in the field in an incoherent manner. More efficient implementation of these projects is only possible through a comprehensive planning or making them parts of a general strategy. Therefore, **"project dominated era of short-term solutions" should be replaced by "the era of projects framed by a strategy"**.

➤ **THE VULNERABILITY AND THE HATE SPEECH WITHIN TURKISH SOCIETY ARE THE BIGGEST OBSTACLES BEFORE THE "NEWCOMERS":**

The biggest obstacle before a society in its struggle with the social problems is its inner social vulnerabilities. If a society has inner tensions and vulnerability, together with a harshness leading to

hate speech, the attitude towards newcomers becomes even more problematic. In other words, for a society composed of individuals that don't like one another, the hate speech - in an even stronger way - will be extended against others.

➤ **THE "LACK OF CONTROL" PERCEPTION IN THE SOCIETY SHOULD BE REMOVED:**

One of the most important sources of anxiety in the society has been the perception that the state doesn't have sufficient control on the process. This perception, in turn, exacerbates the anxieties among society regarding Syrians.

➤ **EFFORTS SHOULD BE SPENT TO SOLVE GENERAL AND LOCAL COORDINATION PROBLEMS**

Coordination problems among and within the institutions should be taken seriously and policies solving these problems should be developed. Otherwise, the services are delayed, their efficiency is decreased, and the social anxieties would further be fueled.

➤ **THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE ENHANCED:**

The issue of Syrians in Turkey has created an important opportunity to experience how important a role the civil society can play. While the civil society organizations had to rely on their cooperation with international organizations and the international NGOs in the beginning, the development of a serious capacity has been possible through the passing time. This development of capacity has also led to a development in terms of international cooperation. The cooperation between the public institutions and the NGOs has also developed into an impressive level. New NGO formations of Turks and Syrians should be supported in the process. However, it is also necessary to establish mechanisms that would allow conducting impact analysis studies on activities as well as openly displaying cooperation opportunities and possible support resources through a transparent NGO mapping.

The purpose of this study is to draw a picture that is as realistic as possible using the views of both the Turkish society and Syrians. This picture makes it possible to analyze social cohesion and the social "acceptance" among the most critical actor in the process, the host society. Even though the purpose of this study is not to develop a conceptualization of integration, it is generally defined here as **"a way of life and emotion enabling peaceful cohabitation in the framework of mutual acceptance and respect, on the basis of a common belonging where plurality is accepted, for communities that come together either spontaneously, voluntarily, or forcibly"**. In the framework of this definition, it is obvious that a lot of different actors, the political and social structure, various priorities, the capacity, and most importantly, social acceptance can/will play a role in the process of integration. It is also obvious that in the case of refugees, there are many additional complexities concerning the integration policies. Moreover, there are difficulties stemming from the dynamism, volatility, and uncertainty of the process.

What started in 2011 in Turkey appears to be a very important process that moves towards permanent stay of refugees. The large number of Syrians in Turkey is both causing anxieties among the Turkish society and enhancing the risk for Syrians to form inward-looking communities. In other words, there is a risk of ghettoization where Syrians could produce the social spaces that they need by themselves. While taking these risks in serious consideration, policies need to be developed that would aim for Syrians to live together with the Turkish society as an honorable part of it. The structure of the integration policies should be **dynamic, modular and prioritizing local integration** and they should be based on rights and centered around individuals so that they can contribute in minimizing current and future problems.

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- IOM International Organisation for Migration: www.iom.int
- UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: www.unhcr.org
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Appendices

APPENDIX-1: SB 2019 Question Forms of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

A. Framework Questions for Turkish Citizen Focus Group Discussions

a. In all Turkish Citizen Focus Groups

i. Perceptions about Syrians

- Are there Syrians living in your neighborhood/district/region?
- Which two concepts are mostly used in describing the Syrians living in Turkey?

ii. Living with Syrians

- Did the situation of Syrians living in Turkey positively or negatively affect Turkey? Why? In what ways? How? (for each title, positive and negative responses in two groups)
 - Economy
 - Society
 - Culture
 - Politics
- What type of relations do you have with Syrians? Could you share your experience?
- Have you or anyone close to you been harmed by Syrians? Could you explain?
- Do you think the Syrians have integrated into Turkey? Why? Why not?

iii. Social Distance with Syrians

- To what extent are the Syrians like us culturally? Why-How?
- Among those I will read, which one(s) would not be a problem for you, which one(s) would you never want? Why? (The reasons, rather than the responses, are important to us, we need to make them explain)
 - Marrying a Syrian (either you or a family member)
 - Doing business with a Syrian
 - Being friends with a Syrian
 - Being a neighbor to a Syrian
 - Having your child take education in the same classroom with Syrian kids

iv. State Policies on Syrians

- Do you think Turkey's policies on Syrians are right? Why?
- (If not discussed in detail in the above question) What kind of policy should be followed on Syrians' working in Turkey? Why?
- Do you think Syrians in Turkey should have political rights? If yes, which rights? Why?

v. Future of Syrians

- Will Syrians in Turkey return to their country after the war ends?
- What kind of policy should be followed for Syrians who will stay in Turkey in the long term? Why?

b. Questions Specific to Participants/Themes

i. Women Focus Groups

- In your opinion, is there a difference between the approach of women and men to Syrians living in

Turkey? If so, what does this result from?

- Were/are Syrian women in the country differently affected compared to Syrian men? Could you explain? (The question can be asked together with the above question)

ii. Teacher Focus Groups

- How did the Syrians affect education in Turkey?
- What should be done for the education of Syrian children?
- How could problems in the education system be overcome? What should be done?
- Do our teachers have the required competence about Syrians and do they receive sufficient support? What should be done?

iii. Student Focus Groups

- How did the Syrians affect universities in Turkey?
- What kind of arrangement should be made about Syrians' entry into universities in Turkey? Why?

iv. Artisan/Employee Focus Groups

- How did the Syrians affect your work, business?
- What are the positive and negative effects of Syrians on your sector?

v. NGO Focus Groups

- What are the good/right practices of NGOs for Syrians? In what issues are there problems/wrong practices/failures?
- What are the views of Syrians about NGOs? How are their relations with NGOs?

c. Questions Specific to Cities

- What effects did Syrians have in Istanbul/Izmir/Hatay/Gaziantep?
- What are the right/wrong practices of local administrations and municipalities in Istanbul/Izmir/Hatay/Gaziantep? Which municipalities made a difference in this regard? Could you explain?
- What was the approach of people living in Istanbul/Izmir/Hatay/Gaziantep towards the Syrians? How do you describe relations between them?
- Should the cities Syrians will live in be of their choice or decided by the state? What should be the place of Istanbul/Izmir/Hatay/Gaziantep in this issue? How many Syrians should live in Istanbul/Izmir/Hatay/Gaziantep?

B. Framework questions in Syrians Focus Groups

(In the following questions, we will ask participants to tell their views and experience as well as – according to them - views and experience of Syrians living in Turkey)

d. In all Syrians focus groups

i. Experience of Syrians living in Turkey

- What are the biggest problems of Syrians (not only yourself) in Turkey? Could you explain?
- Are Syrians happy in Turkey? In what ways they are/not happy? Why?
- In your opinion, to what extent have Syrians integrated in Turkey? Why?
 - o Do you think this situation is getting/will get better? What should be done to make it better? Who has roles in this? What roles do they have?

ii. Policies and Practices on Syrians

- How do you find the policies and practices on Syrians in Turkey? What can be better done? What should change?
- (Depending on the responses to the above question, if it has not been detailed) What do you think of the state policies on Syrians in Turkey in these fields?
 - o Health
 - o Education

- o Work-Economy
- o Political-legal rights

iii. Perceptions about Turkish citizens

- How does Turkish society treat Syrians in general? Could you elaborate on that?
- In your opinion, in what type of issues does the Turkish have concerns because of Syrians? Are they right in these concerns? What should be done to ease these concerns?

iv. Future of Syrians living in Turkey

- Do Syrians believe they have a future in Turkey? Why?
- What kind of a future do the Syrians dream of?
- Are Syrians planning to return to Syria? Under which condition would Syrians return to Syria? Could you explain your response?

v. Social Distance with Turkish citizens

- To what extent Syrians resemble the Turkish people? In what ways, how, and why?
- Among those I will read, which one(s) would not be a problem for you, which one(s) would you never want? Why? (The reasons, rather than the responses, are important to us, we need to make them explain)
 - o Marrying a Syrian (either you or a family member)
 - o Doing business with a Syrian
 - o Being friends with a Syrian
 - o Being a neighbor to a Syrian
 - o Having your child take education in the same classroom with Syrian kids

e. Questions specific to participants/themes

i. Women Focus Groups

- Do Syrian women have different experience in Turkey compared to Syrian men? If so, what are these? Could you explain? What are the reasons of these differences?
- What are the most important problems of Syrian women? How could these problems be resolved? Who has roles in this process? What roles do they have?
- What do you think of the policies on Syrian women in Turkey? What are the good ones, which ones have deficiencies? What should be changed, improved?

ii. Artisan/Employee Focus Group

- What kind of experience is working/establishing business in Turkey? Could you explain positive experience and problems you have had?
- What is the state approach to Syrians establishing business/working? Should the state change its policies on it? What should be done? Why?
- What is the approach of the society, particularly the Turkish employees and artisans, to Syrians becoming employees and artisans? Have you observed a change on this in time?

iii. Student Focus Group

- What kind of experience is being a Syrian student in Turkey? What are the advantages and disadvantages of it? How could these be improved/overcome?
- For the future, how and where do you plan to make use of the education you get? Could you explain?
- What do you think of the education policies on Syrians, particularly their access to higher education, in Turkey? What needs to change in this?

iv. Focus Group of Syrians with Turkish Citizenship

- Why did you want to obtain Turkish citizenship?

- What kind of experience did you have during citizenship process? What challenges did you have? What changes do you think are required in this process? Why?
- What changed in your life after you became a Turkish citizen? What kind of advantages and disadvantages did the citizenship bring to you?
- Do/would you recommend other Syrians to become Turkish citizens? Why?

v. NGO Workers Focus Group

- What are the Syrians' views on NGOs and how are their relations with these organizations?
- What do people think of Syrians working in NGOs? Have you had any interesting experience on that?
- What are the advantages and challenges/problems of working at an NGO as a Syrian?

f. Questions specific to cities

- As a Syrian, how does it feel like living in Istanbul/Ankara/Hatay/Gaziantep? What would be different if you lived in another city? What are the advantages and challenges of living in this city?
- What are the correct/incorrect policies of local administrations and municipalities on Syrians in Istanbul/Ankara/Hatay/Gaziantep? Which municipalities are different than the others? Could you explain?
- How did the people of Istanbul/Ankara/Hatay/Gaziantep approach the Syrians? How would you describe the relation between them?
- If you had the opportunity now, where would you want to live? On what criteria would you make your decision, what would you consider?

APPENDIX-2: MAXQDA CODE SYSTEM: Codes and Sub-Codes Used in the Analysis

TR-Perceptions about Syrians

Integration of Syrians to Turkey

Syrians have not integrated

Syrians have integrated

Effects of Syrians to Turkey

Negative effects of Syrians to Turkey

Negative effects of Syrians - societal

Negative effects of Syrians - political

Negative effects of Syrians - cultural

Negative effects of Syrians - economic

Positive effects of Syrians to Turkey

Positive effects of Syrians - political

Positive effects of Syrians - cultural

Positive effects of Syrians - societal

Positive effects of Syrians - economic

Describing concepts

Negative concepts

Positive concepts

TR-Interaction with Syrians

Received harm

Relations and experience with Syrians

Places they see Syrians

Syrians in the living environment

Negative relations and experience

Positive relations and experience

TR-Social distance with Syrians

Attitude to social relation types

I would not want my child to have education in the same classroom with Syrians

I would want my child to have education in the same classroom with Syrians

I would not be neighbors with a Syrian

I would be neighbors with a Syrian

I would not be friends with a Syrian

I would be friends with a Syrian

I would not do business with a Syrian

I would do business with a Syrian

I would not marry a Syrian

I would marry a Syrian

Cultural similarities of Syrians to us

They are not culturally similar to us

They are culturally similar to us

TR-Views specific to cities

Views on where Syrians would live in Turkey

People's attitude to Syrians in cities and relations with them

Attitude of people from Gaziantep

Attitude of people from Hatay

Attitude of people from Ankara

- Attitude of people from Istanbul
- Attitudes and studies of city municipalities regarding Syrians
 - Municipalities in Gaziantep
 - Municipalities in Hatay
 - Municipalities in Ankara
 - Municipalities in Istanbul
- Effects of Syrians on cities
 - Effects on Gaziantep
 - Effects on Hatay
 - Effects on Ankara
 - Effects on Istanbul
- TR-Views of those working at civil society organizations
 - Relations of civil society organizations with Syrians
 - Negative/harmful actions of NGOs on Syrians
 - Positive/beneficial actions of NGOs on Syrians
- TR-Views of Turkish artisans/employees
 - Negative effects of Syrians in their sectors
 - Positive effects of Syrians in their sectors
 - Negative effects of Syrians in business/work
 - Positive effects of Syrians in business/work
- TR-Views of Turkish students
 - Steps to follow regarding Syrians's entry to universities
 - Effects of Syrians on universities in Turkey
- TR-Views of Turkish teachers
 - Compatibility and problems of teachers in education of Syrians
 - Problems in education system and ways of solution
 - Path to follow in education of Syrian children
 - Effects of Syrians on education in Turkey
- TR-Views of Turkish women
 - How women in Turkey are influenced by Syrians compared to men in Turkey
 - Differences between experiences of Syrian women and Syrian men
- TR-Expectations about future of Syrians
 - Syrians will not return to their country after the war ends
 - Syrians will return to their country after the war ends
- TR-Views on state policies regarding Syrians
 - Path to follow regarding Syrians' working
 - Syrians should not have political rights in Turkey
 - Syrians should have political rights in Turkey
 - Turkey's policies on Syrians are not correct
 - Turkey's policies on Syrians are correct
- SR- Opinion specific to cities
 - City of preference to live if given the chance
 - People's attitude to Syrians in cities
 - People's attitude to Syrians in
 - People's attitude to Syrians in Hatay
 - People's attitude to Syrians in Ankara
 - People's attitude to Syrians in Istanbul
 - Attitudes of local administrations to Syrians in these cities
 - Attitude of local administration to Syrians in Gaziantep
 - Attitude of local administration to Syrians in Hatay
 - Attitude of local administration to Syrians in Ankara

- Attitude of local administration to Syrians in Istanbul
- Living experience as a Syrian in this city
 - Living experience as a Syrian in Gaziantep
 - Living experience as a Syrian in Hatay
 - Living experience as a Syrian in Ankara
 - Living experience as a Syrian in Istanbul
- SR- Opinion of Syrians working at NGOs
 - Work experience as a Syrian in an NGO
 - Challenges/problems of working at an NGO as a Syrian
 - Positive aspects of working at an NGO as a Syrian
 - Opinion of Syrians working at NGOs
 - Views of Syrians about NGOs and their relationship with these organizations
- SR- Opinion of Syrians with Turkish citizenship
 - Whether they suggest citizenship to other Syrians
 - Changes in life after obtaining citizenship
 - Disadvantages of citizenship
 - Advantages of citizenship
 - Changes needed in citizenship processes
 - Experience and challenges in the process of obtaining Turkish citizenship
 - Reasons of opting for Turkish citizenship
- SR- Views of Syrian students
 - What needs to change in education policies on Syrians
 - Views on education policies on Syrians
 - Views on how education obtained in Turkey will be used in the future
 - Student experience in Turkey as a Syrian
 - Negative experience about being a student in Turkey as a Syrian
 - Positive experience about being a student in Turkey as a Syrian
- SR- Views of Syrian artisans/employees
 - Views of Turkish society on Syrians' working/establishing businesses
 - Attitude of the state on Syrians' working/ establishing businesses
 - Working/business experience in Turkey
- SR- Views of Syrian Women
 - Practices and policies on Syrian women in Turkey
 - Solutions to the problems of Syrian women
 - Problems of Syrian women
 - Different experience of Syrian women compared to men
- SR- Social distance with Turkish citizens
 - Views on social relation types
 - I would not want my child to have education in the same class with Turkish children
 - I would want my child to have education in the same class with Turkish children
 - I would not be a neighbor to a Turkish citizen
 - I would be a neighbor to a Turkish citizen
 - I would not be a friend with a Turkish citizen
 - I would be a friend with a Turkish citizen
 - I would not work a Turkish citizen
 - I would work with a Turkish citizen
 - I would not marry a Turkish citizen
 - I would marry a Turkish citizen
 - Cultural similarities of Syrians to Turkish citizens
- SR- Future of Syrians
 - Probability of return of Syrians to their country after the war ends

- Future expectations of Syrians
- Views on whether Syrians have a future in Turkey
- SR- Perceptions regarding Turkish citizens
 - What needs to be done with regard to the concerns of Turkish society
 - Concerns and anxieties of Turkish society about Syrians
 - Behaviour of Turkish society to Syrians
- SR-Policies and practices about Syrians
 - Evaluating state policies
 - Policies on Syrians regarding legal-political rights
 - Employment-economy policies on Syrians
 - Education policies on Syrians
 - Health policies on Syrians
- SR- Experience of Syrians
 - Trends in integration of Syrians to Turkey
 - Integration of Syrians in negative trend
 - Integration of Syrians in positive trend
 - Integration of Syrians
 - Syrians have not integrated into Turkey
 - Syrians have integrated into Turkey
 - Happiness of Syrians
 - Syrians are not happy in Turkey
 - Syrians are happy in Turkey
 - Problems of Syrians

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- Göç Uyum ve Yerel Yönetimler (2019) (Migration, Integration and Local Governments) (in Turkish) (2018)
 - Perspectives, Expectations and Suggestions of the Turkish Business Sector on Syrians in Turkey
 - Syrians Barometer-2017: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey (2018)
 - Syrian Refugees and Process Management of Municipalities: The Case of Istanbul (2017)
- Perspectives, Expectations and Suggestions of the Turkish Business Sector on Syrians in Turkey (2015)
 - "Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi: 14. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye'ye Göçler" (with A. Kaya) (2015)
 - "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration" (2015)
- Turks in German Cartoons, 50 Jahre 50 Karikaturen/50 Years 50 Cartoons: Türken in Deutschland aus der Sicht Deutscher Karikaturisten (2012)
 - Turks Abroad: Fifty Years of Migration and Integration (2010)

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

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SYRIANS BAROMETER - 2019

A FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING SOCIAL COHESION WITH SYRIANS IN TURKEY



Prof. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN

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
Turkey has been simultaneously known as a transit, origin, and destination country in the context of human mobilities. As a country with an intense internal migration dynamic, Turkey has a social structure that is familiar with human mobility. In the last 10 years, however, Turkey has been having an experience of human mobility that is unique and unprecedented in its history with respect to its scope and qualities. When the first group of 252 Syrian asylum-seekers arrived in

Turkey on 29 April 2011, nobody had expected that millions would have followed them and the crisis would have continued this long. A country with only 58 thousand applicants for international protection back in 2001, Turkey has become the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world since 2014, with Syrians entering their 10th year in the country. The number of Syrians in Turkey has exceeded 3,6 million, accounting for 4,37% of its national population. More importantly, the new sociological reality is very clearly presenting itself. More than 98% of Syrians in Turkey as "urban refugees" are living side by side with the Turkish society, 535 thousand Syrian babies have been born in Turkey, more than 650 thousand Syrian children are currently enrolled to Turkish public schools, more than 33 thousand young Syrians are students at Turkish universities, around 120 thousand Syrians obtained Turkish citizenship, and there are around 1 million Syrians that are actively working. This "compulsory common life" experience is also causing a social shock among the Turkish society. However, the resilience and social acceptance of the Turkish society is making this common life to continue largely without problems. It must be added that this social acceptance is fragile, in a trend of shrinking, and increasingly turning into "toleration".

"Syrians Barometer: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians", designed and has been regularly repeated by Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan, is an effort related to the social aspects of social cohesion, instead of conceptual or official ones. The present study is based on the same structure used in "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration" in 2014, "Syrians Barometer: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians-2017", and "Şanlıurfa Barometer" in 2018. SB-2019, similar to its predecessors, aims at understanding the developments, integration processes, and tensions related to the "common social life", from the vintage point of both Turkish society and Syrians, and developing policy recommendations related to these. The study includes public opinion surveys conducted on highly-representative samples as well as focus group meetings.

Chaired by Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan, the research team included Dr. K. Onur Unutulmaz, Tülin Haji Mohamad, Dr. Yeşim Yılmaz, and Deniz Aydın. The reports of the study were penned by Prof. Erdoğan. In addition, comprising the most esteemed academics in the field of migration, refugees, and social research in Turkey, "**Syrians Barometer Academic Advisory Board**" including Prof. Dr. Nermin Abadan-Unat, Prof. Dr. Mustafa Aydın, Prof. Dr. Banu Ergöçmen, Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Ferris, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kasım Han, Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu, Omar Kadköy, Prof. Dr. Neeraj Kaushal, Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, Prof. Dr. Fuat Keyman, Ümit Kızıltan, Prof. Dr. Kemal Kirişçi, Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Narlı, Dr. Kathleen Newland, Prof. Dr. Barbara Oomen, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Saime Özçürümez, Prof. Dr. Nasser Yassin, and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayselin Yıldız provided invaluable support and contributions.

SB-2019 study was conducted in 26 cities with 2,271 individuals on "individual-basis" from among the citizens of the Republic of Turkey, and with 1,418 Syrians living outside of camps in Turkey on "household-basis". Also, 20 focus group meetings were held both with Turkish people and Syrians in 4 cities. The research findings show that the social acceptance of the Turkish society - albeit still at a high level but also "reluctant" and "fragile" - is in a declining trend, and that the anxieties are becoming evident. Meanwhile, Syrians who have now become "urban refugees" seem to be in a tendency to hold on to life in Turkey and to make their future plans in Turkey. It is understood that Syrians who have to a large extent lost their hopes that peace and tranquility would be established in their country feel much safer, happier and harmonious in Turkey. Despite all uncertainties and anxieties, the process is inevitably evolving towards a common life. Given these, the issue of how to realize a common future compatible with peace and human honor should be prioritized and the process should be managed based on accurate data. Prof. Erdoğan states that through this study, he aims to understand and describe the process that has been experienced since 2011, and also to provide accurate data for researchers and policy makers for the sake of a rights-based and human-oriented, peaceful future. He says this research's effort with an academic outlook in shedding light to the reality should be seen within its own limitations, considering the dynamic nature of the process. Prof. Erdoğan adds that the collected data - albeit with a high level of reliability and representative sample - eventually represents the research participants during the period the study is conducted, rather than showing the "absolute truth". He stresses that most generalizations and descriptions, particularly those of the "Turkish society" and "Syrians", should be considered within this context and limitations.



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